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Capital, in the form of foreign aid, is a very substantial revenue form for many developing 
nations.  Foreign aid is integral to strategies of nations working to relieve human suffering and 
achieve a secure, stable world.  One of the greatest impediments to foreign aid effectiveness is 
unpredictability, or capital volatility.  At a macro level, capital volatility’s impact in developing 
nations is multiples of that in the industrialized world.  Capital volatility has been shown to 
substantially impact social welfare costs and both the efficiency and effectiveness of aid.  Thus, 
volatility reduces the value of foreign aid.   
This investigation explored linkages between organizational behavior and capital 
volatility by analyzing the promises and disbursement conditions agreed to by donors and 
microfinance recipient organizations: capital investment deals.  Capital volatility is defined as the 
difference between commitments and disbursements.  The examination utilized a case study of 
a donor collaborative project—Microfinance Institution Technical Assistance Facility in Sierra 
Leone—the first of over 20 created to develop an inclusive, pro-poor financial sector by 
assisting microfinance institutions.  Disbursement conditions and bureaucracy alone are not 
sufficient explanations of capital volatility.  A deeper analysis revealed the role of each party’s 
perceptions and expectations in their respective understandings of a performance based 
agreement that defines the deal as a relationship, not just a legal document. These 
understandings are the bases of each party’s decisions and actions, often with ethical 
implications and consequences.  This project has produced a theoretical lens – the Capitalflow 
Bureaucratic Triad - to understand this complexity and plan future volatility reducing strategies.     
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1.0  CONTEXT, BACKGROUND, RESEARCH PROBLEM 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
This study investigated relationships between organizational behavior and characteristics of 
capital flow.  Organizations in the study collaborated to provide the poor access to financial 
services via microfinance organizations.  The unit of analysis was capital investment deals 
consummated in a United Nations Capital Development Fund (UNCDF) collaborative financial 
sector project, Microfinance Investment and Technical Assistance Facility (MITAF), the first of 
22 such projects implemented within seven years.  Research was conducted in Sierra Leone, a 
post-conflict fragile state in Sub-Saharan Africa and a region of the world with formidable 
challenges to development efforts.  The UNCDF project served as a case study framed by the 
Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework of Nobel Laureate Elinor Ostrom.  
Grounded theory in the tradition of Anselm Strauss and Juliet Corbin was employed to analyze 
behavior and capital flow data.   
Archival and interview data were used to identify linkages between organizational 
actions and capital flow volatility.  Archival data was used to collect capital disbursement 
information, ascertain espoused behavior, and observe actual behavior linked with capital 
disbursement. Focused interviews were used to non-intrusively elicit beliefs, perceptions, and 
actors’ values as they pertain to linkages between organizational behavior and capital volatility.   
Central concepts accounting for the most variance in the linkages emerged from data through 
grounded theory analytic processes.  The resulting substantive theory provides a lens to make 
sense of the complexity and interconnectedness between organizational behavior and capital 
flow volatility.  This increased knowledge can aid efforts to minimize capital devaluing impacts of 
volatility.       
Most available research on capital volatility focuses on macro level activity, especially 
the amount of capital, between donor institutions and developing nations.  Statistical procedures 
were most often used to develop explanations for volatility.  Project and budget support to 
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governments is explored in this body of research to provide explanations for volatility, such as 
disbursement conditions and accountability, government institutional strength, and donor priority 
changes.  However, there is not a deep, rich description and explanation of linkages between 
organizational behavior and capital flow volatility.  This investigation aims to addresses this void 
in the research by addressing the following questions:  
• How did different actors account for variances in capital disbursements? 
• What responses did different actors recommend to reduce variances? 
• How were organizational behaviors linked to volatility in disbursements?  
The result is a substantive theory that accounts for the phenomena of variability in capital flows 
and linkages with actors’ behavior: Capitalflow Bureaucratic Triad (CBT).   
CBT theory serves as a lens to identify and understand the interconnectedness and 
complexity associated with capital investments.  The theory states:  Value of capital is affected 
by linkages between organizational behavior and capital volatility.  Capital flow volatility is 
determined by the interactions of three properties of bureaucracy:  collaboration; accountability; 
and effectiveness, efficiency, and responsiveness (impact).  Capital value is a function of the 
level of volatility and microfinance institution (MFI) condition at disbursement.  MITAF 
participants acted bureaucratically to create, and in response to, capital flow; thereby 
determining the amount of delay and MFI condition at disbursement.  CBT theory helps explain 
the affect behavior-volatility linkages have on capital flow, and assists predicting behavior and 
volatility in certain contexts.  Moreover, insights from this investigation can add to the bodies of 
knowledge on organizational theory and capital volatility and predictability.1  They can also 
contribute to academic work, inform efforts developing pro-poor financial sectors supporting 
entrepreneurship and spawn human development.  The insights are particularly relevant in post-
conflict settings and developing nations seeking to constrain divisions and tensions associated 
with triggering conflict (Momo, Costa, Letho, Manzi, & Rebakis, 2011).  
                                                
 
1 Volatility and predictability are defined differently in the literature.  However, as reflected in the literature 
review, both include the property of time (Celasun & Walliser, 2008).  Time was central in this 
investigation of capital flow. In this investigation, the term “volatility” is used to explain variability in 
disbursement timing, primarily because the level/amount of disbursements did not substantially vary 
between expected and actual.  
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1.2  CONTEXT OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT AND ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE 
Human development is deemed vital to global organization performance in the 21st century.  It 
has been accepted as one measure of organizational performance, and has long been 
considered an important measure in development policy and practice.  The seminal work of 
Seers (1972) emphasizes the importance of development efforts in realizing “the potential of 
human personality” (p. 21).  As such, global organization performance in the 21st century will be 
affected by the degree multicultural managerial staff can be assembled in a competitive global 
hiring context (Harvey, Novicevic, & Kiessling, 2002).  
Human development is also vital to assembling effective multicultural teams.  Global 
organizations need this diversity to seize opportunities and attack global problems.  Going it 
alone is less frequently an option:  whether an entrepreneurial venture in a developing country, 
a United States human services nonprofit organization, or a fragile nation-state government.  
Today’s opportunities and problems place demands on organizations beyond their capacity to 
respond alone.  Karen Cook, Russell Hardin and Margaret Levi (2005) draw on theoretical and 
empirical research to examine factors essential to the creation and sustainment of cooperation 
in numerous contexts.  They argue that actors who mutually benefit from exchange and 
cooperation work to structure interactions with high levels of cooperation to achieve improved 
performance outcomes.  Cooperation within and between global public organizations is reflected 
in assembling multicultural teams and is repeatedly affirmed as an effective organizational 
strategy. 
Cooperation in multicultural teams is central to public organizations, such as government 
and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), facing human development challenges as they 
respond to some of the most difficult problems in our world.  One formulation of these problems 
is reflected in the United Nations Millennium Declaration, expressed through eight goals.2 The 
first goal is eradication of extreme poverty and hunger (Perkins, Raddelet, & Lindauer, 2006).   
  
                                                
 
2 The United Nations Millennium Declaration is a commitment to make development a reality for everyone 
by 2015 and is expressed in eight goals, including eradicating extreme poverty and hunger (Perkins, 
Raddelet, & Lindauer, 2006). 
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The behavior of public organizations in attacking poverty, expressed as strategies and tactics, 
are important considerations. Strategies and tactics employed by public organizations in 
responding to difficult problems, such as alleviating poverty, include structuring effective 
collaborations.         
1.3 RESEARCH PROBLEM 
In 1976 Milton Friedman exclaimed in his address upon receiving the Nobel Prize in Economics 
that, “The poor stay poor not because they are lazy, but because they have no access to 
capital.” Sir Fazel Hasan Abed, founder and chairman of the Bangladesh Rehabilitation 
Assistance Committee (BRAC),3 characterizes Friedman’s connection as involving capital and 
personal empowerment: “The poor remain poor because they are powerless.  Once empowered 
the poor are able to change their lives” (CGAP, 2006, p. vii).  In this investigation the problem is 
best described by beginning with Alex Counts, president of Grameen Foundation USA.  He 
states that, “there is no lack of capital…[but instead] the lack is delivery channels for capital” 
(Counts, 2010).  The problem in this investigation is embedded in a need for capital investment 
delivery mechanisms.  
1.3.1 The problem illustrated 
To illuminate Alex’s point, consider entrepreneurs in least developed countries (LDCs).  
Jacqueline Novogratz (2009) recounted working on an entrepreneurial bakery venture with a 
group of poor, single Rwandan mothers.  She was introduced to the project while serving as a 
consultant to Duterimbere, a budding new microcredit facility funded by the United Nations 
Children’s Fund.  Novogratz assisted in implementing systems and procedures to improve 
product quality and account for inventory and sales.  Perhaps more importantly, she engaged 
                                                
 
3  BRAC’s relief work evolved to development initiatives.  The organization changed its name to 
Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee.  Later, in the 1990s, BRAC was deeply involved in urban 
poverty reduction.  The acronym, BRAC, now represents a motto: Building Resources Across 
Communities.  Microfinance is central to BRAC’s development model. 
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the women in a business model where they saw their effort correlating with income, as opposed 
to charitable donations, to sustain livelihoods.  Novogratz (2009) writes,  
For the first time, their [the bakery women’s] incomes allowed them to decide when to 
say yes and when to say no.  Money is freedom and confidence and choice.  And choice 
is dignity.  The solidarity of the bakery also gave them a sense of belonging that made 
them even stronger (p. 78).   
Entrepreneurship is about more than economic development, it is also about human 
development since it provides individuals the opportunity to guide their own destinies through 
work. Public organization efforts to alleviate poverty, such as supporting an entrepreneurial 
bakery venture, are illustrated in global multicultural cooperation activities of a microcredit 
capital delivery mechanism.  
Entrepreneurship is celebrated both for its innovation in responding to needs, and as a 
valuable mechanism to advance national development agendas.  Entrepreneurship is a cross-
cutting field of study that has been used to explain several societal phenomena in various 
disciplines of social science (Low & MacMillan, 1988).  Development economists contend that 
entrepreneurship provides comparative advantage at both mirco and macro levels.  Individual 
entrepreneurship is reflected by employable skills or business ventures.  National 
entrepreneurship results are manifested in exportable products.  Political scientists frequently 
seek to understand individual entrepreneur’s political behavior in explaining a stable political 
system, and institutional structures that support or hinder the emergence of entrepreneurial 
responses to a nation’s needs (e.g., poverty alleviation, education, individual-choice capacity, 
and health).  Many political scientists favor approaches that espouse institutional support and 
promotion of an entrepreneurial class.  Other social scientists have found linkages between 
changes in society and the organizational structures associated with entrepreneurship.  Their 
research reports that entrepreneurial class organization is driven by such factors as cohesion 
and feelings of aimlessness—all of which produce important consequences for social change 
processes (Martinussen, 1997).  A common question is how to generate sufficient financial 
capital to promote entrepreneurial innovation that permeates all societal levels.  Microfinance 
can help provide needed financial capital.  As a banking intermediary, it serves as a capital 
delivery mechanism to empower entrepreneurs and households in the quest for poverty 
alleviation.  
Capital needs of entrepreneurs and households in LDCs were addressed by the United 
Nations (UN).  The UN undertook a project to identify capital access barriers.  The project 
included multi-stakeholder consultations during 2004 and 2005, as well as input from a 2005 
global e-conference, material from experts via an on-line questionnaire, and in-depth interviews.  
6 
 
One output was a published report by Imboden and her colleagues, “Building Inclusive Financial 
Sectors for Development” (“Blue Book”).  An important finding was that, “A major concern of 
MFIs [microfinance institutions] is the ability to fund the growth of their loan portfolios…” 
(Imboden, Clark, & Herman, 2006, p. 76).  This concern is embedded in another important 
finding contained in the report:  “Financial sector strength is fundamental for linkages and 
intermediation across the financial sector…and for the funding and capitalization of the full 
range of financial institutions” (p. 77).  Factors inhibiting capital delivery mechanisms, such as 
constrained funding of MFI loan portfolio growth and financial sector weakness, are important 
considerations in efforts to provide poor people access to financial services. 
1.3.2 The problem where market mechanisms are inadequate    
Financial sector strength in LDCs is affected by environmental factors.  Many LDCs are conflict 
environments with fragile state governments.4  MFIs in a financial sector affected by conflict and 
state fragility find it difficult to access capital market mechanisms (Sen, 1999).  Both foreign 
portfolio and direct investment (FDI),5 in general, respond to economic incentives such as 
market size.  Customers and capital investors perceive high risks are associated with doing 
business in settings that can be destroyed overnight by on-going or resumed conflict (Imboden 
et al., 2006).  Scholars have researched these concerns and conclude that they directly impact 
access to capital. 
                                                
 
4 Conflict is understood by drawing on the frequently cited work of Lotta Harbom and Peter Wallensteem 
(2005), which utilizes the definition of armed conflict from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program.  That 
definition is: “[A] contested incompatibility that concerns governments or territory or both, where the use 
of armed force between two parties results in at least 25 battle-related deaths.  Of these two parties, at 
least one has to be the government of a state” (p. 634).  The term fragile state does not have a universal 
definition, nor is the status generally seen as a dichotomy.  The Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development used the phrase “poor performance” to address states lacking the capacity to provide a 
political space or deliver public services, as well as those countries that have the capacity, but lack the 
commitment to do so. 
 
5 Foreign portfolio investment involves foreigners purchasing shares of stock in domestic companies.  
Such investments are often central to discussions of capital volatility; however, private capital flows are 
not substantial in much of Sub-Saharan Africa, primarily due to underdeveloped capital market 
mechanisms. Foreign direct investment (FDI) involves a company forming or expanding a subsidiary in 
another country.  FDI is often the result of  multinational firms making decisions regarding market location, 
internalization of subsidiary transactions, and vertical integration of outputs and inputs (see Honohan & 
Beck, 2007, p. 123; Krugman & Obstfeld, 2005, pp. 157, 160-163, 613). 
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Researchers have examined capital flow by focusing on factors such as capital market 
characteristics, access to external financing, rule-of-law, and investor incentives. Research has 
found a positive relationship between government infrastructure and FDI (Globerman & Shapiro, 
2002).  This relationship was explored deeper by an often cited earlier work of Rafael La Porta 
and his colleagues from Harvard and University of Chicago (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer, & Vishny, 2000).  These researchers reported on variances among nations in breadth 
and depth of capital markets, and company access to external financing.  They found through a 
meta-analysis investigation that a common finding is investors having legal protection from 
management and controlling shareholders aids understanding variances.  La Porta et al 
conclude that, beyond a broad definition of government infrastructure, placing a premium on 
external investors’ rights is required to reap benefits of developed capital markets.  On the other 
hand, when rule-of-law is separated out (i.e., controlled), there are empirical findings that FDI 
goes to richer nations (Alesina & Dollar, 2000).  In other words, when fragile state factors (e.g., 
legal infrastructure) are considered the same among nations, the relationship between 
investment in a nation and its legal infrastructure is subordinate to other investor incentives. 
While Western economies often obtain investment capital through markets, post-conflict 
fragile states lack the capacity and institutional structure to support healthy markets.  
Challenges to viable capital delivery mechanisms (e.g., capital markets) are exacerbated by the 
absence of both institutional infrastructure (e.g., institutionalized formal rules) for a viable capital 
market, and sufficient financial incentives to attract private capital (Alesina & Dollar, 2000).   In 
effect, these settings are dependent on official development assistance, or foreign aid, as a 
primary source of capital.  This is evident in development financial institutions6 accounting for 
over 50% of the more than $4 billion in foreign aid microfinance capital investment in 2007 (Cull, 
Demirguc-Kunt, & Morduch, 2008).  Foreign aid is a vital capital source for LDCs, including 
capital delivery mechanisms for microfinance instruments engaged to battle poverty. 
Foreign aid takes the form of money (e.g., grants, subsidized loans), commodities, and 
technical assistance (Perkins et al., 2006; Rapley, 2007).  The Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) is 
the official source of information on foreign aid.  According to DAC, foreign aid (concessional 
assistance) meets two criteria:  the main goal is the promotion of economic development and 
welfare; and aid is in the form of a grant or subsidized loan.  Most foreign aid has been from one 
                                                
 
6 Development financial institutions are private sector development mechanism for government 
development initiatives (Reille & Forster, 2008). 
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country to another (bilateral assistance).  The largest category of bilateral aid is government 
assistance to low and middle income nations.  Donor countries also provide aid through 
multilateral mechanisms; institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and UNCDF pool resources from numerous donors.    
1.3.3 The problem where organizational responses are used 
One response to the need for capital delivery channels is organizational rather than market 
institutions. UNCDF implemented a new strategy in 2003 that responded to the need for capital 
delivery mechanisms:  sector development programme (SDP).  SDP had three key features:  
financial sector assessment, nationally owned vision (e.g., strategy and action plans for 
inclusive financial sectors), and capital investments in MFIs.  As a capital delivery mechanism, 
SDPs were designed to ultimately provide poor people access to financial services, including 
capital in the form of credit. 
SDPs are an organizational response to the LDC need for capital investment 
mechanisms when the market did not provide an adequate response.  A substantial amount of 
economic activity occurs in organizations rather than markets. Nobel Laureate Herbert Simon 
(1996) notes that economists employ externalities and uncertainty when explaining organization 
advantages over markets for much economic activity.  The more important reason, according to 
Simon, is actors provide additional effort to benefit collaboration because they benefit more from 
collaborative learning than by incurring costs of learning independently (e.g., reduce transaction 
costs). 
SDPs are collaborative capital delivery mechanisms that address a major constraint to 
financial sector accessibility to the poor.  Yet, SDPs have a characteristic found in both capital 
markets and foreign aid:  volatility.  Capital flow volatility, as will be explained in the next 
chapter, involves disbursement variances in the amount and timing of capital, including foreign 
aid.  This aspect of the problem—capital delivery mechanisms experiencing capital flow 
volatility—is a serious concern because volatility has demonstrated dramatic devaluing effects 
on capital. 
The literature offers several reasons for the importance of understanding volatile 
properties of capital flow to LDC economies, and to MFIs.  First, aid volatility can indirectly offset 
some direct beneficial aid effects, such as MFI loans strengthening poverty alleviating 
entrepreneurial ventures.  Second, matters relating to aid volatility are receiving increased 
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attention due to their impact on achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).7  The 
number and strength of external shocks (e.g., GDP effect) on LDCs tend be larger than those 
experienced by industrialized nations (Pallage & Robe, 2003).  Third is the large amount of aid 
provided to LDCs and MFIs.  Finally, uncertainty about aid flows has a detrimental effect on 
economic growth; volatility of aid is an aid value-determiner (Bulir & Hamann, 2003). 
1.3.4 The problem refined and its effects 
Capital flow characteristics are central to macro and micro development efforts described 
above.  Capital flows at the macro level normally coalesce with business cycles and economic 
growth or contraction.  Economists assess that business cycle fluctuations impact social welfare 
costs (measured by change in consumption) in developing and industrial nations (Birdsall, 
2004).  In addition, economic crises over the last twenty years have demonstrated that business 
cycles are closely correlated with short-term capital flows.  Instability in these capital flows 
negatively affects the growth of macro economies.  For example, capital quickly leaving a 
country in large amounts can be devastating.  Beyond economic slow-down, the risk of capital 
instability is an impediment to investment (Joseph Stiglitz, 2000).  At the micro level, capital 
instability affects livelihoods, nutrition, education, and health.  Research provides valuable 
insights into the challenges capital flow volatility can present in providing effective capital 
delivery mechanisms.   
Stephane Pallage and Michel Robe (2003) studied the impact of macroeconomic cycles 
on African and industrialized nations by measuring the consumption welfare cost of fluctuations.  
The 33 African countries analyzed included only those that had data for 22 consecutive years 
and did not experience war during the period.  Through the use of various statistical models the 
study found welfare costs of cycles to African countries are large multiples of the cost to the 
United States.  For example, U. S. consumption volatility in one model was 1.36%, but the 
median was 5.11% in Africa.  Moreover, the median welfare cost in African countries is 14 times 
the U.S. level.  The researchers noted that “What is striking…[is] the welfare cost of fluctuation  
  
                                                
 
7 See the often cited authors, Ales Bulir and Javier Hamann (2008, p. 2049), and Ellerman (2007) for a 
discussion of the scarcity of research on aid volatility.  
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in low-income countries remains a very large multiple of its U.S. counterpart” (p. 690). 
Moreover, welfare gains occurring as a result of eliminating volatility are so substantial they 
could add 1% to annual growth indefinitely. 
Closely related to macroeconomic cycles, capital flow volatility has received 
considerable attention, especially at the macro level.  There is extensive research on the 
economic effects of capital flow, particularly following financial liberalization (Celasun & Walliser, 
2008; Honohan & Beck, 2007).  For example, one empirical study (Demir, 2009) looked at 
Mexico and Turkey to understand the effect of internal funds on fixed investments when credit is 
constrained (i.e. capital flow constrained).  A central discussion in the study is the relationship of 
financial liberalization, imperfect capital markets, and capital flow volatility. Also, the 
investigation demonstrates capital flow volatility increased after liberalization, and reductions in 
growth and trade are significantly related to capital volatility.  These findings are of particular 
interest because capital market mechanisms, influenced by financial liberalization, are generally 
viewed as the inevitable source of capital for a sustainable microfinance sector. 
 At the micro level stable capital flows enable effective strategic planning and budgeting.  
This includes the dissemination of information used in planning by individuals, firms, and 
governments.  Planning guides and promotes strategic activity.  Conversely, micro-level capital 
instability constrains this type of activity, as demonstrated by the empirical record of credit 
contractions (Miller et al., 2000).   
A by-product of credit contractions is capital volatility, which can create economic shocks 
with negative impacts on poor people.  For example, LDC public organizations would be unable 
to pay workers and delay human capital investments.  Also, credit contractions central to the 
Great Recession had far reaching effects.  The World Bank estimates 100 million more people 
will be impoverished as a result of the 2007-2008 Great Recession.  This figure does not 
account for approximately 130 million directly affected by 2007 food price increases (de Catheu, 
Kotoglou, Malhotra, Jacob, & Wee, 2008).  Researchers have found restricted access to credit, 
savings instruments, and insurance products constrain the poor’s ability to exploit new farming 
opportunities, educational and skill development, medical care, and entrepreneurial initiatives 
(Rodrik, 2000; Spencer & Wood, 2005). While microfinance institutions are put forth as a 
mechanism to promote LDC human development, their effectiveness depends on reliable 
capital flow used to provide financial services.   
Foreign aid capital flow in post-conflict fragile state settings is particularly alarming.  
Post-conflict fragile states experience greater volatility in official development assistance (i.e., 
foreign aid) in comparison to other developing nations.  Several scholars have studied this 
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volatility.   One theoretical study, exploring effects of business cycle productivity and high aid 
volatility on welfare costs to consumption, found aid volatility costs far exceeds business cycles 
(Arellano, Bulir, Lane, & Lipschitz, 2009).  As de Catheu and her colleagues contend, it is 
imperative for these nations to receive sustained foreign aid (de Catheu et al., 2008).  For 
instance, approximately one-third of armed conflicts that reignite do so within ten years of 
declaring peace.  A key risk factor for reigniting armed conflict is the lack of economic 
opportunities. Research has found that economic opportunity—defined as per capita income, 
per capita income growth rate, population growth, and schooling of young men—significantly 
effects the risk of resuming conflict (Bigombe, Collier, & Sambanis, 2000).   With this 
understanding, it is sobering to note that 50% of 2007 foreign aid benefited only five of 48 post-
conflict fragile states (de Catheu et al., 2008). This investigation assumes, based on the 
relevant literature and archival evidence, development and aid are vital to maintaining peace 
during this critical ten year window.  Moreover, of the world’s low income nations, fragile states 
are falling behind in efforts to achieve the MDGs, including a reduction of people living in 
extreme poverty.  Slow progress toward achieving the MDGs contributes to spillover effects felt 
throughout the global community, such as volatility, illicit activities, war, and public health 
concerns.  Given the tremendous amount of aid capital investment, stakeholders have begun to 
request explanations for shortfalls in MDG achievement.  The explanation, in part, will be the 
devaluing effect experienced due to aid capital volatility. 
In summary, the problem examined in this investigation is the insufficient understanding 
of volatility in capital flow from delivery mechanisms to MFIs used to provide financial services 
to poor people, including loan capital.  Capital flow volatility involves variances in the amount 
and timing of capital.  Effectively addressing this problem requires first ascertaining how others 
have attacked the problem.  This is discussed in the following chapter.  However, a study 
involving microfinance institutions and capital flow processes necessitates a basic overview of 
the role and development of money and banking.  The overview in the following section focuses 
on daily living and institutional operations.  The point of departure is individuals engaging in 
financial exchange transactions.  Increasingly without regard to what nation a person calls 
home, or an economy’s sophistication level, this basic starting point undergirds a financial 
framework within which services and institutions can be placed.  The next section provides a 
primer on the origins, structure, and basic functions of the financial services sector, money, and 
banking.  Microfinance entities are institutions that facilitate poor people engaging in financial  
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transactions by providing services otherwise available to them.  As the overview makes clear, 
the behavior shaping power of promises (credible commitments) is foundational to financial 
transactions, especially extending credit.  Promises are central to a healthy, robust financial 
services sector. 
1.4 MICROFINANCE IS BANKING 
History records how people and households in many traditional societies lived self-sufficiently.  
Food, clothing, housing, and security were provided at the household level.  Envision a family 
with no trade or commerce.  Then enter people in communities who have discovered that not all 
people perform all tasks equally well, and that all can improve their state by focusing more effort 
on certain competencies.  Small communities of individuals and households exchanging goods 
soon give way to more people engaging in exchange transactions that find one-on-one bartering 
to be highly inefficient.  The money artifact served to address some weaknesses of bartering.   
George Kaufman (1977) records exchange transaction history, describing the role and 
function of money and banking.  He explains money’s value is not intrinsic, but its utility is in 
facilitating exchange.  It allows the value of each good to be specified only in money terms and 
not relative values in the trading transaction.  Grain, cattle, salt, shells, tobacco, and various 
metals were used in societies of old as money.  Metal coins functioned as the primary form 
through most of recorded history.  Paper notes and currency, followed later by checks, were 
used to facilitate more efficient exchange transactions.  As will be explained, banking was 
central to facilitating efficient exchange transactions.  The Commercial Revolution of the 17th 
century and the Industrial Revolution of the 18th century proved transporting, storing, and 
securing metal coins for monetary use was increasingly onerous. 
Money and credit are different, but related.  For the sake of simplicity, money is owned, 
credit is owed; money is an asset, credit is a liability.  To illustrate the money-credit distinction 
and financial services people use, Kaufman classifies people as savers or borrowers.    Savers 
choose to hold savings as cash, use it to reduce debt, or “rent out” the “purchasing power” of 
savings to borrowers (Kaufman, 1977, pp. 25, 50).  Borrowers create financial claims that can 
be thought of as a note (i.e., evidence of borrowing and debt).  Borrowers provide notes to 
savers and savers provide money to borrowers.  Borrowers pay-off the note through the 
payment of rent (as interest), and the payment of principle (the notes’ original face-amount).  Of 
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course, in practice people are often not one or the other but both, functioning in different roles 
based on the transaction’s nature (Kaufman, 1977).  Servicing these different roles in the 
transaction is the function of banking, or financial intermediaries. 
Kaufman explains that exchange transactions between borrowers and savers occur 
through direct or intermediary markets.  Investment banking involves institutions that bring 
borrowers and savers together in direct (or private) capital markets.  The typical banking actors 
here are brokers and dealers.  Brokers bring parties together to facilitate transactions and 
receive remuneration in the form of commission.  Dealers, on the other hand, purchase notes 
from borrowers and then sell notes to savers.  Dealers are compensated on the difference 
between the amount they pay for notes and the sales price.  This difference emerges over some 
period of time, results from numerous factors, and is not always advantageous to dealers.  In 
the capital market transaction, savers own the notes of borrowers as an asset, similar to 
currency.   
In contrast to capital market activity, as Kaufman explains, intermediary market activity 
(e.g., banking) involves borrowing through instruments that can be viewed as secondary notes.   
Savers obtain (purchase) secondary notes from these intermediary market institutions.  In turn, 
these institutions purchase notes from borrowers.  Intermediary institutions facilitate two 
exchange transactions that occur practically simultaneously.  Money flows from savers to 
intermediary institutions and then money flows to the borrowers. 
Dorothy Nichols (1975) describes the power of the intermediary market to create rapid 
development, which became clear many centuries ago.  Intermediary institutions, engaged in 
activities commonly referred to as commercial banking, provided safe storage of precious 
metals, such as gold and coins.  Two realities became vivid in terms of the money-credit 
distinction and financial services people use.  First, receipts (secondary notes) people were 
given by commercial bankers for depositing their precious metals were being used to facilitate 
exchange transactions.  Receipts functioned as currency because holders believed they could 
go to commercial bankers and exchange the receipt for precious metals.  That is, there was a 
credible commitment that the receipt was backed by the bank.  Second, commercial bankers 
learned that notes could be purchased from borrowers with receipts, rather than actual precious 
metals.  In other words, bankers could make loans (purchase notes) without actually giving the 
borrower precious metals from storage, using receipts instead.  Not only did receipts have 
transaction value, but more receipts could be issued than actual precious metal stores in the 
bank.  This was because only a portion of receipts representing all precious metals at the bank 
would be presented to the bank for payment in the form of precious metals at any given time.   
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The result from the notes-receipts transaction relationship is understood as the money 
multiplier effect of fractional reserve banking.  Multiplication of money results in an abundance 
of resources for development based on promises (i.e., credible commitments) rather than hard 
assets (e.g., precious metals).  The ability to trust and act based on promises became integral 
to economic systems.  Commercial banks are only one form of financial intermediary.  Another 
financial intermediary form is designed to operate in both direct and intermediary markets. 
  Finance companies are a form of financial intermediary operating in direct and 
intermediary markets simultaneously.  Kaufman explains these institutions raise capital by 
selling short and long term securities in direct financial markets.  Securities function similar to 
the notes referred to previously.  These securities are obligations and borrowings of finance 
companies.  Finance companies are normally understood in terms of customer segments 
served:  businesses or households.  Household institutions, or personal finance companies, 
operate as intermediaries by financing small purchases and providing money directly to 
borrowers, who are typically higher risk customers.  The finance company intermediary is most 
like the microfinance institutions described in this investigation.  The history of the small loan 
company goes back many years and shares the focus of serving a population described in a 
manner very similar to the population served by modern day microfinance institutions (MFIs). 
An Ireland lending mechanism illustrates both the historic use of credit in development, 
and similarities in target populations with modern day MFIs.  W. L. Shuldham (1903) referenced 
lender performance data in 1838 when arguing to the Duke of Wellington, that the “Loan-Fund 
system” is clearly “capable of effecting great and lasting benefits…in the amelioration of the 
condition of the working classes of the community,” and that such a practice is “very ancient” 
(pp. 5, 14, 15).  The remarks to the Duke described the purpose, function, and challenges of 
providing pro-poor financial services in Ireland.  Similar to modern day MFIs, the loan-fund 
system was discussed as a mechanism “by which the working classes of the community can be 
raised in their social and moral character” (p. 4).  The mechanism was also described as 
benefiting entrepreneurs and farmers.  This demonstrates that the use of financial services as a 
human development instrument has been valued for hundreds of years.   
Early mechanisms in Ireland created lending products available to the poor.  These 
products focused on pledged loans in the form of pawning, where borrowers lost use of the 
asset (Shuldham, 1903).  Shuldham distinguished pledged loans from loan-fund contracts 
provided as character loans.  The loan-fund product seems to have required a co-signer (e.g., 
sponsor).  According to Shuldham, this feature is associated not only with the social pressure to 
repay (to avoid humiliation), but also “a friendly intercourse is generally the consequence” (p. 
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10).  The virtues of character loans were extolled: “[such a person] feels himself rather raised 
amongst his class, is naturally stimulated to exertion to uphold that character…and prides 
himself on his power of thus borrowing” (p. 5).  Shuldham posits that the loan-fund system has 
the propensity to address character flaws, “Where the laws are almost powerless it is often 
found that the dread of ‘a bad name at the Loan Board’ has proved effectual to check both rioter 
and drunkard” (pp. 7, 9).  He explicitly cautioned against viewing loan-funds as a panacea for 
addressing all the ills of the working classes, but a device to be given careful consideration.  
More than just a tool of economic development, relationships and power that emerged from 
access to Ireland loan-fund financial services were believed to benefit human development. 
In their book on the concepts driving the modern microfinance movement, Beatriz 
Armendariz de Aghion and Jonathan Morduch (2005) draw on what they argue is the best 
known story of microfinance to discuss its beginnings.  There are similarities between key 
features of this story and the loan-fund program in Ireland.  The authors explain how in 1976 
Professor Muhammad Yunus began experimenting with making loans to the poor.  Early results 
indicated that borrowers were being helped a great deal and repaying predictably without 
providing collateral.  Yunus (1999), founder of Grameen Bank, focused on the “landless poor,” 
and those skilled  in weaving, husking rice paddies, cattle, and rickshawing (pp. 42, 140).    
An innovation at Grameen Bank that facilitated rapid growth seems to be a variation of 
the Ireland loan-fund program’s sponsor co-signer feature.  Rather than a single sponsor with 
greater financial strength, Yunus employed a “group lending” contract that provided for the poor 
to, in-effect, co-sign for each other (Armendariz de Aghion & Morduch, 2005, p. 12).  Another 
similarity of the microfinance movement with the pro-poor lending of Ireland is social benefits.  
Yunus (1999) argues there are powerful “socioeconomic implications of credit” that likens the 
“silence and indifference” financial institutions showed the poor to “financial apartheid” (p. 150).  
He explains that economically empowered poor are determined fighters of population problems, 
illiteracy, and health issues.      
Another distinctive microfinance feature empowering poor in LCDs is a specific target 
market.  Prior to Yunus and Grameen Bank, BRAC pioneered the idea of targeting women.  
Also, BRAC took a client relations approach to microfinance that focused on customers’ 
businesses as much as loan terms and performance.  BRAC’s experience also supports the 
view that benefits of microfinance go deeper than economics to include health, education, and 
family planning (Smillie, 2009) Contemporary microfinance has significantly expanded the  
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portfolio of loan products available (e.g., individual loans) and is impacting the institutions’ 
credibility, earning them a seat at the table where development agendas are shaped and 
strategies designed.  Collected microfinance data reflect a capital delivery mechanism 
experiencing rapid growth, including substantial outreach to the poor.  Table 1 provides some 
key indicators of growth and impact.  If it is assumed that each family has five people, then the 
over 128.2 million poorest8 clients served by the end of 2009 affected over 640 million people 
(L. R. Reed, 2011). 
Table 1:  MFI growth and impact. 
   
Taken from State of the Microcredit Summit Campaign Report 2011 
Data Point Finding 
Number of MFIs Reporting (1997-2009) 3,589 
Number of MFIs Reporting in 2010 (December 31, 2009 data) 723 
Percent Poorest Clients Represented by MFIs Reporting in 2010 94.6% 
Total Number of Clients (as of 12/31/09) 190,135,080 
Total Number of Women (as of 12/31/09) 140,117,727 
Total Number of Poorest Clients (as of 12/31/09) 128,220,051 
Total number of Poorest Women (as of 12/31/09) 104,694,115 
 
 
 
1.5        INVESTIGATION OUTLINE 
 
Chapter one provided a broad overview of:  
• global organizations and human development;  
• entrepreneurship and LDC development;  
• centrality of investment capital to LDC development, capital delivery 
mechanisms, and capital devaluing effects of volatility; and 
• financial services and intermediary roles, including microfinance. 
 
 
                                               
8 Income of less than $1US a day.  
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Global organizations strive to assemble the multi-cultural teams required to perform at high 
levels.  Included in global organizations are public organizations dedicated to addressing some 
of the world’s most acute challenges.  Chief among these challenges is poverty alleviation in 
LDCs, which necessitates capital delivery mechanisms.  Capital flow volatility is a major 
difficulty since it devalues capital provided through these mechanisms.   
Chapter two reviews literature on the volatility problem and the outcome of 
organizational actions and interactions in this investigation:  capital flow.  Capital provided 
through markets and official development assistance (i.e., foreign aid) mechanisms are 
discussed.  Opportunities and limitations of capital markets in LDCs are described, as depicted 
in literature.  Also, foreign aid capital is portrayed in literature as related to normative agendas of 
developed nations, including political objectives. Though public organizations are depicted as 
primarily motivated by non-commercial, social, and political drivers, literature does not present 
public organizations as possessing homogenous development missions and objectives.  LDCs 
are argued to be seriously constrained in generating the capital needed to spur development, 
especially extremely poor countries.  Also, literature posits that LDC foreign aid relationships 
with donors weaken local accountability and exploit LDCs by supporting resource extraction at 
preferential terms of trade.  Extant literature on donor foreign aid volatility is synthesized.  
Research confirming aid capital volatility, utilizing various measures, is referenced.  In addition, 
structures and processes related to aid volatility in the literature are described.  Moreover, 
methodological, data, and unit of analysis limitations of extant research are discussed in 
explaining the value of this investigation.   
Chapter three presents part one of the research design and methods.  Complexity and 
detail in this investigation were addressed utilizing the Institutional Analysis and Development 
(IAD) framework created by Nobel Laureate Elinor Ostrom.  IAD performed three primary 
functions: 
• Identified components to be considered in the investigation. 
• Provided patterns of component relationships, which represent assumptions 
about order, attributes, and context.  The assumptions are based on theoretical 
and empirical analysis. 
• Accommodated numerous and varied theories employed in the investigation. 
IAD is robust and effective in analyzing complexity.  In this investigation it only served to provide 
basic structure to a complex array of considerations.  The linear, controlled research paradigm 
that dominated much of the 1960s and 1970s appears confounded and often overwhelmed by 
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the detail and complexity in this investigation’s methods.  However, clamoring for simplicity and 
conciseness can raise the analytical product so far from data that it bears little resemblance to 
its source.  It seems scholarly communities desiring more international participation believe it 
may be necessary to embrace qualitative methods and presentations that are thicker (i.e., 
dense, many concepts and linkages) and fill gaps normally filled by implied assumptions (APSR, 
2011). IAD served to incorporate and make explicit within the investigation factors bearing 
significantly on the phenomenon explored. 
In addition to IAD, the investigation employed a case study approach.  Case study 
methods facilitated deeply exploring complex activity occurring in capital delivery mechanisms.  
Case study approaches are able to incorporate numerous forms of evidence, such as reports, 
artifacts, and interviews. While current phenomena were examined, a controlled intervention 
could not be administered.  The focus of the case study was activity substantially completed 
when the investigation began.  The selection of the first UNCDF sector development 
programme as the case, Sierra Leone serving as the setting, and subjects are discussed in 
detail in this chapter.  The vital importance of this UNCDF project in post-conflict fragile state 
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) at the precise time the phenomena occurred is explained.   Sierra 
Leone is described as an appropriate context because it captured the attention of world 
microfinance leaders, and the assessment is uniquely fit for a West Africa model.  Moreover, 
employing a case study within the IAD framework provided for a robust, versatile analytic 
device.  
The methods discussion continues in chapter four by explaining the use of grounded 
theory within the analytic device.  Grounded theory methods in this investigation attempted to 
conform primarily to the guidelines and thinking of Anselm Strauss and Juliet Corbin (1998).  
Grounded theory is primarily used to investigate problems not sufficiently explained, such as 
donor capital flow volatility.  The chapter explains grounded theory methodology used to 
analyze both the capital flow process and values and beliefs that informed action-decisions (i.e., 
behavior) linked to capital disbursements.  The techniques and procedures of grounded theory, 
in the Strauss and Corbin tradition, thus provided valuable evidenced-based insights on 
characteristics of capital flow and organizational decision making linked to capital flow. 
Chapter five presents the qualitative descriptive analysis results, including an important 
portrayal of organizational learning.  The capital flow process from investment decision until all 
money is accessible to the MFI is described in terms of SDP’s design (espoused operating 
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theory) and actual implementation (working rules or theories-in-use).  This description’s value is 
embedded in the view that public policy administration is the actual expression of policy and 
speaks to espoused theories’ relevance in attacking societal problems.  MFI sector development 
utilizing a SDP project, rather than aid directed to the Sierra Leone government, is a 
fundamental distinction in this investigation compared with much capital volatility literature. The 
state’s role and analytical depth of participant action were fundamental, substantial distinctions 
of this investigation.   Moreover, the chapter describes performance based agreements as not 
only a key MFI investment document, but a context integral to understanding linkages between 
behavior and capital volatility.  The role of disbursement conditions, including MFI reporting, is 
also explained.  The chapter concludes by detailing capital disbursement issues.  Issue 
complexity is reflected in donor accountability processes related both to volatility and MFI 
accountability involving community stakeholders.  Consequences of performance based 
agreement (PBA) disbursement conditions are postulated in participant expressions.  All 
participant types acknowledge that unsatisfied disbursement conditions at MFIs is a factor in 
capital volatility.  However, the appropriate and effective use of conditions was viewed 
differently.    
 Chapters six and seven continue reporting analysis results by digging deep into 
linkages between organizational behavior and capital flow, including presenting a lens to view 
complexity and interconnectedness.  Chapter six presents analysis focusing on linkages 
between behavior and capital flow.  Results are reported on the examination of interactions in a 
particular context and an intervening condition:  performance based agreements is the context, 
and mid-term evaluation the intervening condition.  Chapter seven continues by detailing a 
theory developed to identify and make sense of the case’s complexity and interconnectedness:  
the Capitalflow Bureaucratic Triad (CBT). CBT theory defines bureaucracy as structures and 
processes employing collaboration to accountably serve the public effectively, efficiently, and 
responsively.  CBT theory states: value of capital is affected by linkages between organizational 
behavior and capital volatility.  Capital flow volatility is determined by the interactions of three 
properties of bureaucracy:  collaboration; accountability; and effectiveness, efficiency, and 
responsiveness (impact).  Capital value is a function of the level of volatility and MFI condition at 
disbursement.  CBT was developed by close connection to data (i.e., grounding in data) and 
incorporates expanding traditional understandings of bureaucracy in a manner to acknowledge 
the centrality of hierarchical structures in organizations, while also recognizing ambiguities, 
conflicts, and collaborative authority structures and processes.  
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Chapter seven explains and applies the CBT model to observed phenomena.  CBT is 
described by drawing on basic atomic theory.  CBT properties, similar to elements of physical 
matter, can be found in different mechanisms.  For example, both markets and organizations 
have accountability mechanisms.  Also, the three CBT properties are viewed as ratio variables 
with a range of dimensions, not dichotomous variables.  As such, seeing different properties of 
bureaucracy at different dimensions is not cause for calling bureaucracy something else; it is 
just a different expression. CBT theory examines behavior-volatility linkages at the most basic 
levels, argued to be CBT properties, and uncovers explanations overlooked or undetected at 
higher levels of examination. The CBT model can be applied to empirical data as an explanatory 
tool.  It also can be applied to theoretical data to aid efforts in planning volatility constraining 
approaches to capital investment. 
Finally, chapter eight provides four strategic recommendations for minimizing capital 
devaluing linkages of behavior and capital flow:   
1. Directly address exogenous variables, or environmental factors, to minimize 
delays in capital disbursements.   
2. Employ the combined skill sets of a multicultural team to expeditiously assess the 
situational context, detect and assess contextual changes, and maintain a 
calculated action-orientation while realizing changes in human behavior and life 
style status are long-term propositions.   
3. Provide sufficient funding and marshal sufficient resources to collect data and 
employ the rigorous processes required to inform learning and make thoughtful, 
nuanced, strategic decisions as the program progresses.  
4. Account for project commitments because entering collaboration makes one-on-
one transactions between donors and MFIs subject to additional commitments 
that must be accounted for; tracking money is only part of accounting. 
In addition, the chapter contains an agenda for future research.  The agenda’s central theme is 
deeply exploring different constructs of actors that give rise to behavior related to capital 
volatility.  In an arena where participants representing different regions of the world interact to 
address societal problems, better understanding cultural factors can convert barriers to bridges 
in accomplishing common objectives.  Moreover, understanding factors linked to aid capital 
volatility is important to developing responses to minimize volatility’s capital devaluing effects.  
Extant volatility research is discussed in the following chapter.  
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2.0  LITERATURE REVIEW:  HOW THE PROBLEM HAS BEEN ATTACKED 
This chapter reviews the literature on capital flow and actions (i.e., behavior) of participants in 
capital investment deals and other explanations (e.g., structure, governance, and institutional 
factors) for capital volatility. Addressing the aid capital volatility problem experienced by capital 
delivery mechanisms needs to be better understood to assist mechanisms as learning 
organizations.  Perhaps more importantly, it must be determined what relationships need to be 
explored with consideration to volatility (e.g., structures, institutions, processes, and behaviors)?  
These discussions are important to understanding how volatility and MFI condition affect foreign 
aid capital value.   
The chapter begins with a brief review of the advent of modern foreign aid and capital 
investment attributes where return to shareholders is not a primary driver.  Modern foreign aid is 
shaped by a post-World War II model that seems incompatible with the most impoverished 
LDCs today.  Foreign aid efforts are challenged by a paradox of LDC’s need for capital to 
develop, but an inability to generate it.  In addition, literature suggests the donor-recipient 
relationship undermines local accountability.  Literature is reviewed in the next section that 
focuses on how others have attacked volatility in capital delivery mechanisms.  Ales Bulir and A. 
Javier Hamann are used to frame the synthesis of volatility literature, utilizing their extensive 
work in the area.  Their research is supplemented by recent studies focused on particular 
relationships and programs.  Finally, difficulties encountered in researching capital volatility are 
discussed.  Access to data, methodological limitations, and the limited research to-date are part 
of the challenges this investigation attempts to assist.  Included is how this investigation helps 
address these difficulties and adds to the existing body of knowledge. 
Research on understanding and attacking capital volatility primarily consists of 
examining aid where the participants are bilateral and multilateral donors investing in LDCs.  
Statistical techniques were normally employed to identify statistically significant relationships 
between numerous independent variables thought to be related to volatility and numerous 
measures of volatility.  Also, program evaluations and some qualitative program research  
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provide limited discussions of factors related to volatility.  Although interesting relationships 
were discovered, over 15 years of volatility research has found a need for much more data and 
different data to explain a large unaccounted for variance. 
2.1 LITERATURE REVIEW:  MODERN FOREIGN AID AND MOTIVES BEYOND PROFIT  
Foreign aid dates back many years and is primarily driven by non-commercial factors.  Modern 
foreign aid takes shape after World War II.  Normative priorities, including political agendas, are 
often associated with industrialized nations deciding where to provide aid.  Security and military 
factors are often integral to the analysis (Oxfam, 2005).  Similarly, the recipients of foreign aid 
are often not primarily focused on commercial drivers (e.g., return to shareholders).  This 
extends not only to government recipients, but other public organizations such as civil society 
organizations.  For example, many MFIs operate or start as NGOs primarily emphasizing a 
social mission. In addition, international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) are key 
players in providing foreign aid. 
The advent of modern foreign aid occurred at the conclusion of World War II.  Although 
world leaders anticipated European countries would rise from the ashes or pull themselves up 
by their boot straps, two years later it became apparent this was not happening and the Western 
world was confronted with rebuilding 16 countries in Europe.  Though this foreign aid effort 
focused on nations of relatively high income, skilled labor, and established institutions such as 
banks and judicial systems, it is considered by many to be the model for development efforts 
today.  This gives reason for pause since development efforts are often aimed at the most 
deprived, impoverished, fragile-state conditions on the globe (Picard & Buss, 2009).  Moreover, 
Karlan and Morduch (2009) observed a startling disconnect between locations of microfinance 
aid capital flows and locations with extreme poverty, given that microfinance is viewed as a 
capital delivery mechanism to assist with poverty alleviation.   
 Perkins and his colleagues (2006) explain the view that foreign aid may undermine 
development.  What may be the most important support for this view is empirical data on 
incentives for private sector activity.  Perkins, et al., find that flows of substantial amounts of aid 
to a country place donors in an asymmetrical power position relative to the recipient project or 
country.  It is argued the result has often been recipients acquiescing to the agenda of donors, 
regardless to perceived value or appropriateness, to secure on-going financial support.  In 
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essence, recipients are dependent on foreign aid for survival.  Viewed this way, MFIs’ 
accountability to the public, non-donor stakeholders is weakened by foreign aid (Jurik & Cowgill, 
2005; Moss, Pettersson, & van de Walle, 2006).  Furthermore, the literature depicts foreign aid 
machinery with a vested interest in the on-going need for aid.  Italy and the United States are 
cited as examples where aid money is conditioned on recipients purchasing from the donor 
country.  It is contended that dependency is supported by donor agencies seeking influence and 
power while donor staffs and retained consultants seek employment security, plus embedded 
reward-promotion systems (Leys, 1996; Oxfam, 2005; Perkins et al., 2006; Yunus, 1999).   
A central argument of early dependency theories of development is that close 
relationships with open markets and rich nations have an “obstructing and blocking impact” on 
development (Martinussen, 1997, p. 94).  Dependency theory considers policies favoring central 
areas at the expense of the peripheral as maleficent.  Foreign investment inflows are viewed as 
giving rise to increased outflows of interest and surplus, serving the elite and foreign interests 
instead of the common citizen (Seitz, 2008).   For example, early dependency theories may 
view the subsidized loans MFIs obtain from donors as exploitive.  On the other hand, MFIs that 
provide loans to people in the informal economy are considered people focused (Escobar, 
1995).   In the view of early dependency theory, the periphery has nothing to gain from capitalist 
development (Leys, 1996).   
These theorists contend dependency theory conclusions hold regardless of the success 
of newly industrialized countries, which appear to contradict central propositions of dependency 
theory.  Stephan Haggard examined the success of the newly industrialized countries (NIC).9  
His comparative study found, chief among explanations of the NIC’s success, a state with 
infrastructure to develop and implement policies and a substantial measure of separation from 
powerful economic interests (Leys, 1996).  Furthermore, a seemingly tacit endorsement of 
Rosenstein-Rodan’s Big Push argument is observed in Leys’ point that NICs were provided 
substantial capital investments and access to markets in the United States.  Big Push theory of 
aid development asserts that massive capital infusion is necessary to spur development in 
extremely poor countries because they do not have, nor can internally generate, the resources 
needed to grow.  
                                                
 
9 Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan comprise the NICs.  China, and to a degree India, 
joined this group in the 1980s.  Malaysia also benefited during this period.  These nations were 
considered to be developing nations by industrialized nations. The boom of the 1970s in electronics 
resulted in multi-national firms seeking out reduced-cost production operations (Leys, 1996; Perkins et al., 
2006).   
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 This is consistent with, and illuminated by, the seminal work of Emeritus Professor J. 
Kenneth Benson (1975).  He frames the discussion of resource dependency theory,  
[I]nteractions must be explained ultimately at the level of resource acquisition…a system 
resource view of organizations…Such an orientation becomes, for decision makers, an 
operational definition of the purposes of the organization…responsible largely for 
maintaining or expanding this established organizational machine” (p. 231).   
Benson’s (1975) theoretical framework of inter-organizational interaction was created from 
empirical research of exchanges between human service nonprofit organizations.  He explains 
that deep methods of analysis center on the actions of organizations to obtain an adequate level 
of essential resources, including “money and authority” (p. 231).  He contends that missions and 
visions of organizations take a subordinate position as an understood assumption that can be 
retrieved as a legitimization mechanism for continued operations.  Benson and others suggest 
that acquisition and maintenance of a reliable and sufficient source of capital and authority is the 
primary orientation of organizational decision makers (Benson, 1975; Froelich, 1999).   
Nancy Jurik and Julie Cowgill (2005) conducted a case study of a training and micro 
lending program offered by a nonprofit community organization where struggles associated with 
resource dependency were observed.  The researchers recorded struggles associated with 
daily provision of client services while securing capital for operations and lending.  Competition 
for limited capital investment was the most pressing challenge, according to organization staff.  
It was felt that the pressing challenge compelled the organization to trade quality for rapidly 
achievable outcome measures to impression-manage investor relations.  The espoused focus 
on the poor and very low-income people by government investors combined with accountability 
measures of client success and high repayment rates to create an environment where 
organizational beliefs acquiesced to the capital infusion imperative.  
 The importance and role of MFIs not infused by investor capital primarily focused on 
maximizing economic profits, such as NGOs, is underscored by empirical studies (Cull et al., 
2008; Karlan & Morduch, 2009).  Cull and his colleagues (2008) found strong evidence to 
suggest there is a substantive trade-off between MFIs focused on maximizing profits and those 
focused on outreach to the poor.  The report indicates that nonprofit MFIs serve a large 
distinctive market representing the neediest and clearly achieve greater outreach than profit 
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driven institutions.10  Interestingly, the nonprofits also demonstrated encouraging financial 
performance.  To be clear, the focus of the capital investors is being explored in this literature 
search.  MFIs seeking to maximize profits and MFIs with a nonprofit mandate both received 
foreign aid.  The common objective of investors and MFIs seemed to suggest a better fit.  
However, this is not to the absolute exclusion of profit maximizing MFIs receiving capital from 
social investors, nor socially focused MFIs receiving capital from investors seeking returns 
(Reille & Forster, 2008).   
Nongovernmental organizations as social investors are found to have a distinct place in 
foreign aid literature.  For example, a recent study of over 60 INGOs representing the larger, 
non-humanitarian organizations found that the organizations did not complement official aid by 
focusing on fragile states.  In addition, it was found that INGOs selected nations that had 
common characteristics with regard to religion or colonial past (Koch, Dreher, Nunnenkamp, & 
Thiele, 2009).  In another study of the allocation of aid by European NGOs over nine years to 78 
recipient countries, it was found that the NGOs were more likely than non-NGO aid institutions 
to assist poor countries with low life expectancy.  Furthermore, it was found that the NGOs were 
not influenced by the funding source or the commercial relationship of the recipient country with 
the NGO resident country (Nancy & Yontcheva, 2006).  This sample of studies illustrates that, 
although collaboration exists, INGOs and government-related donor agencies do not unilaterally 
embrace the same approach to provide aid capital.   
 Catapulting NGOs to the forefront of development and foreign aid was not as 
complementary as the evolutionary relationship might suggest.  Antecedents of modern foreign 
aid find western INGOs involved from post-World War I into the Marshall Plan after World War II 
(Picard & Buss, 2009).  More recently new reform policies of the 1990s implemented targeted 
programs in cooperation with NGOs.  These more recent cooperative initiatives represented a 
marked change in relationships.  The literature reports that relationships between NGOs and 
donors emerged that were incomprehensible little more than a decade earlier (Howell & Pearce, 
2001).  The convergence of the plurality of ideological spheres in the institutional sector of 
                                                
 
10 Valentina Hartarska (2005) is supported by the finding of Cull et. al. (2008) as reported here (p. 1635).  
However, a 2009 study by Roy Mersland when he was a Ph.D. student at Adger University in Norway 
reports there is no difference (Mersland & Strom, 2009).  Mersland used a different, less rigorous 
measure of average loan.  In addition, the studies had other differences.  Studies that report outreach 
level did not differ between profit-maximization organizational orientation and nonprofit orientation should 
be reviewed carefully to be clear on measurement methods and sample composition.   
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NGOs gave reason for pause.  The explanation of civil society organization presented by 
Michael Edwards (2004) seems most appropriate at this juncture of the donor-NGO relationship,  
Depending on whose version one follows, civil society[11] is either a specific product of 
the nation state and capitalism…or a universal expression of the collective life of 
individuals at work in all countries and stages of development but expressed in different 
ways according to history and context (p. 3).   
In summary, foreign aid in development efforts is a complicated device.  On one hand, 
LDCs are viewed as unable to generate the capital needed to spur development, especially in 
extremely poor countries.  On the other hand, relationships with donors of industrialized nations 
are viewed as weakening the ties with local stakeholders and considered to be exploitive with 
the intent of extracting resources at preferential terms of trade.  Though donors are primarily 
driven by non-commercial considerations, at times relationships with recipients have attributes 
associated with unhealthy outcomes. Public organizations are primarily motivated by non-
commercial, social focused drivers; however, public organizations do not possess homogenous 
development missions.  These drivers and missions are reflected in research on aid capital 
volatility.  
2.2 LITERATURE REVIEW:  HOW OTHERS ATTACKED CAPITAL VOLATILITY 
The most cited researchers of aid volatility and predictability are Ales Bulir and A. Javier 
Hamann.  As these scholars point out, donor commitments have lower predictive power in 
poorer, more aid dependent nations. The primary value of Bulir and Hamann’s (2003) work to 
this investigation was twofold:  
• Finding that “average absolute aid volatility” behavior is consistent with relative 
volatility (p. 70 note 14); and  
• Analysis of projections and disbursements of program and project (sector) aid in 28 
nations concluded program aid had the greatest projection-disbursement difference 
and project aid was lower than projections by at least 5%.    
                                                
 
11 One definition of civil society includes the descriptor nongovernmental organizations (Edwards 2004, p. 
21).  
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These findings undergird this investigation by vividly illustrating the presence of aid volatility in 
aid dependent settings, regardless of the level of non-aid revenue.  Also, the findings suggest 
that disbursement projections for specific projects, similar to SDPs, can be made more 
accurately than disbursements to governments for programs in the national budget.  
Three research teams followed this seminal work and found additional support for the 
importance of strong government institutions.  They took a closer look at the volatility 
experienced by government programs and sector support and studied possible explanation for 
low predictability.  One team extended the Bulir and Hamann research by analyzing 
disaggregated aid provided to governments and ascertaining differences in capital volatility.  At 
about this same time another team of researchers discovered capital volatility differences 
between institutions that quickly improve and those that quickly weaken.  
Fielding and Mavrotas (2005) extended the 2003 work of Bulir and Hamann.  They 
disaggregated aid into sector and program for 66 countries and utilized the disaggregated data 
to conduct a more rigorous analysis than Bulir and Hamann.  Noting the explanatory weakness 
of a single aggregate to measure aid, they explained different conditionalities that accompanied 
different types of aid.  For instance, sector aid, such as aid provided to state institutions to 
develop an inclusive financial sector, involves donors providing aid for a period of time with 
parameters on use and management.  Sector aid emphasizes physical and human capital 
investment, which affects long-term development outcomes.  Program aid is not linked to a 
specific project and has been characterized in various forms such as budget support, food, and  
humanitarian aid.   This distinction in the analysis sheds a little more light in understanding aid 
volatility, measured as a percentage change in aid flows.  Program aid is considerably more 
volatile than sector aid. 
 Furthermore, Fielding and Mavrotas (2005) tests four hypotheses that propose to 
explain the uncertainty of aid flows.  Two are of particular interest to this investigation: 
• Nations with a policy regime favored by donors may obtain more aid; however, these 
flows may be more volatile as explained by a permanent enhancement in the policy 
regime receiving a reward of a temporary increase in aid. 
• Nations possessing higher ranked institutions may possess a greater capacity to 
maintain positive working relationships with donors, resulting in decreased volatility. 
The policy regime measurement was based on the frequently cited work of Dollar and Kraay 
(2003) where they found high volumes of trade (indicative of open trade policies), strong 
institutions, and rapid growth are connected.  Ranking of institutions by Fielding and Mavrotas  
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utilized several factors from research conducted by Daniel Kaufmann and his colleagues (2003).  
Though Filed and Mavrotas did not use all the factors, results found all the components 
employed from the set show institutional quality reduces volatility. 
Victoria Levin and David Dollar comprised another team of researchers.  Their work 
(Levin & Dollar, 2005) found that fast improvement or weakening of state institutions provides a 
partial explanation for differences in aid volatility between difficult partner countries (DPCs) and 
other low-income countries.  In their 2005 research, donors’ aid allocation to DPCs was 
analyzed to determine if the amount deviates from the expected based on, among other 
variables, the institutional environment (as defined by World Bank’s Country Policy and 
Institutional Assessment).  The findings supported conclusions in their 2004 study showing 
donor support for nations with stronger institutions (Dollar & Levin, 2004; Levin & Dollar, 2005).  
Moreover, the authors reported that numerous bilateral and multilateral donors have changed 
allocation practices to favor nations with greater institutional strength (Levin & Dollar, 2005).  
The work of Levin, Dollar and others illustrates the linkage between a nation’s designation as a 
fragile state and providing weak institutional services, such as the monitoring function of 
microfinance regulators (Momo et al., 2011).  
Oya Celasun and Jan Walliser composed the final of the three research teams.  This 
team used IMF program data to explore questions related to aid volatility and predictability 
(Celasun & Walliser, 2008).  They found an empirical distinction between volatility and 
predictability primarily related to the level/amount of aid.  In addition, their work supports 
findings of other researchers regarding the devaluing effect of aid not disbursed as promised.  
Most importantly for this investigation, they found that:  
• Behavioral factors relating to disbursement conditions and donor bureaucratic issues 
account for disbursement delays.   
• The difference between aid disbursement and commitments for some post-conflict 
countries were “staggering” (p. 557). 
The researchers also explored the justification for disbursement delays, explaining that there 
were instances when volatility was a desired result of participant actions.  
Bulir and Hamann updated their work in 2003 and 2007 by extending their analysis with 
post-Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) data. Also, in 2008 they added new data and 
measures.  Their 2003 research suggested that work associated with PRSP could reduce 
volatility.  It was believed that PRSP would result in better ownership and conditionality 
compliance by recipient countries and better coordination among donors, resulting in a 
reduction of aid flow volatility.  The relative volatility of aid, that is, aid in relation to domestic 
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revenue, had increased on average in the post-PRSP period.  Specifically, the relative volatility 
increased post-PRSP after showing a decline in 1995-98.  In addition, there was no substantial 
evidence that absolute aid volatility had decreased (Bulir & Hamann, 2007).  The assumptions 
regarding the expected behavior associated with PRSP were not examined to determine if they 
were prevalent or simply not substantially linked to volatility.  Earlier research drilled deeper and 
found certain donors negotiating disbursement conditions without using the PRSP framework as 
the basis (Oxfam, 2005).  The 2008 update uses commitments and disbursements of long-term 
loans as an approximation for aid as the aid flow commitment-disbursement data base did not 
exist.  The researchers’ data indicated no improvement in disbursements relative to 
commitments, with the poorest nations experiencing a shortfall in excess of 40% (Bulir & 
Hamann, 2008).  
A partnership of donors analyzed aid capital (primarily budget support) to a region with 
some of the poorest countries on earth (SPA, 2008).  Several reasons for delayed disbursement 
in several African nations were reported by donors, including: 
• Primarily administrative problems on the donor side—41% of respondents 
• Recipient government administrative delays—38% of respondents 
• Recipient government failing to meet conditions—35% of respondents 
Recipient countries were asked to rank donors, overall and individually, on a number of factors.  
Three of the questions explored capital disbursements and provided insight into their 
assessment of donor capital volatility. In general, donors (primarily bilateral donors and 
international financial institutions) ranked higher than the previous year on disbursement 
performance. 
A few years earlier a survey of eleven LDCs across global regions was conducted 
(Oxfam, 2005).  The unpublished report was developed from 2004 data collected by asking 
ministry staff of recipient governments to express their views on specific dimensions of donor 
practice. The responses involved six donors, primarily bilateral and the World Bank.  The 
recipient countries were to have worked with the donors during the previous two years.  The 
study confirmed the presence of volatility in over 30% of cases.  As in the research conducted 
by the partnership of donors, recipients reported improved disbursement.  An interesting finding 
is that recipients believed coordination was integral to constraining volatility.  The power of 
donor collaboration was an antecedent to improved working relationships with recipients.  Also, 
the report pointed out that recipients are held accountable for performance by donors; however, 
there is not a robust accountability mechanism for donors.    
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Autonomous evaluation units are often used by public organizations to assist with 
accountability.  A recent evaluative study conducted by such a unit within the World Bank 
provides interesting insights into behaviors linked to disbursement performance, or capital 
volatility.  The evaluation assessed the Poverty Reduction Support Credit (PRSC), a World 
Bank tool in providing aid (PRSC Evaluation, 2010).  PRSC is a lending program utilizing 
principles of indigenous stakeholder input and development holistically defined to include 
structural, institutional, and social interests.  More importantly for this investigation, PRSC was 
aimed at reducing the burden of conditionalities.  The evaluation discussed disbursement 
concerns in considerable detail.  Two key discussions were particularly germane:  conditionality 
and flexibility.  Although a decline of legally binding conditions for tranche disbursement began 
prior to PRSC, the evaluation found PRSCs had a lower number of conditions than other policy-
based lending 1980-2008.  This reduction is believed to be related to “fast-disbursing loans” 
(PRSC Evaluation, p. 24).  However, clients perceived the number as still too high.  This was 
believed to be, in part, because other non-legally binding measures of performance 
incorporated in the program were confusing clients.  The flexibility discussion in the study 
explained how PRSC allowed adaptation to local environments by modifying the condition, its 
timing, or elimination when deemed unrealistic.  PRSCs experienced extensive use of flexibility, 
but surveyed donor staff suggested modifications were frequently made due to disbursement 
pressure from management, and in some cases was ill advised.   
Other work attacking the volatility problem has provided valuable insights to assist 
understanding and researching the problem.  Donor commitments have not been an effective 
device to decrease volatility.  Aid volatility differs by type of aid.  Sector aid, similar to SDPs, is 
less volatile than program aid (e.g., general budget).  Also, larger emergency aid is associated 
with higher volatility.  LDCs engaged in developing strategies to reduce poverty did not reduce 
volatility.  LDC economies more open to trade have higher volatility, as do policy regimes 
favored by donors.  Rapid changes in the quality of institutions affect the level of volatility, and 
improved institutional quality reduces sector aid volatility.  The limited work focused on behavior 
found donors explaining volatility in terms of administrative difficulties and the failure of recipient 
governments to meet conditions.  On the other hand, research based on data collected from 
recipient countries provided limited explanations for volatility.  Recipients’ responses connected 
donor coordination with timely aid disbursements and ranked donors’ performance, which 
suggested a trend of improvement.   The number and content of disbursement conditions 
attached to capital investment deals were connected to the level of volatility.  When a flexibility 
device was available to respond to contextual changes it was often perceived to be misused as 
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a tool to respond to donor management disbursement pressure.  Longer relationships between 
donors and recipients were related to lower differences between expected and actual 
disbursements.  Still, researchers have universally cited a large unexplained variance and the 
need for more and better data to address the problem.  These concerns are discussed in the 
next section.   
2.3 LITERATURE REVIEW:  CHALLENGES ENCOUNTERED BY OTHERS 
Sufficient work on aid volatility has fostered a good understanding of the future research 
challenges and limitations to the extant body of knowledge on the topic. The existence of a large 
unexplained variance has been recognized. Factors insufficiently explored have been 
highlighted.  Data limitations have become apparent.  Also, the need for robust, deep research 
is clear.  The extensive literature on aid volatility almost exclusively aims at macro level effects 
or briefly addresses micro-project level volatility as a portion of a larger evaluation (Eifert & 
Gelb, 2005, 2008; Latortue, Littlefield, Siedek, & McKee, 2007; Levin & Dollar, 2005; 
McGillivray, 2006).  Moreover, given the importance of capital funding to microfinance in LDCs, 
especially foreign aid, it is surprising that no study could be found connecting capital volatility to 
microfinance funding.    
On occasion researchers attempt to infer macro findings at the micro level, such as the 
MFI sector program level.  For example, aid volatility research findings pertaining to sector 
focused budget support, such as developing an inclusive financial section in a nation, applied to 
an SDP-type project.  However, researchers acknowledge numerous difficulties in doing so and 
include budget support definition differences (2008).  Explanations of project level volatility have 
not been developed by independent researchers because access to the appropriate data to 
rigorously, deeply explore the questions is limited (Birdsall, 2004).  A small exception is program 
evaluations gathering input in accordance to a priori defined outcomes and measurements.   
Studies repeatedly cite the need for additional detail to understand aid volatility.  For 
example, researchers found a substantial amount of variance remained unexplained.  They  
discussed the inadequacies of existing data sets and concluded that “An ideal dataset would 
also indicate why committed or expected aid and actually disbursed aid differ” (Celasun & 
Walliser, 2008, p. 554).    For example, researchers did not have access to key documents 
detailing capital investment deals between donors and recipients nor discussions where actors 
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expressed their beliefs in their own words in closed meetings (Oxfam, 2005).  When data was 
available, some important data sets were aggregated in a way that vital distinctions were not 
uncovered. 
Organizational behavior has been underexplored and remains substantially uncovered.  
Researchers have examined the relationship between volatility and, for example, a LDC being 
designated as a fragile state or having certain governance characteristics (Bulir & Hamann, 
2008).  Conversely, observing behavior to develop definitions and identify relationships is 
sparse in the literature.  Research was located that assessed the appropriateness of 
disbursement-delaying behavior; unfortunately, rich descriptions of the behavior with linkages to 
volatility were not provided (Celasun & Walliser, 2008).  Behavioral responses to the influence 
of accountability mechanisms, for example, were not sufficiently explored (Oxfam, 2005).  Just 
as a recipient is held accountable for satisfying disbursement conditions, a donor’s behavior in 
response to accountability for disbursement commitments is important.  Similarly, information 
connecting donor and other participants behavior to volatility in the constraining context of 
collaborations is sparse (Oxfam, 2005).  
The setting and factors explicitly considered in studies reveal limitations in some of the 
research.   One study examined capital investment in government budget sector development 
programs to observe relationships between volatility and institutional ranking of the government.  
The ranking of institutions used a set of factors from prior research while leaving unexplored the 
factor in the set that measured perceptions conflict would destabilize the government institution 
(Fielding & Martrotas, 2005; Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2003).  Numerous studies 
measuring aid effectiveness, many including volatility effects, are sensitive to environmental 
factors and yet often overlook such exogenous variables in their analysis (Oxfam, 2005).  
Field work in challenging LDC settings is often strenuous and expensive, resulting in 
methodological approaches and subject selection that constrain analytical rigor.  In addition, the 
overwhelming focus on aid to governments can make it difficult to focus on and isolate certain 
behaviors that may be common among aid capital recipients in expansive government 
institutions.  Another constraint faced in much extant research is the amount and timing 
properties of volatility (Celasun & Walliser, 2008; World Bank, 2010).  Expectations regarding 
amount of capital and timing of disbursement are both important.  If treated as separate 
variables there are likely to be collinearity difficulties.  Although certain measures may show 
capital disbursement amounts as expected, it is highly likely timing volatility is more prevalent.   
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In other words, by the end of the designated agreement period most committed capital may be 
disbursed; however, it was likely delayed at one or numerous points during the agreement 
period.  This timing property has not received sufficient attention in research to-date.  
Research subject selection and data sources challenged limited rigorous analysis.  This 
issue is related to difficulties accessing data.  Studies exploring questions important to 
understanding the problem used instruments that imposed a construct on responders in eliciting 
their views and beliefs.  On one hand, this approach is more constraining than allowing 
responders to express views and beliefs using their own words.  On the other hand, instruments 
normally had other advantages in the analytic process, such as facilitating certain statistical 
calculations.  Moreover, often there was only one data source used to elicit responses to a 
question.  For example, a study may focus on donors or recipient governments; when both were 
included they were asked different questions (SPA, 2008; World Bank, 2010). 
These are important challenges that on-going research is seeking to overcome.  The 
relationship between organizational behavior and capital flow volatility is insufficiently explored 
in the existing literature (CGAP, 2002; Latortue et al., 2007; Reille & Forster, 2008).  
Furthermore, no research could be located connecting microfinance, foreign aid capital, and 
capital volatility.  More specifically, research utilizing grounded theory technique12 to examine 
linkages between capital flow volatility, donors, and microfinance institutions could not be found.  
The methods and techniques in this investigation can be viewed in light of these challenges to 
researching capital flow volatility while considering different ways to respond to these important 
challenges.  
Capital flow is the outcome from capital investment deals that is the spotlight of this 
study.  In grounded theory this outcome is referred to as the consequence when employing the 
coding paradigm (Hallberg, 2006; Strauss & Corbin, 1998).  The opportunity (value) of the 
capital flow in this investigation was measured by time and MFI condition at disbursement 
(Ostrom, 2005).   Time dimensions ranged from when MFIs received the official investment 
capital approval notice until the complete investment was made or disbursed.  MFI condition at 
disbursement had several properties with dimensional ranges.  Examples of properties include 
                                               
12 Grounded theory techniques accommodate diverse data types, allow for eliciting constructs and 
explanations from interviewees nonintrusively, and analyzes text data by fragmenting and re-aggregating 
to form concepts as foundation components of dense, integrated theory.  These techniques are discussed 
extensively in chapter four. 
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outreach, financial performance indicators, and institutional factors (e.g., governance, internal 
controls, data and information systems).  Actions of participant in a deal impacted the value of 
the outcome. Therefore, certain actions added or took-away from value.  The permitted, 
required, and forbidden actions of participants were determined by rules specified in documents 
(espoused rules).  Also, actions were determined by the relative control participants exercised 
(working rules).  Understanding the problem and responses, while working to develop remedies, 
involves seeing linkages between behavior of all actors in deals and the problem, or value-
impacting volatility of disbursements.  The following chapter begins presenting the research 
methods and techniques employed in this investigation.   
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3.0  RESEARCH DESIGN:  SUBJECT SELECTION AND ANALYTICAL FOCUS  
This investigation approached volatility with the assumption that a substantial portion of what 
remained unexplained would be found by better understanding relationships between volatility 
and behaviors at the organizational level. The capital delivery mechanism analyzed in this 
investigation, the first UNCDF sector development programme (SDP), was involved in many 
activities to produce outputs and outcomes selected and defined by its organizers.  As such, this 
investigation narrowed in on activities that identified and explained linkages between 
organizational behavior and capital flow.   This investigation was not about how microfinance 
institutions helped people emerge from poverty and enhanced their self-worth.  Similarly, it was 
not focused on decision processes involved with foreign aid donors deciding to participate in the 
SDP nor on decision processes resulting in capital investment in deals.  The focus of this 
investigation is phenomena associated with capital investment deals to identify linkages 
between behavior and volatility.   
Investigating aid capital volatility is essentially an analysis of public organization 
behavior and donor foreign aid capital flows in a LDC.  Behaviors are actions/interactions, 
strategies, and tactics.  Aid flows are operationalized in numerous ways in the literature; 
however, it will be shown that participants in this investigation understand it in terms of different 
time dimension.  Volatility is variability in disbursement timing of each tranche from the 
time a capital investment deal was approved and as measured against the structure of 
the deal (e.g., length of time to satisfy conditions, and length of time between satisfying 
conditions, TSP requesting donor disbursement/processing disbursement, MITAF 
process/procedure).    
This chapter is part one of setting forth the research design and methods used to 
examine the interactions associated with capital flow pursuant to capital investment deals.  
Public organizations and donor foreign aid have a complex relationship shaped by important 
environmental (exogenous) factors, which requires a robust framework to structure examination.  
The framework selected clarified analytic components and relationship, narrowing in on a 
specific aspect in the complexity to facilitate developing substantive theory.  In addition, a case 
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study method was used to explore empirical data pertaining to a project beginning several years 
before commencing examination.  Also, grounded theory approaches were used to elicit diverse 
insights and participant perspectives, as well as analyze interview and archival data containing 
details of key interaction attributes.  Some data were analyzed to calculate descriptive and 
inferential statistics used to portray activity levels and timing, including statistically significant 
differences between periods of activity.  The following details how this investigation combined 
these analytics to develop a robust investigation of linkages between organizational behavior 
and aid capital volatility.    
This chapter provides investigative methods and techniques used to frame the study and 
select the case. First, the initial UNCDF-SDP is described as the space where deals are 
negotiated and implemented.  SDP, as the case study, is explained and participant information 
is provided.  The UNCDF-SDP was a collaborative project.  Project participants included the 
Sierra Leone government, donors, MFIs, and an apex mechanism administered by a technical 
service provider (TSP).  Participants were subjects that employed action/interaction strategies 
and tactics to alter and respond to capital flow, as well as changes in context or conditions, 
including macro conditions (Strauss & Corbin, 1998).  It is argued in detail that the case study 
method, microfinance, the first SDP, and Sierra Leone are uniquely appropriate for this 
investigation.  The research questions are also presented.   
Second, the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework is presented as a 
tool for framing the investigation.  The general variables of the framework are specifically 
identified as pertaining to this investigation.  This includes a detailed discussion of the 
environmental variables that other research was charged with insufficiently considering. Three 
environmental factors shaped the case:  MFI regulation, informal economy, and rules.  The 
following chapter will discuss data collection and analysis in the grounded theory tradition. 
3.1 THE CASE STUDY AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The case study approach is well suited for this close, detailed analysis of capital investment 
deals.  Case study analysis is appropriate for relatively current phenomena where a controlled 
intervention cannot be administered.  This investigation of a UNCDF-SDP involved 2004 
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through 2009,13 which does not lend itself to experimental controls as the project was near 
completion at the commencement of this investigation. Case study techniques have the capacity 
to incorporate numerous forms of evidence such as reports, interviews, and artifacts.  For 
example, observations, interviews, and archival and document analysis data collection 
procedures are appropriate for the case study approach. Each was used in this investigation. 
The purpose of this investigation was not to generalize to all MFIs nor all flows of donor 
aid.  Rather, it was to develop a substantive theory applicable to SDPs and other collaborative 
arrangements to create inclusive financial sectors (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss, 1987; 
Strauss & Corbin, 1998), as well as add to current theory.14  These are appropriate aims for 
case study research (Yin, 2009).  The case study method accommodated the complexity and 
many components of interest in this investigation, such as environment, capital flow, and 
participant actions/interactions.  Each aspect underscores the applicability of the case study 
approach.   
This investigation will add to aid volatility and organizational literature by answering three 
research questions as applied to the SDP case: 
• How do different actors account for variances in capital disbursements? 
• What responses do different actors recommend to reduce variances? 
• How are organizations’ behaviors linked to volatility in disbursements? 
The resulting substantive theory represents the actors in the SDP case and is applicable to that 
collaboration; it focuses on the population from which it was developed (Strauss & Corbin, 
1998).  It also can be applied to similar settings as set forth in this chapter.  This theory is 
labeled Capitalflow Bureaucratic Triad.  The theory states: Value of capital is affected by 
linkages between organizational behavior and capital volatility.  Capital flow volatility is 
determined by the interactions of three properties of bureaucracy:  collaboration; accountability; 
and effectiveness, efficiency, and responsiveness (impact).  Capital value is a function of the 
level of volatility and MFI condition at disbursement.  The explanatory power of the theory and 
                                                
 
13 This investigation focuses on 2006-2009, though not exclusively. 
14 Strauss and Corbin draw upon the Glaser & Strauss classification of theories as substantive or formal.  
Formal theories are useful to broader interests and concerns.  They are derived from analysis involving 
diverse conditions and sampling.  Substantive theory applies to the population and context from which it 
was derived; however, similar conditions and populations can benefit, such as SDPs in conflict, fragile 
state settings.     
38 
 
model was found in the specific external variables shaping capital investment deals, particulars 
of a deal, organizational behavior, structure of the collaborative, and related capital volatility 
(Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Strauss & Corbin, 1998). In other words, CBT’s ability to explain 
what may occur in certain situations is the framing of conditions that give rise to capital 
disbursement and the actions/interactions employed, and explaining the volatility affect.  The 
following section argues that the first UNCDF-SDP is an appropriate selection for the case. 
3.1.1 Case Selection: Why microfinance, SDP, and Sierra Leone? 
Capital delivery mechanisms are needed at various levels of LDC societies and for numerous 
development instruments.  Capital volatility at these levels and for these instruments devalues 
the foreign aid disbursed. This section argues that microfinance is a valuable instrument, SDP a 
valuable mechanism, and Sierra Leone a valuable LDC setting for examining linkages between 
organizational behavior and capital volatility. 
3.1.1.1 Why microfinance? 
The need for capital delivery mechanisms and challenges of capital volatility are vivid when 
viewed through microfinance institutions (MFIs).  MFIs are a ubiquitous development device in 
LDCs.  They have demonstrated the potential to be an effective capital delivery mechanism for 
poor people. 
     The problem of volatility experienced by aid capital delivery mechanisms is better 
understood by examining capital investments in instruments that provide capital directly to poor 
people in LDCs.  Microfinance is one of many development instruments and is intriguing 
because it demonstrates that the poor are bankable.15  Access to financial services such as 
savings, insurance, transaction instruments (e.g., checking accounts, debit/credit cards, mobile 
phones), and credit help poor entrepreneurs and households improve their welfare and manage 
economic shock (Karlan & Morduch, 2009).  Although rigorous research on the role of 
microfinance in improving the lot of the poor is sparse, encouraging work has shown that better 
financial institutions and private credit both grow aggregate output through an increase in 
                                                
 
15 Bankability is a measure of the poor’s insurability, capacity to repay loans, and accumulate savings 
(Karlan & Morduch, 2009), 
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savings and improve income dispersion (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, & Levine, 2007; G. R. G. Clarke, 
Xu, & Zou, 2006; Gries, Kraft, & Meierrieks, 2009; Joseph Stiglitz, 1988).  Given that futility 
often connects with efforts to establish statistically significant relationships and causation to 
development interventions, it seems to be more important that microfinance is a development 
instrument with the potential to be self-sustainable.  Even if lacking statistically significant 
evidentiary backing, the early 21st century economic environment (i.e., resources and capital are 
constrained), favors self-sustainable development instruments with measurable outcomes.  
While microfinance dates back centuries, its recent use as a component of the global 
development agenda has pointed to important questions.  A particularly heated debate involves 
the structure and mission of MFIs:  
• Are these financial services best provided by non-profit or for-profit institutions?   
• Is profit maximization or social outcomes the best organizational purpose?   
• Can a combined goal of improving the lot of the poor and operating sustainability 
result in sufficient outcomes that warrant a long-term investment?   
For example, consider India’s microfinance sector began as a nonprofit endeavor emphasizing 
social outcomes, but also experienced success commercially. This commercial success has led 
to a political backlash with potential to have impacts some contend will be similar to the 
subprime mortgage meltdown, with global implications (Bajaj, 2010; Polgreen & Bajaj, 2010; 
Taylor, 2011).  This empirical paradox illustrates the divergence that occurs in striving to 
achieve a dual bottom-line mission.   
Lending to the poor in Ireland was used to improve both economic and social well-being 
in the 1800s (i.e., dual bottom-line).  Its use today speaks to the persistence of the belief in 
financial services as central to fighting poverty.  Nevertheless, MFIs’ centrality in the 
development paradigm ultimately makes it the focus of critical evaluation.  Numerous concerns 
regarding effectiveness in alleviating poverty and opportunity costs of not funding alternative 
instruments are often expressed (Dichter, 2007; Hulme, 2007). 
The cross-cutting impacts of microfinance on development issues, including gender  and 
education concerns, and its appeal to private and public investors attract researchers spanning  
organizational, social, political, and economic fields (Armendariz de Aghion & Morduch, 2005; 
Dunion, 2010; Imboden et al., 2006).   Researchers have examined microfinance institution 
governance and financial performance.  Studies have considered the impact of subsidies on 
credit allocation, such as targeting women when providing credit.  Scholars have explored 
40 
 
questions of microfinance aid allocation around the globe.  Examining microfinance to 
understand the relationship between capital volatility and organizational behavior adds to a rich, 
diverse body of literature.   
At present, when income disparities are growing globally, it is important to aim for 
uncovering instances, descriptions, and explanations of capital flow volatility pursuant to 
investment deals, especially as they relate to microfinance institutions.  Organizational actors 
interacting in foreign aid capital investment in an MFI need to be understood in terms of lived 
reality directed at poverty alleviation.  It is here that NGOs, international aid agencies, local 
governments, and nation states can experience organizational learning and organizational 
intelligence.16  Microfinance is an appropriate intervention to study this linkage phenomenon 
because of its centrality to the global development agenda, the integral role the financial sector 
has in a nation’s administrative institutions, and the apparent interconnectedness of actor 
behavior and capital flow.  
3.1.1.2 Why the first UNCDF Sector Development Programme? 
In 2003 the United Nations Capital Development Fund (UNCDF) created its first SDP as a 
capital delivery mechanism for Sierra Leone in response to the need for capital and a delivery 
channel, the Microfinance Investment and Technical Assistance Facility (MITAF).  From 2003 
through 2009 UNCDF formed 22 sectors development programs that serve as capital delivery 
mechanisms in LDCs. The MITAF case was the space where one or more donors, a MFI, and 
the apex (technical service provider) interacted.  MITAF was created by a collaborative 
agreement involving the government of Sierra Leone, Bank of Sierra Leone, UNDP, and 
UNCDF.  Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW), a German development financial institution, and 
Cordaid, an Amsterdam based Catholic INGO joined the project’s governing Investment 
Committee (IC) in August 2004 and December 2004 respectively.  The collaboration initially 
committed $12.5 million USD to assist in developing a pro-poor financial sector in Sierra Leone.   
MITAF, functioning as an apex, was administered by a technical service provider (TSP) 
selected by the IC in July 2004.  Over time, the TSP recommended, with the IC selecting, 
sixteen microfinance institution partners ostensibly according to criteria contained in the UN 
                                                
 
16 Organizational learning involves behavior changes as knowledge and awareness are acquired.  
Organizational intelligence is a sustained improvement in performance as a result of learning (March, 
1999). 
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Programme Support Document (project support document).  Project funding intended to 
address and underwrite several key sector capital needs, including technical assistance; training 
fellowships, including institutional development; capitalization; operating losses; fixed assets; 
and loan funding.   
The project approach, as opposed to a corporate entity, was selected as the initiative’s 
vehicle as the most expeditious.  This decision underscores the importance of rapidly advancing 
MFI sector development, as expressed in the project support document.  This decision created 
a context that affected organizational behavior and capital volatility. In MITAF distinctions of 
market, government, and civil society were apparent, yet often indistinguishable. Donor 
diversity, timing and context relative to the end of armed conflict, a Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) 
setting, and the interest of international leaders made MITAF a complex and interesting case 
within which to examine relationships between organizational behavior and capital volatility. 
3.1.1.3 Why Sierra Leone?   
Sierra Leone, a post-conflict fragile state SSA nation, has several attributes that made it a 
valuable setting for this investigation.  First, Sierra Leone experienced a brutal civil war that 
ended in 2002.  It was recognized that a vital part of rebuilding the country was the creation of a 
sound, broad, and far reaching financial services sector.  In Sierra Leone this need produces 
significant demands for the diverse set of actors developing the financial sector.  Second, Sierra 
Leone developed a national policy to guide post-conflict rebuilding, including adopting a 
National Microfinance Policy.  A key component of the policy underscored Count’s (Counts, 
2010) point regarding the need for capital delivery mechanisms;  substantial capital was needed 
to develop an inclusive financial sector for the country.   A vehicle for delivering the capital was 
just as important due to the fragile state of the post-conflict government.   
Third, in support of the national policy, diverse donors and leaders in microfinance 
responded to the need for capital by collaborating with the government of Sierra Leone to 
develop a pro-poor financial sector.  From 2003 through 2009 UNCDF formed 22 sector 
development programs that serve as capital delivery mechanisms in LDCs; Sierra Leone was 
the first location selected.  This distinguishes the country among developing nations.  Leaders in 
microfinance considered Sierra Leone uniquely situated to serve as a model for West Africa due 
to its weak framework as a fragile state  (MicrofinanceFocus, 2009; UNCDF, 2004a, 2008).  It  
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was believed successful interventions in the country can inform developing effective programs 
in the region.  Particularly important for serving as a model, was the SDP’s design to operate 
exclusively during the critical years following civil war (when conflict is most likely to re-erupt) 
and the period when post-conflict states are most capable of effectively absorbing foreign aid.   
  The fragile state attribute is inseparable from its pre-war colonial history (Picard, 2005).  
Sierra Leone’s pre-war period during the 20th century was highlighted by independence from 
British rule in 1961.  Sierra Leone is approximately the size of the state of South Carolina in the 
United States and located on the coast of West Africa.  Pedro da Cintra, a Portuguese explorer, 
named the country Serra de Leao roughly translated as Lion Mountains in 1462. The current 
capital, Freetown, was founded by the Sierra Leone Company in 1787 and has been home to 
former African slaves from America and the West Indies.  After becoming Britain’s West African 
colony in 1792, Sierra Leone served as the residence of the governor for the settlements of 
Gambia and the Gold Coast.17  In addition, Sierra Leone was considered to be the educational 
center of British West Africa.  However, the Sierra Leone turned over by the British to residents 
of the country was extremely poor (e.g., viewed by many as raped of the best diamond 
reserves), practically illiterate (literacy rate below 10%), and possessed frail government 
institutions.   
Following independence, a new prime minister took office pursuant to the 1967 
elections.  He consolidated power by creating a one-party state and implementing a patrimonial 
political system.  This political situation permitted Increased corruption, patrimonialism, and 
deterioration of government institutions to take place and effectively marginalized Sierra Leone 
tribes and people.   In response, unemployed and excluded young men formed the 
Revolutionary United Front to overthrow the abusive regime.  A  civil war ensued that tore the 
nation once known as the “Athens of West Africa” (A. Patton, 1996, pp. 59, 60) into ruins and 
covered it with blood until a peace agreement was finally reached in 2002 (Donovan, Smart, 
Moreno-Torres, Kiso, & Zachariah, 2005).  Rebuilding was essential for national recovery.  Part 
of this recovery was creating a, sound, broad reaching financial system — a hallmark of truly 
modern societies.   
                                                
 
17 The Gold Coast was the name given by Europeans to the region now known as Ghana.  The 
Portuguese, first to arrive to the region in 1471, found substantial gold deposits in the area.  European 
traders created residences along the coast in the years following the discovery to trade these resources.  
The British Gold Coast was established in 1821 as the British took control of coastal lands. 
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Figure 1:  Sierra Leone map. 
http://www.worldatlas.com/webimage/countrys/africa/sl.htm 
Sierra Leone’s poverty and banking-access challenges are reflective of SSA’s distinction 
in the developing world.  According to a 2002-2004 data, the proportion of the SSA population 
with a bank account in prudentially regulated financial institutions18 was less than 20% 
compared to the West and Asia, with substantially more people holding bank accounts (Karlan 
& Morduch, 2009).  The vast majority of the poorest clients served were in South Asia, which 
recorded a decrease in the proportion of poorest from 1981-2005 (from 60% to 40%) with the 
absolute number remaining constant at approximately 600 million. In SSA the proportion 
remained virtually unchanged at 50%, while almost doubling in absolute terms to over 300 
million.  This comparison illustrates the relationship between access to financial services and 
reduction in poverty, as well as the disparate experience of SSA.  Similar to the focus on 
poverty and disparate resource flow by Stephane Pallage and Michel Robe (2003) when 
selecting SSA for their business cycles welfare cost study, this investigation in a SSA nation is 
particularly germane.19   
  
                                                
 
18 Prudential regulation pertains to deposit taking institutions  (2006, p. 36).   
19 The poverty disparity is underscored by empirical data showing much of the developing world trending 
toward halving those living on less than $1.25 per day while SSA is left behind.  Research has found  
SSA is the only region where more than 50% of people are in extreme poverty (Dunion, 2010). 
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The connection between microfinance clients, capital flow, and foreign aid in Africa is 
backed by empirical evidence.  A survey recording pricing and other constraints related to 
financial service access in the top commercial banks (categorized by size) specifically notes the 
inaccessibility of commercial banks in Sierra Leone.  Sierra Leone represents an extreme 
example where owning a checking account involved fees greater than 25% of per capita gross 
domestic product (Karlan & Morduch, 2009).  This illustrates how capital provided to Sierra 
Leone commercial banks did not translate into improved access to capital for the poor because 
of factors such as account maintenance cost incurred by customers. In addition, the 
International Monetary Fund categorized Sierra Leone financial sector as “underdeveloped” 
because the nation only provided one account for every 32 people and private sector credit at 
5% of  gross domestic product (IMF, 2009b).  Data reflect African citizens’ capital taking flight off 
the continent to the tune of 40% of portfolio value, with alarming figures in SSA (Cai & 
Theisman, 2005; Salisu, 2005; The Economist, 2005).  Disparate access to financial services 
and lack of capital employed to address this issue underscore the importance of capital delivery 
mechanisms with constrained volatility to strengthen aid capital value.    
Sierra Leone is a major foreign aid recipient and one of the most challenged nations in 
human development.  Economist Dwight Perkins and his colleagues (2006) posit that foreign aid 
from industrialized nations is a vital capital flow for developing countries.  No other part of the 
world receives a greater proportion of aid than Africa. In 2009 aid per capita was $47 USD to 
Africa, with SSA receiving multiples more than northern Africa (Deutscher, 2010; OECD, 2011).  
Moreover, aid to Sierra Leone was almost double the amount invested in SSA (Deutscher, 
2010).  SSA has one of the lowest human development measures globally and faces formidable 
challenges in this area; in 2010, Sierra Leone ranked 158 out of 169 countries on human 
development progress (UNDP, 2010).  Sierra Leone is extremely poor, receives substantial 
amounts of foreign aid, and has a very large segment of the population underserved by the 
financial sector.  
These details point to the urgency and importance of having an effective capital delivery 
mechanism.  With the end of war, how could poor, untrained people in Sierra Leone make a 
living while contributing to the rebuilding and restructuring of a devastated country?  Sierra 
Leone’s leaders developed a plan that initiated the National Micro-Finance Policy.  The policy 
was developed by a public-private task force and approved by the Sierra Leone cabinet.   The  
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policy acknowledges linkages between reduced poverty and economic growth.  The policy also 
recognizes that microfinance services result in more productive economic activities undertaken 
by the population (RSL, 2002a).  Lack of capital was a major constraint in developing a viable 
pro-poor microfinance sector.   
The validity of this major constraint seems to be reflected in citizen activities and plans.  
For example, a comparison between 400 Sierra Leone microfinance borrowers and 900 non-
borrowers and to national statistics found that activities involving livestock, poultry, and 
agriculture were more prevalent among microfinance borrowers than both non-borrowers and 
the national average (BRAC, 2010).  In addition, according to this and other studies, borrowers 
more often planned to start new enterprises in the coming year than non-borrowers (BRAC, 
2010; Karlan & Morduch, 2009). The relationship between microfinance clients, higher instances 
of productive activities, and reports of plans for new enterprises suggested that relief from 
capital constraints was associated with increased economic activity in Sierra Leone.  
Investigating capital flow volatility in delivery mechanisms was well served by focusing on a 
SDP in Sierra Leone.  
3.1.2 Organizations as participants and people as corporate actors  
It is important to understand the perspective of this investigation regarding diverse actors, 
people interviewed as corporate-actors representing organizations that participated in a Sierra 
Leone-based capital delivery mechanism (Strauss & Corbin, 1998).  Although the participants in 
this study consist of three types of corporate actors - or “decision-making entities” –as Ostrom 
(2005) explains—they are connected to other environments or settings.  This connection is 
illustrated by how rules are perceived and understood by different cultures.  In other words, 
people are viewed as organizations, rather than individuals.  The IAD framework allows for, and 
deems it appropriate to give, consideration to the fact the interviewees are, in fact, individuals 
that also interact with various people in numerous other situations.  Ostrom draws on the work 
of Fritz Scharpf to explain how individual “private preferences” are “neutralized” in employment 
relations (Ostrom, 2005, p. 38).  Accepting that respondents are involved in employment 
relations (i.e., corporate actors) and utilizing the case study approach are central to avoid  
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problems encountered by linking hierarchical data at different levels.  This investigation did not 
look at the effects of macro interventions at the level of the MFI.  The focus was on 
interorganizational behaviors related to capital flow, all at the same organizational level (Newton 
& Llosa, 2010).    
Interviewees were corporate actors interacting with other participants in MITAF; 
however, linkages of actors with other environments/settings were not ignored in this 
investigation (Ostrom, 2005).  People in MITAF organizations interact with others in settings 
beyond employment where their individual preferences are shaped and consequently shape 
deals that result in MITAF organizations action/interaction.  For purposes of this investigation, 
the employment setting was the context for the people interviewed.  The neutralizing of private 
preferences in employment settings is explained by Herbert Simon as decisions people make as 
participants in organizations.  In other words, he says people set-aside private preferences 
when making decisions, in employment settings, in deference to organizational preference, such 
as policies and procedures.  Simon (1996) identified organizational performance resulting from 
the self-sacrificing work of people as central to certain business activities being conducted 
through organizations and not markets.  As Simon explains, views of these people were 
influenced by the organization’s perspective.  As such, in this investigation interviewees’ 
perceptions, beliefs, and values were considered to be those of the employer corporate-actor, 
acknowledging that there were factors that distinguished the interviewees as shapers of 
implemented corporate policies, such as culture factors (H. A. Simon, 1997).  The apex, MFIs, 
and donors represent rich, diverse organizational cultures and staffs from different regions of 
the world. 
3.1.2.1 Donors:  MITAF Investment Committee   
In this study, donors were the source of capital.  Donors comprised the Investment Committee 
(IC), which functioned like a nonprofit organization’s board of trustees.  Donors also operated as 
corporate investors with respective organizational interests.  The three types of donor 
institutions are described in this section.  Having organizational profiles of the subjects 
advances the understanding of behaviors examined in this investigation.  
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The German Development Bank (KfW) is considered both a bilateral donor and financial 
development bank (2009; Easterly & Pfutze, 2008).  On one hand, KfW operates based on 
many of the same principles as a development, or international, bank (type of multilateral donor) 
by investing in nongovernmental entities like microfinance institutions (Latortue et al., 2007).   
On the other hand, it is exclusively associated with a particular country, Germany; therefore, it is 
considered as bilateral.  The German Development Bank ranks among the top five funders in 
SSA based on amount of foreign aid.  These top five provide 50% of the microfinance funding in 
SSA (2009).  In addition, KfW committed and provided more capital to MITAF than each of the 
other IC members. 
Two MITAF donors are part of the United Nations (UN) family.  The United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP) and United Nations Capital Development Fund (UNCDF) are 
multi-lateral donors (2002).  The UN selected UNCDF as the focal point of its system’s activities 
for the 2005 International Year of Microfinance.  MITAF Sierra Leone is part of a UNCDF 
initiative in Africa, “Building Inclusive Financial Sectors in Africa” (UNCDF, 2004a, 2008).  UNDP 
and UNCDF are financed by numerous nations and UN members.   
The final MITAF donor, Cordaid, is an Amsterdam based international non-governmental 
organization (INGO) with multiple development goals.  Cordaid’s in-house microfinance 
expertise is somewhat unique among INGOs (CGAP, 2004; Latortue et al., 2007).  The relation 
with its government is a noteworthy attribute as the Dutch are ranked among the top nations 
investing in microfinance and historically allocate extraordinary amounts of bilateral assistance 
through nongovernmental organizations (CGAP, 2004; Derksen & Verhallen, 2008).  One 
survey reports that Cordaid invested in more SSA countries than KfW in 2008 (CGAP, 2004).  In 
addition, Cordaid is a religious, or faith-based, INGO.  This faith-based aspect represents a 
unique and remarkable attribute  (Derksen & Verhallen, 2008).  A recent survey reports that 
U.S. religious congregations alone contributed an estimated $4.5 billion to U.S. based 
international relief and development efforts in 2008 (Triplett, 2010).   This amount approximates 
total annual investment in microfinance and may be an indicator of the potential importance of 
this faith component. 
3.1.2.2 Apex:  Technical Service Provider 
There was an intriguing operational link in this investigation between donors and microfinance 
institutions: the apex organization. The purpose of MITAF was the establishment of an inclusive 
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financial system to broaden access to financial services to the poor (UNCDF, 2004b).  Important 
to a financial system are meso level20 organizations including customer credit reporting 
agencies, MFI rating agencies, and other second tier entities (CGAP, 2006).  Apex 
organizations are one type of second tier meso mechanism.   
Apex organizations have various organizational structures.  They serve as channels of 
funding and/or technical support providers to numerous MFIs in a single nation (CGAP, 2006; 
Duflos & El-Zoghbi, 2010).  The MITAF apex was formed in 2003 as an administrative 
mechanism for this UNCDF project. The project structure was used rather than a distinct 
corporate entity.  This was a conscious decision, in collaboration with the Government of Sierra 
Leone, to expedite the project’s launch (UNCDF, 2004b).  Creating a corporate entity would 
have resulted in a distinct ownership structure, accountability lines, and different considerations 
in designing capital flow.  Equally as importantly to this investigation, organizers believed it 
would have taken at least six months to complete the Sierra Leone bureaucratic process to form 
a corporate entity, which was deemed an unacceptable delay.  The apex was charged with both 
MFI sector capacity building (e.g., providing technical assistance to MFIs in business plan 
preparation for submitting funding proposals to the IC) and a financial intermediary role between 
donors and MFIs.  Regardless of the organizational structure, these are typical roles for apexes 
(Gonzalez-Vega, 1998).  The financial intermediary role can be viewed as the broker in 
investment banking institutions, as discussed in chapter one.  MITAF serves as a market to 
reduce the transaction costs of connecting capital-providers and capital-seekers.  The apex 
facilitates transactions without taking legal title to the financial claims. This role has been 
emphasized as an important distinction of the MITAF structure.  The apex involvement in capital 
flow varied in important ways as it performed numerous tasks.  
The Program Support Document (PSD) provided a detailed and integral role for the apex 
in MITAF (UNCDF, 2004b).  The IC selected the technical service provider to manage the apex 
(CGAP, 2006; UNCDF, 2004b).   The apex was explicitly charged with achieving the projects’ 
outcomes, including MFIs operating according to minimum financial sustainability standards and 
considerably increasing customer outreach (UNCDF, 2004b).  To a great extent, the apex/TSP’s 
performance was measured based on these and other project outcome targets specified in the 
PSD.   
                                                
 
20 Meso level is the middle level of a financial sector.  The micro level includes financial intermediaries 
and other financial service providers.  The macro level of a financial sector is comprised of government 
policies and processes. 
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Studies reported a mushrooming of apex organization use in MFI sector initiatives throughout 
the world during the period of this investigation.  Though reports indicate mixed performance 
results, the TSP role was underscored as central to the success of apexes (CGAP, 2006; Duflos 
& El-Zoghbi, 2010; Levy, 2002).  Of all its managerial functions, the most important may be the 
selection of MFIs considered for investment by donors (Levy, 2002; UNCDF, 2004b).   
3.1.2.3 Microfinance institutions   
Chapter one provided a detailed introduction to microfinance institutions (MFIs) as embedded in 
the broad context of financial intermediaries.  MFIs provide the basic services of commercial 
banks:  deposit accounts, loans, transaction services (e.g., ATM cards).  Half of the MITAF MFIs 
offered these basic services.  The primary distinction between MFIs participating in MITAF is 
whether or not they accepted non-collateral deposits.21   
The main function of the financial services sector in Sierra Leone’s informal economy is 
providing deposit and loan products.  Sierra Leone MFI’s are portrayed as operating in the 
informal economy community.  Many MITAF MFIs, considered the best prospect for providing 
leadership to the nation’s MFIs, did not easily fit into the commercial bank legal framework that 
permits institutions to accept customer deposits.  Organizing a commercial bank in Sierra Leone 
is difficult primarily because of high capital requirements.  One MFI partner that met these 
requirements was ProCredit.  ProCredit’s target market was the same as MITAF, both of which 
sought to increase financial service access.  Four MITAF members were formed as community 
banks, which were also technically organized as commercial banks; they resembled community 
credit unions with residents of the chiefdoms as shareholders.  ProCredit, in contrast, was 
substantially owned by an international holding company and MITAF Investment Committee 
member KfW had over a 20% stake.  This powerful, resourceful partnership was crucial in 
ProCredit’s satisfaction of commercial bank capital requirement regulations.  Community banks 
were initiated by Sierra Leone’s central bank, Bank of Sierra Leone.  This included capitalization  
  
                                                
 
21 Collateral deposits are MFI customer accounts used as collateral for loans.  
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assistance in the form of loans with very favorable terms, and waiver of some capital 
requirements in the commercial bank legal framework.  Many MFIs in MITAF were established 
without the powerful, resourceful relationships of ProCredit and the community banks. 
Consequently, a large portion of MFI partners were similar to finance companies, providing loan 
products only (no deposit accounts).   
MFIs in MITAF are distinguished by four characteristics:  structure, domicile origin, 
geography, and the year of MITAF capital commitment.  For example, structure is characterized 
by such attributes as domestic, international, urban, northern, southern, NGO, and community 
bank.  Many MFI partners began focusing on lending as one of several programs offered by an 
NGO.  For instance, World Hope International has been registered in Sierra Leone since 1999 
and offers education and health programs; microfinance was added in 2002 (Hope Micro). 
Another example is the American Refugee Committee (ARC).  ARC registered in 2000 and 
sponsors various programs on HIV awareness and skill development.  The ARC microfinance 
initiative began as a program in 2001 and reorganized as a separate institution in 2005 (Finance 
Salone).  Another example, the Grassroots Gender Empowerment Movement (GGEM), is a 
domestic NGO involved in community development, networking services, and micro-credit.  In 
January 2008 its microfinance operation was reorganized to operate in a separate department 
with separate financial accounting; however, it remains part of the NGO.  This structural 
distinction at GGEM is an important illustration of efforts to satisfy MITAF’s emphasis on clarity 
and transparency in MFI operations, while remaining part of the NGO structure.   
 The Community Empowerment and Development Agency (CEDA) story gives a sense 
of the organizational roots shared by many MITAF MFIs.  CEDA began as a program, Lunia 
Agriculture and Rural Development project, focused on agricultural activities and gender 
empowerment in the southern districts of Bo and Kenema.  After restructuring and increasing 
institutional capacity to serve more people and communities, the current name was adopted and 
in 1994 it was licensed as a national NGO.  CEDA developed a program for micro-credit with 
support from the government’s Social Action for Poverty Alleviation.  As of December 31, 2009 
CEDA had over 6,300 borrowers, ranking among the top five in MITAF MFIs for clients served.  
The expectation and belief was that CEDA had capacity to significantly grow the number of 
clients served. 
MFIs in MITAF have diverse backgrounds, structures, and product portfolios to serve 
those with limited access to financial services.  One shared characteristic was the espoused 
view of MITAF,  MFIs as partners (MITAF, 2006).  This eclectic collection of MITAF MFIs (e.g., 
NGOs, commercial banks, community banks), selected to be developed as leaders of the MFI 
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sector, often presented challenges to MITAF that could not be effectively addressed with a one 
size fits all approach.  The diversity and associated challenges were reflected in organizational 
behaviors and capital flow.  The diversity and associated challenges, along with complexity 
introduced by interactions with donors and the apex, were examined utilizing the IAD 
framework.  
3.2 THE IAD FRAMEWORK  
The IAD framework serves organizational analysis by accommodating numerous, varied 
theories, such as grounded theory.  The framework presents patterns of relationships that can 
be analyzed at any number of points in its structure.  Nobel Laureate Elinor Ostrom (2005) 
explains that a framework is used to identify both the components to be considered in the study 
of an institution and the questions explored.  As the next section explains, IAD accomplishes 
this by providing a number of general variables that can be used to analyze an empirical setting.  
The general variables, exogenous (environmental) variables, influence the configuration of the 
action arena where interactions produce outcomes.  These variables represent implicit 
assumptions, how relationships are ordered; attributes of the world; and the nature of the setting 
where the MITAF case functions.  The specific variables of a study are unique to that case and 
are set forth below for this investigation.  
3.2.1 IAD components 
Theories are selected that narrow in on certain parts of the IAD framework to explain 
relationship patterns (Ostrom, 2005).  Research on foreign capital processes cannot draw 
exclusively on one discipline as this would significantly narrow the influence of other variables.   
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Public administration, organizational theory, economics, history and development studies have 
vital theoretical constructs pertinent to understand relationships between organizational 
behavior and donor capital flow characteristics (Ostrom, Gibson, Shivakumar, & Andersson, 
2002).  For example, theories of path dependency, development dependency, and resource 
dependency, along with institutional and organizational theories are used in this study to 
understand how behaviors are linked to capital volatility and to appreciate how 
interorganizational activities (MFIs, donors, apex organizations) are shaped by history, context, 
and tradition.    
The IAD framework is used to investigate phenomena in a variety of empirical contexts. 
For instance, an evaluation conducted for the Swedish International Development Agency 
explored how development corporation incentives affect sustainable outcomes in 
underdeveloped states (Ostrom et al., 2002). Findings from this and other research were used 
to select environmental variables and other parameters of this investigation.  This included 
incorporating the implicit assumptions of the IAD framework, which are grounded in theoretical 
and empirical analysis, to guide this investigation.  IAD is robust and effectively assists analysis 
of complex phenomena.  In this investigation it provided basic structure to the complex array of 
considerations.  Figure 2 illustrates the IAD framework. 
 The basic structure of the examination acknowledged the integral role played by three 
environmental variables:  MFI regulation, informal economy, the Rules.  These variables 
represent implicit assumptions, mainly how relationships are ordered; attributes of the world; 
and the nature of the setting.  Simon (1996) argues that environmental factors play an important 
shaping role in work to reconcile desired and actual states, while being primarily responsible for 
the complexity observed in participant action/interactions.  These three environmental variables 
have essential, distinctive attributes, properties.  Properties are essential, distinctive attributes of 
concepts and categories.  The properties and attributes of environmental variables significantly 
affected organizations interacting in MITAF. 
The principal component of the IAD framework is the action arena, which includes two 
subassemblies of variables: action situation and participants.  The action situation subassembly 
is the set of interactions and sphere where the actors of the participants subassembly interact.  
As such, the action situation involves several components, as detailed in Figure 2.  Action 
situation variables are set of actors (participants), positions (occupied by actors), outcomes, 
actions and linkages to outcomes, control (over the function of linkages), information available 
to participants, and costs and benefits assigned to outcomes. “Situations are structured  
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Figure 2:  Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework. 
interactions among participants where individuals must make decisions about actions that affect 
them and others” (Ostrom et al., 2002, p. 23).    
This investigation utilized a case study to investigate linkages of organizational 
behaviour and capital flow.  The IAD action arena was the equivalent of the case study, the 
space where one or more donors, a MFI, and the apex (technical service provider) interacted.  
The action situation was represented by the agreement between a donor(s) and a MFI, 
negotiated by the apex, prescribing certain conditions and terms of payment for capital 
disbursements.  This agreement is referred to as a deal.  The deal is the unit of analysis.  The 
components of the action situations, such as actors, positions, and outcomes were stipulated in 
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a performance based agreement, the Programme Support Document, and other official 
documents.  Participants were MITAF actors involved in the deal and each had particular 
attributes:  learning capacity, power, and credible commitments.  Interactions in the IAD 
framework are actions/interactions of the actors that explicate the working rules, or theories-in-
use.  Working rules govern behaviour in an action arena shaped by environmental variables.  
Capital flow was the outcome of behaviour, which was valued by volatility measures and MFI 
condition at disbursement. Feedback from outcomes to the action arena and exogenous 
variables has the potential to change these over time.  The aim of this investigation is to identify 
and examine linkages, or correlations, between interactions and outcome characteristics.  The 
following is a discussion of specific environmental variables that shaped outcome producing 
interactions in the MITAF case. 
3.2.2 IAD environmental variables 
The MITAF case was an action arena where capital investment deals were negotiated, and 
organizations acted/interacted to implement the deal.  The case was shaped by three outside 
factors:  MFI regulation, the informal economy, and the Rules.  The shaping effect of MFI 
regulation in Sierra Leone as a public good was understood in terms of its properties as a post-
conflict and fragile state.  The community environmental variable, informal economy, was the 
location of this study.   Literature defines the informal economy as all economic activity not 
subject to government regulation or taxation.  It typically involves self-employed people and 
households.  In this investigation, the informal economy was a by-product of numerous 
interrelated events, such as colonialism and the Sierra Leone civil war. These rules involved 
boundaries and choices.22  It was assumed that rules were relatively more pliable than the two 
other exogenous variables, in terms of responsiveness to participants’ actions/interactions and 
the resulting outcomes.  MFIs, donors, and the apex (technical service provider) are better 
positioned to adjust the rules of interaction and the flow of capital than to adjust microfinance 
regulation or the informal economy (March, 1999; Ostrom, 2005).  The discussion of rules drew 
on theories and empirical data from the literature to explain how they shaped the arena where 
                                                
 
22 Boundary rules involve participant entry and exit relative to MITAF.  Choice rules affect the power in 
capital investment deals (IAD action situations) and its distribution.  Both will be discussed in greater 
detail later. 
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participants interacted. Organizational behavior is about decision making and capital 
characteristics are about capital flow volatility.  Rules, espoused and in-use, frame what is 
permitted, forbidden, and required in behavior and capital flow.   
3.2.2.1            Bio-physical condition:  MFI regulation 
The MITAF project intended to create a pro-poor financial sector. The literature explains that, by 
its very nature, the financial sector is a legal and regulatory framework infused by capital in 
order to create robust institutions and reliably provide the public financial services (Armendariz 
de Aghion & Morduch, 2005; Krugman, 2009; Meagher et al., 2006).  This investigation viewed 
the state as using microfinance regulation to influence and shape the interactions between 
microfinance institutions, donors and the apex organization (technical service provider).  
Microfinance regulation can be viewed as a rule in the framework (Ostrom, 2005; Ostrom, et al., 
2002). On the other hand, when considering the characteristics of the good influencing the 
MITAF case, focusing on public good attributes of microfinance regulation allowed for it to be 
considered as an IAD Biophysical Condition (Ostrom, 2005; Ostrom et al., 2002; Joseph  
Stiglitz, 1993).  A key function included in the role of a regulatory institution is monitoring risk 
and management (Meagher et al., 2006; Joseph  Stiglitz, 1993).  The monitoring attribute 
provides the MFI regulator access to potentially valuable and damaging information about MFIs.  
This threat of disclosure, backed by its legitimacy as a public organization, is used by 
governments regulating MFIs to provide identity to the sector in terms of social acceptance and 
expected behaviors.  As a farmer plants in soil with certain climatic conditions, a MFI operates in 
a specific publicly created financial sector framework.  The institutional strength and specifics 
can vary greatly, yet the regulatory framework’s centrality is particularly true in a nation’s 
financial sector. 
The IRIS Center analyzed key characteristics of MFI regulatory frameworks in seven 
nations (Meagher et al., 2006).  The research found that MFI regulation takes the form 
represented by a place on a spectrum.  On one end of the spectrum is state ownership of MFIs 
and at the other end unlimited market entry with monitoring provided by market forces.  These 
researchers and others reported that outreach, sustainable growth, and financial constraints are 
impacted by the location of MFI regulation on that spectrum (Meagher et al., 2006; Joseph  
Stiglitz, 1993). 
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Researchers have found that limited data availability has constrained analysis on the 
impact of regulation on MFI performance, or interaction with capital markets in this investigation 
(Hartarska, 2005).  Valentina Hartarska (2009) assembled data on 108 MFIs serving 30 nations 
to analyze the impact of various governance mechanisms, including regulation, on MFI outreach 
(i.e., number of active borrowers) and return on assets.  Although the model excluded findings 
on the effect of regulation on financial performance, the analysis found there is no relationship 
between regulation and outreach.  Hartarska’s work evidences the mixed results of limited 
research to-date and speaks to the need for more studies of these important linkages.  
MFI regulation in Sierra Leone, viewed as a public good,23 was understood in terms of 
two properties:  post-conflict and fragile state.  The post-conflict context required examining MFI 
regulation with questions of imperatives and preferences for providing a pro-poor financial 
sector.  The fragile-state infrastructure considered measures of governance, political will and 
commitment, as well as propensity to resume conflict.  The regulatory function, operating as a 
public good, provided definition and identity to MFIs because of its legitimacy in monitoring MFI 
solvency and management.   
Insight into the post-conflict property is provided by Karen Doyle’s work (1998), 
considered by many as the foremost research on practitioner experience in post-conflict nations.  
Perhaps the most important aspect of her study for this investigation is the exploration of 
practitioners’ considerations of linkages between the post-conflict setting and services provided 
by MFIs.  The study primarily drew on 16 MFI initiatives operating in the SSA nations of Rwanda 
and Mozambique, plus Cambodia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Also, data triangulation was 
provided by the collection of statements and material from the SSA nations of Angola, Uganda, 
and Sierra Leone, in addition to Tajikistan and Albania.  The programs in the study, all 
implemented in the aftermath of war, demonstrated that MFIs have few environmental 
imperatives.   Doyle also found that donors supportive of efforts in post-conflict environments 
are willing to accept the associated risks (e.g., conflict, instability, destruction).  Moreover, she 
asserts donors are coming to understand how imperative it is for them to be intimately involved 
in post-conflict settings. Her assertion underscores the importance and value of this 
investigation’s focus on years when conflict frequently reignites and foreign aid is wasted or 
                                                
 
23 Public goods are products and services normally considered to be provided by government or public 
organizations.  Public goods attributes are non-rival (one person’s use does not reduce benefits to others-
no rivalry for benefits) and nonexclusive (one person cannot be prevented from enjoying the benefit by 
another’s use).  
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maximized.  Doyle’s work and that of others point to the unique properties of post-conflict 
microfinance sectors and attributes of available capital during the crucial decade after peace is 
achieved (Bigombe et al., 2000; Clarke, 2006; Collier and Hoeffler, 2002; Smillie 2009).   
Donors and regulators of Sierra Leone MFIs came together to create the MITAF project 
approximately two years after reaching a peace agreement as a key policy intervention to 
restore the economy.  The Programme Support Document (Development of a Sustainable Pro-
Poor Financial Sector in Sierra Leone (2004-2009), 2004), which created the project, describes 
the MFI operating environment as “comparable to other post conflict situations” (UNCDF, 
2004b, p. 2).  Research has demonstrated that one key “policy-dependent” conflict risk factor is 
absence of economic opportunities (Bigombe et al., 2000, p. 326).  Although research found 
that minimal political and financial infrastructure was required for operations, it was emphasized 
that other conditions must be considered to ensure MFIs operate beyond the immediate 
emergency and rebuilding stage to the stage of operating sustainable solutions (Doyle, 1998; 
Manalo, 2003).  Microfinance regulation in the form of laws and institutions is the preferred 
method of this institutionalization.    
Laws and institutions struggle in fragile state nations.  The term fragile state does not 
have a universal definition, nor is the status generally seen as a dichotomy.  In the parlance of 
donor-participants in the MITAF case, it seems that “fragile state” and “poor performer” were 
synonymous for a time leading up to 2001.  The Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) used “poor performance” to address states lacking the capacity to 
provide a political space or deliver public services, as well as those countries that have capacity, 
but lack commitment.  OECD changed the discourse by making a clearer distinction between 
capacity and commitment by using the expression “difficult partnerships” (Tommasoli & 
Bergeron, 2001).   The absence of ownership and credible commitment to effective policies, 
including implementation, are key characteristics of nations characterized as difficult 
partnerships.  In the often cited work of Victoria Levin and David Dollar (2005) for a country to 
be considered among the “difficult partnerships” (DPC) two criteria must be satisfied:  low-
income in accordance to per capital GNP classifications of the World Bank, and ranking in the 
lower two quintiles of the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA).    The important 
distinction from the earlier OECD definition is the absence of an explicit consideration of a 
nation’s commitment to effective policies. Regardless of the prevailing definition or scale of 
measurement, Sierra Leone has been generally considered a “fragile state.” 
  
58 
 
In summary, state regulation of microfinance activities plays an important role in shaping 
how actors interact to provide capital from donors to microfinance institutions.  Regulatory action 
takes many forms including the threat of direct intervention, MFI ownership, and providing 
information about sector and institution performance.  Available research on regulation in post-
conflict fragile state settings demonstrates the robust shaping capacity of MFI regulation on 
capital delivery mechanisms, such as the MITAF case.  For example, while market capital tends 
to focus more on incentives other than institutional strength, donor capital has demonstrated a 
predisposition toward developing nations with stronger and improving government institutions. 
3.2.2.2    Community:  Informal economy 
The MITAF case as a space of negotiating deals was also shaped by the informal economy.  A 
very large segment of Sierra Leone’s economy is considered informal.  The informal economy 
was understood in this investigation by its properties of survival and criminality.  The people 
participating in the informal economy are seeking not only to survive physically, but also to cope 
with the many social factors affecting their livelihoods.  These factors include norms of behavior 
and asset, income, and opportunity equality.  The criminality property considers the tenuous 
nature of the informal economy and the potential for illicit activities to reach very destructive 
levels with international implications.  Sierra Leone’s leaders are focused on the informal 
economy to provide licit, viable employment in the fight against poverty and the propensities 
toward criminality. 
Emeritus professor and anthropologist Keith Hart is generally credited with first using the 
phrase “informal sector” in academic literature.  In his research on Africa the term is used 
primarily to reference self-employment (Gerxhani, 2004).  Sir Fazle Hasan Abed, BRAC 
founder, underscores the role of self-employment in elucidating the linkage to microfinance.  He 
explains that livelihoods and augmenting household income in the form of microenterprises are 
very often the focus of a pro-poor MFI. The vast majority of microfinance customers do not 
move beyond household employment (Smillie, 2009).  Dwight Perkins and his colleagues also 
hold this view regarding employment impact, explaining that personal enterprises normally 
benefit the owner and a few family members (Perkins et al., 2006).   
Given that microfinance is integral to the poor experiencing improved outcomes from 
economic exchanges, such as through personal enterprises, MFIs are embedded in the informal 
sector.  The informal sector has been approached in different ways throughout the literature. 
John Rapley refers to Africa’s empirical data and draws on thinking that emerged in the 1990s, 
questioning both the development agenda and the idea of development itself.  Rapley (2007) 
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describes how postdevelopment thinkers assert development is never about improving the lives 
of citizens; rather development is intended to surface people from the informal sector to be 
taxed.  They argue the result is consolidation of government control over people.  The informal 
sector is a substantial economic and social space in developing countries like Sierra Leone.   
As Rapley and others point out, the persistence of the informal sector is in part due to 
weak incentives provided by a formal economy.  In numerous African countries the ability of the 
state to govern beyond the borders of the capital city is critically weak.  This includes the ability 
to provide basic services to the rural areas that provide the most resources to the state.  The 
literature describes the informal sector serving the formal economy at below value wages and 
prices.  Informal sector participants also generally perceive government services to be 
insufficient or inequitably provided in favor of higher income earners.  As a result, scores of 
citizens in numerous fragile African states avoid the government as much as possible through 
tax evasion, illegal trade, and a general disregard of the formal law—operating outside the 
formal economy (Cilliers, 2004; Rapley, 2007; Schneider, 2002). 
Another approach to understanding the informal sector builds on the above views of 
labor markets and small firms in a functioning local economy.  Bottom of the pyramid (BOP), or 
lower-income market, are labels used by some researchers of multinational corporations in 
developing nations (Kolk & Van Tulder, 2006; SadreGhazi & Duysters, 2009).  These 
researchers analyze market approaches to development where people are characterized as 
producers or consumers rather than by level of daily income.  Beyond corporate social 
responsibility, multinational corporations are considering lower-income markets due to slowing 
growth and increased competition in industrialized nations (D'Innocenzio, 2011).   The Africa 
BOP market has been estimated to be approximately $429 billion USD and includes over 485 
million people.  Research found that multinational corporations can transfer capital and 
technology to these vast markets with the potential for great productivity at lower cost.  BOP 
research of informal economies connects the unofficial and the official segments of economies 
in developing nations.  
Austrian economist Friedrich Schneider prepared a frequently cited work using a 
definition involving economic activities that are unregistered, yet contribute to determining 
official GNP (Schneider, 2002).  Looking at economic activity in African countries, including 
Sierra Leone’s West African neighbors of Cote D’Ivoire, Ghana, Benin, and Burkina Faso, 
Schneider reports that the average size of the informal sector was 42% of GNP from 1999 to 
2000.  He labels this a “quite large” informal economy (pp. 5, 6).  Schneider’s assessment can 
be compared to the International Monetary Fund’s interpretation of Sierra Leone’s informal 
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economy as “a large volume of activity” (IMF, 2009a).    Economic exchange in Sierra Leone to 
a very large extent occurs in the informal sector (IMF, 2009b; UNCDF, 2004b).  In this 
investigation two properties were particularly important to how this informal economy shaped 
the MITAF case:  survival incentive, and criminality.  
The vast body of knowledge on the informal sector from a global cross-country 
perspective notes that the most salient distinction between developed and developing nations 
involves is the theory of “survival.”  In other words, survival is central in decisions to participate 
in the informal sector of developing nations (Gerxhani, 2004; Seitz, 2008).  This sociological 
aspect of explaining the informal sector understandably has economic implications.  
The “social relations of household production” may not be conducive to market 
incentives that motivate production beyond consumption (Leys, 1996, pp. 135, 140, 141); 
however, it is a vital mechanism for survival in many SSA societies where agriculture is 
particularly important (Manalo, 2003).  Survival explanations, often referred to by economists as 
peasant rationality, underscore the consumption aspect of households more than the production 
aspect. Economists have come to find value in the survival rationale by analyzing agricultural 
arrangements, such as sharecropping.  Typically economists have been highly critical of such 
arrangements due to insufficient production incentives.  The value of survival behavior, in these 
arrangements, is a favorable combination of the “pure wage contract” where the land owner 
bears all the risk, rather than “pure rental contract,” where risk is assume by the worker (Joseph 
Stiglitz, 1988, pp. 115-117).  Poor people avoid risk since they vacillate between survival and 
catastrophe (Allen, 2007).  The place of microfinance in this theory of behavior in the informal 
sector may be one of assisting people in managing risk concerns through savings and credit 
products  (Joseph Stiglitz, 1988).     
Still, developed and developing nations converge on most of the theories explaining the 
presence and increased activity in the informal sector, which includes criminality (Escobar, 
1995; Gerxhani, 2004; Karlinger, 2009; Seitz, 2008).  Aristotle said, “Poverty is the parent of 
revolution and crime” (Aristotle, 1984).  Aristotle’s poverty-crime propensity is supported by the 
work of a seven-member network of African research NGOs.  The network researchers 
concluded that community attributes found in the informal sectors of most African post-conflict 
fragile states represent a nearly indistinguishable interconnection between licit and illicit 
activities involving government, business, perpetrators, and violence triggers (Cilliers, 2004).   
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Identifying and responding to capital flow volatility effects in funding MFIs can assist efforts to 
advance licit, labor intensive employment and enterprise activities that can thwart propensities 
to resume conflict or engage in illegal activity in order to survive. 
The potentially destructive impact, nationally and internationally, of this theoretical 
convergent point of criminality theory is implicated in a multi-year research project conducted by 
Pierre_Arnaud Chouvy and Laurent R. Laniel (2007).  This study sheds light on the darker 
aspects of the informal sector.  Part of the analysis examines the complex linkages between 
illicit agricultural production and armed conflict within underdeveloped states.  West Africa, 
where Sierra Leone is located, is considered one of the main narcotic-producing areas on the 
globe (Karlinger, 2009).  Cannabis,24 used in marijuana and hashish, is reported to be widely 
produced in Africa; unfortunately, academic work on the cannabis economy is not robust.  An 
important take away from this work is the complex and extensive consequences associated with 
this illicit activity, including environment and human health degradation, as well as socio-
economic issues of maintaining peace and perpetuation of the elitist status quo. 
Probably the most notorious connection between Sierra Leone’s informal economy and 
illicit trade is the diamond industry.  Officially the diamond trade makes up 50% of exports from 
the country (IMF, 2009a, p. 22).  Informally, according to the IMF, “External transactions are 
characterized by a large volume of activity in the informal sector, principally diamond 
smuggling…Estimates of smuggled imports and exports, in particular diamonds, are also not 
available” (IMF, 2009a Informational Annex, p. 11). Global Witness25 and others report 
substantial illegal diamond trading (BBC, 2009; Momo et al., 2011).  Although substantial, 
income is apparently inequitably distributed in illicit informal activities.  
  
                                                
 
24 According to the World Health Organization, “Cannabis is by far the most widely cultivated, trafficked 
and abused illicit drug. Half of all drug seizures worldwide are cannabis seizures. The geographical 
spread of those seizures is also global, covering practically every country of the world. About 147 million 
people, 2.5% of the world population, consume cannabis (annual prevalence) compared with 0.2% 
consuming cocaine and 0.2% consuming opiates.”  In addition, research reports damage to health, 
including the fact that cannabis “impairs cognitive development (capabilities of learning), including 
associative processes; free recall of previously learned items is often impaired when cannabis is used 
both during learning and recall periods; airway injury, lung inflammation, and impaired pulmonary defense 
against infection from persistent cannabis consumption over prolonged periods.”  
http://www.who.int/substance_abuse/facts/cannabis/en/, accessed February 16, 2010. 
 
25 Global Witness has served as a key member of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme employed 
in Sierra Leone. 
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This inequality aspect is an element of measuring the progress of development efforts 
and provides insight into human behaviour and potential. Dudly Seers in his seminal 1972 
article, “What are We Trying to Measure?,” formed three basic questions that have been used 
repeatedly in the debate about measuring development:  “What has been happening to poverty?  
What has been happening to unemployment? What has been happening to inequality?” (Seers, 
1972).  In developing these questions Seers explains the importance of “the realization of the 
potential of human personality” (p. 21).  He contends that equality is valuable both as an end 
and a means of economic development.  Interactions in MITAF that produced capital flow to 
MFIs were shaped by an environment where people worked to improve their lifestyle by 
leveraging their potential.  Capital provided by MITAF to MFIs was a strategy of licit activities 
that had positive wealth distribution effects.  
3.2.2.3 Rules 
Rules frame actor interactions of actors, such as rights and responsibilities of participating in a 
capital investment deal.  The MITAF case was shaped by rules that linked participant 
perceptions and responses relative to both espoused theories and working theories (theories-in-
use).  What actors believed, valued, and perceived, along with their historical experiences, were 
central to rules in effect (working theories).  The centrality of participant perceptions of and 
responses to espoused theories and working theories is embedded in a particular public policy 
perspective.  Public policy administration is viewed as the actual expression of policy and 
speaks to espoused theories’ relevance in attacking societal problems.  Moreover, rules are 
viewed in terms of characteristics that form boundaries and explain choice.  Research 
consistently finds that the absence of these two organizational rule categories contributes to 
poor performance (Ostrom, 2005).  
Capital volatility in this investigation was determined by participant interactions.  Path 
dependency theorists teach that the outcome of interactions within an environment is a 
byproduct of both the present environment and the previous environment (history).  This 
historical path shapes possible outcomes (March, 1999).  Nobel Laureate Douglass North 
(1990) clarifies path dependence not as an inevitability, but rather explains action-choice 
linkages over history.  He posits that past constraints, such as colonialism, narrow subsequent 
choice options and reflect the reinforcing attribute of IAD framework exogenous (environment) 
variables, including rules.  
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The literature describes a colonial past connected to modern aid.  In the highly regarded 
work of economist Alberto Alesina and former World Bank economist David Dollar, bilateral 
donors’ aid allocation behavior is explained (Alesina & Dollar, 2000).  Their findings reflect the 
general belief that donor nations tend to provide more aid to former colonies than to other 
countries.  Moreover, the colonial relationship is strong and contributes more robust 
explanations than variable such as quality of institutions, economic policies of the recipient, and 
whether the nation is a democracy.   
This investigation was interested in power relative to rules involving the organizational 
control over aid provision (i.e., capital flow).  According to literature, the degree of one 
organization’s dependence on another is dependent on the extent to which resource control is 
concentrated.  Of critical importance to the degree of control are alternatives available to the 
focal organization.  In this investigation, the focal organization can be the MFI, apex, or the 
donor depending on interaction particulars.  The understanding of power in dependency theory, 
including exchange relationships, is founded in the work of Richard Emerson and others that 
portrays dependence as the basis of power (see Emerson in Cook et al., 2005; Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978; also see Emerson in Scott & Davis, 2003). 
The seminal work of Emeritus Professor J. Kenneth Benson (1975), University of 
Missouri-Columbia frames the resource dependency theory discussion,  
[I]nteractions must be explained ultimately at the level of resource acquisition…a system 
resource view of organizations…Such an orientation becomes, for decision makers, an 
operational definition of the purposes of the organization…responsible largely for 
maintaining or expanding this established organizational machine” (p. 231).   
Benson’s (1975) theoretical framework of interorganizational interaction was created from 
empirical research of exchanges between human service nonprofit organizations.  He explains 
that deep methods of analysis center on the organizations’ actions to obtain an adequate level 
of the “most fundamental” resources for work, namely “money and authority” (p. 231).  He 
contended that missions and visions take a subordinate position as an understood assumption 
that can be retrieved as a legitimization mechanism for continued operations.  Benson and 
others suggest that the acquisition and maintenance of reliable and sufficient sources of capital 
and authority are the primary orientation of organizational decision makers (Benson, 1975; 
Froelich, 1999).   
Benson (1975) emphasizes a perspective that clarifies the linkage between resource 
dependency at the organizational level and societal organizational matters, such as dependency 
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theory.  According to Benson, the basis for between-organization power differences is partially 
accounted for by the linkage of organizations to society-at-large.  This view can be seen both in 
the work of Strauss and in microfinance literature (see Strauss in A. E. Clarke & Friese, 2007; 
Smillie, 2009).  Empirically, many societies in Africa are characterized by households with 
husbands working in the nation’s center region and wives raising children in the periphery with 
inadequate resources.  At times some wives provide sex to the landlord in lieu of paying rent, a 
brutal reality of survival in a vicious market (Bardhan, 1988; Novogratz, 2009; Smillie, 2009).  
Understanding resource dependency between organizations, according to Benson (1975),  
requires both “the larger pattern of societal dominance,” such as dependency theory at the 
national level, and the linkage with path dependency (p. 233).  
Nancy Jurik and Julie Cowgill (2005) conducted a case study of a training and micro 
lending program offered by a nonprofit community organization which was struggling with 
resource dependency.  The researchers recorded daily struggles of daily providing client 
services while also trying to secure capital for operations and lending.  Competition for limited 
capital investment was the most pressing challenge, according to organization staff.  It was felt 
that the pressing challenge compelled them to trade quality for rapidly achievable outcome 
measures, which would help to impression-manage investors.  The espoused focus on poor and 
very low-income people by government investors, combined with accountability measures of 
client success and high repayment rates, created an environment where organizational beliefs 
acquiesced to the capital infusion imperative. 
The literature suggests that when one or more actors are resource dependent on 
another actor there is a propensity for homogenization that renders irrelevant the rich, unique, 
organizational characteristics of dependent actors (Carroll & Steane, 2002; Froelich, 1999).  
Rules in resource dependent relationships can be explained by natural system organization 
theories that give place to fallible people (Scott & Davis, 2003).  Regardless of using rules as  
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institutions or an informal framing of human interactions, Deng’s renowned statement on the use 
of power to achieve economic development illustrates the linkage and persistence of 
imperialism.  “It does not matter if the cat is black or white, as long as it catches the mice” 
(Collier, Dollar, & Stern, 2000, p. 6 n. 4).26  As long as more powerful actors are able to exploit 
resources of others, the exact mechanism—colonialism or neocolonialism—is irrelevant 
(Easterly, 2006; Said, 1989). 
MITAF participants engaged in deals where action decisions were controlled by diverse 
and sometimes conflicting agendas.  Power in MITAF was more complex than donor decisions 
regarding capital and disbursement conditions.  For example, power involved both political 
interests related to resource distribution and MFI social mission imperatives.  Another 
complicating factor was disbursement pressure involving the foreign aid machinery.  Viewing 
rules from the perspective of foreign aid as investment capital, and also recognizing that 
organizational behaviour was shaped by resource dependency theory, helped with the 
investigation of MFI capital investment deals.  Analysing years of investment commitment data, 
including focused interviews, provided important insights to the power relationship between 
actors and control over capital flows to MFIs.  This analysis involved identifying important 
characteristics of various capital disbursements.  It also necessitated connecting these 
disbursements with certain organizational behaviours, such as institutional strengthening, 
outreach, sustainable operations, and investment accountability.  Perhaps equally important 
was the linkage between actions and various actor perceptions, beliefs, and explanations.   
  
                                                
 
26 For example, regardless of “slavery” or “apprenticeships,” forced labor is the same.  William Wilberforce 
is renowned for his work to enact the 1807 Abolition Act prohibiting the transatlantic slave trade.  On the 
other hand, British Colonial Office archives back the claim that he actively supported the reintroduction of 
slavery in Freetown, Sierra Leone using unpaid apprenticeships carrying the threat of imprisonment for 
attempting to escape (Tomkins, 2010, p. 54).      
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In sum, actor interactions occurred in a context shaped by environmental variables.  
Developing a pro-poor financial sector as a capital delivery mechanism to low-income people is, 
in essence, a public good defined by MFI regulation.  The post-conflict context and fragile state 
institutions defined MFI regulation in Sierra Leone.  MFI regulation shaped the space where 
MITAF participants interacted.  MFIs provided services to people primarily operating in the 
informal economy, which affected participant interactions.  Survival and criminality were informal 
economy properties.  Central to shaping interactions were rules defining behaviour that was 
required, forbidden, and permitted.   Path dependency and resource dependency were central 
to explaining and predicting the shaping effect of rules. Examining behaviour-volatility linkages 
requires the consideration of interaction shaping variables, such as IAD exogenous variables.  
3.3 SUMMARY  
This chapter has set forth methods to structure and focus this investigation.  Case study 
methods fit empirical phenomena and multiple data forms.  The centrality of microfinance in 
human development efforts made it an appropriate focus for this investigation.  MITAF was 
selected for its emphasis on serving as an aid capital delivery mechanism and its cast of actors.  
More importantly, MITAF possessed the phenomenon examined in this investigation:  capital 
volatility.  Also, Sierra Leone was an appropriate context because it captured the attention of 
world microfinance leaders for its unique fit as a model for West Africa.  The setting and 
subjects were placed in the IAD analytic framework to structure the examination.  IAD structured 
environmental factors that prior research was charged with insufficiently considering, and this 
chapter described the factors selected for investigation.  Moreover, capital investment deals 
involving this setting and these subjects were subjected to rigorous grounded theory analytical 
procedures and techniques. 
 A unique, rich view was provided by making sense of linkages between organizational 
behavior and aid capital volatility utilizing grounded theory methods and approaches. Rich, 
extensive data were examined from the combination of official documents detailing capital flow 
and organizational behaviors, as well as, non-intrusive interviews with diverse actors.  
Concentrating on the micro project level removed a host of other explanations, such as 
complexity resulting from recipient government processes, and ambiguity of assumptions in 
macro level analysis.  Organizations actions that mutually agreed to desired behaviors, 
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including the disbursement of capital in prescribed amounts and time frames, held the 
explanations of why capital is volatile.  Mutually agreed to performance indicators (e.g., 
outreach levels and financial sustainability levels) that are consistent with organizational 
missions can frame disbursement conditions that often fall prey to challenges associated with 
organizational implementation limitations.  The next chapter describes grounded theory 
procedures and techniques used to collect and analyze data in developing a theory of linkages 
between organizational behavior and capital flow volatility.  
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4.0  RESEARCH METHODS:  GROUNDED THEORY APPROACH 
Chapter four is the second part of the research design and methods used in this investigation to 
examine interactions associated with capital investment deals.   A key challenge in this 
investigation was accounting for many activities involved in achieving a prori MITAF outcomes 
intended to be mutually supportive.  This resulted in examining many linkages to excavate those 
connecting behavior to capital flow.  Consequently, the central aim of this investigation was to 
find the few central concepts that organize MITAF’s many linkages.  A few central concepts, 
rudiments of theory, were excavated and assisted in making sense of the linkages.  The central 
concepts account for much of the variation observed in behavior-volatility linkages.    This 
chapter describes grounded theory procedures and techniques employed in rigorous and 
credible collection of various data forms, analytic instruments, examination procedures, and 
techniques.  
The chapter begins by explaining how grounded theory accommodated archival data 
collection and non-intrusive approaches to elicit behavior-volatility linkage explanations directly 
from actors in their own words, as opposed to imposing a structured survey instrument. This 
investigation attempted to conform primarily to the grounded theory guidelines and thinking of 
Anselm Strauss and Juliet Corbin (1998).  Initial primary data was derived from archival 
documents.  Interviews began very early in the process. The selection of capital investment 
deals for detailed analysis was guided by an approach consistent with theoretical sampling as 
prescribed by grounded theory methods.  Grounded theory approaches and guidelines are 
generally designed to develop theory utilizing non-intrusive techniques (Dey, 2007).  A basic 
grounded theory tenet is the use of guidelines as opposed to firm rules for conducting research.  
Therefore, it is important for a study to specify the guidelines used.  These guidelines, as 
employed in this investigation, are set forth in this chapter.  
Next, the chapter describes the analysis process in rich descriptive detail.  Early 
incorporation of interviews after commencing archival analysis allowed early recognition of 
comparisons and contrasting between documents and interviews, which informed additional 
data gathering.  Utilizing NVivo 8, a computer qualitative analysis system, a hierarchical coding 
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process was employed using open coding, axial coding, and selective coding.  Problems, 
concerns, incidents, and episodes that appeared to be significant to MITAF actors were 
identified in the data (phenomenon).  The identified phenomena were labeled as concepts.  
Concepts were grouped into categories by employing constant comparison. Thus, categories 
and related properties and dimensions were created from the data, as were process 
movements, ordering, change, and evolution linked to context and conditions. For example, 
performance based agreements was a context of examining behavior and capital flow, and the 
mid-term evaluation was a condition under which MITAF approved and implemented capital 
investment deals.  Subsequent generative questions used in data collection were directed by 
the data and analysis.  Identifying and verifying linkages between concepts, and between 
concepts and the associated properties and dimensions, proceeded to theoretical saturation to 
form a substantive theory and ensure data grounding (Hallberg, 2006; Lee, 1999; Strauss, 
1987; Strauss & Corbin, 1998).   Moreover, empirical linkages embedded in deals were 
uncovered with the assistance of interviews. 
Grounded theory procedures and techniques are considered valuable in methodological 
literature because of its broad application in numerous organizational issues (Lee, 1999). 
Grounded theory is primarily used to investigate phenomena that are not sufficiently explained, 
such as aid capital flow volatility.  Grounded theory methodology involves procedures used to 
analyze the process of capital flow from the point of MITAF Investment Committee approval to 
the final disbursement of capital, to access by the MFI.  Grounded theory approaches were also 
used to examine values and beliefs that informed action-decisions linked to disbursements.  
Thus, the process and procedures provided valuable evidenced-based insights on MITAF 
capital flow characteristics, and organizational decision making linked to capital flow. 
4.1 DATA COLLECTION 
Investigating past human behavior to understand linkages primarily involves text.  Grounded 
research usually includes data collection beyond interviews (Ryan & Bernard, 2003; Suddaby, 
2006; Yin, 2009).  Consistent with this line of thought, the point of departure for field-work was 
archival analysis.  The start of this investigation primarily included annual and quarterly narrative  
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reports prepared by the apex and the Programme Support Document (PSD).  Numerous other 
documents served as data and evidence throughout the study.  In addition, focused interviews 
were conducted utilizing an open-ended, conversational method (Yin, 2009).    
4.1.1 Archival documents     
Technical and non-technical document reviews provided data and stimulated interview 
questions.  Appendix A provides a list of these documents.  Strauss and Corbin (1998) defines 
these documents when used according to their grounded theory approach.  “Technical 
literature” is reporting of research, among other professional documents. “Nontechnical 
literature” is documents, records, reports, and other materials that serve as primary data (pp. 
35, 51, 52).   
Most documents were obtained from MITAF participants.  Some were obtained from 
subject web pages.  Several documents were referred to by interviewees, further adding 
credibility to these documents.  All but a few documents were in electronic format.  The 
documents provided quality, relevant data on organizational behaviors and characteristics of aid 
capital flow.  The documents contained data that explicated, and were explicated by, the 
interviews. 
Several documents were particularly valuable: Programme Support Document (PSD), 
Investment Policy and Procedures Manual of MITAF (Manual), performance based agreements, 
and MITAF narrative reports.27  The PSD, viewed as primary data, functioned as a constitution, 
by-laws, and strategic plan for MITAF.  The Manual, also a primary data source, was designed 
as a policy guide and operations manual for administering the project.  MITAF narrative reports 
were also primary data and provided rich details on the decisions, actions, and behaviors of the 
organizations, as well as aid capital flow to MFIs.  Particularly useful for this investigation was 
MFI performance indicator data (e.g., outreach and portfolio-at-risk) and donor disbursement 
behavior and rationale. Included with each MITAF narrative report was a set of spreadsheets 
providing ordinal and ratio data on MFI performance, donor capital commitment, and 
disbursement details.  Spreadsheets for year-end 2009 and first quarter 2010 were used for this 
investigation to provide capital investment commitment and disbursement data for each MFI by 
                                                
 
27 MITAF narrative reports were provided to all donors, the Bank of Sierra Leone, and the Ministry of 
Finance. 
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year.28  Other documents, such as MFI evaluations, served as secondary sources for 
triangulating emerging concepts and strengthening interpretations about observed events 
(Denzin & Lincoln, 2003).   
The examination approach was based on a concept-indicator model that emphasizes 
constant comparison between and within empirical indicators and emerging categories and 
concepts.  The analysis began with fragmenting archival documents, especially MITAF 
narratives.  The generative questions29 stimulated by these archival documents were combined 
with the interview guiding questions. 
4.1.2 Interviews   
Open-ended interviews conducted both in the field30 and via Skype31 were conversations 
utilizing a protocol approved by the University of Pittsburgh Institutional Review Board (IRB).  
This consistent line of inquiry aimed to answer posed research questions.  More precisely, the 
interviews were a non-intrusive method used to elicit participant understandings of aid capital 
flow interactions, beliefs regarding the process, challenges, and needed changes in MITAF.  
The open-ended questions allowed respondents to express their perceptions and beliefs in their 
own words, as opposed to requiring them to use a construct involving forced-choice.  
Interviewees representing the actors in the case study were required to provide informed 
consent (verbal) to participate in the study.  Accordingly, a recruitment script, pre-interview 
statement, and a project information document were prepared and received approval in 
compliance with the ethical standards for human subject research.32  These approved 
documents are in Appendix B.  Interviewees were informed of the general thrust of the research, 
                                                
 
28 Strauss and Corbin (1998), explicitly discussed the use of quantitative methods in theory building.  
They summarized that “Getting to the heart of the matter, our advice…is to think in terms of the interplay 
between qualitative and quantitative methods…the more operational point is that data collection and 
analysis can be done in both modes, and in various combinations, during all phases of the research 
process” (p. 31). 
29 “Generative questions” prompt the analysis down fruitful paths including hypothesis development, 
gathering particular types of data, and valuable comparisons (Strauss, 1987, p. 22).  
30 Field work was conducted July 8-22, 2010 and February 14 through April 28, 2011. 
31 The audio interviews via Skype allowed for many of the advantages of face-to-face interviews, such as 
developing relationship, tenor and voice inflection.  In addition, one respondent could see the interviewer, 
though the respondent was not visible (Fontana & Frey, 2003; Markham, 2008). 
32 After this research proposal was approved by the proposal committee the researcher completed 
training, and was certified, for human subject research.  This study was deemed exempt from review by 
the IRB.  
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what was being requested of them, and their rights.  Although archival data are quality evidence 
of relationships between actor behavior and aid capital volatility, the interviews were an 
essential source of data for behavioral event case studies (Yin, 2009). The interviews resulted in 
multiple forms of data, including field notes from the informal portions of the interview, digital 
recordings of the interview, and transcribed recordings. The following discusses the subjects 
(donors, apex, and MFIs) involved in the interviews, beginning with donors. 
As mentioned earlier, four donors comprise the MITAF Investment Committee.  This 
investigation portrayed the donors in a fascinating collaboration of diverse organizations for a 
specific sector project.  The interviews included one KfW representative and one Cordaid 
representative.  Both were intimately involved with MITAF and attended IC meetings.  Interviews 
were conducted independently via Skype utilizing auto media. In addition, one representative of 
UNDP was interviewed in Sierra Leone at the UNDP office, while four subjects were interviewed 
from UNCDF in Sierra Leone, Senegal, and New York City.  These donors represent the type of 
agencies that  provide most microfinance capital to developing nations (Reille & Forster, 2008).  
The apex organization was the MITAF operational mechanism and interacted 
extensively with aid agencies and MFIs (Levy, 2002; UNCDF, 2004b).  As mentioned earlier, a 
technical service provider (TSP) was selected by the Investment Committee (IC) to administer 
MITAF.  Two TSP staff provided interview data, a base of operation for this research, and 
extremely valuable archival data. 
MFIs were the primary focus of donor and apex activity.  Four of the participating MFIs 
were selected for interviews.  The primary purpose for sampling MFIs was to identify actors 
participating in transactions with a variety of capital flow characteristics that clarify and enhance 
understanding of organizational behavior.  Although it would have been possible to interview the 
managing director of each MFI, the most effective and efficient use of resources was found in a 
purposeful sampling approach.   The study was able to assemble a group of MFIs that represent 
a very high degree of variation in behavior and capital volatility during 2006-2009 by utilizing a 
combination of operational construct sampling and criterion sampling (Morse, 2007; M. Q. 
Patton, 1990).  In this investigation such an approach is considered, in effect, to be theoretical 
sampling when used in grounded theory (Cutcliffe, 2000).33  Specifically, IC approved capital 
                                                
 
33 Grounded theory uses theoretical sampling without a preset limit of interviews in order to achieve 
theoretical saturation.  Often qualitative researchers do not make a distinction between purposeful and 
theoretical sampling.  It is important for the study to describe the sampling strategy in detail so as to 
minimize questions regarding sampling, improve rigor, and provide clarity on theoretical sampling 
techniques (e.g., MFIs of various regions, structures, performance based agreements for aid capital 
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investment deals (consummated by executing performance based agreements) were selected 
that provided rich data for analysis (i.e., grants and loans), frequency, and important time 
periods.  In addition, MFIs were selected based on four criteria:  structure, domicile origin, 
geography, and year of MITAF capital commitment.  MFIs representing different regions and 
structure (e.g., NGOs and community bank) were considered when selecting organizations for 
interviews.  This sampling approach captured diverse behaviors and characteristics and 
provided rich insights on the linkages between behavior and capital volatility. 
The sampling process began by analyzing MITAF deals through the entire project 
period.  In particular, data at the MITAF office were analyzed to identify consummated capital 
investments by type, year, donor(s), and MFI.  For example, three MFIs interviewed each 
received capital commitments from MITAF donors representing 9.2% of the 76 deals (i.e., 
capital commitments).  One MFI received both grants and loans from the IC during five of the 
seven project investment periods.34  
The four MFIs selected for interviews served as the primary, though not exclusive, MFIs 
observed in this investigation. Observed MFIs were selected by using a combination of 
operational construct sampling and criterion sampling. The MFIs in this investigation are not 
identified in order to preserve confidentially in accordance with the IRB approved protocol.  
These four MFIs accounted for approximately 42% of the total deals during the MITAF operating 
period.  The dollar amount of capital investments represented by these deals was approximately 
32% of all MITAF capital investments. 
Interviews were conducted in numerous configurations and a variety of settings.  The 
managing director of one MFI was at the main office, while another interview was conducted in 
a hotel dining hall in the MFI’s community.  One consisted of a focus group comprised of the 
managing director and six personnel, including senior management and field staff.  Similarly, 
two other interviews included the managing director and two other staff, conducted at the 
corporate location. 
  
                                                                                                                                                          
 
investment).  In this analysis, where a case study was combined with the grounded theory approach, it 
must be emphasized and demonstrated that experienced, knowledgeable interviewees were selected. 
34 A “period” was only a year during 2004-2009.  Before MITAF was officially launched the IC made 
investments. In the archival data this time was referred to as “interim” and is included in this study as one 
of the operating years through the standardization label of “periods.”  
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The interviews elicited data from MFI actors, as well as donors and the apex, using a 
consistent line of inquiry comprised of three questions:   
• Briefly describe the disbursement process from Investment Committee approval to the 
last disbursement. 
• Are there any major challenges to this process working as designed?   
• Are there any major design features in this process that should be changed, deleted, or 
added to?   
These “guiding questions” provided structure while allowing for extensive flexibility (Strauss & 
Corbin, 1998, p. 78).  The structure assisted in organizing and analyzing data, as well as 
assessing the quality of the study.  The flexible open-ended question format provided for 
responding to emerging questions and concepts in the field.  For example, other subject-specific 
questions were asked based on the archival analysis; thus, both generative and confirmatory 
questions, as well as concept testing elements, were included in interviews (Lee, 1999; Strauss, 
1987; Strauss & Corbin, 1998).   
The structure and flexibility also eased the administration needed to accommodate 
eliciting data from groups (focus group), which occurred in four interviews.  The challenges 
typically associated with group interviews were not substantial distractions.  The benefits of this 
type of interview (e.g., perspective of specialized experts such as operations, finance, and 
lending) strengthened the data.  For example, a senior official’s presence had a constraining 
effect on other members who may have sought to dominate the discussion under different 
conditions.  When respondents other than the senior officer provided limited input it did not 
distract from the data collection because the interview was intended to include only the senior 
official  (Fontana & Frey, 2003; Krueger, 1988).   
Gathering interview data involved important questions pertaining to access, culture, 
presentation, trust, and rapport (Fontana & Frey, 2003).  Access to the setting, or interview 
subject, was accomplished through a variety of approaches.  One respondent was identified at a 
conference and was instrumental in securing three other interviews.  A business owner and 
NGO managing director is a personal acquaintance of the investigator and negotiated 
schedules and provided the location for an interview with another MITAF participant.  The apex 
was contacted via email in the embryonic stages of developing the research proposal and 
visited a year before this study began in order to ascertain the study’s feasibility.  In addition, the 
apex provided email contact information for KfW and Cordaid respondents.  In total, eleven 
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interviews consisting of 23 individuals,35 conformed to the Strauss and Corbin guidelines for 
creating a “skeleton of theoretical structure” (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p. 281).  Archival 
documents, combined with repeatedly returning to data to fill in the skeleton, created a dense, 
integrated theory. 
Beyond access, cultural matters factored into minimizing difficulty in securing and 
administering interviews.  This was especially important when establishing rapport.  Valuable 
assistance was provided by an “insider” to assist the researcher in moving throughout the 
country to conduct interviews (Fontana & Frey, 2003, p. 77).  Moreover, without the assistance 
of this lecturer from Njala University (compensated) with logistical preparations prior to arrival, 
the tremendous amount accomplished in the short research schedule would not have been 
impossible.  With MITAF scheduled to officially end soon after field work commencement, this 
assistance was especially valuable.36   
Presentation, trust, and rapport drew on several study approaches and attributes.  The 
researcher always dressed in business attire (coat and tie), though respondents were in more 
casual attire.  This was intended to raise respondents perception from what may have been a 
student researcher to a more professional researcher.  This was also used in Skype interviews 
where it was unclear at the onset if visual contact would be possible.  When conducted face-to-
face, a university business card was presented upon arrival.  An official introduction and the 
Pre-Interview Statement underscored the professional nature of the exchange.  In most 
instances, the pre-interview discussion was instrumental in easing the atmosphere and creating 
openness.  Brief responses and stoic expressions quickly moved to smiles, laughter, and more 
extensive comments.   
For example, in two interviews the researcher mentioned visits to northern Sierra Leone, 
with specific geographic details.  There was a noticeable change in the vibrancy and openness 
of the engagement.  Another example is when the investigator drew upon banking experience 
connections, including candidly granting a request for an example of a bad lending experience, 
to provide a common frame of reference with the respondents.  This created a sense of 
camaraderie and mutual empathy (Morse, 2007; Strauss, 1987).          
In some instances the interview meeting served as the actual interview request.  In those 
instances the interviewer recited from memory the Subject Recruitment Script.  Upon receiving 
approval to proceed, and afterward, there was informal conversation.  These informal 
                                                
 
35 This does not include the storyline interviews used to validate findings.  
36 The initial field data gathering occurred July 11-22, 2010. 
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conversations provided valuable insights and elicited data from responders when recording may 
have been a restraint.  For example, one responder used the expression, “Probably, the, I would 
say in a positive sense, the bureaucracy in the institutions.”   This response, shaped to be “in a 
positive sense,” may have been altered because of the recording.  Informal conversations, 
especially after the interview, often had at least a small sense of greater freedom of expression.  
In any event, before starting the line of inquiry in the protocol, the interviewer read the Pre-
Interview Statement (PIS), in accordance with IRB approved protocol.  The PIS included a 
request to record the interview and the promise of response confidentially.  Field notes of 
informal conversations were created according to the relevant insights provided and were 
analyzed as secondary source material.  Though Strauss seems to emphasize field notes and 
deemphasize recording verbatim text, both provided evidence for this study (Covan, 2007; 
Stern, 2007).  
Given the exploratory design of the research, the investigator probed for greater insight 
and depth in responses.  During initial interviews, additional specific questions were posed to 
many subjects.  These specific questions focused on two areas:  exploration of events recorded 
in archival documents or that emerged from other interviews, and testing concepts excavated 
the data.   
Two examples illustrate these question forms and how the queries were made.  Analysis 
of narrative reports prepared by the apex recorded an event where a donor delayed the 
execution of a PBA pursuant to an investment decision.  The MFI response referenced above 
was related to the second protocol question, Are there any major challenges to this process 
working as designed? The interviewee responded, “Well, the thing is, it’s not necessarily the 
processes, you know. Probably, the, I would say in a positive sense, the bureaucracy in the 
institutions.”  This created an opportunity to ask about donors timely completing contracts and 
the linkage with capital volatility, “Have you…experienced, one…delays in contracts being 
executed when you come to an agreement, and two, if you have, did it really matter, did things 
get held up because of that?”  The exploration of specific events assisted in understanding 
perspectives, beliefs, and interpretations provided by each respondent.   
Another example illustrates concept testing with disbursement conditions stipulated for 
capital investment.  One concept that explains volatility emerged from an interview.  The 
concept noted that MFIs take a long time to satisfy disbursement conditions and, in the interim, 
donor investment priorities change.  In a subsequent  interview a donor responding to the first 
protocol question, Briefly describe the disbursement process from Investment Committee 
approval to the last disbursement, by saying, “…sometimes it can take some time because it 
77 
 
has to be processed through the finance department to make sure the funds are available.”  
This created an opportunity to verify the concept.  The investigator noted, “Let’s stay there for a 
second. Because that could be a point…Though funds were committed to the MITAF project, 
from time to time, a funder can have organizational priorities change, and as those 
organizational priorities change, that impacts from time to time, the availability of funds for any 
given request that comes through. Am I close?” 
These specific questions were often asked when comments by the respondent created 
the appropriate condition, or context in which to ask them (Krueger, 1988).  On occasion the 
specific questions were asked after the interview protocol was completed.  The portion of the 
interview shaped by the protocol was recorded and lasted approximately 16 to 90 minutes.  
Though both the median and the mode lengths were approximately 30 minutes, the extreme 
variance was the function of a number of factors:  place in interview sequence, the interviewee’s 
conversational style, and the number of interview participants.  Noteworthy was the apex 
interview, which was the longest.  It was agreed early on by the researcher and apex staff to 
make this the wrap-up interview.  Also, time was taken during the interview to download several 
electronic documents.37 
4.2 DATA ANALYSIS METHODS  
This study focused on answering the research questions and, to a great extent, analysis was 
accomplished simultaneously with data collection.  The grounded theory approach and 
techniques used to analyze data are presented in this section.  The primary analytical work was 
beyond coding text and involved interpretive analysis that required creatively utilizing constant 
comparison to develop theories.  Central to this emergence process was regular memo writing 
before and during data coding.  Memoing recorded early hypotheses development and served 
to create dense, integrated theory as the hypotheses were revised throughout the investigation 
(Bazeley, 2007; Gephart, 2004; Strauss, 1987; Strauss & Corbin, 1998; Strubing, 2007).  It was 
not a linear process, but involved intimate contact with the triad of analytic operations described 
below. 
                                                
 
37 Electronic documents valuable to this investigation were provided by donors and the apex. 
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Adherents to the school of grounded theory believed theory should be “developed in 
intimate relationship to the data” (Strauss, 1987, p. 9).  The methods are inductive in the sense 
that explanations emerge from data.  The approach is also deductive because relationship 
conceptualization is an interpretive process.  The grounded theory approach used in this study 
deduced what was occurring by employing data techniques such as the triad of analytical 
operations (data collection, category coding, memoing), and constant comparison of pieces of 
data.  Rather than positivistic methods involving hypothesis directed data collection and the 
concept of hypothesis testing (Gephart, 2004), the result was a theory “integrated, consistent, 
plausible, close to the data” (Glaser & Strauss, 1967, p. 103). As such, interpretations evolved 
from fragmenting the first archival document and generative questions began with the first 
interview (Strauss, 1987; Strauss & Corbin, 1998).  
The initial data revealed explanatory concepts which were categorized and used to 
develop preliminary hypotheses for additional data collection and for successively evolving 
analysis of the relationships among categories (grouped concepts).  Data were systematically 
coded to make salient embedded categories.  The categories were constantly compared to 
each other and successive data collected.  A core category emerged, bureaucracy, and was 
repeatedly affirmed by its dominant relationship to other categories.  The model that emerged, 
Capitalflow Bureaucratic Triad, was validated by expert assessment and revisiting the data 
(Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Ryan & Bernard, 2003; Strauss, 1987; Strauss & Corbin, 1998). 
The archival documents and interview transcripts were fragmented by analyzing for 
emerging empirical indicators of concepts that could be grouped into categories.  Fragmenting 
is a process to open-up text, separate discretely, analyzed in detail, and compare to identify 
patterns (Strauss & Corbin, 1998).  The constant-comparative technique was used to modify 
categories and explanations, achieving a better fit of the categories with each other, in re-
aggregating fragmented data to develop core concepts of integrated theory.  Throughout the 
coding process theoretical memos were prepared as part of the deductive abstraction process 
of theory development.  In addition, most interview recordings were listened to repeatedly and 
informed memoing. Use of a digital recorder and other automated devices and applications 
were instrumental to conducting detailed, careful analysis. 
79 
 
4.2.1 Computer aided qualitative data analysis 
SPSS,38 Microsoft Word and Excel were used to help facilitate data analysis.  The majority of 
computer analysis, however, was accomplished by employing NVivo 8.  NVivo is a descendant 
of Tom and Lyn Richards’ Non-numerical Unstructured Data Indexing, Searching and 
Theorizing (NUDIST) software.  NVivo, along with ATLAS,39 are the leading computer aided 
qualitative data analysis applications (Bazeley, 2007; Mecca, 2010; Strauss & Corbin, 1998).  
Computer aided qualitative data analysis, including NVivo, has been discussed and 
debated extensively in methodology literature (Bazeley, 2007; Crowley, Harre, & Tagg, 2002; 
Holton, 2007; Weitzman, 2003; Yin, 2009).  Computer applications are primarily viewed as tools 
in analysis.  Tools do not conduct analysis nor do they develop theory.  Using computers in 
qualitative research includes extremes of researcher detachment, such as entirely automating 
the coding process with results interpreted with statistics.  For the most part the tools are 
generally accepted and regularly used by researchers to varying degrees to code passages of 
text for retrieval, record relations among categories, and graph linkage models (Holton, 2007).  
Computer use in coding is strongly cautioned when abiding by the spirit and letter of the 
Strauss and Corbin guidelines employed in this study.  When decomposing analytical coding 
processes, Strauss did not consider precise process distinctions “particularly relevant or 
important” (Bazeley, 2007, p. 82). The general concern among classic grounded theorists is 
computers are the impetus for a preoccupation with data coding and retrieval methods to the 
neglect of interpretive processes, such as theoretical memoing.  On the other hand, recording  
  
                                                
 
38 Chapter five reports on an analysis of particular variables, MFI percent of total number of MITAF deals, 
and a dichotomous variable (yes received capital commitment, no did not) for the three periods (i.e., 
years) with the highest number of capital investment deals.  In addition, chapter six refers to the statistical 
appendix in support of the importance of 2006. 
 
39 The researcher attended both introductory and advanced training on ATLAS. 
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and transcribing data is argued as valuable in the effort to capture rich data often lost to human 
memory or note taking.  Nevertheless, Strauss discouraged a focus on precise capture of 
interview data.  This reflected his concern for researchers focusing more on data accuracy than 
theory development.  He was not concerned about missing interview data captured by digital 
recording.  He believed if it was important it would surface again, thus minimizing the 
importance of meticulously maintaining frequencies of empirical indicators (Bazeley, 2007; 
Covan, 2007; Stern, 2007).  However, given the small size of this study, it seems Strauss would 
recommend transcribing the interviews (Strauss, 1987).    
Classic grounded theorists are less concerned about using computers per se than a 
“mechanistic mind-set” that is “counter-creative” to the essential function of interpretive creativity 
(Holton, 2007, p. 287). In this examination, digitally recorded interview files were named to 
maintain respondent confidentiality and transcribed by a qualified person with a master degree 
from the University of Pittsburgh (compensated).40 Strauss and Corbin’s concerns were 
controlled by continuously employing the triad of analytical operations (Strauss, 1987). 
This investigation used a combination of computer applications for data fragmentation, 
reduction, and sampling.  MITAF narrative reports, formatted in Microsoft Word and Excel files, 
were fragmented in the field utilizing the Microsoft Word function copy and paste and the find 
edit procedure. Generative questions resulted that supplemented the protocol to gather rich 
data revealing concepts, properties, dimensions, linkages, and processes.  In addition, Excel 
assisted in analyzing instances of committed capital to guide theoretical MFI sampling for 
interviews.  SPSS was used to make salient embedded linkages between organizational 
behavior and capital flow volatility, such as context and intervening conditions.  However, NVivo 
served identification of empirical indicators, coding text, developing a hierarchal code structure, 
and analyzing association and relations to attain theoretical saturation in model development.   
4.2.2 Open coding 
Empirical indicators were initially identified during the open coding procedure (Strauss & Corbin, 
1998).  This procedure was used to fragment data in the data reduction process and involved 
both “line-by-line analysis” and “microscopic analysis” (Strauss, 1987, pp. 267, 268).  Archival 
                                                
 
40 The transcriber successfully passed the transcription test administered by the Qualitative Data Analysis 
Program, University Center for Soical and Urban Research, University of Pittsburgh. 
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document and interview transcript text was analyzed to identify events, behaviors, ideas, and 
conditions pertaining to the research questions.  The creative technique of labeling was 
employed to name discrete phenomena.  Though the labels were both sociological and in vivo, 
the in vivo codes were given preference.  Sociological labels were formulated by the researcher 
based on scholarly knowledge and expertise in the field of investigation (e.g., microfinance).  In 
vivo labels were words used by actors in the MITAF case (Strauss, 1987).   The labeling 
technique in the open coding procedure was guided by analytical usefulness and imagery.  That 
is to say, the name selected was evaluated for its ability to relate with other codes, have its own 
meaning, and easily move forward in theory development.  In addition, the name selected was 
intended to minimize the need to continually provide examples in order to explain meaning 
(Strauss, 1987). The name selected for discrete phenomena was very important in this 
investigation, especially as re-aggregation occurred in axial coding.   
NVivo refers to nodes, or named discrete phenomena.  Nodes were developed from the 
analysis and resulted in the assignment of archival document and interview transcript text to 
nodes in the open coding procedure.  This process generated approximately 40 codes using the 
hierarchal structure, the majority of which were related to bureaucracy and conditionalities.  A 
Node Summary is in Appendix C and reflects the hierarchy structure as axial coding began.  It 
contains information such as name, description, number of source documents, and number of 
text references assigned to the code/node.  Table 2 provides an example of initial and final 
codes resulting from continually eliminating old and adding new, as well as the reassembling 
process in axial and selective coding.  It reflects fragmentation, re-aggregation, and integration 
that occurred in the coding process utilizing the NVivo application.  
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Table 2:  Coding development. 
 
Initial 
Organizing 
Categories 
Examples of Response Final Coding 
Categories 
Donor Tools They say ok, since maybe the institution is asking for 
$100,000 loan, $50,000 capacity building. So UNDP say 
ok, I will give the $50,000 capacity building. KfW will say 
ok, I will give the $100,000 loan. 
Bureaucracy of 
Collaboration 
Probably, the, I would say in a positive sense the 
bureaucracy in the institutions. You know, you know, for 
example CORDAID may have different processes, approval 
processes and UNDP may have their own systems and 
UND may have their own systems so that’s really, that’s 
really a challenge. 
So that is in the case of a loan.  Now in the case of a grant, 
my experience has been that the donors, for example, they 
approve 50,000 or 100,000 dollars as a grant to the 
institution. One of the donors will say we’ll give 25,000, 
another will say give 50,000, another would say 15,000 and 
so on among themselves. 
Resource 
Dependency 
Who are they [MITAF] to determine that? But, when 
because we don’t have resources, and if they say things, 
inasmuch as you will say that’s not the way, you don’t have 
the wherewithal to do what you want to do.   
Bureaucracy of 
Accountability 
our [funder] focus is building the capacity of the national 
stakeholders, I mean, so that in the, and for sustainability 
reasons, in the long-term, the TSP [technical service 
provider] and this and that might be, but we [Sierra Leone] 
did need this to continue. Even when they are not here. 
So all these things are taken into consideration so when the 
presentations are made like, you know, for funding by the 
TSP [technical service provider] you look at some, some of 
them, they’re weak, but you say look, they’re, weak, ok, but 
what do we do? If we deny them they die.  Sometime they 
operate in certain areas where other institutions are not. 
Dual Mission It goes through a lot of bureaucratical hoops like we are 
having to establish another branch. The document, the 
business plan is there, but we are still awaiting funding. So 
each time an area that will be ministered to have to go to. 
There is no, no microfinance institution there. So the people 
are always waiting. (outreach mission) 
Bureaucracy of 
Effectiveness, 
Efficiency and 
Impact 
But, today we carry 2 missions. We have a social mission, 
we have a commercial mission. How do you blend all of 
these? And in the process, we cannot reach many of the 
rural population because of permanently watching OSS 
[operating self-sustainability], permanently watching 
productivity, permanently watching FSS [financial self-
sustainability], permanently watching our targets. 
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4.2.3 Axial coding 
Whereas the open code procedure served to fragment data, axial coding was used to begin the 
process of re-aggregating data (Strauss & Corbin, 1998).  Axial coding employed the constant-
comparative technique, code-to-code analysis to nuance out code properties and dimensions.  
More important than properties and dimensions were viewing interactions in the capital flow 
process by employing axial coding.  It was essential to capture variance in decision makers’ 
alignment of actions by decision makers with conditions and structures, which axial coding 
facilitated (Strauss & Corbin, 1998).  This resulted in an hierarchal coding structure as 
subcategories emerged.  In addition, axial coding procedures employed the Strauss and Corbin 
(1998) coding paradigm.  Each category, or code, was explored with the intent of understanding 
what was going on with activity flow and relationship ontology.   
Participant action/interaction and capital flow were examined to identify concepts of 
behavior-volatility relationships and the connections that hold them together.  Table 2 (in the 
previous section) includes the node “Donor Tools” as a product of open coding.  A sample of 
text references in Table 2 is provided as backing for the “Donor Tools” empirical indicator (i.e., 
category).  An example of axial coding is the emergence of “Collaboration” as an axial code.  
Table 2 does not depict examination of the “Donor Tools” and “Collaboration” relationship, which 
is the relationship connection for the “Information Asymmetry” node.41  Relationship of 
“Collaboration,” “Information Asymmetry,” and “Donor Tools” connects a substantial proportion 
of text sources.  Of the 17 sources available for coding, Collaboration accessed 15, Information 
Asymmetry accessed 12, and Donor Tools accessed 11.  Of the nodes accessing the same 
number of sources, Information Asymmetry had the second most text references while 
Collaboration and Donor Tools had the most.  Furthermore, Collaboration text references were 
also references in 75% of all nodes.  Although the Strauss and Corbin approach emphasizes 
that grounded theory is not a numbers game, dense and saturated integrated theory is a basic 
tenet. The nodes represent concepts of relationship between behavior and volatility while 
serving as connectors by accessing a substantial portion of sources with frequent references in 
those sources.     
  
                                                
 
41 Appendix C contains a graphic illustration of NVivo 8 employed in axial coding analysis. 
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The Strauss and Corbin (1998) coding paradigm assists excavating embedded 
relationships as a tool to arrange and classify emerging linkages.  Their paradigm, presented in 
Table 3, served a central aim of this examination’s strategy, mainly relating structure with 
process (Nutt, 2010).  Structure, or the organization, and process, or capital flow, are 
foundational to MFIs in post-conflict fragile states participating in the development of an 
inclusive financial services sector.  The coding paradigm assisted in uncovering the 
performance based agreement as a vital context and the mid-term evaluation as a critical 
intervening condition. 
Table 3:  Coding paradigm. 
 
Components Description Example 
Phenomenon Repeated patterns of events, 
happenings, actions/interactions of 
what people do and say. 
Pattern of portfolio-at-risk 
(PaR) above industry 
standards. 
Causal conditions Events that influence phenomena. Delay of capital disbursement 
for capacity building 
Intervening 
conditions 
Conditions mitigating or otherwise 
altering the impact of causal 
conditions on phenomena. 
Donors approving and 
disbursing capital although 
MFIs not performing at 
industry standards due to mid-
term evaluation occurring, and 
the need demonstrated by 
program outputs and 
effectiveness. 
Contextual 
conditions 
Patterns of causal and intervening 
conditions that intersect at a time and 
place to create a set of circumstances 
which people respond to with 
actions/interactions. 
Explains why donors disburse 
capital to MFIs not performing 
at industry standards for some 
deals and not others.  
Actions/Interactions How people handle situations, 
problems—strategic or routine tactics. 
How socially focused MFIs 
responded to donor 
requirements for lower PaRs 
in order to provide funding to 
sustain operations. 
Consequences The result of actions/interactions with 
inherent properties. 
Conditions that emphasize 
PaR at industry standards 
levels result in capital 
disbursement delays.  
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4.2.4 Selective coding 
Axial codes served formulating theory by informing the selective coding procedure (Strauss & 
Corbin, 1998).  Axial coding employed the technique of integration, “the ever increasing 
organization of the components of theory”  (Strauss, 1987, p. 21).  The technique involved 
identifying the central category, or categories, that accounted for the greatest amount of 
variation within the codes.  Central categories coalesced other categories to explain the 
linkages between behavior and volatility.  Although bureaucracy and disbursement 
conditionalities explained the variation overwhelmingly, Strauss and Corbin (1998) suggest that 
one idea be selected as the core category (selective coding).  Using their criteria, provided in 
Appendix D, bureaucracy was selected as the core category.  The selective coding procedure 
also involved developing internal consistency, addressing logic gaps, completing the 
development of some categories, and eliminating others.  For example, over a dozen coding 
categories stored in NVivo free nodes (i.e., functionally eliminated) were used in fragmentation 
to reference data not directly related to this investigation. 
It is important to understand that these procedures did not proceed linearly.  Both data 
collection and data analysis methods were guided in an iterative fashion by the triad of 
analytical operations:  data collection, coding, and memoing.  Coding quickly led to memoing. 
Theoretical memos were analytical and interpretive devices that described linkages among 
concepts.  Memos evolved through the research with numerous adjustments and additions.  It is 
a device that served both to maintain grounding and enhance distance from the data for 
conceptualization (Strauss & Corbin, 1998).  
After selecting bureaucracy as the core category, a “storyline memo” was written to 
present concepts that emerged from the investigation for MITAF actor validation.  The storyline 
memo was used to validate the “theoretical scheme” utilizing actor feedback interviews and 
email.  The script used to request evaluation of the storyline memo is in Appendix B.  The 
storyline memo, as originally presented, is in Appendix E.  The feedback resulted in adjustments 
and informed strategy recommendation development, illustrating the non-linear execution of 
research procedures.   
86 
 
4.3 TRUSTWORTHINESS 
The trustworthiness of this examination was measured by drawing on “criteria for evaluation,” 
emphasized by Strauss and Corbin (1998, pp. 268-272).  Validity, reliability, credibility, 
adequacy of the research process, and empirical grounding of the research were used as 
method-appropriate alternatives to the “usual scientific canons” (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p. 
266).  It is important for the reader to understand the criteria used to generate the research 
findings to avoid misunderstanding due to different criteria.   
Strauss and Corbin redefined the external validity measurement in terms of explanatory 
power, the aim of grounded theory in building theory.  This case study examination explains 
what might occur in given situations.  The specific conditions that give rise to certain 
organizational behavior and capital flow volatility were set forth.  In addition, how organizations 
responded to variance in capital flow, and how variance in capital flow varied with the behavior 
of organizations is presented.  As a result, others can make informed assessments as to the 
applicability of the research findings to other settings and test the theory’s validity (Dey, 2007; 
Strauss & Corbin, 1998). 
Reliability of research findings for Strauss and Corbin (1998) substantially conforms to 
the classic understanding that other researchers ought to develop “the same or very similar 
theoretical explanation” about the focus of the study when conducting the analysis (p. 267).  
Documentation of the procedures, including the research process, serves reliability.  This 
documentation included a daily research log of field-work as an audit trail, secure data files, and 
research field notes.  The digitally recorded interview files were named to maintain respondent 
confidentiality, transcribed, and compared to the recordings by the investigator to strengthen 
reliability (Lee, 1999).  In addition, the  application of the triad of analytical operation controlled 
research bias by maintaining data grounding (Strauss, 1987).   
  Credibility was used as the method-appropriate criteria for research accuracy and 
thoroughness to identify and describe organizational behavior and capital volatility.  This 
examination involved methods of triangulation, in which multiple sources were used to answer 
research questions.  For example, in MFI organizations accounting for a substantial number of 
donor commitments to provide capital, at least one representative of each Investment 
Committee organization and apex staff were all asked the same three interview questions.  In 
addition, archival data were obtained from, or confirmed as appropriate by, at least one of these 
organizations.  This reduced the risk of weakening data analysis by any single source and form 
of data and analysis.  Participant checking aided reflectivity and verification (i.e., storyline 
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memo).  Initial findings were presented to some MITAF participants to obtain feedback.  This 
included their assessment of the face validity, which was reflected in the resulting substantive 
theory. 
Adequacy of the research process was determined as the researcher’s coding 
procedures supported careful and thorough following of proven grounded theory methods, such 
as identifying empirical indicators and theoretical sampling.  The basis for case and interview 
subject selection was set forth earlier in this chapter.  The major categories that emerged with 
some of the empirical indicators are presented in Appendix C.  Examples of theoretical 
formulations guiding data gathering are reported in this chapter.  The basis and validation of 
several beliefs regarding conceptual linkages were also provided earlier in this chapter.  
Moreover, the how and why of the core categories selected are detailed in the previous section 
(Selective coding), and integral to theory development in chapter seven.  Finally, each phase of 
the examination was scrutinized and reviewed by research advisors at the University of 
Pittsburgh (i.e., dissertation committee members).  These advisors provided critical comments, 
especially on the methodology and data analysis, before the study commenced, which made the 
examination transparent and rigorous.  
Empirical grounding of the research in this investigation was based on the belief that the 
components of theory are concepts grounded in data.  This investigation was guided, and 
measured, by several procedures and techniques drawn from the Strauss and Corbin method 
(Strauss & Corbin, 1998).  Concepts were used to develop dense theory and a sense of robust 
use is resident in the report (see chapters five and six).  Systematic linkages between concepts 
was achieved and “woven through the text of the publication” (p. 270).   Process development 
and density thoroughly and carefully identified “movement, sequence, and change,” including 
evolution in response to context and condition changes, resulting in category density and robust 
explanatory power (p. 167).  Accounting for variation by focusing on change and linkage with 
structure both connected the categories and identified patterns over time and space.  For 
example, organizational behavior related to capital disbursement was observed during the mid-
term evaluation year and during performance based agreement consummation. Variation 
conditions are not only discussed as exogenous variables of the IAD model, but reflected in 
examinations of decision making and capital volatility.  Verification was accomplished by both 
obtaining feedback from actors in the field (e.g., storyline memo), and reexamining data central 
to the triad of analytical operation (Strauss, 1987). 
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4.4 SUMMARY 
This chapter set forth in rich detail grounded theory research methods, approaches, and design 
aspects used to ensure rigor and trustworthiness in this investigation.  Archival and interview 
data were collected and analyzed to identify volatility and linkages with organizational behavior.  
This data was analyzed and uncovered performance based agreements as a context to observe 
substantial variability.  Similarly, the MITAF mid-term evaluation was discovered to be an 
intervening condition.  This context and intervening condition was examined to observe linkages 
between organizational behavior and capital flow volatility.  The examination utilized descriptive 
and inferential statistics, but primarily grounded theory coding facilitated by computer aided 
qualitative data analysis (e.g., NVivo).  The result was a central code, using the in vivo code 
label “Bureaucracy,” explaining a substantial amount of variation in the behavior-volatility 
linkage.   Findings, pursuant to the employment of methods described in this and the previous 
chapter, contain a rich detail of the MITAF case structure and processes, loci of behavior-
volatility linkages.  These descriptive findings are presented in the following chapter, and are the 
foundation for analyzing connections between organizational behavior and capital flow volatility.       
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5.0  DATA FINDINGS:  ESPOUSED THEORIES AND WORKING THEORIES  
The process discussed in this chapter, as recorded in archival documents and expressed in 
participants own words, focuses on actions intended to consummate and implement MFI capital 
investment deals.  The portrayal of how agreements can be viewed from different perspectives 
is described.  Also depicted is the constraining-empowering tension of organizational 
imperatives and collaborative commitments.  The tension is observed in original processes 
(MITAF espoused theory) that were experiencing numerous changes, primarily due to conflict 
with individual donor organization imperatives.  The formalized changes, developed in response 
to working theories or implemented processes, demonstrated MITAF’s learning capacity and 
limitations.  The importance of MITAF’s learning capacity and limitations is embedded in the 
view that public policy administration is the actual expression of policy and speaks to espoused 
theories’ relevance in attacking societal problems.  On some occasions MITAF limitations were 
seen in formalized changes that complicated consummation and the deal implementation 
process.  As such, MITAF’s adapted behavior (i.e., learning) is best observed by focusing on the 
process to formalize commitments of capital investment in MFIs.  Moreover, behavior and 
participants’ expressions regarding the implementation of performance based agreements 
(commitment formalization) revealed perceptions and beliefs important to understanding 
interpretations of mutually agreed stipulations.  Description of the MITAF capital investment 
process, including adaptations over time, from Investment Committee approval through 
disbursements depicts complexity in developing MFIs in post-conflict fragile state Sierra Leone. 
This chapter lays the foundation for analysis of behavior and volatility by describing 
specific MITAF participant actions related to capital investment that emerged above other 
related and unrelated actions. It aims to vividly, richly portray and provide comprehensive insight 
on MITAF capital flow processes.  First, the espoused theory of MITAF capital flow is exhibited.    
Official documents were examined, triangulated utilizing interview data, to excavate the evolving 
espoused capital flow process.  Challenges, organizational learning, and limitations of formal 
responses were observed from this process.  Second, the actual process used for capital 
disbursement in MITAF is described to understand both what was done and how adapted 
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behavior came into being (Nutt, 2010).  The descriptions of espoused and actual processes are 
rich, portraying flexibility and vibrancy.  Individual organizational imperatives, collaborative 
commitments, and administrative expediencies created dynamic tensions that affected capital 
flow.  Finally, capital disbursement action was brought into focus.  The constraining-empowering 
tensions of organizational imperatives and collaborative commitments were found to affect 
organizational learning.  Also, capital flow was affected by struggles of dual bottom-line 
objectives (financial performance and outreach to people) and operations administered with 
ambiguous identity.   
The relationship between capital flow volatility and organizational behavior was 
investigated using the MITAF project as a case to examine and identify capital investment deal 
organizational-volatility linkages.  But, the MITAF project was created to do much more than 
provide capital to relieve a “major constraint” in developing the microfinance sector.  Prescribed 
project outcomes included assisting the Bank of Sierra Leone to establish a microfinance unit, 
and disseminate sound microfinance principles, which are widely accepted and practiced 
throughout the sector in Sierra Leone. The linkages between organizational behavior and capital 
flow volatility are connected to activities involving numerous related initiatives.  Central to 
understanding linkages is understanding the capital flow process as designed and actually 
implemented, while MITAF also worked to advance related initiatives (Nutt, 2010).  Examination 
of the MITAF project capital disbursement process is important, and “failing to deal with process 
will lead to incomplete and misleading understandings” (p. 600).  Perceived values—what 
should be—were reflected in the design, while effect was reflected in practice.  This chapter 
presents MITAF espoused theories, or the designed process, and the working theories, or 
process as practiced, to provide capital to microfinance institutions.  
Microfinance, a mechanism to deliver capital to the poor, was one of four key initiatives 
stressed by the Sierra Leone government to restore the economy during post-conflict 
reconstruction.  As such, MITAF was designed and implemented pursuant to the government’s 
microfinance initiative (RSL, 2002b).  Investigation of capital investment deals involved deal 
activity intertwined with many actions/interactions beyond capital investment, such as 
government initiatives and related MITAF activities.  These actions/interactions were intended to 
be “mutually enforcing” (UNCDF, 2004b, p. 7).   
Investors engaged in actions/interactions were ostensibly guided by the project’s 
“overarching goal” to achieve the poverty reduction objective in the Millennium Development 
Goals (UNCDF, 2004b, p. 6).  MITAF intended to assist in guaranteeing a “rapid development of 
the microfinance sector” by developing “professional microfinance institutions…leaders.” These 
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leaders were to drive sector development by demonstrating to other MFIs and the public that 
investment in the “lower end of the market are bankable” (p.6).  The Sierra Leone government, 
United Nations Development Program (UNDP), and United Nations Capital Development Fund 
(UNCDF) all agreed,42 as evidenced by signing the Programme Support Document (Appendix 
F), that rapid sector expansion was important and the absence of MFI leadership was a 
“principal constraint” to expansion (pp. 4, 6).  Also, one of the four output concentrations was to 
support the Bank of Sierra Leone in establishing “an optimal enabling environment for 
development of the microfinance industry” (p. 7).  MITAF support was to include: providing staff 
training, developing studies on sector constraints and opportunities, distributing information, and 
developing the nation’s capacity support services (meso level institutions) such as, information 
technology, legal services, and accounting.  MITAF aims included creating an enabling 
regulatory microfinance environment (not constraining), removing MFI leadership-void 
constraints, and propelling MFI sector development.   
Utilizing the MITAF project for sector development, rather than directing aid to the Sierra 
Leone government, is a fundamental distinction of this investigation to other capital volatility 
literature.  Many capital volatility researchers analyzed sector aid administered through 
government recipients.  This investigation focused on the provision of sector aid to service 
delivery organizations (MFIs) through a project mechanism (MITAF).  Macro studies do not 
delve as deeply into volatility and organizational behavior data as compared to this 
investigation.  Macro level studies used statistical techniques to analyze measurements 
aggregated at the nation state level.  The role of the state, and analytical depth and detail, are 
fundamental, substantial distinctions of this investigation.    
 
                                               
42 KfW (German Development Bank) is prominently noted as a founding member of MITAF both in the 
Programme Support Document (UNCDF, 2004b, pp. signature cover page, 26) and the Investment 
Committee Manual (MITAF, 2006, pp. 4, 7).  MITAF was a UN project with the government of Sierra 
Leone and KfW was not a signatory.  
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5.1 PROCESS AS DESIGNED: ESPOUSED THEORY OF MITAF CAPITAL FLOW 
The process designed for donors to provide capital to MFIs reflects situational expediency, 
innovativeness, and commitment to collaboration and learning.  It focused on accountability, 
concessions, participatory engagement, and sound financial principles.  Individual institutional 
imperatives quickly surfaced to mandate adjustments from the design.  These adjustments 
involved greater accommodations of individual organizational interests and prevented the 
essential central function—the flow of capital—from encountering project-halting process 
problems.  To be clear, of all the designed outcomes of MITAF, capital investment to MFIs for 
capacity building and growth of loan portfolios was central: it was about the money! 
The design for capital disbursement from donors to MFIs served to implement MITAF 
Investment Committee (IC) decisions aimed at building MFI capacity and investment in MFI 
market leaders (UNCDF, 2004b).  This disbursement process was intended to, “function as an 
effective and conducive mechanism for donors to channel their investments to MFIs” (p. 7).  It 
was designed with the explicit intent of mobilizing additional donors or “strategic partnerships 
that enable MFIs access to capital (grants, loans [hard and soft] and commercial equity)” while 
maintaining the focus of providing financial service access to the poor (p. 12).  The essential 
components of the process are depicted in Figure 3.  The illustration reflects a process that 
continually engaged the various participants. 
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Figure 3:  Process of capital flow as designed (espoused theory). 
Investment Committee Approval of 
Investment Proposals 
When consensus is reached, 
Performance Based Agreements (PBA) 
prepared with key indicators and 
reporting requirements 
MFI propose 
collateral and 
“negotiation” 
meetings 
PBA provided to MFI for review, signature, 
and returned to MITAF 
Donor signs signature 
page of PBA 
MFI reviews and executes 
PBA 
PBA  to Donor 
for review and 
signature 
Approval letters delivered within one week of 
the IC approval 
Returned to MITAF by MFI 
within 14 days of 
approving 
LOAN 
 
GRANT 
MFI “negotiation” meetings 
MFI reviews and 
executes PBA 
Capital Disbursement 
Donor option 1: disburse 
entire amount to MITAF 
within two weeks 
Investment Manual 
changed to $500,000 
minimum balance 
 
 
MFI requests disbursement from MITAF with supporting documentation 
evidencing that disbursement conditions have been met 
Donor capital disbursement, in an amount equal to the 
specified percentage of funds, to MITAF account 
Modified with $500,000 minimum balance change 
 
First disbursement sent within 14 days of PBA, provided conditions met.  IC approves disbursements of 
payments at IC meeting 
MITAF disburses capital to MFI 
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 This investigation focused on organizational behavior and capital flow from the time a 
deal was approved at an IC meeting until the last tranche of capital was disbursed and available 
to the MFI.  The MITAF process for disbursing investment capital involved actions that various 
participants were empowered to take.  In the Program Support Document (PSD), for example, 
the rules for investing capital in MFIs were intended to clearly present required, permitted, and 
forbidden actions. MFIs were required to meet agreed conditions to receive capital; donors were 
required to maintain certain funds with the apex (MITAF project bank account); and the apex 
was required to meet with MFIs after IC approval to negotiate terms (Figure 4 and Figure 5). 
The objective is order and reliability in behavior and the flow (disbursement) of capital.  The 
capital flow design and the empowered actions are generally set forth in the PSD and the 
MITAF Investment Committee Policy and Procedural Manual (Manual).  For example, the 
tranche design, which involves disbursing loans using installments, is an example provided in 
the Base Loan Product available from MITAF.  The specific design and actions are contained in 
a performance based agreement (PBA).  The PBA served as the investment contract between 
donors and MFIs.  Figure 4 contains an excerpt from the PSD, Development of a Sustainable 
Pro-Poor Financial Sector in Sierra Leone (2004-2009), setting forth the process.   
The process of capital disbursement begins with IC approval.  Then, the process is 
understood by going through first the PSD,  the Manual next, and finally the PBA.  Donors 
agreed to the choice rules (rules governing choice) of utilizing the same key performance 
indicators and required MFI reporting to donors.  For example, key indicators used to determine 
minimum performance standards for MFI capital disbursements included: 
• Outreach understood as the number of MFI active clients; 
• Loan portfolio quality measured by portfolio-at-risk (PaR) of those loans 30 days or 
more past-due on payments; 
• Profitability/Sustainability measured utilizing the computation of Adjusted Rate 
Return on Assets (AROA).43 
A sample apex recommendation for grant and loan disbursement is provided in Appendix H.  
                                                
 
43 AROA is computed in the conventional method for return-on-assets (profit/assets) with total 
consolidated profit reduced for an inflation computation using a rate provided by the Bank of Sierra Leone 
and applied against a change in the MFIs equity/net assets; subsidized cost-of-funding computed using a 
market rate for loans provided by the Bank of Sierra Leone applied against compulsory savings balances 
and subsidized loans to the MFI; and in-kind subsidies (non-monetary) computed using data from the 
Bank of Sierra Leone and applied against a particular MFI’s activity.  
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After performance indicators are stipulated for donor use, the PSD focuses on donor 
activities involving capital disbursements.  The Manual, however, discusses the process 
between donors’ agreement to key indicators and actual disbursement of capital to MFIs.  In 
addition, the Manual details the process through PBA completion. 
 
 
Figure 4:  Programme Support Document. 
Additional detail on the design of the capital flow process is found in the Investment 
Cycle section of the Investment Committee Policy and Procedure Manual.  Details in the Manual 
provide additional insight on the choices, actions, and general involvement of the MFIs and 
apex (TSP) in the capital investment process.  The Manual, dated approximately three years 
after the PSD created MITAF, reflects participant effort to enhance the espoused, formalized 
capital investment process. 
8. Execution/Implementation Arrangements: 
 
UNCDF/SUM will serve as executing agent for its own funds, and implementing agent 
for some UNDP budget lines. Other donors are encouraged to cost-share through UNCDF/SUM 
in order to 1) minimize disbursement pressure; 2) harmonize reporting; 3) reduce administrative 
costs; and 4) expedite payments and implementation.   
The project will establish a forex, interest-bearing main account with sub-accounts for 
each MFI or programme component. The Technical Service Provider and CEO of each MFI 
supported will serve as co-signatories of the respective sub-accounts. Donor/Investors will 
ensure that either: 1] investments approved by the Investment Committee can be paid within 
two (2) weeks of approval; or 2] that a certain percentage of committed funds (i.e. concretely 
committed via contracts for specific projects) is kept in the main account. It will be replenished 
upon proof that the previous tranche has been adequately used. Donor funds will be expended 
on a pro-rata basis (calculated according to the percentage of funds accepted under 
management) based on the payments approved at each meeting. Arrangements will be made 
for external auditing of the use of funds on a yearly basis by an independent auditing firm who 
will report to the Investment Committee.   
Donors will have the right to cease support to an MFI, programme component or the 
programme if deemed necessary (non-fulfillment of performance criteria, misappropriation of 
funds). The decision should be discussed in the Investment Committee, or between the relevant 
donors in the case of support to a specific MFI (MITAF, 2006).   
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After IC approval of the deal, the apex is required to act, and interact, with the MFIs.  
The apex prepares a letter regarding the IC decision and it is “delivered to the local office” of the 
MFI (MITAF, 2006, p. 20).   In practice this involved sending an email with the notification and 
proposed conditions as attachments (Appendix G), or the MFI was called and requested to pick-
up the letter from the MITAF office. This is followed by interaction of the apex with the MFI in a 
personal way.  A meeting between the apex and MFI is explicitly required to negotiate the rules 
of the particular deal.  These rules (PBA terms) specifically included duration of the deal, 
performance targets, specific conditions (other than performance targets), fund transfer 
specifics (e.g., foreign currency issues44) and, in the case of a subsidized loan, loan terms. 
Upon reaching consensus the apex drafts the PBA for MFI review.  When agreement is reached 
on a final document the espoused process calls for the MFI to execute it.  Action and interaction 
of all participants in the deal is expected to occur, according to the espoused rules, once an 
agreement is reached. 
The espoused process implies that donors will sign the document first, especially for 
grant deals, and that MFIs will not secure any substantive changes in negotiations that 
necessitate execution of new documents.  The Manual provides that MFIs return the PBA within 
14 days of approving it followed by fund disbursement.   The donor signing is described in the 
prior section of the Manual (4.5 Approval), and occurs before discussing approval letters or MFI 
performance based agreement negotiations.  Discussing PBA signatures before negotiations to 
produce PBAs may seem out of sequence.  Closer examination, however, combined with 
interview data, provided insight on efforts aimed at developing an expeditious process.   The 
signing discussion specifically references the grant agreement page.  The conclusion that 
donors were intended to sign first was supported by a donor’s recount of how the process 
operated in the early years,   
Now, in some of the early investment committee meetings, we had, we had literally the 
grant agreements printed and ready to be signed once we knew at the end of the 
meeting what had been approved. And so we literally would, KFW, UNDP, and UNCDF 
would just pass the papers back and forth and say ok, we approved six, let’s sign them, 
let’s go. And with, and we each left with our own copies that we could take and put into 
our financial process and start the approvals. 
                                                
 
44 Capital comes in the form of foreign currency and needs to be converted to leones.  This can be 
especially sensitive on loan deals where, over the period of the loan, the relative currency value can 
change dramatically. 
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That worked fairly well in some of the early meetings. When it didn’t work well it was 
because the technical secretariat wouldn’t follow our requests and get the MFI to sign 
their grant agreement in advance. They, they sort of argued well, we don’t want to raise 
expectations. And we said, well, you know, look, we’re, you can just tell, we’re approving 
90% of what you propose anyway (Interview 8). 
 
Special provisions were made for loan deal complexity.  Although PSD is silent on the 
distinction, the Manual implies that donor PBA signatures come after the apex negotiates within 
donor-stipulated parameters.  IC approval is explicitly described as a decision to support, with 
loan conditions and performance indicators subsequently negotiated.  Furthermore, signed loan 
documents are described as “approval” forms, not “agreements” (MITAF, 2006, p. 20).  As a 
result, Section 4.6.3 of the Manual requires each donor in a loan deal signs individually and 
subsequent to the MFI (Figure 5). 
The Manual is dated July 2006, falling in one of the four years subject to this 
investigation (2006-2009).  The date in the file name, as provided to this researcher, was 
October 7, 2006.  The dates corresponded with the MITAF mid-term evaluation, which 
commenced September 6, 2006, and included an on-site examination September 18-30 (Duval 
& Bendu, 2006).  One of the findings of the mid-term evaluation was that “[t]he procedures still 
in place for disbursing donor funds to partner lending institutions are unwieldy and contribute to 
unnecessary and disruptive delays in financing” (p. 33).  Findings and recommendations were 
presented to MITAF and other stakeholders in a meeting to review an Aide Memoire after the 
mission ended September 30, 2006.  The Manual’s detail espoused tighter procedures and 
more explicit donor funding requirements.  This investigation found that some donor behavior 
deemed objectionable during mid-term evaluation was still occurring through the end of MITAF. 
However, focusing on administrative incidents and brief explanations of the mid-term evaluation 
obfuscate more substantive behaviors by MITAF participants that are linked to capital flow 
volatility.   
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4.6 Closing 
4.6.1 Letters of approval or rejection 
After the IC meeting, approval and rejection letters are delivered to the local office of all applicant MFIs 
within one week of the decision. All letters will follow the standard format (see MFI Grant Approval 
Letter.doc and MFI Grant Rejection Letter.doc).  When MFIs are approved for a loan, they are to propose 
collateral. Further, a meeting is scheduled to finalize the negotiations.  
4.6.2 Negotiations/Closing with approved MFIs 
MITAF meets with the selected MFIs to discuss the duration of the contract, performance targets, specific 
conditions, fund transfers and where applicable loan terms and collateral. Once a consensus is reached, 
grant or loan agreements are drafted. The agreements are provided to the MFIs for review and signature.  
4.6.3 Contracts with approved MFIs 
The MFI returns a copy of the signed contract to MITAF within 14 days of approval. Funds placed by 
donors under MITAF management are signed by UNDP, UNCDF and KfW on behalf of MITAF.  
Signatories for the MFI are the Executive Director or other high level senior manager.  
Performance based financing agreements are negotiated and signed with the approved applicants.  
Consensus is reached on the financing to be made available (loans or grants for the loan fund or 
operational cost support) and the performance targets to be reached during the funding period in all areas 
of the Performance Standards (see the monitoring section 4.8). 
The Investment Committee uses separate agreements for grants and loans (see Grant Agreement.doc  
and Loan Agreement.doc). Agreements include responsibilities of the MFI, contract duration, MFI bank 
account information, records, information and reports and general provisions. The loan contracts include 
also MITAF bank information and repayment schedules 
4.7 Disbursement 
MITAF maintains an MFI Investment account in Freetown (grants and loans) to facilitate initial and 
subsequent tranche payments. Donor/investors will transfer the approved/foreseen funding amounts into 
the account, upon which MITAF will domestically transfer funds to the MFIs’ dollar accounts. All MFIs are 
required to exchange dollars for leones through a legally registered exchange bureau or commercial 
bank.  
Initial funds are disbursed within 14 days of the signing of contracts. Subsequent tranches will be 
disbursed as per contract. The funds will be transferred by MITAF from the MITAF MFI Investment 
account to the MFI account.  
MFIs are obliged to maintain certain performance standards to remain eligible for ongoing and future 
financing.  In the case of non-performance, funds may be recalled and reallocated to a better performing 
institution. 
Donors have the right to cease support to an MFI, to a programme component or to a programme, if 
performance criteria have not been met or if there has been a misappropriation of funds. The decision 
should be discussed in the Investment Committee or between the relevant donors in the case of support 
to a specific MFI. 
To ensure that investments approved by the Investment Committee can be paid within two weeks of 
approval, at least $500,000 is maintained in the MITAF Investment account. It will be replenished upon 
request from MITAF and proof that the previous tranches have been adequately used.  The KfW, 
UNCDF, UNDP funds are expended on a pro-rata basis (calculated according to the percentage of funds 
accepted under management) based on the payments approved at each meeting (MITAF, 2006, p. 21).  
Figure 5:  MITAF manual. 
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The behavior and process described in these two archival documents, combined with 
the PBA, reflected the struggles of establishing rules involving choice (e.g., duties, rights, and 
resource allocation) and boundaries (entry and exit).  The Execution/Implementation 
Arrangements section in the PSD focuses on donor actions (see Figure 4 above).  This reflects 
the orientation of the PSD, the agreement creating MITAF, which provided for the interests, 
rights, and responsibilities of the donors.  The capital disbursement process was provided for in 
substantial detail, while allowing flexibility. 
Capital investment disbursement stipulations in the PSD provided donors two options.  
In summary, after a MFI proposal was approved by the IC, donors that were party to the deal 
were to either:  (1) pay to MITAF their portion of the deal within two weeks of IC approval, or (2) 
maintain in the MITAF main account a percentage (unspecified) of the amount provided for in 
the executed PBA (percentage approach).  Presumably the initial payment was due when the 
donor returned the executed the PBA. The percentage was maintained by replenishing 
payments once proof was received that the prior tranche was used appropriately.  
Organizational learning recorded in the Manual is visible when it is juxtaposed with the 
PSD on matters of capital disbursement.  MITAF demonstrated the attributes of an adapting, 
learning organization on the matter of donors making capital available for disbursement to MFIs 
by MITAF.  For instance, the percentage approach was modified from the PSD to a fixed, 
specified amount in the Manual.  The two options were replaced in the espoused process with a 
flat $500,000 minimum balance in each donor’s account, all maintained in the MITAF main bank 
account.  Although this practically addressed most disbursement needs, the Manual also 
stipulates the donor was required to transfer to MITAF the amount of approved capital, or the 
foreseen deal, (presumably if soon to be approved) for MITAF to disburse to the MFI.  This 
change, combined with limited donor behavior, was arguably evidence that organizational 
learning occurred pursuant to experience and the formative mid-term evaluation. 
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The espoused process provided that capital disbursements to MFIs were accounted for 
on a pro rata basis between the donors in the deal, in accordance to disbursement decisions 
made at each IC meeting.  In addition, disbursements were subject to specific conditions as 
expressed in the consummated PBA.  In other words, at each of the two annual IC meetings 
disbursement decisions were expected on prior deals and the payment of those disbursements 
from the MITAF main account were charged on a pro rata basis to each donor’s account.  
 A hypothetical deal depicts the process.  Assume the donors’ portion of the total capital 
commitment to the MITAF project is as follows:  KfW 50%, UNCDF 20%, UNDP 20%, and 
Cordaid 10% (Table 4).  IC approves a deal for investment capital totaling $300,000 to an MFI 
for staff capacity building and office equipment.  The capital commitment allocation of the deal 
is: KfW 50% ($150,000), UNCDF 20% ($60,000), UNDP 20% ($60,000), and Cordaid 10% 
($30,000).   In this example the PBA calls for the initial payment to the MFI to be $60,000 after 
resumes and applications for three prospective operations officers are submitted to MITAF.  
Table 4:  Example of capital pro-rata commitment for $300,000 MFI Deal. 
When the MFI provided a request for disbursement, accompanied by the resumes and 
applications, the apex presented the disbursement request for approval at the next IC meeting.  
Upon receiving IC approval, the capital is disbursed by the apex from each donor’s balance in 
the MITAF’s main account charging the investors accordingly:  KfW, $30,000; UNCDF, $12,000; 
UNDP, $12,000; and Cordaid, $6,000.  Subsequently, MITAF provides donors a request for 
replenishment in the event their balance goes below $500,000.  The Manual provides that 
MITAF disburses the initial payment to the MFI within 14 days of receiving a completely 
executed PBA.  
The PBA consummated the capital investment deal and, in harmony with the PSD and 
Manual, set forth choice options and boundaries to the parties of the deal.  For example, the 
(Not actual percentages or amounts) 
Donor % of Total Capital 
Committed to 
MITAF 
MFI Capital 
Commitment Allocation-
Total $300,000 
First Tranche 
Allocation-Total 
$60,000 
KfW 50 $150,000 $30,000 
UNCDF 20 $60,000 $12,000 
UNDP 20 $60,000 $12,000 
Cordaid 10 $30,000 $6,000 
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“Payment/Date” by the donor (“Grantor”) to the MFI (“Recipient Institution”) was contained in the 
PBA along with “disbursement conditions,” “key/results milestones” (“Expected Results”), and 
reporting requirements.   The espoused rules provided in the first section of the PBA were as 
follow: 
1.1 The Recipient Institution agrees to:  complete the key results/milestones 
specified in the Section III below, including providing reports and statements to the 
grantor in accordance with the Monitoring Schedule.  The Recipient Institution shall 
be responsible for verifying the accuracy of all reports.  Funds provided pursuant to this 
Agreement shall be used to achieve these results/milestones. The Recipient 
Institution shall be free to reallocate resources as needed in order to produce the 
expected results.  
   
The initial payment, or tranche payment, date stipulated in the agreement was mandated 
to occur within 14 days of agreement execution.  This suggested that initial payment 
requirements stipulated in the “Disbursement Conditions” portion of the PBA were fully 
achievable within 14 days, if not immediately, in order to for these various documents to work in 
harmony (e.g., PBA and Manual not in conflict).  In addition, it suggested that funding 
requirements in the Manual, as amended June 19, 2007, are satisfied (e.g., PaR maximum of 
5% for loan-funding grants).  Noteworthy was the explicit choice rule that the MFI had sole 
discretion in resource use to achieve “expected results.”   
 
One of the most insightful provisions regarding organizational learning is Section 3.4 of 
the 2009 version of the PBA template: 
 
3.4 The Recipient Institution shall request disbursements with the supporting 
information to show that disbursement conditions have been met. All payments shall be 
deposited into the Recipient Institution’s bank account of which the details are as 
follows:  
 
Name of the Bank:   
Bank Routing Number:  
SWIFT Code:  
Beneficiary Account Name:   
Beneficiary Account Number:  
Address of Bank:   
The agreement provided that capital disbursed by a donor pursuant to the deal was not to 
MITAF, but directly to the MFI’s bank account. 
The espoused capital flow theory in MITAF provided several valuable insights.  The 
design consolidates capital from donors, as a collaborative mechanism, for disbursement by 
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MITAF to MFIs.  Donors were obligated to proactively make the capital available.  The initial 
disbursement of capital was required to occur quickly after approval of the PBA.  MFIs bought-in 
to expected results and conditions as the process explicitly called for “negotiations,” as opposed 
to presentation of terms.  Furthermore, it was reasonable to conclude the PBA signatory 
process for grants, plus the “negotiation” approach for PBA development, resulted in terms 
reasonable and achievable for the MFI.  However, the working rules, as expressed by MITAF 
participants, differed in substantial ways from what was espoused.    
5.2 THE PROCESS AS IMPLEMENTED:  THEORY-IN-USE 
The key components of consummating and implementing a capital investment deal are related 
and intertwined. The PBA is required to officially and legally do the deal, especially for loan 
capital.  Certain provisions of the PBA are central and located in section III of the document: 
Key Results/Milestones and Payments.  These provisions included conditions for disbursement 
and reporting.  The official definition of these terms versus participants’ view of their 
operationalization reflected beliefs and perceptions that surpassed framing of document 
provisions.  In practice, deals proved to be imperfect, loosely structured understandings deeply 
embedded in complex historical and human factors.  Data providing insight into practice is 
provided in the following sections. 
5.2.1 Performance based agreements 
The immediate focus after IC approval was consummating the capital investment deal through a 
completed PBA.  MFIs in the field described the beginning of the process as receipt of an 
approval letter.  They then spoke of a process to agree on loan terms that created the PBA,  
And then we agreed on loan terms and conditions, you know, and once we agreed on 
loan terms and conditions, the formal document was sent to us for the review details and 
send it back and we agreed on the final loan terms and conditions (Interview 2). 
The MFIs recounted a process very much in line with espoused procedures for executing the 
PBA up to completion.  However, some explanations suggested that organizational behavior 
was not consistent with espoused theory on matters pertaining to donor execution of the PBAs.  
103 
 
Bureaucracy was a concept that emerged in MFI interviews to explain delays in donor PBA 
completion; they seemed to view the process as a black box.  MFI interviewees had some 
specific insights on donor and apex processes, but their viewed was substantially limited to 
information entering the process and decisions emerging.  For the most part, they were unsure 
how disbursement processing occurred.  Suggestions regarding donor PBA execution 
embedded in MFI interview data were empirically supported in an official May 2009 MITAF 
archival document, “Investments approved in mid February 2009…The donors had not even 
signed the grant and loan agreements” (MITAF Narrative Report-3rd Quarter 2009).   
The PBA was the essence of the capital investment deal.  This perception was 
especially so for complex donor institutions.  As emphasized in the banking discussion in 
chapter one, the fractional reserve banking system functioned on the money multiplier effect in 
which the ability to trust and act based on promises was integral to economic systems.  Capital 
investment in a financial institution (i.e., MFIs) was a foundational component of the financial 
trust apparatus.  One donor explained the centrality of mutual commitments in the deal involving 
donor-MFI relationships, 
Person:  Basically this performance based agreement stated the target to be achieved 
and the way that the resources will be disbursed, as well as the purpose of the 
resources and as well as the monitoring aspect. 
 
Investigator: So this performance based agreement makes out the stipulation of the 
approval for the grant or the loan? 
 
Person: More than the approval, it’s a, as a name is performance based agreement, 
agreed performance between the microfinance institution and [donor], which are the 
conditions to release the funds.  
 
Investigator: Ok. There it is. 
 
Person: So it’s very important, it’s the, the uh, the commitment that is made in both 
times. Microfinance institution saying that look, if I receive this amount of resources, I will 
use all the resources to do this and that, and this is what I want to achieve as far as 
outreach is concerned, portfolio quality is concerned, financial sustainability is 
concerned, and impact on the population is concerned. So this is the binding and legal 
agreement between the microfinance institution and the, the, and [donor]. And it also 
includes the, the reporting, including a template of quarterly reporting on the 
achievement of the set of targets as well as reporting on audited statements and so on 
and so forth. So, this is really a discussion between the microfinance institution and 
[donor]…(Interview 5). 
The tenor of the response suggested that a donor-MFI deal is a particularly intimate 
relationship that strains the limits of donor collaboration in packaging deals.  The respondent 
characterized the commitments as “very important,” underscoring intimacy.  Collaboration limits  
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were vivid in the characterization of the deal as a “discussion” between the MFI and a donor.  In 
practice, investment packages most often included more than one donor and many deals had 
cross-connecting properties. 
One MITAF participant shared particularly interesting insights on how collaborating 
donors came to participate in a deal.  Neither MFI notification letters nor the MFI negotiation 
meetings were mentioned by this respondent.  Rather, the actual process of multiple donors 
participating in a deal was emphasized, as were apex efforts to prepare an agreement and 
secure participating donor signatures.  Contrary to the espoused allocation technique for 
determining a given donor’s investment in a deal, the actual process was much more 
fragmented.  Also, the evolution of the last few years of the donor PBA execution process was 
excruciating.  Understanding actual capital disbursement necessitates looking beyond the point 
of approval because the amount to be disbursed does not follow the allocation scheme outlined 
by MITAF’s espoused rules.  
  Actual donor collaboration in a deal was driven much more by individual organizational 
preferences and goals than espoused processes.  A simple, two donor illustration was provided 
during an interview,  
One donor giving a grant, and one donor giving a loan and because of their own 
whatever, one donor says no, I have no more money for grants. And the other one says, 
okay, I have money for grant. For example…UNDP is not allowed to do loans. So, 
UNDP will say, okay, I will give them a grant, you give them a loan. They do that kind of, 
but the loan will not be shared between donors. One donor will give a loan, the other one 
will give a grant (Interview 3). 
The IC would agree to invest capital in an MFI and donor organizations discussed what specific 
deal an organization would participate in (grant, loan, or both).  An investment package for an 
MFI was considered by the IC.  Then particular donors would participate in portions of a 
package.  These portions could stand alone or be cross-connected.  For example, one portion 
of the package could be a deal for capacity building and the other portion could be for loan 
capital once capacity building occurs.  In this instance the deals were cross-connected as the 
loan capital was intended to be available after capacity building occurred. 
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Decision making on deals not only considered the investment tool (grant or loan), but 
also the type of MFI.  Although the investigation’s focus, as reflected in interview questions, 
began after the decision was made to invest capital, investment decision actions impacted the 
actual disbursement conditions of the deal.  A MITAF participant provided an illustration of this 
oft repeated message.  “In many cases you find out Cordaid normally goes for the local, small 
MFIs. And, KFW tends to be more commercial oriented and they prefer big players like BRAC, 
LAPO” (Interview 3).  Empirically, in the November 2009 IC meeting, the TSP recommended a 
grant deal of less than $20,000 for an MFI.  The apex was directed to fund such requests from a 
MITAF budget line item; however, on this occasion Cordaid provided the capital.  This behavior 
is consistent with the Cordaid Agreement to participate in MITAF (“Preferred market segment” in 
Appendix H).  
These types of organizational attributes directly related to conditions of capital volatility.  
Deals made one-on-one between MFIs and donors, though in a collaborative fashion, allowed 
for individually designed PBAs without technically impacting other parties.  For instance, a 
participant provided an example of a deal with a 7% PaR45 for the first disbursement, rather 
than the espoused requirement of 5%.  The condition for the second tranche was in-line with the 
5% requirement.  This reflected a more lenient, less commercially rigid philosophy. 
Organizational learning reflected in MITAF’s adaptation underscored their commitment 
to collaboration and capitalization on each donor’s unique contribution.  Beyond the simple two 
donor illustration provided earlier, one participant shared the complexity and finesse involved in 
the MITAF donor collaborative, 
So because we were 3 or 4 donors through MITAF, we should evenly decide, it goes 
each donor has to say for example, ok through the investment committee, I can fund this 
or that. So let’s say UNCDF would come and say ok, I’m willing to, to give a loan to let’s 
say ARD, or I’m willing to give a grant for capacity building to finance the loan for such 
amount...KFW would say we are funding, we are giving a loan to Hope Microfinance, for 
example. UNDP would say ok, we are not allowed to give loan, but we can give grant for 
capacity building for example. And CORDAID would say ok, we can give some funds, 
you know, for capacity building and loans as well. So it depends on what we agreed 
upon (Interview 6). 
  
                                                
 
45 Portfolio-at-Risk (PaR) is a loan portfolio default measurement of “the outstanding principal amount of 
all loans that have one or more installments of principal past due by a certain number of days (often 30, 
60, or 90 days), divided by the total outstanding principal amount” (Rosenberg, 2006, pp. questionnaire, 
9). 
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Investment opportunities included collaboration within a given MFI investment package 
and among different MFI investment packages presented at the same IC meeting.  The strength 
of the collaboration was felt in the commitment of each donor to work cooperatively, when 
considering numerous investment opportunities, through the expression of individual 
organizational imperatives.  Similarly, the complexity and finesse involved in the collaboration, 
as reflected in Interview 8, was felt in not only consensus building work among investors, but the 
shaping effect of environmental factors, such as an MFI regulator (a signatory to the project 
support document).  
One of the key challenges was that, you know, decisions were taken by consensus with 
the investment committee. And you have a range of interests present. Now, I think one 
of the key challenges is national ownership. The, the nominal chair, non-voting chair of 
the investment committee was the governor or deputy governor of the Central Bank. 
That really was, that wasn’t always a problem per se. You know, it is, the, the Central 
Bank, well ok. They were related to one specific group of institutions, the community 
banks (Interview 8).  
One response to the complexity and finesse associated with the MFI regulatory 
presence was to change the rules.  MITAF voted to adjust the structure to include the Central 
Bank representative on the advisory board and removed that role from the Investment 
Committee.  This structural adaptation also illustrated MITAF’s organizational learning.  
The actual process for completing the PBA reflected MITAF had learned the limits of 
collaboration contained in the same attributes providing strength.  The procedures designed to 
achieve organizational objectives in mission fulfillment were difficult for a donor to abandon 
when the collaborative operational directive required each donor to work out the deal (i.e., 
complete the PBA) directly with the MFI.  One donor recounted that,  
Actually, the, even the investment committee decisions were made for approval of 
applications, but in practice, afterwards, the individual donors were requested to take up 
responsibility for contracting and disbursement. So during MITAF 1 period, that’s what 
we did. After investment committee decisions, we took up well, the obligation and 
contract individuals (Interview 7).  
The implicit message in such an action/interaction strategy was one of customization that 
stretched the limits of order and reliability among participants.  If there is not a master PBA with 
multiple signatories, to accommodate the practicalities of execution across nations, then the 
expediency of individuality was at the expense of commonality.  Below is one donor’s 
explanation,  
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Because, exactly having those double procedures, because everybody, if, if you’re 
making a contract, you will have to follow your own procedures as well. There’s no 
organization that says ok, you’ve, you’ve approved it somewhere outside. Let’s make a 
contract right away. No. Everybody still has his or her own procedures (Interview 7). 
Reaching agreement on terms and preparing PBA documents, and especially securing 
signatures from donors, on occasion involved a considerable amount of time.  This was 
particularly so in multi-party deals. Two deals for one MFI, valued at over $500,000, from the 
November 2009 IC meeting, still had undrafted PBAs at year-end.  Once prepared, the 
agreements were unsigned by the donor as of March 2010 in part due to a deteriorating 
outreach problem at the MFI.  Could this deterioration have been related to the delay of over 
$500,000 in capital the MFI ostensibly expected within weeks after negotiating conditions?  
Getting agreements written and signed was not as swift as provided for in the espoused 
disbursement process.      
This donor described efforts to complete a grant deal, which espoused procedures 
depicted as simpler than loan deals, 
No, let’s assume that we’re talking about a grant contract. That’s, that was more frequent 
under MITAF 1. So the next step will be preparation of the grant contract, taking a 
template as, as the underlying format, and the template has, had been agreed upon in 
advance, and so, we as donors ok, receive the template with the terms and conditions, 
ideally with the terms and conditions had been agreed upon in the IC.  The donor 
reviews the grant contract and it has been always the case that there have been 
changes in terms of conditions or the contract was not properly made, so formal, formal 
mistakes. So it’s, it’s known that you have let’s say one round of review. Some cases 
you have two or one or three, so the donor reviews the contract, sends it back to the, the 
TSP and the TSP gets in touch with the respective MFI to discuss the changes if 
relevant and if of importance… and sends it back to the donor, in this case, (donor) and 
if we agree to the, yeah, to the version, we sign (Interview 9). 
In this instance, term changes and preparation mistakes were donor explanations for delayed 
PBA completion.  Also, this donor expressed the feeling that there had always been multiple 
drafts involving at least one round of views and redraft.   
As suggested by the espoused process, loan deals were more specifically structured by 
intimate donor involvement in PBA preparation.  “[T]he loan terms are whatever the donor says, 
but normally donors, each donor will approve funding for each particular investment. They will 
lend, they have their own conditions or whatever. So they will draw up the loan agreement” 
(Interview 3).  Another participant referenced the cross-national challenges and connected 
them, in part, to the institutional structure of MITAF, 
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…when they didn’t get all the agreements signed at the investment committee meeting 
and, you know, pdf files were flying around the internet like can you sign mine and send 
it back to me and, and people were traveling all over the world, that dragged out the 
process, the process of payments very long. And I think that became a big problem. I 
think, you know, from one of the design issues you face at the beginning of these funds. 
And I call them, I put them in the category of funds for inclusive finance, and one of the 
decisions you face early on is what’s the legal identity of this (Interview 8). 
 
The cross-national challenges of consummating PBAs further exemplified MITAF as a 
learning organization.  There was continual change and adaptation to find processes that 
served both collaboration and individual organizational imperatives.  One participant 
summarized the learning process as demonstrating extensive effort to operate collaboratively, 
And that impacts their [MFIs] performance. If you have a business plan and their 
projections are saying one year,  these are my targets and the money comes 2 years 
after it then you are really, you’re business plan is derailed. And actually, that’s how we 
operated in the initial three years or so. And they now decided and said no, this is 
causing more problems. Now, one investment, one donor (Interview 3). 
Rather than attempt to pro rate a deal among two or more donors, as originally espoused in the 
formal process, it was decided each investment deal had only one donor; however, an MFI 
investment package often involved more than one deal. 
The PBA involved a complex document and process.  This was not only because it is a 
legal document, but because its meaning in relationships and differences in agreements were 
reflected in different actions regarding the same MFI investment package.  Individual donor 
imperatives were balanced with collaborative commitment.  The apex administered the PBA 
preparation process to the extent that agent relationships were not complicated (e.g., some loan 
deals).  MFIs sought the most favorable terms possible, while seeking clarity on how boundary 
constraints applied to aid evaluation of the opportunity; a deal or no deal dilemma.  Central to 
the PBA were disbursement conditions.  In the end, the complexity of relationships and guiding 
processes were expressed in capital disbursements; it was about the money! 
5.2.2 MFI actions:  Conditions and reporting 
This discussion of MFI actions pertains to conditions and reporting and is descriptive.  Upon 
looking at the types of conditions through the lens of working-rules, the linkages and 
correlations begin to erupt.  Obvious linkages are addressed in a surface manner, as was in the 
PBA discussion.  This section describes how conditions and reporting operated in practice.  
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Linkages are discussed in the next chapter.  It is important to realize the ethical commitment 
PBA parties related to conditions, as well as organizational ontological struggles involved in 
action/interaction strategies. 
5.2.2.1 Conditions in investment deals 
The espoused understanding of conditions involved the expected behavior of MFIs more than 
donor expectations.  As such, observed MFI behavior, in respect to the conditions in investment 
deals, revealed a lot.  Conditions also told much about the agreement process.  Boundary rules 
gave potential parties to a deal the power of choice:  deal or no deal.  Also, there can be 
agreement, but implementation can be viewed from meaningfully different perspectives.  For 
instances, conditions set forth in PBA as rigid expressions of commitments gave place in 
practice to understandings best described as an evolving set of disbursement conditions with 
exceptions.  Though not unheard of, MITAF agreements to invest given certain disbursement 
conditions rarely received the no deal response from MFIs.  MFIs generally viewed the 
condition-disbursement connection as a key factor in their decisions. 
There is evidence that condition setting was a negotiation process.  Agreeing to 
conditions empirically involved some give and take.  On one hand, conditions emerged from the 
IC and were generally believed to reflect interests and agenda of capital providers.  These 
conditions prevailed in limited instances of divergence. On the other hand, one MFI explained 
there was negotiation on currency denomination for the loan.  The MFI seemed adamant about 
the loan being in domestic currency (leones) and apparently won a concession from the 
donor.46  In the mind of this MFI the foreign currency issue was a condition; but, the context of 
deals normally considered that conditions pertain to requirements for capital disbursement to 
MFIs.  This is one example of how properties of a particular stipulation in deals were perceived 
differently.  At times terms (conditions) involving repayment of capital were as important to an 
MFI as conditions for disbursement; capital flows both ways.  The following interview excerpt 
presents the example, 
Person:…Once the loan was approved, we had a series of meetings, a couple, I think 
one meeting with the representatives of those who came here, the representatives of the 
donors who were here and we agreed on a loan terms and conditions. 
                                                
 
46 The Programme Support Document urges donors to be considerate of certain MFIs in this regard, 
“Care should be taken to avoid burdening young institutions with foreign exchange risk in loans 
denominated in foreign currency, unless adequate precautions are taken” (UNCDF, 2004b, pp. 15, note 
17) .   
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Investigator: So after the loan had been approved, there was a meeting with the donors 
came and had a meeting with you? 
 
Person:  Yes, yes. The next investment committee meeting, they didn’t come closer to 
approval or anything… there was a meeting, it was with them.   And then we agreed on 
loan terms and conditions, you know, and once we agreed on loan terms and conditions, 
the formal document was sent to us for the review details and send it back and we 
agreed on the final loan terms and conditions. There were targets, benchmarks set, you 
know, so they advance the first loan…. 
 
Investigator: We talked about sitting down with the donors and working out the specifics 
of the conditions… 
 
Person: Right 
 
Investigator: …And as a result, an agreement coming out of that. How does (interrupted) 
  
Person: Let me give you an instance. One of the issues that we are very concerned with 
a government loan is foreign exchange risk, Ok. We operate in leones [domestic 
currency] and we just can’t see ourselves paying who knows, in Euro, to our donor 
(Interview 2). 
 
Negotiation and flexibility were constrained and framed by the espoused intent of the 
MITAF project to develop a sustainable pro-poor financial sector.  The sustainable property, 
reflected in the performance indicator dimensions, depicts the preponderance towards financial 
performance.  For example, the one social indicator provided for in official documents is, 
outreach understood as the number of active clients.  MFIs were required to report numerous 
statistics about the poverty and gender of their clients; however, these indicators were not used 
for performance measurement.  Outreach measurements are diverse and complex in the 
literature.  For NGO MFIs the mere number of clients does not adequately account for the 
challenge of sustainably providing financial services to the poor.  Conditions for disbursement 
perceived to be excessively and inflexibly focused on financial performance indicators may 
result in an MFI making action-decisions that caused ethical struggles.  One MFI explains the 
struggle in embracing performance indicators perceived as moving the MFI from its mission, 
Does it have an OSS that is 100% plausible? Does it have an FSS that is 100% 
plausible?47  Does it have a yield productivity of its portfolio? Hmm. Ah ah. Why are 
these people looking at those numbers? We are looking at the survival of people. So I 
                                                
 
47 Operational Self-Sustainability (OSS) and Financial Self-Sustainable (FSS) are organizational 
performance measurements.  They are computed by dividing total revenue by total cost, and total 
revenue divided by total adjusted cost (inflation + subsidized cost of funding + in-kind subsidies) 
respectively.  See note 2 for more information on total adjusted cost. 
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will go these MITAF meetings and argue that look, if a woman is late for one day, we 
should show understanding. These people are struggling. If they don’t pay the loan 
today, they pay it tomorrow or they pay it next week. Let us be magnanimous to 
accommodate them. And [MITAF staff] would say oh, the chief executive of [MFI] is not 
prepared. He himself is not prepared to be a microfinance person because we need to 
change him. He has not shifted from the mindset, you know. Par-time repayment, full-
time repayment, he doesn’t pay, he doesn’t pay. Ouch! Come on [MITAF staff]. Why are 
they thinking this way? Well later, we started calculating what it means to the quality of 
our portfolio... if somebody is to pay us today and failed to pay.  
 
But, today we carry two missions. We have a social mission, we have a commercial 
mission. How do you blend all of these? And in the process, we cannot reach many of 
the rural population because of permanently watching OSS, permanently watching 
productivity, permanently watching FSS, permanently watching our targets. The [MFI] 
set up, it should have been moving to support more people. It’s so focused on 
sustainability issues that we are missing out on many deserving people (Interview 1).  
 
Is this financial-social dichotomy represented by MFI-MITAF relations reminiscent of 
work produced by Amin (1972) and Reed (2009), which found the African trade system replaced 
with colonial-type trade?  Central to the dual bottom-line dilemma, as expressed by the MFI 
above, were diverse beliefs regarding the characteristics of “deserving people” in the sense of 
people qualifying for loans. 
Complexity and nuanced word use are important in discussing PBA conditions.  Donor 
agreement to use common performance indicators represent the scale; however, the measure 
of achievement on that scale could vary.  MITAF’s aim was to develop the sector as a place 
where industry practice standards were the norm.  Nevertheless, the actual indicators used to 
establish standard PBA conditions varied.  Perhaps more important were perceptions that 
achievement was inconsistently determined by a fixed scale.  For example, there was a 
perception that PBA conditions placed existing domestic MFIs in a conditional and contextual 
disadvantage,   
Procredit at that time was not yet fully established in Sierra Leone. They were just 
playing with the idea of setting up Procredits. Of course they had their international 
donor. And when they came, we understood that a tranche of one million dollars was 
provided to Procredit to commence their business. And because we already had 
systems, we already had PaR, we already had clients on the ground, we already had 
challenges on the ground, I mean we are not just conceptualizing an idea. We already, 
so we raised the point, can somebody be really punished simply because he has put an 
idea into practice? If I already doing business, definitely, I will have the defaulters, I will 
have PaRs, that’s the nature of our business. So the tranches were in that direction one 
would see, they may not be purely on conditionalities (Interview 1). 
 
A perception existed that applying the same conditions to both a domestic MFI and an 
international MFI, without an established business in Sierra Leone, may not give adequate 
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consideration to the particular challenges of the nation that has for years been ranked among 
the lowest in the Human Development Index.  In 2005 ProCredit received $1 million, making it 
the highest single capital investment made to an MFI and the fourth highest total capital 
investment made to an MFI during the life of MITAF.  Investment and timely grant disbursement 
may have been, in part, due to existing donor relationships as much as commercially based 
criteria.48  In early 2010 ProCredit was sold to Ecobank Sierra Leone due to high PaR and 
fraud.  Official MITAF records suggested that Sierra Leone’s fragile state, post-conflict setting 
may have been central to ProCredit’s performance problems.  “Considering the ample financing 
and high level of management capacity and governance, the situation of ProCredit Sierra Leone 
is concerning and possibly illustrative of the challenging environment for microfinance in Sierra 
Leone” (MITAF Narrative Report-4th Quarter 2009).  
5.2.2.2 MFI reporting requirements in deals  
The reporting requirement for MFIs involved substantial work.  It was understood and accepted 
by MFIs as part of the decision to be in MITAF.  For many it was also seen as a necessary 
action to operate a sustainable, relevant MFI.  Donors valued the apex role of collecting MFI 
reports and providing quarterly reports, as well as specific information with requests for 
disbursement pursuant to satisfying conditions in a deal.  There was some concern that on-
going MFI reporting requirements were potentially difficult to enforce after capital was invested 
(disbursed); however, no specific instances were reported.  
Reports required in the PBA were varied and took different forms in practice.  The 
quarterly reports contained numerous statistics beyond specific performance indicators in the 
PBA; in practice, MFIs submitted similarly detailed monthly reports to MITAF.  Audited financial 
statements were at times challenging to provide.  Some external auditors produced suspect 
reports and MITAF provided training to assist the auditor most used by MFIs.  For example, 
official documents report that normal examination procedures such as loan balance verification, 
loan classification review, and loan loss verification and examination were not performed.  Such 
expertise and resources are not plentifully available in post-conflict fragile state settings.  Mix 
                                                
 
48 See chapter three’s discussion of ProCredit in the microfinance institutions portion of the case study 
explanation. 
113 
 
Market49 was contained in the PBA as part of a broader goal to ensure an environment 
conducive to industry development.  This effort included an industry database, such as Mix 
Market, that developed from monthly reporting.  This reflects the intertwined nature of 
actions/interactions in MITAF.  Most MITAF MFIs did not report to Mix Market and some of 
those that did were not consistent reporters.  Two other reporting requirements involved 
evaluations.  MITAF underwent mid-term and final evaluation and the PBA required MFIs to 
cooperate with both.  The mid-term evaluation included data from visits to eight MFIs, and the 
final evaluation visited five MFIs with survey questionnaires sent to thirteen MFIs.  This reporting 
approach kept MFI management very close to the operating and market indices of their 
organization, as well as enhanced transparency with other stakeholders (Duval & Bendu, 2006; 
2009; Interview 2). 
The connection between reporting and capital disbursement is vivid and important  One 
MFI spoke candidly about reporting information that constrains capital disbursement, mostly 
because some conditions were considered unfair, 
Person: Here, a bit of culture here.   Our customers here, about 80% of them, are 
farmers. Normally we give to them such, I’m a business man, I’m this, in the end you see 
they only do business in the off-season, but after which they go back to the farms… The 
conditions that because of the time.  For the past three years, or two years, three years 
from, we have not accessed loan funds. Any grants from MITAF….But if this is all of us, 
even those only have about three to four hundred million and us that have 1 point 
something billion who are all fighting for a 5% PaR, I don’t think it’s fair. 
 
Like these past two years is a universal disease, and business fall. So even now, even 
right now, most of our traders, they are termed traders. If that occurred, goods like rice, 
then that’s it. But the price has not moved far, it has been since they bought it, so now 
what can they do? So they have to default, some of them their final payment has 
passed. We’re not getting money from it. And as soon as his family thinks he owes more 
than they think he should be, then your PaR starts to increase….This is the thing….We 
are honest with ourselves. We can say our PaR is 1. But they should not beat us with it. 
It‘s just to access the form. We tell the truth, and we tell the truth they refuse to give us 
the funds, one day, we’re going to tell lies, which is not good for business (Interview 10). 
 
This MFI had a loan approved four years earlier, yet had not received a single disbursement.  
However, it received grant capital totaling over $200,000.  A powerful point regarding conditions 
and reporting was found in perceptions that conditions were unfair, given that a “universal 
                                                
 
49 The Microfinance Information eXchange (MIX), a nonprofit organization, develops the MFI market 
infrastructure.  This is accomplished by, among other activities, providing data sourcing and monitoring 
tools (CGAP, 2006). 
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disease” of economic collapse had gripped both Sierra Leone and the world.  MITAF official 
documents also referred to economic conditions in explaining deteriorating loan portfolios 
across the sector.  “The situation [deteriorating loan portfolios] has been exacerbated by the 
economic downturn” (MITAF Narrative Report-1st Quarter 2010).  Consequently, if the desired 
reasonableness did not prevail, the MFI above suggested that reports could be falsified in the 
future (i.e., “we’re going to tell lies”). 
5.3 SHOW ME THE MONEY: DISBURSEMENT OF CAPITAL 
Disbursement commitment and performance of conditions were central to capital.  MFIs 
developed action/interaction strategies based on them.  Apex performance indices were 
impacted by them.  Donor accountability and public scrutiny focused on them.  Nevertheless, an 
empirical investigation found capital volatility with properties and dimensions involving all three 
institutions:  MFIs, apex, and donors.  The following discussion moves from the condition and 
reporting aspect of deals to capital disbursement.  Essentially, it was about the money!   
The empirical capital disbursement process illustrates the struggle of organizational 
learning in a context of constraining-empowering tensions, organizational imperatives, and 
collaborative commitments.  It also illustrates struggles of dual bottom-line objectives and 
administration with ambiguous identity.  Using MFI day-to-day business as the point of 
departure, analyzing capital disbursement expands to the apex efforts to achieve numerous 
outcomes designed to be mutually enforcing.  Apex actions resulted in MFIs experiencing 
various degrees and types of scrutiny.  In turn, at times MFIs did not distinguish between a 
disbursement request verification visit, donor field visit, and a rating institution assessment.  The 
apex “drowning in data”  (Snibbe, 2006), worked to synthesize and summarize to prepare 
stakeholder communications (Block, 1996), while also being prepared for a plethora of detailed 
questions regarding the impact and strength of the nascent MFI sector.  Finally, donors 
experienced calls for accountability from above and beneath, working in a complex collaborative 
that frequently changed cash disbursement processes and, thereby impacted their respective 
organization’s performance. 
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5.3.1    The act of disbursing capital 
  
The scale expressing the distinctiveness and variableness of the disbursement process was 
vast, ranging from before an official request for disbursement, to considerably after 
disbursement approval.  One account records how donor behavior seemed inconsistent with 
supporting the collaborative process,  
And in some cases, the donors even send the money to the MFI before they can meet 
the conditions… ok, now the MFI has met the condition, all the conditions in the loan 
agreement, in the grant agreement… go ahead and disburse the money. But there are 
cases where the donors will just send…(Interview 3). 
Similarly, the final evaluation records Investment Committee members doing deals directly with 
MFIs, utilizing the apex to varying degrees, and investing capital without prior IC approval 
(Duval & Bendu, 2009)  The record reflects an occasion when the IC officially directed the TSP 
to negotiate more flexible conditions on existing deals; however, accounts like Interview 3 above 
seem to be outside that collaborative process. 
In another account, an MFI had two different loan capital disbursement experiences.  In 
this interview an example was given about an account very close to the espoused process, 
absent the procedural details. 
And then we agreed on loan terms and conditions, you know, and once we agreed on 
loan terms and conditions, the formal document was sent to us for the review details and 
send it back and we agreed on the final loan terms and conditions. There were targets, 
benchmarks set, you know, so they advance the first loan. Then, they said the second 
loan, the second tranche, second disbursement would be as soon as you meet 
performance targets A, B, C, as we agreed upon. So that’s one aspect. Once the 
institution meets that target, and usually within a week or two, the payment is made.  So 
that is in the case of a loan (Interview 2). 
This MFI also had a prior loan that was disbursed approximately two years after committee 
approval.  In one official document the delay was connected to a two year delay in 
consummating the loan agreement.  Another official document stated concerns about this 
particular deal:  “The loan approved by MITAF Investment Committee for [MFI] was released in 
2008 after [MFI] met the disbursement conditions” (MITAF Annual Narrative Report 2008). 
Similar to earlier examples of PBA signature delays, capital volatility in this deal was not 
reflected in certain records used to calculate volatility by most volatility studies.  Technically the 
agreement was not completed until conditions were satisfied.  Such organizational behavior 
conceals a volatility property from traditional capital flow statistical calculations. 
Once the PBA was executed, disbursing the investment capital became the focus.  The 
disbursement process, in practice, changed significantly from the design as individual donor 
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imperatives were accommodated to achieve the collaborative goal of providing capital to the 
nascent Sierra Leone MFI sector.  KfW employed an imprest account, which is an account 
providing MITAF authority to release funds deposited by the donor.  This operated much like 
MITAF’s original design, with adaptations illustrative of experiential learning.  For example, KfW 
disbursed all capital for the deal to MITAF upon the MFI satisfying conditions for release of the 
first tranche.  Cordaid, on the other hand, disbursed directly to the MFI.  UNDP activity reflects 
both disbursements to MITAF and to MFIs directly.  UNCDF, after crafting the PSD to use an 
imprest account, encountered organizational concerns involving accountability and the potential 
for fraud.  The collaboration to invest capital in the MFI sector responded to individual 
organizational accountability imperatives with behaviors affecting capital flow effectiveness, 
efficiency, and impact.  The between donor aspect and behaviors affecting capital flow value 
(i.e., effectiveness, efficiency, and impact) will be discussed further in the next two chapters. 
5.3.2 Capital disbursement:  Perceptions, strategies, and impacts 
MFIs worked to expand service and operate sustainably and were challenged by capital 
volatility regardless of cause.  This was especially the case for NGO MFIs that embraced the 
social mandate of serving those on the fringe of credit quality, as much as commercially driven 
MFIs embraced the financial performance mandate.  As the MITAF project support document 
explained, Sierra Leone MFIs operated in a capital constrained environment and this capital 
was vital to achieving their dual bottom-line objective.   
An analysis of capital disbursements provided a statistical profile of MFIs with the most 
deals, thus the greatest opportunity to observe variance in behavior and capital flow.  A 
Univariate ANOVA was conducted to investigate percent of total number deals differences in 
capital investments by year (Yes, MFI received a capital investment commitment; No, MFI did 
not receive a commitment).  A summary of results are found in Appendix I along with other 
descriptive and inferential statistics.  The years selected had the highest number of capital 
investment deals for the MITAF project.  The results showed a significant main effect for 2006 
capital investment deals, (F (1, 8) =9.876, p = .014, partial η2=.552), and 2008 capital 
investment deals (F (1, 8) =11.878, p = .009, partial η2=.598).  The effect size indicated that a 
large proportion of percent variance was accounted for by 2006 and 2008 when looking at the 
three years with the most capital investment deals.  On the other hand, MFIs that received the 
most capital did not provide more opportunities to observe frequent interactions (deals).  For 
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example, the four MFIs that received over 49% of the capital invested represented less than 
30% of capital investment deals.50 
MFIs drew upon numerous MITAF capital investment deals to express views of the apex 
and donors when considering a mission mandate to serve communities.  Representatives from 
this MFI shared, with conviction, the challenge of serving people living in areas where more 
profit oriented MFIs would not go.  One representative spoke of the belief that their vital, urgent 
requirement for capital would be addressed as donors saw the tremendous need and 
worthiness of their mission, 
So in our cases we are purely relying on MITAF to actually push our business plan 
forward to ensure that we are because taking into our consideration, our own mission, 
we are there to target the vulnerable, actual poor. So if we don’t get into these areas 
where in we cannot get so much other NGOs that will eventually go there. They have 
many proposals and making profits. That is their only business.  But we are there with a 
social mission to target these people, to make sure that we develop them to live above 
the poverty line.  So, if we are meeting these constraints in terms of, accessing funds to 
meet these people is actually a big problem for us. So if only they can, if only MITAF can 
ensure that we have a direct sort of a direct contact with the donors instead of having 
this intermediary as MITAF is playing now.  But if we have a direct contact with the 
donors, wherein they can see exactly where we are operating and the constraints we are 
going through, I believe things can move more faster (Interview 5). 
 
Another view speaks of the impact capital delays can have on MFI integrity and 
reliability, 
So for now, we are really ready. But the only thing is that we are the fast track the 
disbursement. Because, like for instance, if you’ve already talk to a client that I will 
disbursed to you, and blah, blah and you failed to do that. They’ll start calling you, that 
person’s lying.  They don’t even have the capacity. Already you’ve talk to them. You 
have done your document, and you have the go ahead from MITAF…(Interview 5) 
 
Official MITAF documents from November 2009 recorded one property of capital disbursement 
practice that could apply to the view shared above.  This property is also found in MITAF official 
documents reporting on the quarter ending December 31, 2009 and addressed a grant deal 
where disbursement conditions have been satisfied, 
The grant approved in mid February 2009 for (MFI) by [donor] has not been disbursed 
by end of this quarter despite several reminders by the TSP. These delays have 
impacted negatively on meeting outreach targets as MFIs have not received the needed 
funds to expand outreach (MITAF Narrative Report-4th Quarter 2009).   
 
                                                
 
50 Two of these four MFIs are included in this study’s interview sample. 
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Interview data from the donor in this grant deal, combined with disbursement empirical records, 
were examined and interpreted this excerpt as pertaining to the accountability property of the 
bureaucracy category.  Accountability processes at the donor both contributed to disbursement 
delays and MFI accountability activity involving its community stakeholders. 
Many capital disbursement experiences fit closely to the illustration below. All 
participants acknowledged that unsatisfied disbursement conditions were factors in the capital 
disbursement process, 
Secondly, most of the institutions will not meet the criteria at once, it’s difficult for one 
institution to meet all the criteria, but if you have 75% of the criteria met, the institution 
will say ok, we will or provisionally approve of this funding until you can go and meet 
these 20 or 25% once you meet the 25% then we’ll release the money. That’s where 
some kind of delay comes in. The institution takes looooooong sometime to meet these 
criteria and so by the time they meet the criteria and they send it back to the institution, 
and then because it’s been a period of time before, so the institution takes time to 
respond, you have to wait sometimes a looooong time before it comes because things 
are moving. So if the institution acts very fast to meet the 25% criteria and send it back 
within that timeframe, then the institution, the organization can respond quickly,  but 
when you take so much time there are things, you know, higher priorities emerge and 
then that particular need get you know, subsumed, you know submerged…(Interview 4). 
 
Both prior research and the MITAF experience supported the importance of institutional strength 
to the value of aid and aid absorption.  The net value of capital flow in MITAF was shaped not 
only by volatility, but MFI condition at capital disbursement time.  The interview excerpt below 
illustrates one approach used to support MFI development when MITAF deemed the MFI to be 
weak institutionally, 
Because they are weak. We have to buy and we have to give them the equipment, the 
motorbikes whatever. But for some mature institutions, we give them the money, but we 
make sure they give us a budget. They give us a budget, put down whatever it is they’re 
going to buy and then we give them the money and they move the money to the 
operation officer and they have to follow-up and then they buy the equipment that they 
promised to buy (Interview 3). 
Disbursement conditions are a mechanism designed in part to ensure MFIs are prepared to 
effectively and efficiently employ capital investments to impact target populations.   
It seems disbursement conditions could have been more effectively employed with a 
focus on MFI condition over MFI performance, 
Investigator: …Institutional conditionalities for disbursement. Whether it be a loan or a 
grant, and you gave me an example where we might call it capacity building.  
Respondent: Yeah 
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Investigator: Can you talk a little bit about the use of that indicator in making a 
disbursement decision? 
Respondent: I must say that these type of indicators were not very often proposed by the 
TSP. These were the type of things that we came up later with a, with making really the 
contract. Because when making the contract then…you want to put incentives and 
specifically, when you make a combination…of a grant and a loan, also you want to 
know that what happens with…the loan is also reliant on making good use of the grant 
(Interview 7). 
I mean one, one point that is quite, quite striking is for example, the very heavy case 
load of loan officers. And sometimes a loan officer has to serve up to six, seven, or eight, 
even eight hundred clients, which could not be deemed as effective and productive 
anymore because these amounts are simply not manageable by loan officers. But MFIs 
abstain from hiring and recruiting new staff because their operational costs would have 
increased and they would have, they would not have met certain objectives. So 
institutional, institutional development was, was kind of hindered by, or at the expense of 
of fulfilling the MITAF criteria…(Interview 9).  
The dual bottom-line objective of social targets (e.g., outreach) and financial targets (e.g., PaR, 
OSS, and FSS) were important measures in MITAF.  Nevertheless, critical to developing a 
sustainable pro-poor financial sector were strong MFIs, as measured by institutional factors.  
Low volatility capital, disbursed judiciously and expeditiously by MITAF, was observed to 
improve MFI institutional strength.  Unfortunately, investments did not often appear to focus on 
institutional weaknesses in substantial amounts. 
5.4 SUMMARY 
This chapter portrayed the MITAF process from the time a decision was made to invest capital 
in an MFI through the disbursement of each tranche from the donor until all money was 
available to the MFI.  Rich, vivid, detailed accounting of the design and actual processes was 
presented.  The process designed was formally adjusted to account for intervening conditions.  
In contrast to violating order, order was redefined as reflective or organizational learning.  Of the 
various targeted outcomes, organizational behavior clearly indicated it was about the money, 
not only effectiveness and efficiency, but also flow.   
Capital investment and disbursement (i.e., capital flow) was always pursuant to deal 
formalization in a performance based agreement.  Espoused formalization process particulars 
varied by deal.  At times formalization employed working rules inconsistent with official 
procedures.  Also, capital investment deal provisions were viewed and implemented differently 
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by participants in the deal.  Capital volatility properties embedded in participant behavior were 
observed.  
Accounts in the previous section raised one of several factors related to capital volatility 
and is explored in the next chapter’s linkage analysis.  Several accounts have been reported 
where participants viewed some MITAF conditions as questionable or inappropriate.  One 
participant recounted a conversation involving an MFI that disagreed with MITAF’s philosophy, 
“I’m disappointed in people like [MFI], He’s the guy that is so adamant. The [MFI] guy…Your 
[MITAF] recommendations are brilliant, but we [MFI] don’t share [the views]” (Interview 3).  
Certain MITAF policy standards did not seem appropriate to some participants for various 
reasons.  On the other hand, none of the standards were more demanding than those provided 
by industry good practice recommendations.  Were there instances when the PSD provision for 
revising and resubmitting a proposal should have been invoked rather than approving a 
proposal with conditions that could have been extremely demanding?  Perhaps.  In the next 
chapter linkages are explored by presenting concepts excavated from data.  With the 
descriptive illustrations of this chapter as a foundation, the following chapter presents 
explanations for capital volatility and related organizational behavior that provided the 
foundation of the CBT substantive theory. 
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6.0  RESULTS AND INTERPRETATION: BEHAVIOR-CAPITAL VOLATILITY LINKAGES 
MITAF participant’s actions/interactions affected capital value by increasing or decreasing 
volatility and strengthening or weakening MFIs.  That is to say, certain actions added to or 
subtracted from capital value.  Capital flow value in this research was a function of two 
variables:  disbursement conditions, including MFI condition at disbursement; and participant 
bureaucracy, directly affecting volatility level.  The classical capital flow function (i.e., recipient 
compliance delays, donor bureaucratic red tape/procedures) is an equation that over-simplifies 
the complexity of connected concepts in variable hierarchies.  In this chapter it is argued that, in 
addition to routine responses to everyday events, it was the strategic, intentional, premeditated 
actions responding to perceived problems linked to volatility that illuminated and redefined the 
classic capital flow equation.  
This investigation analyzed complexity and interconnectedness that resulted in decision 
making dilemmas (actions) and volatility in capital flow.  The focus was not on categorizing 
empirical activity codes (e.g., open, axial, selective).  Instead, it focused on certain structures 
(conditions) and the way they interconnected to elicit participant action (Strauss & Corbin, 
1998).  Toward this end, the chapter presents both a context and intervening condition to 
analyze action (H. Simon, 1996).  The first section presents the context as consummation of 
capital investment deals in an executed performance based agreement (PBA).  The second 
section presents the intervening condition as the MITAF mid-term evaluation.  Of several 
contexts and conditions in this investigation these two not only accounted for substantial 
variability, but possessed interesting properties not explored extensively in the traditional 
literature.  In the third section it is argued that leadership and cultural affects are found in a 2007 
apex leadership change.  Global organizations are challenged in assembling effective 
multicultural leadership teams.   
The fourth section portrays MITAF as structure and processes defined by collaboration 
between eclectic organizations. Participant organizations—MFIs, apex, and donors—were in 
their positions ostensibly avoiding the forbidden, yet doing what was required or permitted by  
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MITAF participation.  Participant perceptions concerning other’s position and responsibilities 
were often fundamental in linking variation in behavior and capital flow.  Capital flow to MFIs 
was considered vital to economic growth, improved living standards, and economic stability 
because it was central to facilitating expected behavior from all MITAF participants, notably  
accountably collaborating to produce effective, efficient, poverty-reducing outcomes (e.g., 
capital flow) in a sustainable fashion.    
Linkages between organizational behavior and capital flow volatility involved complexity 
and interconnectedness.  This complexity and interconnectedness were best viewed by 
analyzing progression as a process with a specified starting point.  It must be noted that 
behavior and volatility linkages did not function as simply and neatly as this heuristic portrayal 
suggests.  The particular parties involved, past experience of each party, shared experience, 
and factors within the MITAF case (but outside of the deal) were just a few of the contributing 
dynamics to complexity and interconnectedness.  This chapter’s simplified illustrations are not 
intended to depict the deep, vast complexity and interconnectedness that impacted capital flow 
value, but rather to provide a logical illustration of the complexity and interconnectedness of 
organizational behavior and capital volatility. Researchers are often forced, by method and data 
constraints, to attack complexity and interconnectedness in a manner that produces narrow 
explanations.  At times rigid investigative processes overemphasize technical correctness at the 
price of not capturing the dynamic flow and quintessence of data.  Understanding linkages 
between behavior and capital flow volatility involves examining interconnections and complexity, 
rather than assuming them out of the analysis and focusing on a few variables.   
Fundamental to seeing linkages between an action and capital volatility is the working 
definition of volatility.  Previously the tranche structure of capital disbursement was presented as 
a key capital flow process property.  Also, distinctions between capital investment resources 
(i.e., benefit of investment, regardless to form) and actual provision of liquid capital (i.e., money) 
were introduced.  In addition, dimensions of capital flow in this investigation were stipulated as 
time measures (without focusing on investment amounts).  Dimensions are central to 
understanding volatility’s working definition.  Measurement began from the time a donor 
committed to investing and continued until the complete investment was made or disbursed.  It 
did not begin with the formalization of the deal (i.e., PBA consummation).  The actions, from 
commitment to complete disbursement, formed a structured process.  More precisely, from the 
time MITAF was to have delivered the approval letter until the last tranche was placed in an 
unrestricted account or the resource benefits were accessible by the MFI, mutual 
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understandings formed a structure. Volatility is variability in disbursement timing of each 
tranche from the time a capital investment deal was approved and as measured against 
the structure of the deal (e.g., length of time to satisfy conditions, and length of time between 
satisfying conditions, TSP requesting donor disbursement/processing disbursement, MITAF 
process/procedure).     
Dimensions of volatility in the data were more nuanced than a dichotomy (i.e., capital 
commitment point, and point of last disbursement).  The first tranche disbursement was 
intended to be universally expedient, but not prior to the prescribed point.  Not only was volatility 
understood through the last tranche’s disbursement, but also through the timing of each 
tranche. Structuring a capital investment deal to provide money or other resources, single or 
multi-tranche, are examples of actions (behavior) linked to volatility.  This chapter presents the 
analysis of this linkage.  
6.1 RELATIONSHIP FORMATION:  POST DECISION, PRE-MONEY 
The first action after approval of a deal was the apex communicating approval to the MFI.  Apex 
actions are integral to capital flow and include PBA preparation, implementation support to MFIs 
and donors, and disbursement completion.  Table 5 contains several key apex actions in the 
apex-MFI exchange, constructed by MFIs, donors, and apex actors.  It illustrates how MITAF 
participant interactions were viewed in this investigation.  Approval notification letter delivery 
and ensuing MFI PBA condition negotiations were closely related, but remained separate and 
distinct actions.  In this section, 2008 and 2009 deals are used to view complexity, 
interconnectedness, and variability between participants and between years. For example, there 
was no empirical evidence the apex TSP did not generally administer approval letter delivery 
and MFI condition negotiations effectively and efficiently.  Approval letter delivery and MFI 
condition negotiations are linked to capital volatility because donors did not disburse capital until 
the PBA was complete.  Also, this section examines an apex leadership change.  Apex 
perspective and practice moved from a dimension of a northern hemisphere attributes to 
southern attributes.  The 2007 apex change had capital volatility effects.  
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Table 5:  Apex-MFI interaction. 
 
 
Organizations Interacting Action/Interaction 
Apex-MFI Interaction Notification letter 
PBA-negotiate conditions 
Monitoring satisfaction of 
conditions 
Trainings 
Technical Assistance 
Advocating for capital 
disbursements 
Flexibly/Rigidly administering 
condition satisfaction 
assessments 
Communicating program 
emphasis (e.g., 
sustainability, outreach, dual 
objective) 
Notification of condition 
satisfaction and request for 
disbursement 
Reporting MFI performance 
 
In practice, apex-MFI interactions were not the sole purview of investment deal condition 
negotiations.  Evidence reveals donors were actively involved with MFIs, especially in loan 
deals (Interview 3; Interview 7).  As described in the prior chapter, this illustrates that MITAF 
became a learning organization, adapting to operational realities as they appeared.  The 
evidence suggests that donor-MFI interactions produce different conditions, at times, from those 
agreed to in IC meetings.  On occasion direct donor involvement created greater leniency in 
disbursement conditions, which could result in lower capital volatility.  Direct donor involvement 
in PBA condition negotiations was linked to capital volatility because information asymmetries 
(e.g., unequal access to certain information by the parties due to limited access to each other) 
were reduced and donors better addressed their interests in concert with MITAF goals.  Also, 
direct donor involvement added another step to the PBA completion effort.  Donor-MFI 
interactions increased or decreased capital volatility. 
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Figure 6:  Performance Based Agreement context. 
 
Figure 6 depicts complexity in the PBA context.  Two or more organizations interacted 
directly with a MFI at different stages to varying degrees, depending on the deal.  All parties and 
interactions worked to implement IC approvals: apex-MFI, donor-MFI, and apex-donor.   Direct 
donor-MFI contact did not necessarily reduce time or add time to the PBA completion process.  
Nor did it necessarily result in conditions different from those reached by apex-MFI condition 
negotiations.  Effectiveness and efficiency in certain organizational settings were served by 
greater intimacy between parties to a deal.  
Donor-MFI interaction dimensions extended from better quality, less filtered information 
shared between parties to delays in receiving information needed for compliance monitoring.  
There was evidence that donor-MFI interaction placed a greater focus on strengthening 
institutional capacity over financial performance than  by apex-MFI condition negotiations (Duval 
& Bendu, 2009; Interview 5, 20:37-48; Interview 7, 10:00; Interview 9, 27:30).  On the other 
hand, donor-MFI direct contact did add complexity.  This complexity accounted, in part, for 
PBAs not being executed in a timely fashion.  For example, official records suggest that a loan 
PBA was not executed for two years after the terms were negotiated by the donor (MITAF 
Narrative Report-Annual 2008; MITAF Narrative Report-4th Quarter, Annex R).  In another 
instance, the apex responsible for monitoring and reporting on MFI PBA compliance had not 
received the donor-MFI negotiated grant PBA approximately three months after it was 
completed, nor had the grant been disbursed.  In contrast, donor-MFI interaction could reduce 
the number of apex-donor PBA draft exchanges and allow for finely tuned PBAs as donors and 
MFIs had increased access to unfiltered information. 
Apex delivers 
Approval 
Letter to MFI 
Apex meets with 
MFI to negotiate 
conditions within 
IC parameters 
Donor meets with 
MFI to negotiate 
conditions 
Apex provides PBA with 
negotiated conditions to 
donor for review and 
approval 
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Beyond approval notification and negotiating disbursement conditions, additional 
action/interaction linkages were observed in the PBA context.  Apex-donor interactions 
throughout PBA production were central to agreement completion and necessary for capital 
disbursement.  There was considerable variability based on deal particulars and donor 
imperatives.  Interview data reported PBAs always had at least one exchange of PBA 
modifications between the apex and donor.  This required another review by the MFI.  Again, 
direct donor-MFI interactions were linked to apex-donor interactions because of the PBA context 
(e.g., apex was responsible to notify MFI of approval and is accountable to IC for the deal).  
There were instances when the PBA had several bureaucratic levels to supersede before 
execution.  For example, in 2005, UNCDF instituted centralized processing of PBAs that 
required all documents be sent to New York City from around the world.   In contrast, another 
donor provided for PBA signatures and disbursements to be decentralized and processed in 
Sierra Leone.  Loan deals were considered more complex than grant deals.  One donor 
discussed the practical and theoretical aspects of PBA completion, 
The only thing is signing the agreement between the institution and (donor). Back and 
forth, you know, between MITAF. So you know, sometimes, you missed this. Oh, you 
forgot this. Oh, you sent it to me I forgot, please send it back to me again. You know, 
these kind of things. That’s, so it’s a lot of bureaucracy. But in, really, it’s not a big deal. I 
mean it could take a very short period of time to report this. Once we agree in the 
investment committee (Interview 6). 
PBA completion was theoretically simple and direct; however, as an empirical context, PBAs 
involved complexity affecting capital flow.   
PBAs became more complex in deals that were cross-connected, implicitly if not 
explicitly, especially when different types of deals (grants and loans) were involved.  One donor 
underscored the importance and complexity of cross-connected deals (i.e., linkages between 
objectives of different deals in the same MFI capital investment package), 
That’s a good issue. Sometimes it’s, it’s, that happened. That the, the loan and the grant 
were contracted by different donors and then, then, if, you need to check before 
disbursement whether they have committed, whether the other, for example, if 
disbursement was related then to also having disbursement of the grant, so you need to 
double check (Interview 7). 
Another participant provided a scenario illustrating the challenge of linkages between 
actions/interactions of donor-MFIs in separate deals, but part of the same MFI capital 
investment package, 
Let’s say UNCDF will say ok, we can fund capacity building grant… And KFW will say 
ok, we have money for loan. We don’t have money for capacity building, we have money 
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for loans, so we can, because institutions request both… But then, if the institution gets 
the loan before it gets the capacity building money, because, for example, KFW might be 
faster than UNCDF in terms of processing, then, perhaps, the institution… the loan is 
given because the grant has to be made so that they can improve the capacity building. 
But if they get the money for the loan, and they don’t have the money for capacity 
building, then, you know…(Interview 6). 
Greater complexity and linkage connections were observed in cross-connected deals.  
The PBA context is used in Figure 7 to set forth the complexity of cross-connected deals.  
Donor collaboration and coordination are considered a key output in the MITAF Programme 
Support Document (PSD).  “Strategic partnerships are built with other donors and private sector 
in joint support of a sustainable pro-poor financial sector”  (UNCDF, 2004b, p. 12).  The more 
partners in a collaborative, the more opportunity existed for complexity, including cross-
connection deals.  This complexity affected capital volatility. 
   
Figure 7:  Performance Based Agreement context—complexity of multiple 
linkages. 
Close examination of PBA consummation revealed there were important actions linked 
to capital disbursement timing and the context of cross-connected linkages.   One criticism of 
the apex in mid-term and final evaluations was the cumbersome financial tracking system.  This 
was related in some measure to the MITAF structure as an entity.  Nevertheless, it complicated 
and constrained detailed analysis of capital flow in deals.  Combining analysis of financial 
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records of deals with archival and interview data provided an important perspective on PBA 
linkages, a prerequisite for capital disbursements.  A substantial number of deals revealed 
cross-connected linkages with complex actions/interactions (apex-MFI, donor-MFI, apex-donor). 
6.1.1 2009 PBA context:  Delayed deals and cross-connections 
A good example of cross-connected linkages, and delayed deals was exemplified in the last 
year of MITAF. There were 16 deals in 2009, totaling approximately $2.5 million USD, the 
largest dollar amount committed to MFIs for a single year and the third largest year for number 
of deals.  Five MFIs representing twelve deals (over 2/3 of 2009 deals) approved in February 
and November 2009 experienced PBA delays.  The deals involved three of the four IC members 
(UNDP excluded).  All twelve deals primarily involved donor delays.  The length of time these 
PBAs were delayed was the minimum time capital flow was delayed; capital disbursements 
delays could have been extended for other reasons.  Delays due to PBA matters did not 
consider action/interactions after PBA completion that added additional delays, such as the MFI 
not satisfying conditions for disbursement.  Moreover, cross-connectivity was observed among 
deals in 2009.  
6.1.1.1 February 2009: Six deals with three donors   
 
PBA delays from February 2009 IC approvals involved six deals.  Table 6 frames the deals, 
MFIs, and donors involved.  Three deals involved one donor (Donor 09a) and the agreements 
were completed in the fourth quarter of the calendar year (over six months later).  The other 
three deals involved two donors (Donor 09b, Donor 09c).  Two of these deals were with one 
donor (Donor 09b), involving one MFI (MFI 09b), and the agreements were completed by June 
30.  Completion occurred after the 30 day window within which PBAs were expected to be 
completed.  The following is a discussion of the last of these three deals with Donor 09a and 
Donor 09c, which illustrates cross-connected linkages and complexities. 
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Table 6:  Deals, MFIs, and donors 2009. 
MFIs Donor 09a Donor 09b Donor 09c 
MFI 09a  November 09, Grant and Loan  
MFI 09b  November 09, Grant and Loan  
MFI 09c February 09, Grant*  February 09, Loan* 
    *Cross-connected deals 
Donor 09a was party to a February 2009 deal cross-connected with a deal capitalized by 
Donor 09c (Figure 8).  In this instance, the loan capital donor completed the PBA and disbursed 
capital before the grant PBA was completed.  The loan deal was implicitly cross-connected to 
the grant deal.  The grant was for technical assistance by Planet Rating, which conducted an 
institutional appraisal and loan portfolio due diligence study that provided recommendations.  
Ostensibly this study provided by the grant deal would inform the apex administering the loan 
deal’s conditions with greater specificity, based on the belief that technical assistance would 
build MFI 09c’s institutional capacity to better employ loan capital.  As depicted in Figure 8, the 
loan PBA was completed by June 30, as was the disbursement.  The grant PBA was completed 
in the fourth quarter, much later than expected and after loan capital was disbursed.  This 
example illustrates potential spillover effects of one donor adhering to time constraints when 
another donor, whose deal is connected, engages in prohibited actions (e.g., delayed PBA 
completion).  Not only was the MFI impacted, but a donor collaborative partner could have been 
potentially affected.  There was only one cross-connected deal in 2009, but 2008 had 
eight such deals (20% of the 2008 deals), adding a different dimension of complexity. 
 
Figure 8:  February 2009 Deals with Cross—Connected Linkages and Delayed 
PBA. 
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This cross connected deal could have resulted in a longer disbursement delay if Donor 
09c waited for grant disbursement before providing capital.  Using the timeframes discussed in 
chapter five, the MFI approval letter is delivered within one week of IC approval with the MFI 
returning the PBA within two weeks of approval.  A close approximation of the minimum capital 
delay can be computed based on a close examination of this process.  The loan deal in Figure 8 
involved a delay of up to three months due to PBA consummation alone.  The grant deal was 
possibly extended up to an additional six months beyond the loan deal.  If the two deals were 
implemented to complement each other, then loan capital would have been disbursed after 
grant capital and, given the grant’s delay, the loan deal could have been a year or more 
delayed. 
6.1.1.2 November 2009: A focus on four deals with one donor  
 An examination of PBA consummation of deals approved in November 2009 provided 
additional insights on actions linked to capital volatility.  Four of the six deals experiencing PBA 
delays had only one donor (Donor 09b), representing approximately 25% of the total dollar 
investment for the year.  This dollar investment proportion for 2009, the largest of all MITAF 
years, is a substantial concentration.  Drafting of the agreements did not begin until after the 
New Year.  Important and interesting behavior was observed when carefully considering the 
data on these deals.   
Review of official documents indicated two of the four deals with Donor 09b involved one 
MFI (MFI 09a) where PBA consummation was constrained by the IC, “subject to conditions 
being met” (MITAF Narrative Report-4th Quarter 2009).  More specifically, as another official 
document put it, “the grant and loan agreements will be processed once PaR30 is 5% or below” 
(MITAF Narrative Report-1st Quarter 2010).  This same donor made a loan investment in MFI 
09a in 2006 with the same PaR restriction of 5% as a condition.  After over three years of the 
MFI not meeting the condition, in November 2009 the apex recommended a wavier in 
recognition of progress made so that the load could be disbursed.  A new November 2009 deal 
was committed to with the same conditions that were waived in November 2009 for a deal 
approved three years earlier.   
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MFI 09a events made two other November deals with Donor 09b more interesting.  Two 
November deals did not have an IC constraint on PBA consummation.  This was particularly 
relevant as the record reflected extensive IC discussion about these two deals,51 both 
comprising an investment package for one MFI (MFI 09b).  Nevertheless, the record shows that 
PBA work began considerably late on the MFI 09b deals, and then the TSP took action to 
withhold recommending Donor 09b sign the PBAs due to observing a substantial drop 
(approximately-20%) in MFI 09b’s outreach in the quarter following IC approval.  It was reported 
that the reduction was due to suspended loan activity after detecting fraud in one of its nine 
branches and wanting to monitor the situation (MITAF Narrative Report-1st Quarter 2010). 
Eventually, two 2009 loans were approved totaling $650,000 (MITAF Minutes November 2009; 
MITAF Narrative Report-4th Quarter 2009) for MFI 09b from donor 09b and were adjusted in the 
records to reflect one loan of $300,000 approved November 2009 (MITAF Narrative Report-4th 
Quarter, Annex R).  This formalization suggested that resulting disbursement activity had 
minimal volatilities and delays; close examination of the detail supported disbursements were 
made that pertained to the deal consummated months earlier, the February 2009 loan deal 
(MITAF Minutes November 2009). 
The point was not that an unauthorized transaction may have occurred, which involved 
placing conditions on an IC committee directive without authorization.  Rather, strategies were 
employed using noteworthy techniques.  Also, the strategies were based on data not normally 
available if behavior complied with PBA completion policy. 
  Conditions based on information about MFI performance, such as PaR deterioration, 
were provisions in the PBA.  The IC was also permitted to decide whether a proposal must be 
revised and resubmitted to allow the MFI to address its weaknesses.  IC policies and 
procedures governed approval criteria, such as having a “good credit history” (MITAF, 2006, p. 
5).  It was interesting that the IC constrained the donor (Donor 09b) by placing a condition on 
consummating two deals (MFI 09a).  Collaboration could obfuscate one organization as the bad 
guy in such constraining situations.  Also, the apex-donor decision to delay PBA consummation 
in two deals involving one MFI (MFI 09b) was based on MFI outreach data that may not have 
been available if PBAs were timely processed.  In addition, evidence suggested the 
                                                
 
51 A key IC concern regarding MFI 09b, an international MFI forming a Sierra Leone MFI, involved capital 
structure.  It was important that international debt capital be reclassified as equity.  This was likely to 
improve the priority of any donor loans relative to the international MFI’s capital (MITAF Minutes 
November 2009). 
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disbursement delay actually contributed to the outreach reduction, beyond the fraud.52  For 
example, MFI 09b opened three new branches 60 days before the November IC meeting.  The 
branches reduced not only the MFI’s financial performance ratios, but likely reduced available 
cash for loans important to increase and maintain outreach as higher expenses demanded 
cash.  Volatility in the PBA context was particularly clear when apex-donor restrictive action was 
compared to donor 2008 PBA consummation action for another outreach-challenged MFI.  Such 
a comparison is provided in the next section.  
There are various explanations of PBA delays and how they impacted capital volatility.  
Delay in PBA commencement and completion were at times related to IC imposed constraints.  
Consummation delays were also due to strategic, intentional, premeditated actions responding 
to perceived problems, such as MFI outreach contraction.  At times, efficient document 
processing was a contributory factor.  In 2008, MITAF had fewer PBA consummation 
constraints and PBA disbursement conditions were relaxed from industry standards.  PBA 
delays were important action-links to capital volatility because capital commitment notifications 
after an IC meeting, though perhaps real to the MFIs, were not formalized outside the PBA.  
They were, therefore, not tracked transparently and capital volatility was not constrained. 
6.1.2 2008:  PBA condition differences and UNDP & YES 
Examination of 2008 capital commitment formalization identified actions linked to capital 
volatility, including dimensions of MITAF capital volatility.  In 2008 there were 21 deals totaling 
approximately $1.8 million USD, the third largest dollar amount for a single year and the largest 
number of deals for a year.  A UNDP program new to MITAF, Youth Employment Secretariat 
(YES), completed paper-work (Memorandum of Agreement) in early 2008 to pave the way for 
participation in MITAF and was a capital source for UNDP to invest in five of ten MFIs approved 
by the IC for capital investment.  UNDP/YES provided approximately 48% of the amount 
approved for capital investment in 2008.  Moreover, each MFI selected for UNDP/YES capital 
investment received both grant and loan capital.  The significance of capital types was 
                                                
 
52 Although it is not suggested that fraud and malfeasance is an everyday occurrence, fraud in branches 
and various departments in financial institutions around the world is not infrequent and is a matter 
requiring constant vigilance.   In this instance, the officer involved at the branch was dismissed and by 
March 31, 2010 OSS increased over 10% to approximately 100% while the increase in PaR afterward 
was less than 100 basis points.   
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investigated utilizing a Univariate ANOVA.  The percent of total number deals differences in 
capital investments by year, by type of deal (results summary is in Appendix I) was examined. 
Except for 2008, all main effects and interaction effects were not significant.  Results revealed 
that the deal type grants and loans (M=10.30%, µ1/2=9.2%) in 2008 significantly differed in 
percent of deals from all other types (p<.005).  The 2008 main effects (F (2, 4) =7.0, p = .049, 
partial η2=.778) represent the amount of variance in the percent of deals accounted for by types 
of deals.  UNDP/YES is noteworthy because each of its recipients was provided grants and 
loans and it represents a substantial proportion of 2008 investment.  Also, there was no 
evidence of PBA delay, dispute over conditions, post-PBA consummation disbursement delay, 
or premature disbursement criticism.  The noteworthiness primarily resides in the profile of MFIs 
receiving capital; which, as a group, are leaders in the number of capital investment deals in 
MITAF.   
6.1.2.1 MFIs qualifying for capital investments   
UNDP capital disbursement to MFI unfolded efficiently and effectively.  A memorandum of 
understanding was executed between MITAF and YES early in the second quarter of 2008 and 
the IC met in March, May and July (UNDP was the agent for YES).  Expected timeframes for 
key tasks were reported or were inferred from observed events.  The records reflect the 
investments were approved at May, and July meetings; therefore, PBA completion was 
expected to be the end of June and August respectively.  There were no official records 
reporting this occurred; however, nothing refuted it.  For example, PBAs outstanding from the 
March 2008 IC meeting and afterward were specifically disclosed in the 2009 first quarter 
narrative report; UNDP/YES deals were not reflected as delinquent.  These 2008 PBA 
completions demonstrated volatility was constrained on numerous occasions. 
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A closer look at a few MFIs was warranted because between-donor variability in actions 
occurred in capital investments.  Three MFIs were approved for capital investments in both 
2008 and 2009.  Looking at the loan portfolios of these three MFIs provides some insight on 
conditions that may have been included in the PBAs, or at least insight on how disbursement 
decisions were made.  As pointed out earlier, donor-apex-MFI negotiation of PBA conditions is 
central to timely PBA completion and condition specifics central to capital disbursement timing. 
Two of three MFIs (MFI 08c, MFI 08d) maintained a portfolio-at-risk (PaR), the percent of loan 
balances over 30 days late, at an acceptable level in 2008 and 2009.  The other MFI (MFI 08e), 
approved for both grant and loan capital at the July 2008 IC meeting, had chronic challenges.   
In 2008 the loan portfolio of MFI 08e did not meet industry standards (e.g., PaR and 
write-off levels).  During each quarter of 2009, PaR and the amount written off as uncollectable 
(WO) struggled to improve.  This information is provided in Table 7, which compares MFI 08e 
with MFI 09b.  Strengthening the MFI 08e portfolio was very slow, reflecting a bumpy improving 
trend.  Especially encouraging progress was achieved after short-term technical assistance 
focusing on PaR reduction was provided during the first quarter of 2009.  In November 2009, 
the IC approved another grant and loan investment package for MFI 08e.  The loan amount was 
almost twice the UNDP/YES loan, with the explicit stipulation that disbursements were 
conditioned on a PaR below 5%.  The loan PBA was completed before year’s end.53  As of 
March 31, 2010 MFI 08e’s PaR was almost 9% (0% WO), a 40% decrease in PaR and WO from 
a year earlier.  The reduction from June 2009 to March 31, 2010 was over 20%.  Yet, it needed 
to decrease another 40% in the following two quarters for MFI 08e to receive a disbursement 
within a year of the November IC approval.  That was a very tall order.  In contrast, all 
indications were the 2008 UNDP/YES grant was totally disbursed by December 31, 2008 and 
the loan was disbursed in two tranches by June 30, 2009.  As of June 30, 2009  MFI 08e’s 
combined PaR and WO was over 11% (7%, 4.11%), considerably above industry standards.  
Perhaps more important was MFI 08e’s combined PaR/WO decreasing approximately 2% 
during the disbursement period of the July 2008 deals. 
  
                                                
 
53 This was based on the deal not being listed among PBAs incomplete as of December 31, 2009. 
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Compare this MFI 08e experience in 2008 and 2009 to MFI 09b in 2009, where the apex 
withheld a recommendation for the donor to sign the MFI 09b PBA because of a reduction in 
outreach. MFI 08e experienced less volatility than MFI 09b, but MFI 08e performance indicators 
were not better than MFI 09b.  The dimensions of actions linked to capital volatility are vivid.   
As reflected in Table 7, Two 2008 deals for MFI 08e experienced timely PBA consummation.  In 
addition, MFI 08e was approved for additional capital investment in 2009 (grant and loan), even 
while performing below industry standards and with outreach challenges.  The 2009 PBAs were 
competed timely. In contrast, MFI 09b experienced a reduction in outreach that resulted in a 
several week postponement of PBA drafting.  Official documents available at the time of the 
investment decision characterized the 2009 outreach reduction as “slight” and forecasted 
increased outreach (MITAF Narrative Report-4th Quarter 2009).  Furthermore, there were 
additional delays due to strategic, intentional actions utilizing information on events that would 
not have been available (and may not have occurred) with the timely processing of PBAs.  The 
scope of organizational response dimensions related to outreach reductions reflected variations 
in behavior. 
The three MFIs involved in 2008 and 2009 deals (MFI 08 c, d, and e) illustrated how 
PBA completion occurred with substantially equal dispatch in 2008, apparently with conditions 
more lenient than industry standards, where disparate MFI performance existed.  The result was 
minimal capital volatility, with portfolio quality improving into 2010.  Also, an under-performing 
MFI (MFI 08e) received desperately needed liquidity to respond to outreach demands after 
seeing an outreach reduction of approximately 30% from 2007 to 2008  (MFI 08e experienced 
8.6% growth 2008 to 2009, compared to MITAF MFIs overall growth above 20%).  
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Table 7:  MFI 08e and MFI 09b comparison. 
 
Indicator and 
Event 
MFI 08e MFI 09b Comment 
PaR/WO 
information 
at time PBA to be 
completed 
• 9.34%/1.99% 4th quarter 
2008;  
• 8.73/2.78% 3rd quarter 2009 
<5%/0% 3rd quarter 
2009 
MFI 08e 2008 best 
information available; 
November 09 
decision based on 3rd 
quarter information 
Outreach at time of 
PBA 
• July 08  
• November 09  
 
• 2008 30% decrease from 
2007;  
• 2009 increase 8.6% (MITAF 
increase 20+%) 
• 12% increase 
from 2nd 
quarter to 3rd 
quarter 2009 
• 1% decrease 
from 3rd quarter 
to 4th quarter 
2009 
• 19% decrease 
from 4th quarter 
2009 to 1st 
quarter 2010 
• MFI 08e received 
capital 
investment 
during year of 
30% decrease in 
outreach, the 
following year 
reflected 
outreach growth 
• MFI 09b did not 
receive capital 
investment when 
experienced 
small decrease in 
outreach, 
downward trend 
continued. 
Timing of PBA • July 08 IC grant and loan 
deals, PBA completed by 
January 1, 2009;  
• November 09 loan deal, 
PBA completed by 
December 31, 2009 
Two November 09 
deals: drafting 
started after 
December 31, 
2009 
MFI 08e grant deal 
total and loan deal 
first tranche 
disbursed by 
December 31, 2008, 
so PBAs were likely 
completed close to 
expected timeframe  
PaR/WO 
information at 
disbursement time 
• 9.34%/1.99% 4th quarter 
2008;  
• 6.82%/2.02% 4th quarter 
2009 
 
• 5.11%/0% 1st 
quarter 2010 
MFI 08e was 
basically stable from 
4th quarter 2009 to 
1st quarter 2010:  
8.94%/0% 
Timing of 
disbursement 
• First tranche by 1st quarter 
2009 (2008 total grant);  
• Second tranche (2008 loan 
final) 2nd quarter 2009; 
• 2009 deals not disbursed by 
March 31, 2010 
2009 deals not 
disbursed by 
March 31, 2010 
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6.1.3 2007:  Apex change in perspective and practice  
A change occurred in 2007, reflected in 2008 activity, with consequences for MITAF 
disbursement processes.  It is a noteworthy year for MITAF in several respects.  First, there 
were no deals approved, not one; only an addendum to a 2006 deal.  Second, at least $1.2 
million USD was distributed to MFIs during 2007.  This is particularly important because it was 
the year that a cash flow crunch was experienced around the world as the Great Recession 
began to emerge (Brunnermeier, 2009; Isidore, 2008).  Third, it was the year after the MITAF 
mid-term evaluation.  The mid-term evaluation occurred in 2006 and, as explained later, 
experienced substantial activity impacting volatility that affected 2007 operations.  Fourth, and 
perhaps most important for understanding 2007’s effect on capital volatility, the apex 
experienced a leadership change at the Sierra Leone office in October 2007.  This leadership 
change was perceived to move the perspective and practice (a power category/node) dimension 
from more of a northern perspective to more of a southern perspective.  Although more precise 
data from various sources is needed to isolate this change variable from the UNDP/YES funding 
source and MFI profile variables, evidence is too strong to deny an affect. 
Empirically, a nuanced, careful view of data adds credibility to perceptions that the 
perspective and practice property measured differently with the leadership change.  This 
perception was expressed during interviews, 
And again, I don’t know when one is African and one is over on the other side, if that 
difference. But we also saw as an MFI, some dramatic changes of the way MITAF 
conducted in terms of accessing resources [after chief of party change]…The north-
south divide….So south, somebody from the south is not probably because he is white, 
he is European… I don’t want to sound racist. It’s just people coming from the north in 
development paradigms. When we engage them, the way southern NGOs sometime 
articulate development ideas and the way our northern colleagues also, by no fault of 
theirs, based on their own background exposure, when you engage in the debate, you 
see them sometimes taking sides, which, with respect, sometimes you feel I wish they 
will have shifted. But of course, shifting people is not easy. Shifting south people to 
north, north people south is quite a challenge eh? In development eh? So you see we 
are both with on these sides and sometimes some people will hold firmly, eh? (Interview 
1). 
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The following interview excerpt provides an example of divergent perspectives spanning the 
scale from commercial MFI paradigm (northern) to accommodative developing MFI paradigm 
(southern),  
And yeah, I was present at the investment committee meeting when the technical 
advisor [former MITAF chief of party] noted he went on for about 15 minutes talking 
about the weaknesses of the community banks. And the governor of the Central or the 
deputy governor of the Central Bank said yes, I hear you, but you know, you think you 
can try and make them work?  (Interview 8). 
 
The following respondents to the north-south hypothesis discussed policies and mutually agreed 
PBA terms (scope) as experiencing culturally shaped applications,  
Person 2: …While you are within a certain scope, but there are things you need to 
understand for this to carry. At the outset, they are so many other thinkings. Whatever 
they [Sierra Leone MFIs] do it’s about is he Mende, is he Temne [two different Sierra 
Leone tribes]. Everything you do, it sounded like that.  
 
Researcher:  So the outside of the scope, there’s this thinking of these cultural factors 
that might be, these people they are serving. 
 
Person: Definitely.  
 
Person 2: Even when they are in the same office, that’s what, that is the dividing line 
(Interview 3, Interview 4). 
Interviews and empirical capital flow records shaped understanding of the mid-term 
evaluation’s criticism of investor risk approaches.  “While there were justifiable reasons for this, 
the Committee has erred on the side of caution in supporting the larger MFIs, not taking enough 
risk on the smaller organizations that may well have the potential to become sustainable” (Duval 
& Bendu, 2006, p. 33).  On one hand, the criticism acknowledges the validity of commercial MFI 
criteria in selecting capital investment deals.  On the other hand, the assessment questions the 
sufficiency of risk taking in selecting deals.  This view of criticisms related to capital flow is 
supported by an earlier criticism in the evaluation,    
[D]isbursement of all types of funding approved by the Investment Committee is tied to 
the tailored performance criteria…As a result, the little grant funding that has been 
approved for operating costs and/or the acquisition of fixed assets has been withheld 
along with approved loan funds. This is counterproductive in that some MFIs – 
particularly the smaller indigenous institutions that are still experiencing serious 
difficulties with portfolio quality – are not receiving the very funding that could help 
increase the institutional capacity necessary to meet the performance criteria (Duval & 
Bendu, 2006, p. 27). 
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MITAF disbursement processes were not only observed in different MFI profiles for 2008 
investment deals, but in movement along the perspective and practice property of the apex.  
How PBA terms were interpreted and implemented by the apex were perceived to be different 
after the north-to-south leadership change.  The implication is the apex adapted by changing its 
cultural application of the MITAF model.  PBA cultural application differences were also 
detected in expressions by southern staffs of northern MITAF donor institutions and in the faith 
shaped operations of Cordaid.  The interview expressions, archival documents, and 
disbursement record of 2008 supported the claim that the change in apex leadership, north to 
south, was a factor in reducing volatility experienced pre-2008. 
6.2  CAPITAL INVESTMENT AND CAPITAL VOLATILITY 
One year that is unique in the pre-2008 experience of disbursement delays is 2006.  Capital 
investment and capital volatility had particular attributes in response to the 2006 mid-term 
evaluation as an intervening condition.  The actions/interactions in 2007 were largely related to 
the massive activity in 2006.  The conditions imposed for capital investment and affected capital 
disbursement had a stronger relationship between 2006 and 2008 than 2006 and 2009.   
 In earlier examination of linkages in the PBA consummation context several insightful 
actions/interactions were observed.  The apex and donor postponed document preparation over 
a month after a November IC approval, with no explicit reason other than perhaps holiday 
(festive) season and procrastination.  Similarly, MFI outreach decline was explicitly attributed to 
the holiday (festive) season in official documents.  The IC actually constrained the preparation 
of a PBA based on achieving a specified level of PaR, rather than making it a condition for 
disbursement or deciding a specific proposal be revised and resubmitted.  Similarly, the TSP 
and a donor agreed not to move forward with deal consummation after IC approval upon 
learning the MFI experienced a large reduction in outreach, which was plausibly related to the 
delayed action on the approved deal.  Participant actions/interactions in the PBA consummation 
context affected capital volatility. 
Linkages between capital volatility and organizational behavior reflected new properties 
when viewed through the lens of 2006 deals.  Remember 2008 and 2009 had several deals 
where PBAs and subsequent disbursement were processed expeditiously.  This was observed 
to be the case even when an MFI had a loan portfolio performing below industry standards, 
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while demonstrating a slow, bumpy positive trend toward improvement, but showed no signs of 
quickly rectifying the problem.  Conversely, the same MFI was approved for a loan capital 
investment after disbursements from the prior loan were complete.  The loan PBA contained 
industry standard disbursement conditions required by the IC, with little evidence supporting 
achievability in a year or less.  Adding to this examination of the PBA context deals from 2006 
demonstrated the importance of intervening conditions, such as program evaluation, on 
efficiency, effectiveness, and reduced volatility 
6.2.1 Mid-term evaluation:  An empirical performance record 
Statistical data presented established the importance of one year over another in observing 
numerous interactions, as represented by number of capital investment deals.  Analysis found 
MFIs with deals in 2006 and 2008, on average, had more experience with MITAF deals. The 
details of this analysis are contained in Appendix I.  MFIs with deals in 2006 averaged 8.04% of 
commitments for all of MITAF, while those without a 2006 deal averaged 3.74%. MFIs not 
receiving deals in 2006 had the lowest average percent of all deals of any group not receiving 
commitments in a year.  To miss out on 2006 was to be relegated to fewer capital investment 
deals.  Closer examination revealed 80% of the 2006 deals were for grants only (no loans) and 
disbursements were paid in both 2006 and 2007; 43.5% were disbursed in each year. It is 2006 
behavior that proved to be the touchstone illuminating linkages with capital volatility. 
Whereas 2008 and 2009 were primarily to observe linkages and interactions in the 
context of PBA consummation, 2006 was to observe process differences when program 
evaluation was introduced into operations.  The evaluation was designed to be formative, rather 
than summative.  Its focus as a performance enhancement tool notwithstanding, it was a record 
of performance and an accountability mechanism. 
Investment committee behavior demonstrated a keen awareness of the imminence of 
the mid-term evaluation. IC meetings took place in March and November 2006.  In the March 
meeting seven deals were approved involving seven MFIs. The November meeting approved 12 
deals involving seven MFIs, including three not involved in March.  Although the details of PBA 
timing were not available for this investigation, available data indicated that four of 12 deals 
received disbursement in 2006, including two being completely disbursed (invested).  The data 
also show the remainder of the deals were completely disbursed by the end of 2007, with the 
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exception of three large, rather complicated deals.54  The deals approved in 2006 and 2008 
were disbursed with the least capital volatility of all the years.  In 2008 capital volatility was 
primarily related to fewer PBA consummation constraints and disbursement conditions relaxed 
from industry standards.  In 2006 this investigation attributed it primarily to self-interest 
associated with accountability in the MITAF mid-term evaluation.  Table 8 shows how a greater 
proportion of deals in a year experienced quicker capital disbursements in 2006 and 2008 
compared to 2009.55 
Table 8:  Percent of deals disbursing dapital—by year of IC approval. 
 
Were the deals in 2006 more simply structured than in later years?  Although, only three 
loan deals were involved, eight of the deals were cross-connected.56  Fewer loan deals made 
2006 less complicated.  However, cross-connected grant deals, even the type in 2006 (i.e., pro-
rata commitments, not linked by conditions), were still fraught with challenges of reaching 
agreement on conditions and obtaining all the signatures.  The deals of 2006 were not 
substantially simpler than later years.  
  
                                                
 
54 Two cross-connected loan deals totaling $952,000 USD involved the Finance Salone transformation.  
The third loan deal for $350,000 USD had complexities involving several contributing sources.  Official 
records indicate the PBA was not consummated for two years after agreement was reached.  In addition, 
official documents report the conditions for disbursement were not satisfied. Finally, corroborating 
interviews suggest the application of the conditions did not consider the minimum acceptable 
performance, but was administered based on 100% compliance.  
55 Precise data could not be located on disbursements that occurred early; however, interview data 
provided sufficient evidence to substantiate that it occurred. 
56 Five loan deals were involved in 2008 (25% of deals) and eight in 2009 (47% of deals). Eight cross-
connected deals were involved in 2008 (20% of deals) and one in 2009.  
 
 
Year of IC 
Approval 
 
(2007 had no 
deals) 
% of Deals with 
Disbursements  
within 6 months of IC 
approval 
% of Deals with 
Disbursements 7-12 
months of IC approval 
% of deals with 
Disbursements 13-
18 months of IC 
approval 
2006 15 50 15 
2008 0 65 25 
2009 17 17 6 
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Were the MFIs performing better, such as in accordance with industry standards, in 
2006 as compared to 2008 and 2009?  Leading up to, and including 2006, economies around 
the world were still growing.  So, it was plausible the MFIs’ performance may have substantially 
slipped in 2007 due to the Great Recession.  Data to carefully assess this was not available for 
this study.  However, the mid-term evaluation report (Duval & Bendu, 2006) provided important 
observations that can be juxtaposed to later years, 
Rapid assessments carried out in 2004, immediately after project inception, showed that 
all of the NGO microcredit programs that were initially financed (ARC/Finance Salone, 
World Hope/Hope Micro, CEDA, ARD and CCF) had significant institutional 
weaknesses. In most cases, the programs themselves could not accurately measure 
basic performance ratios like operational self-sufficiency and PaR due to the lack of 
adequate systems and financial management capacity (p. 25).  
 
MFI performance targets related to PaR have been included in the project grant 
agreements, and it is clear that most institutions have made considerable progress on 
improving the quality of their portfolios. Nevertheless, the current PaR within a number of 
the partner lending institutions is well above internationally recognized good practice, 
and jeopardizes their potential sustainability. Another indicator of portfolio quality is the 
loan loss ratio, which is also extremely high in several of the MFIs. In many cases, a 
significant portion of the PaR and loan losses can probably be traced to serious 
incidents of fraud within the institutions (p. 15). 
As of June 30, 2009 the MFIs approved for capital investments in 2006 had operating self-
sustainability (OSS) ratios above 100% (indicating self-sustainability), except three.  This 
indicates improvement, not deterioration, from 2006.  Furthermore, all initially financed MFIs 
referred to in the evaluation had OSS over 100%.  Compared to 2006, the MFIs were doing 
generally better in 2009. 
The most outstanding difference between 2006 and other years is the mid-term 
evaluation.  Due to some mid-term evaluation details not being available in the archival data, 
estimates on the start of the process were made based on the process for the final evaluation.  
The draft Terms of Reference were likely circulated to stakeholders in approximately March 
2006, the time of the first IC meeting.   At that IC meeting eight deals were approved totaling 
over $645,000 USD.  An early version of the Investment Committee Policy and Procedural 
Manual was dated July 2006.  Not only did the Manual espouse tighter procedures and more 
explicit donor funding requirements, but empirical evidence of 2006 seemed intent on proving it. 
Early disbursements for the March deals began in August and September.  An official document 
records the evaluation began with phone calls to stakeholders on September 6 and on-site 
examination was conducted September 18-30.  Evaluation results were provided in an Aide 
Memoire to MITAF and other stakeholders in a meeting after the mission ended September 30, 
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2006.  One of the findings of the mid-term evaluation was that “The procedures still in place for 
disbursing donor funds to partner lending institutions are unwieldy and contribute to 
unnecessary and disruptive delays in financing” (Duval & Bendu, 2006, p. 33).   
The capital investment machine worked to demonstrate and create an empirical record 
that MITAF, as of 2006, was an improved, learning organization. October produced further 
refinements to the Manual, demonstrating official action taken to improve operations in a 
transparent, accountable manner.  The November IC meeting approved 12 more deals totaling 
over $1.9 million USD.  Also, investment disbursements continued in November and December 
for March deals.  Unlike 2009, 2006 did not experience increased capital volatility due to the 
holiday (festive) season.  The 2007 New Year continued this cycle with investment 
disbursements beginning for the November deals: February, March, May, and July.  The mid-
term evaluation intervening condition accounted for substantial variation in the linkages between 
behavior and capital volatility.  
Beyond the focus of this investigation, a particular attribute involving MITAF’s evaluation 
emerged that impacted the MITAF case:  MITAF 2.  Final evaluation of MITAF’s initial project 
was as much a feasibility study for the next round of MFI sector support as it was a summative 
evaluation of the project.  Both the mid-term and final evaluation were conducted by the same 
lead evaluator.  Since several key problems related to broader outputs of MITAF cited in the 
mid-term evaluation were not resolved, actor focus at the end of MITAF was on how to move 
forward differently and better.  This included matters of capital volatility.  In summary, a MITAF 
successor would not be a project, but an entity.  The entity would be capitalized by donors and 
other investors, have a governing board, and most importantly take ownership and control of 
assets.  This includes ultimate responsibility and accountability for asset effectiveness.  For 
example, if MITAF 2 grants a loan to a MFI and it is not paid back, the MITAF 2 entity incurs the 
loss.  In this example MITAF 2 experiences a reduction in its capital due to a loan loss and 
foregoes expected revenue from the loan. Shaping collaboration to realign accountability, 
effectiveness, and efficiency explains in some measure capital volatility in 2009.  Nevertheless, 
the last year of MITAF contained the largest total dollar amount of deals approved of any year, 
and vividly illustrates complexity in cross-connected linkages. 
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6.2.2 Time in MITAF 
Fundamental to understanding different perspectives of volatility was MITAF’s expressed intent 
about timeframes in both original design and formalized adaptations.  Also, very important were 
words or deeds that were not official or formalized.  These reflected organizational imperatives 
that strained collaboration and yet-to-be formalized commitments.  It was explicitly clear as late 
as 2007, more than half-way through MITAF, that payment of the first capital disbursement (first 
tranche) was to occur one month after providing the MFI an approval letter.  The MFI approval 
letter was to go out within one week of IC approval.  The donor capital was to be on-hand for 
MITAF within two weeks of IC approval.  Conditions were negotiated with the MFI and, when 
approved by the MFI, the PBA incorporating these conditions was returned to MITAF within two 
weeks of approval.  Implicitly the donor signed the PBA within two weeks of the MFI returning it 
to MITAF.  The implication was found in the fact that MITAF was the donor’s designated agent 
in negotiations and donor capital was expected to be on-hand for disbursement within two 
weeks of IC approval.  The first tranche of capital was to be disbursed to the MFI within two 
weeks of PBA consummation.  To be clear, both pre-mature and delayed disbursements could 
detract from capital value.  However, in a country with a nascent MFI sector that is resource 
constrained, a program intent on “rapid development of the microfinance sector” strove to 
minimize extraneous delays in capital flow (UNCDF, 2004b, p. 6).  Disbursements that occurred 
differently than the formalized plan and official procedures constituted capital volatility.  
John Tucker, a MITAF architect and coauthor of, Microfinance Sector in Sierra Leone:  
An Assessment, explained the big-picture connectivity of capital commitments, timing 
expectations, executive focus, and strategic action, 
During the Sierra Leone sector diagnostic, one of the issues we heard from the CEOs of 
the microfinance institutions, was that the CEOs were spending 50, 60% of their time 
going door to door to prospective funders to raise funds.  They all liked the idea of an 
investment committee [IC] where they could make one application, and if their business 
plan was accepted, they would not have to reapply in future years, but rather, only focus 
on meeting their performance targets in their business plan that were mirrored in the 
agreement with the IC.   If they met minimum performance standards, their annual 
tranche of funding would be released.  So this helped streamline a lot of the transaction 
costs of mobilizing funding for them. It was one stop funding for them. (Tucker, 2011) 
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Time in MITAF was not viewed as a flexible framework to guide action.  Time allocation was 
important and a very serious matter.  Streamlining and reliability of commitments were 
important.  Remember, MITAF was developed with a sense of urgency and a driving imperative 
for immediate change. 
6.3 A COLLABORATIVE OF DIVERSE ORGANIATIONS:  APEX, MFIS, DONORS 
As reflected in Tucker’s remarks, from the time of PBA consummation all participants were in 
their positions ostensibly avoiding the forbidden, yet doing what was required or permitted by 
their MITAF participation.  MFIs were serving their clients, working strategically to accomplish 
their goals to further their mission, while simultaneously abiding by their PBA commitments.  
Tucker speaks of MFI CEOs focusing on business plans rather than raising funds.  The PBA 
sets forth a teleological ethical framework for MFIs to decide on resource deployment.  “Funds 
provided pursuant to this Agreement shall be used to achieve these results/milestones. The 
Recipient Institution shall be free to reallocate resources as needed in order to produce the 
expected results” (PBA Template).  In other words, the MFI was permitted to employ invested 
resources as it deemed appropriate to satisfy requirements of achieving agreed to 
results/milestones.      
The apex worked to realize the same results/milestones.  Different techniques and 
technologies were employed to build MFI capacity, provide capital in accordance with deals’ 
conditions, and monitor the MFIs for achievement and targeted assistance.  Donors, as 
Investment Committee members, met at least twice a year to oversee the project.  Also, they 
had various between meeting duties typical of such governance responsibilities.  Also, as capital 
investors, they monitored MFI reports in their investment portfolios.  How each participant 
perceived the other’s position, and the responsibilities of others in light of respective 
responsibilities, was often fundamental to the variableness of behavior and capital flow.   
Environment affects participant perception and related behavior-volatility linkages.  The 
2009 annual report of the UK Department for International Development (2009) called to mind 
that Sierra Leone was in the ten year period in a post-conflict state when a peaceful 
environment is fragile and conflict could reignite, 
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Future conflict remains a real risk unless economic growth continues and people’s 
quality of life improves. Poverty remains wide-spread and health indicators are very 
poor. Amongst the factors causing persistent fragility are: the inability by the 
Government of Sierra Leone to deliver basic health and education services in rural 
areas; the threat to economic stability caused by diminishing revenues due to the global 
downturn; weak accountability to citizens by government and public institutions and lack 
of employment opportunities for the youth (p. 156). 
 
Behavior and capital flows were affected by achieving results/milestones, such as outreach in 
rural areas, and MITAF participants’ perceptions of actions/interactions in the MITAF case.  
Capital flow to MFIs was considered vital to support economic growth, improve living standards, 
and provide economic stability by accountably collaborating to produce effective, efficient, 
poverty-reducing outcomes in a sustainable fashion. 
MFI perceptions of the apex and donors were different and complex.  Perceptions were 
more than an individual opinion, but a strategic assessment of a business association shaped 
and evolved by factors such as history, information access, representations and experience.  
MFIs worked to advance their mission while striving simultaneously to satisfy conditions for 
capital release needed to secure technical assistance, equipment, operating capital, and loan 
capital.  While advancing their mission, MFIs continually assessed the apex and donor in this 
new partnership.  Below are expressions from four MFIs.  These different perspectives, 
provided in their own words, were important to sensing how MFIs viewed their partners in 
serving the people of their nation, 
Thank you very much sir. You see that the processes of transmitting grants to these 
MFIs through MITAF is very slow. Ok? So our institution here as a case study is very 
slow. Because MITAF do peg their grant on the portfolio performance. That is the PaR. 
That you can only have access to this grant if your PaR is below 5%. O.k.  And most of 
these MFIs operate, cannot meet that target because we have the behavior of our 
people here towards loans is not good so we cannot get that 5% PaR as MITAF required 
(Interview 10).  
So in our cases we are purely relying  on MITAF to actually push our business plan 
forward, to ensure that we are, because taking into our consideration our own mission, 
we are there to target the vulnerable, actual poor…(Interview 5 Others). 
On one hand, MFIs believed MITAF did not fully appreciate the borrower’s credit culture, 
the need to “reshift people’s perception from charity to self-reliance” (UNCDF, 2004b, p. 4).  On 
the other hand, MFIs viewed MITAF as a vital partner in implementing the business plan. 
They look at your board, they look at your, you know, governance. They look at your 
operations, they look at management. So basically you have to have a board, you have 
to have this, you have to have this. You know, most things which come over time. I 
mean for men like you, I always tell people, the high mortality rates of institutions in the 
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south, we have the high mortality of NGOs and MFIs, they are here today, and gone 
tomorrow. And to sustain them, in order to sustain them and make them not to die, 
sometimes requires not doing certain things. Let me emphasize. It requires delaying on 
certain actions and sometimes it requires fast-tracking on certain items to protect it 
because they are very vulnerable…Everyday people start new ones, new ones, new 
ones…There is always some confusion, people destroying each other, there’s envy, 
jealousy, and all that. It creates so much bad blood that these institutions will die. So 
managing them is not as straightforward as where you have all the parameters of legality 
and all that. [MITAF leadership] wanted everything to be put in place or not to be put in 
place all in a very simple logical framework. That was where I personally had difficulties 
in appreciating the MITAF approach (Interview 1).  
The only unfortunate thing is since my being here and three years as manager I have 
not, not received a cent from MITAF but the accountant and some ministry officials were 
here during at the time… So I don’t know, they can help (Interview 10). 
The two MFIs above discussed timing as applied to different concerns:  
governance as it relates to capital disbursement conditions, and delays in capital 
disbursements. 
It’s just people coming from the north in development paradigms. When we engage 
them, the way southern NGOs sometime articulate development ideas and the way our 
northern colleagues also, by no fault of theirs, based on their own background exposure, 
when you engage in the debate, you see them sometimes taking sides, which, with 
respect, sometimes you feel I wish they will have shifted (Interview 1). 
But believe me, when we went through it [adding a branch office], and I said this was 
what [MITAF] deprived us of, the ability to learn, to know. You know.  When people are 
given the opportunity to learn, to know, to test, the learning is stronger. Hmm? For 
example, they say your portfolio risk should not be x, you know…They say, you know, 
your loan has been approved but disbursements are delayed until you meet the targets. 
So they are targets that MITAF sets and usually PaR portfolio risk is one of them, is one 
of the core targets….Now, so delays can come from the institution not meetings the 
targets that MITAF thinks should, the institution, should meet, and delays can also come 
from the donor actually moving…the forms. The challenges, I would say is one, the 
donor’s reluctance to put the money in one basket…it was also not totally under the 
control of MITAF if a donor has not sent money, I mean what can MITAF do? The money 
was not in pool of basket. A second challenge of course was the fact that MITAF itself, 
coming new to the country, did not understand the dynamics of how we, coming from an 
NGO background, transforming into a microfinance institution, so we are trapped in the 
transformation process. People measure us as if we are already high class MFIs and not 
transforming into MFIs. So that was also a challenge (Interview 1).  
But if we have a direct contact with the donors, wherein they can see exactly where we 
are operating and the constraints we are going through, I believe things can move more 
faster (Interview 5 Others). 
My thinking is that the donors really don’t spend much time looking at it. They depend a 
lot, rely heavily on MITAF and MITAF prepare like a summary, you know, they send it 
out and usually…and they make some recommendations. I believe that the donors take 
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the recommendations from MITAF fairly seriously and, and they use those 
recommendations to base their decisions…(Interview 2). 
The above responses indicated that MFIs believed MITAF participants viewed 
development differently.  Information asymmetries existed, in the minds of MFIs, involving a 
powerful intermediary (apex) and the asymmetries impacted capital disbursement delays.  
MITAF using measurements more reflective of the sectors nascent stage, and donors more 
directly involved with MFIs were believed to result in decreased capital volatility. 
In terms of releasing monies, I think once the investment committee has approved, I think 
there was a commitment by these donors to transfer the tranches approved. What was, 
what was not forthcoming was the MITAF green light [apex organization]. Because even if 
they have approved, the green light to transfer has to come from MITAF. And that’s where 
the leadership of MITAF, if the leadership is not, well, for lack of a word, if it is not 
sympathetic to the aspirations to this particular MFI, it can hold on to these or raise the 
issue that the challenges, that the conditions have not yet been met. 
The third challenge of course, was the fact that the very investment committee made of 
donors, central bank, MITAF. I mean that all the bureaucracy of the investment committee 
itself was also a challenge….(Interview 1). 
Above, MFI perceptions regarding the apex’s power and subjectivity in disbursement decisions 
and collaborative bureaucracy were believed to be related to capital volatility. 
These four institutions present a cross-section of different MFI views of the apex 
(MITAF) and donors when discussing challenges and capital flow.  Interviews are not intended 
to suggest or imply a lack of value or appreciation for MITAF and the donors.  Rather, it 
presents their expressions, in their words, of important perceptions involving action/interaction.  
The views range from advocate, disinterested party, and partner to gatekeeper and insensitive 
keeper of the purse. 
These perceptions were important for a host of reasons, but in this study chief among 
them was the type of cooperation and flexibility required to operate in high levels of complexity 
and interconnectivity.  There are difficult challenges in maintaining the positive atmosphere 
important to living and working in a post-conflict setting, especially when the “going door to 
door” process for accessing capital was substantially changed, may be to an MFI’s 
disadvantage.  For instance, the main options for domestic MFI capital were now collaborating, 
ostensibly no longer directly accessible, and they agreed to invest capital in new international 
MFIs.  New international MFI investment could have been part of strategy to bolster MFI sector 
leadership with successful MFIs based in African countries, such as Life Above Poverty 
Organization of Nigeria.  The internationally sponsored Sierra Leone MFIs had no experience, 
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or baggage, from the Sierra Leone market.  At the same time, a domestic MFI operating in 
Sierra Leone for years was required to wait because of having baggage from serving the local 
market.  Maintaining a positive atmosphere could be difficult and complicated.  There was little 
consolation later when one international MFI experienced back-breaking financial losses.  Once 
the poster child for policies, procedures, and capacity building training, the international MFI 
ended up on the auction block.  Nevertheless, it received the money and the domestic MFI was 
still waiting. 
A positive atmosphere, including specific cooperation attributes and flexibility, was 
important to living and working with high levels of complexity and interconnectivity and was 
shaped in large part by trust.  Trust, as in donors’ trust of MFIs, and its importance to future 
capital investments, has been studied and supported empirically (Gutierrez-Nieto & Serrano-
Cinca, 2010). What about MFIs trust of donors?  Community stakeholder data was used to 
explicate linkages of capital volatility and MFI integrity and reliability.  Above, data was used to 
illustrate an MFI’s perception that donors encapsulate their interests.  Karen Cook, Russell 
Hardin and Margaret Levi (2005) discuss asymmetrical power by underscoring trust’s value and 
suggesting methods to gain trust from less powerful participants.  Their work draws on 
theoretical and empirical research that examined trust in creating and sustaining cooperation in 
numerous contexts.  One of their key perspectives of trust is “one party to the relation believes 
the other party has incentive to act in his or her interest or to take his or her interest to heart” (p. 
2).  They explain it as believing the other party “encapsulates our interest” (p. 5).  This 
encapsulation of another’s interest precisely responds to the question of characterizing power 
concentration as power asymmetry in the theory of resource dependency.  Actors who would 
mutually benefit from exchange and cooperation are often constrained by asymmetrical power.  
Structuring interactions to increase the cooperation level can improve performance indicator 
outcomes. 
  Records show many MFIs over the years did not consistently produce outcomes 
according to industry standards.  Only a few reached the point of consistently achieving the PaR 
standard.  Although several attained OSS and FSS standards near the end of MITAF, it was a 
constant battle for most MFIs.  Outreach attained levels beyond expectations; meanwhile, the 
stress of competition was evident.  Capital volatility was an ever present nemesis.  As reflected 
in one official document reporting on the first quarter of 2009, “outreach is at 87,417, 93% and 
the June 2009 target is 93,000. Meeting the target is contingent on prompt disbursement of 
approved funds by the donors to the MFIs, which has been delayed in the past and…this 
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quarter” (MITAF Narrative Report-1st Quarter 2009).  In the same document an insightful 
communication to the IC from the Advisory Committee was included, chaired by the Bank of 
Sierra Leone.  “The TSP will initiate renegotiation and release of approved funds to MFIs if 
conditions have not been fulfilled 100 percent” (MITAF Narrative Report-1st Quarter 2009).   
Capital volatility is connected to the value of outcomes.  And, the value of outcomes is the value 
of capital.   
The views of the apex and donors are also important.  To protect interviewee 
confidentially the apex comments will not be connected to the organization.  The apex 
comments and views shared have been sprinkled through chapters five and six.  Also, apex 
interview data was analyzed by fragmentation and reassembling in the concept indicator model 
of grounded theory.  With respect to the apex’s views, the best response was to provide an 
excerpt from the final evaluation about how the apex and its predicament was viewed, a 
reflection of its perception-guided behavior while in a precarious position, 
While donors and MFIs alike appreciate the services that the TSP has provided in 
preparing investments (working with PLIs to develop reasonable requests, assessing the 
PLI capacity to use the funding effectively and presenting requests to the IC), there has 
always been a conflict of interest for the TSP on the ground… Further, the TSP becomes 
both “judge and jury” in the untenable position of advising the institutions on their 
capacity-building strategies on the one hand while assessing their performance on the 
other (Duval & Bendu, 2009, p. 9). 
Donor views of MFIs, apex (TSP), each other and Sierra Leone illustrated their 
operational philosophies and their approaches to development.  For this investigation, 
philosophies and approaches translate to varying degrees into organizational behavior on 
matters relating to capital investment, 
Because at the same time we are having pressure on the other end, may be, an MFI 
wants to know they are getting the money. They are waiting for it. And they’ve been 
waiting for some time now. And because it’s based on the opportunities so if the funds 
do not come as fast as they expected then maybe they can just miss the opportunities 
(Interview 6).  
You see, the donor, the donors are there to support the MFI.  The donors are there to 
ensure the MFI grows, that they grow, they mature, they become sustainable. And if you 
deny a support, you’re killing it. But again, you want to see a vibrant, institution that’s 
going to grow wisely, you know efficiently if the funder provided to them. So all these 
things are taken into consideration so when the presentations are made like, you know, 
for funding by the TSP you look at some, some  of them, they’re weak, but you say look, 
they’re, weak, ok, but what do we do? If we deny them they die.  Sometime they operate 
in certain areas where other institutions are not. And you want to make sure they are in 
as much as possible you, you cover a lot of areas. Especially inaccessible areas like 
rural areas where you don’t have, you know, access to critical funds for small 
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businesses to fight over it. So you want to ensure that each institution survive and can 
provide its services. So you say ok, it’s not too strong, but if it can meet part of the 
criteria we will do this, you know.  Ok, we will not outright deny them. So this is donors, 
they don’t want to deny an institution unless it becomes extremely necessary (Interview 
4). 
The above donors were cognizant of pressures MFIs experienced from community stakeholders 
and were pressured themselves by awareness that MFIs were capacity challenged and 
committed to reaching people in difficult to service parts of the country.  The excerpts below 
reflect how donors differed in their MFI focus, which expressed their development philosophies 
and strategies.   
And ok, in addition to that, yes, there is sometimes, we’re facing conflict of personalities 
between, because it depends on who you represent…The mitigating thing is that we 
actually don’t necessarily fund the same thing. And we don’t also necessarily fund the 
same institution. So perhaps we can just sit there and see, as some people say, I can 
fund this. And you say ok, then go ahead. I am not funding that. So, but there will be an 
institution that you will be interested in and nobody’s going to fund it. So you say ok, I will 
take this one. That’s how it goes (Interview 6). 
If you represent [donor] that funds, let’s say [amount] or [amount] of the total program, 
then of course, you might be, you know, in an uncomfortable position towards this 
[person] because, you know, he can talk louder than you if he wants. Yeah, that, that’s 
what happens actually. It has happened (Interview 6). 
That they wanted, this was their idea how to get their rural access going, community 
banks. And yeah…at the investment committee meeting…for about 15 minutes talking 
about the weaknesses of the community banks. And the governor of the Central or the 
deputy governor of the Central Bank said yes, I hear you, but you know, you think you 
can try and make them work. Can you put the TA [technical assistant] in to make them 
work? And, you know, it was, it was an agreement, that as a package what we had, we 
thought, you know, was a good group of institutions to help build a sector in Sierra 
Leone. Now, some of those community banks are still having trouble. A few of them may 
be viable, but we haven’t gone beyond those four (Interview 8). 
I would say yes it’s quite a favorable environment, that’s why internationals like LAPO 
and BRAC entered the market. I think MITAF, MITAF was, instrumental and also 
contributed to the entry of these two big players…But of course there is still room for 
improvement. And my major concern is the absence of second tier regulations. That 
means that, that transforming into, into a deposit taking MFI is not that easy…and that, 
yes, for a country like Sierra Leone, being at the bottom of the human development 
index and having experienced an eleven year civil war, the microfinance sector is doing 
pretty well (Interview 9). 
Donor, apex, and government interactions involved strategies that, at times, were difficult to 
reconcile with industry standards. 
But, you know, a year from the initial approval, the investment committee would meet, 
the technical secretariate would say here’s the progress. These are the institutions that 
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have met their performance criteria, they’re ready for the next tranche. These are the 
institutions that have not met them, but I think, you know, they understand the problem, 
they’ve got a good plan to fix it, by giving them funding, it will help them actually fix the 
problem. So we might do a waiver and even though they’re missing some of their 
performance targets, do one more tranche of funding, and then keep a close eye on 
them. If they don’t improve, it becomes more difficult. There may be some that are just 
suspended, that, in effect, they’ve missed their performance targets, the technical 
advisor think they understand the problem, they don’t think they’re taking it seriously, 
funding is not going to solve the problem. And actually what you need to do is just 
intensify technical assistance or write it off. You know. It’s venture capital. You invest in 
seven institutions, two of them you’re going to have to write off (Interview 8).  
Not really [do donors visit MFIs for due diligence and monitoring]. Really, to be honest, 
actually, when they go for the investment committee, just get to town the day before and 
leave the day after. For the advisory committee, and the next day we meet, the 
investment committee, and ok, if you want to stay, if you are planning to stay, then you, 
then you can perhaps visit some, like we do usually. We can visit some MFIs (Interview 
6). 
On one hand, the apex was a powerful participant in affecting donor capital flow behavior, as 
indicated in excerpts above.  On the other hand, donors utilized information sources other than 
the apex to assess MFI performance, as indicated in Interview 7,   
But in the, if [donor] takes up the contracting of one of the applicants, then we start also 
a direct dialogue with the, with the applicant so that is our direct source of information. 
And then, beyond that, we also have, well we have other programs in Sierra Leone as 
well. And my colleagues also work on other programs in Sierra Leone. So it’s, the TSP is 
not the only source of information, but I must say that they are, they have proved to be a 
very valuable source of information (Interview 7). 
One donor suggested data and information be used to guide interactions with MFIs aimed at 
providing a non-monetary recognition for achievement that assists with building a sense of 
ownership in MFIs, 
Where quarterly reporting is not only submitted, but should be posted in the next 
month…. So, quarterly, normally, when you receive that, the technical service providers 
should go through the set of target and achievement, and normally discuss with the 
microfinance institution…And if, for all of them we should issue letters saying that thank 
you, you are on targets, or thank you, you really made progress because you you’ve 
done better than what was expected. And then if they are below targets, you need to 
discuss the way to overcome obstacles. Maybe they are obstacles beyond the 
microfinance institution’s management’s control. We don’t know (Interview 5). 
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De facto denial was an empirical category that labeled behavior hesitant to deny an MFI 
proposal, but instead approved the loan with conditions that appeared unrealistic.  The donor 
below spoke to the challenge of reconciling the pressure to support MFIs with the organizational 
imperative to achieve impact with investments,  
It’s often hard to estimate how long it will take an MFI to fulfill certain conditions. So one 
is the necessity of the fulfillment and two is the realization or materialization of, of the 
fulfillment. If it’s, if it’s sent, if it matches with reality, if it’s reachable and if it’s de facto, is 
it true that it took too long in many cases, MFIs to fulfill conditions, and in that case we 
should have kind of all set more appropriate conditions, more realistic conditions. Or we 
should simply have cancelled the loan or the grant agreement because if you need too 
long, in some cases, this could also mean that an MFI was not ready for receiving a 
considerable amount of money and was maybe not enthusiastic enough and not, not, 
not sufficiently well performing (Interview 9).  
The persistent nascent status of the microfinance sector in Sierra Leone was a constant 
factor in efforts to develop MFIs.  Capacity and paradigms were an integral part of developing 
the sector.  Perhaps these were as important as industry practices and institutional financial 
performance.  One official MITAF document records this observation in early 2010.  “Given the 
nascent stage of the sector in Sierra Leone, capacity building of these institutions can take 
longer than anticipated” (MITAF Narrative Report-1st Quarter 2010).  The MFI below expressed 
this view of the development machine, 
I say look, I came to this industry really with no, no knowledge of microfinance, a 
conviction brought me to this industry. A conviction that there is something our people 
are too dependent on handouts. I want to get, I’ve done handouts. So as Sierra 
Leoneans working directly with these different directors, I saw look, this has no meaning. 
They are just playing the game based on the new director. A new director comes in, he 
has his own position. If he comes for schools, gardens, that you, you do gardens. If he 
comes for latrines, we build latrines. Nothing really happens. Oh a new director comes, 
he likes latrines, everybody moves. Ahh, the new director, he likes education and he 
likes school gardens, we start to plant trees behind schools. [laughter] I got mad at 
these. I say look, it’s high time we start to question some of these people (Interview 1). 
H. George Frederickson (2005) references Fred Riggs in echoing the sentiments of this MFI 
representative in describing the interaction of local cultures and development efforts, 
Riggs brilliantly describes premodern, post-colonial developing countries and 
compares them to modern counties.  In doing so he, like Weber, keeps a particularly 
keen eye on bureaucracies….I rejected the escalator model of the new modernization 
literature … in which ‘traditional’ societies were expected to respond to the fresh 
breezes of ‘modernity’ by embracing changes that would, sooner or later, bring them 
into the new world of opportunity…. It struck me that most societies would adhere  
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tenaciously to many of their most valued ancient traditions and cultural norms while 
simultaneously importing and accepting a facade of practices and patterns that would, 
hopefully, enable them to maintain their distinctive cultures while benefiting from the 
autonomy and material goods offered by the outside world (28-30). 
  
Actors more dependent on others, often the MFIs and apex, may choose not to be 
trustworthy in order to avoid being abused (exploited) by the more powerful party, typically 
donors (Cook et al., 2005).  Research on nonprofit organizations shows that organizations affect 
“an illusion of compliance” with government contract provisions when the organizations deem 
provisions unreasonable (Froelich, 1999, p. 257).  When MITAF, or the disbursement 
conditions, were deemed abusive by MFIs then a veneer of action-patterns and discourse were 
embraced by MFIs to maintain a measure of power and access to resources.  Such behavior 
creates an information asymmetry between participants in the deal.  Power asymmetry in 
relationships, characterized as resource dependent, may result in distrust when powerful actors 
do not make “credible commitments” (Cook et al., 2005, p. 54).  Local cultures and development 
efforts reflected MFI resource dependency as they shaped the donor perception and alignment 
assessment (Jurik & Cowgill, 2005). 
The donor below described the importance of developing local interest by referencing an 
expected end to international support.  The reference is to the role of the Bank of Sierra Leone 
in MITAF deliberations regarding investment deals and resource allocation. 
They are like the eye of the government to look at what is happening, I mean, how is 
going to benefit our people and all of that, you know. So I think that their role has been 
very relevant because in the, umm, advisory committee meetings, these proposals are 
normally presented, and it is the Bank of Sierra Leone who chairs, I mean the advisory 
committee meetings.  Because, at times, you know,…the conditions we have, you know, 
of these MFIs meeting, the criterias they have to meet before they can access 
funding…for some of the local MFIs, you know they might need some capacity building 
in some area and so I see it is very relevant because the Bank of Sierra Leone then 
comes up with these issues that look, I mean this is an international MFI. They have the 
capacity to meet these criterias, but we still have our national MFIs who will need to build 
their capacity. Because I mean the internationals might decide to leave one day, you 
know (Interview 11). 
The difference was not in the desirability of disbursement conditions based on industry 
standards, but of the capacity of domestic MFIs to achieve them.  The importance of adequate 
capacity for MFI to performance is not the difference, but perhaps perceptions of the needed 
and appropriate time and effort to build sufficient capacity in a post-conflict fragile state LDC. 
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6.4 SUMMARY 
Linkages were examined between action and capital flow.  With deals as the unit of analysis, 
actions of participants were linked with tranche disbursements to observe linkages between 
organizational behavior and capital volatility.  Examination of PBA consummation discovered 
participant behaviors linked to capital volatility.  For example, not only did agreements quickly 
completed constrain volatility, but delays in completing agreements were employed as a tactic 
to increase capital investment effectiveness and minimize the time between formal 
consummation and capital disbursement.  Examination of the mid-term evaluation also 
discovered behavior linked to capital volatility.  Deals complex in structure administered with 
tight capital-use controls, can be consummated and implemented to invest capital in MFIs 
challenged by performance and capacity limitations in a manner to constrain volatility.  In 
addition, it was observed that leadership and culture mattered to disbursement timing.  Change 
in apex leadership was perceived to be related to administration of deals, which was 
corroborated by both volatility of the deals and belief concerning cultural roles.  
How can the above contexts, intervening condition, complexity, and interconnectedness 
be viewed to make sense of it all?  Deeply embedded in voice and archival data is a lens 
through which diversity and variableness can be viewed with understanding and clarity.  This 
investigation proposes that the Capitalflow Bureaucratic Triad (CBT) is the lens that makes 
sense of behavior-volatility linkages in collaborative mechanisms,  
• when viewing efforts to produce a public good in post-conflict fragile state Sierra 
Leone, 
• where efforts are embedded in the context of an informal economy that is best 
understood as possessing survival and criminality properties, and 
• when rules define efforts by explicating what is required, prohibited, and 
permitted, as well as how to enter and exit the effort. 
Chapter Seven describes CBT theory and applies the model to MITAF data.   
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7.0  POLICY IMPLICATIONS:  CAPITALFLOW BUREAUCRATIC TRIAD THEORY  
How do data help make sense of linkages between organizational action/interaction and 
volatility?  What approaches do different actors suggest to reduce volatility?  How do different 
participants explain differences in capital disbursements?  Embedded in numerous transactions, 
descriptive statistics on institutional performance, and official processes of training and 
technological improvements was extensive evidence of the ongoing struggle of collaboration, 
organizational imperatives, and the dual goal of serving the poor and performing in a financially 
sustainable manner.  This struggle represents the linkage between organizational behavior and 
capital flow volatility.  Value of capital is affected by linkages between organizational behavior 
and capital volatility.  Capital flow volatility is determined by the interactions of three properties 
of bureaucracy:  collaboration; accountability; and effectiveness, efficiency, and responsiveness 
(impact).  Capital value is a function of the level of volatility and MFI condition at disbursement: 
Capitalflow Bureaucratic Triad (CBT).  In a word it is bureaucracy, but this is not our father’s 
bureaucracy.  New lens are needed to better understand relationships between organizational 
behavior and capital volatility, especially when collaborative mechanisms are used.  CBT aims 
to contribute to a better understanding of these relationships. 
This chapter discusses implications of findings and results by connecting CBT theory 
with literature and the investigation’s data.  This is accomplished by moving from the abstract to 
specific, and from literature to data.  First, an overview of the theory as an explanatory lens is 
provided.  The interaction of CBT properties, and properties interacting with capital, is 
emphasized as activity that affects both capital flow and properties.  Drawing on the natural 
sciences, atomic theory is used to illustrate phenomena comparable to MITAF interactions in 
the physical world.  CBT properties have proclivities toward constraining or enabling 
disbursements that function like ions in the physical world.  Second, the CBT overview is 
followed by a brief description of each property’s attributes.  Seven central, though not 
exhaustive, CBT hypotheses are also presented.  These hypotheses, or grounded theory 
statement of relationships, are useful in predicting behavior-volatility connections in capital 
investment deals.  Third, bureaucracy in CBT is connected to classical comparative theorists 
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and others who place collaborative behavior and structures in bureaucratic theory.  The 
collaborative property is set forth as the special CBT bureaucratic attribute, largely shaped by 
IAD environmental variables.  Classical comparative scholars and others are referenced to 
demonstrate collaboration has always been a tenet of bureaucratic literature, but in CBT it 
moves to a more prominent position.   
Fourth, the chapter moves from connecting literature and CBT to connecting CBT to 
data in the investigation.  The MITAF case is presented as an analytic specimen.  Framed by 
IAD, the presentation discusses MITAF’s shaping by environmental variables:  MFI regulation, 
informal economy, and rules.  Also, MITAF participants are set.  The presentation serves as the 
back-drop for an ensuing discussion utilizing CBT to view data linkages between behavior and 
capital volatility.  The theory’s three defining properties are detailed in terms of their attributes 
and dimensions, drawing on evidence from the analysis.  CBT is a policymaking tool for 
examining capital investment deals to understand linkages between capital volatility and 
organizational behavior.  The more linkages are understood, the better volatility constraining 
measures can be developed.   
7.1 A NEW LENS: CASHFLOW BUREAUCRATIC TRIAD THEORY OVERVIEW 
A substantive theory explaining the linkages of organizational behavior and capital flow in 
MITAF was developed in this investigation using data, not applying theories in the literature to 
the data.  Although existing theories explain the phenomena in part, no one theory or framework 
of theories was located that explicated the diverse variance found in the MITAF case.  External 
factors, individual organizational imperatives, collaborative commitments, and the structure of 
MITAF as a project are all components often seen in providing public services; however, this 
combination in one project has been rather infrequent.  In 2003 MITAF was formed as the first 
sector development approach project of UNCDF with UNDP and KfW.  It was an ambitious, 
adventuresome undertaking given environmental factors, a nascent microfinance sector, and 
administration required by this collaborative structure (2011).  The complexity and 
interconnectedness observed in MITAF deals held the key to making sense of linkages between 
behavior and capital volatility. 
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The explanatory power of coalescing and colliding (i.e., interacting) in CBT theory, 
presented above, provides clarity to complexity and interconnectedness in a manner similar to 
how atomic theory taught in U. S. high schools clarified relationships of interacting matter (Scott 
& Davis, 2003; H. Simon, 1996; 1960; Strauss & Corbin, 1998).  Remember that in Einstein’s 
theory of Special Relativity (i.e., E=mc2), he predicted the amount of energy physical matter 
would be equated to if it could be converted to energy.  All physical matter is comprised of 
various combinations of elements.  Each element consists of many identical atoms.  An atoms’ 
structure is unique to each element.  For example, gas is different from diamonds.   The 
structure includes specific combinations of three elementary particles:  electronically neutral 
neutrons and positively charged protons, which make up a nucleus, surrounded by the 
negatively charged electrons.  Modern atomic theory utilizes quantum mechanics to explain how 
these atoms act/interact.  Quantum mechanics is a particularly appropriate simile because, like 
the combination of coalescing and colliding found in the MITAF case, it provides explanations 
that seem to be irrational.  These are not considered flaws of the theory, but how matter 
behaves when examined at a subatomic level; typical concepts involving energy and motion do 
not apply the same.  For example, traditional concepts cannot explain superconductivity.57  
In more basic terms, juxtapose the linkages in this investigation with the linkages 
between a river and conglomerate rock utilizing atomic theory.  Atoms represent the three 
properties of CBT; each property is a different atom.  Consequently, CBT is more like a mixture 
(e.g., conglomerate rock) than a compound (e.g., crayon) as the CBT properties can operate 
distinctively.  Like the atom’s elementary particles—positive, negative, and neutral—there are 
tendencies in CBT properties relative to capital flow.  Positive or negative proclivities toward 
capital disbursement were found in the accountability and EEI properties.58  In other words, 
properties have tendencies to constrain or enable disbursements.   
Numerous considerations—such as stakeholders’ evaluation, particulars of the deal, 
circumstances related to a tranche’s disbursement, and individual organization characteristics—
factor into constraining tendencies embedded in a CBT property that attach to a particular 
disbursement.  This is similar to positively charged atoms transferring from conglomerate rock 
                                                
 
57 Superconductivity is the state of no electrical resistance in certain material below a certain temperature, 
without gradual reduction in resistance before that temperature.  
58 Like neutrons, the collaborative property is neutral in MITAF and defines the collaboration/cooperation 
feature (Standard Treasury of Learning, 1960; UNCDF, 2004b).   
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into a river.  Not only does the conglomerate rock change the flow of the river, but the river 
changes the conglomerate rock (i.e., positively charged atoms, ions, transfer from the rock into 
the water).  The linkage between the rock and the river illustrates the linkage between behavior 
and capital flow in this investigation.  Linkages that reflect constraining tendencies are visible in 
deals with MFIs possessing different strengths.  For example, financial performance as an EEI 
attribute tends to enable deal disbursements involving a financially strong MFI, while 
accountability to government stakeholders tends to enable deal disbursements involving a 
community focused, financially weak MFI.   
Complexity is added to deal disbursement tendencies in CBT properties when quantum 
mechanics theory is introduced.  For instance, the irrationality of quantum mechanics may be 
found in CBT explanations about donors relaxing disbursement conditions.  Donors accept 
lower MFI OSS and FSS as a condition for disbursement and this can result in MFI improving 
OSS and FSS performance59 because the MFI employs disbursed capital to hire additional staff 
and improve outreach.  Staff and outreach improve performance by increasing interest income 
from more loans, and control PaR through increased staff attention to constraining defaults.  
Relaxing OSS and FSS disbursement conditions may be perceived as an irrational act in efforts 
to improve microfinance institution OSS and FSS performance.  Understanding how behavior 
and capital volatility affect each other is aided by the three properties, defining components of 
CBT bureaucracy, even when actions seem unrelated.  
7.2 CBT THEORY:  THREE AUTONOMOUS CONNECTED PROPERTIES  
From IC approval of an MFI investment package numerous, diverse, and complex 
organizational actions/interactions occurred that were linked to capital flow.  Beginning with 
written notice of approval provided to the MFI by the apex, through and until the last tranche of 
capital was disbursed, there were complex interactions between organizational behavior and 
capital flow.  Some behaviors assisted timely capital flow, some delayed capital flow.  Others 
                                                
 
59Remember that Operational Self-Sustainability (OSS) and Financial Self-Sustainable (FSS) are 
organizational performance measurements computed by dividing the total revenue by total cost, and total 
revenue divided by total adjusted cost (inflation + subsidized cost of funding + in-kind subsidies) 
respectively.  PaR (portfolio-at-risk) is a loan portfolio payment default measure.  It normally involves 
balances with payments over 30 days late.   
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caused premature capital flow.  The variance in time is volatility.  The linkages between 
organizational behavior and capital volatility are explained by bureaucracy expressed as three 
interconnecting properties: collaboration; accountability; and effectiveness, efficiency, and 
responsiveness/impact.  CBT theory defines bureaucracy as: structures and processes 
employing collaboration to accountably serve the public effectively, efficiently, and responsively. 
Grasping this autonomous connected aspect (Coleman & Tangermann, 1999) is 
essential to understanding bureaucracy in CBT, and how properties function in CBT.  
Properties, like atomic elements, are not exclusive to a mechanism.  Accountability is found in 
market mechanisms and organizational mechanisms.  Furthermore, properties are not to be 
viewed as a dichotomous variable.  Rather, CBT properties are similar to ratio variables with a 
range of dimensions.  Observing different properties of bureaucracy at different dimensions 
does not make the observed something different than bureaucracy, just a different expression.  
CBT assists this observation by better enabling close examination. When examining matter at 
the quantum level—the smallest, undividable unit—observations not visible at lower levels of 
magnification are seen.  Similarly, CBT theory examines behavior-volatility linkages at the most 
basic levels, which is argued to be the three CBT properties, and finds explanations overlooked 
or undetected at higher levels. 
7.2.1 CBT property attributes 
The three properties of CBT are briefly described below.  The attributes provided reflect 
variances on a spectrum. 
• Bureaucracy of Collaboration. This property provides for, and challenges, group 
commitment and individual organizational restraint.  It involves coordinating resources in 
the context of tensions between individual organizational imperatives and collaborative 
commitment.  It also requires flexibility to accommodate  wide variation in goals.  
Effective coordination of complexity is important.  The art of compromise through 
balance of power is important.  Getting a given task done by utilizing any combination of 
several processes without one single authority is a challenge.  For a transaction-intense 
industry such as financial services, where clear lines of authority and consistency in 
process are norms, this flexibility, complexity, and balancing power is problematic. MFIs 
work together to develop sector capacity and control losses.  The TSP works with 
donors, MFIs, Bank of Sierra Leone, and other resource providers, including consultants, 
to support IC investment activity and develop the sector on three levels:  micro, meso, 
and macro.  Donors make investment disbursement decisions by working together to 
comply with collaborative commitments, while remaining true to their respective 
organizational missions. 
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• Bureaucracy of Accountability. The attributes of serving with, and resisting, 
managerial oversight, governance, transparency, and various stakeholders constitute 
the accountability property.  It often involves both top-down pressure and bottom-up 
pressure from various stakeholders.  For example, disbursements to MFIs are tied to 
satisfying conditions, which involve pressure from MITAF to improve financial 
performance while communities are pressured MFIs for deeper, broader access to 
financial resources.  As goals vary so too do the results.  In the process, accountability 
becomes less clear. 
• Bureaucracy of Effectiveness, Efficiency, and Impact. Those features designed to 
produce quality outcomes at the least cost are challenged by forces pursuing greater 
equality and broader, deeper access to financial services.  Pursuing effectiveness, 
efficiency, and responsiveness/impact by utilizing any one of several processes without 
one single authority is a challenge.  In this collaborative setting of shifting prevailing 
coalitions, whoever sets the goals determines the measurement of performance (e.g., 
effectiveness, efficiency, impact). 
Bureaucracy, as defined by these three properties, interacts with capital flow, shaping and being 
shaped like three-element conglomerate rock in a river.  MITAF participants acted 
bureaucratically to create, and respond to, capital flow; this determined the amount of delay and 
condition of the MFI at disbursement.  The value of capital is a function of the level of volatility 
and MFI condition at the time capital is disbursed.  Capital volatility is determined by the 
interaction of three bureaucracy defining properties.  
There are not three different bureaucracies, but three properties of CBT bureaucracy.  
The concept is similar to triadic chords in music theory where three distinct notes combine as 
the substance of functional harmony.  The properties are not only separate and distinct, but 
overlap in practice.  Property relationships are illustrated in Figure 9, which presents the CBT 
model.  Relationship overlap is portrayed where the hexagons occupy common space.  The 
property hexagons are designed to be applied in three dimensions:  x and y axes portray 
pro/anti collaborative dimensions (y-axis), and alignment with individual imperatives (x-axis); 
individual relative layer indicates weight (upper level more weight, lower level less weight), and 
overlap reflects alignment of properties relative to collaboration and individual organizational 
imperatives.  The properties operate like collinear variables; their combined contribution is not 
merely derived by addition.  This overlap reflects the complexity and duality of a number of 
behaviors and characteristics of capital flow.  Moreover, the Bureaucracy of Collaboration is the 
property where only the MITAF project is represented.  This property’s absence from the 
interconnection of the other two reflects bureaucratic dimensions within, rather than between,  
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participant organizations.  In essence, it is behavior outside of MITAF with unique costs and 
benefits.  CBT theory acknowledges behavior outside the collaborative; however, such 
behavior’s capital value effects are not postulated.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9:  Linkages Theory—Capitalflow Bureaucratic Triad. 
Bureaucracy, as defined by these three properties and as illustrated in Figure 9, 
interacts with capital flow, shaping and being shaped like three-element conglomerate rock in a 
river.  River and rock properties, as explained earlier, grow and strike together to change not  
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only the flow of the river, but the chemical composition of both the river and the rock. Similarly, 
MITAF participants acted bureaucratically to create, and in response to, capital flow; thereby 
determining the amount of delay and MFI condition at disbursement.   
7.2.2  CBT statement of relationships: Hypotheses   
This investigation’s approach to grounded theory used the triad of analytical operations to 
identify preliminary hypotheses that evolved in developing an integrated theory connecting 
actions to capital flow.  For instance, theoretical memos were used to record observed concept 
linkages early in the deductive process.  Strauss and Corbin (1998) explain that the 
“relationships that connect major concepts” are typically “woven into the text” of the report (p. 
213).  They opine that “linkages are unlikely to be presented as a listing of hypotheses or 
propositions” (p. 270).  That said, a brief summary is provided in this section to consolidate 
major relationships (i.e., hypotheses) observed by utilizing numbering that corresponds to that in 
Figure 9.  This summary can be used with CBT theory’s complete presentation herein to serve 
policymaking in different contexts.  These hypotheses are central to CBT bureaucratic theory, 
and relate to an evolving tradition that explains bureaucratic behavior in public organizations, 
which is useful in understanding linkages between behaviors and capital flow volatility.  
In CBT theory capital flow and its volatility were operationalized as variability in 
disbursement timing of each tranche from the time a deal was approved by the IC and as 
measured against the structure of the deal and MITAF espoused disbursement rules.  Capital 
volatility is a byproduct of behavior involving all participant organizations:  donors, apex, and 
MFIs.  Behavioral factors included developing and satisfying disbursement conditions (including 
MFI condition at disbursement); donor bureaucratic activity; participants’ routine response to 
daily business events; and strategic, premeditated actions in response to perceived problems 
linked with volatility.  CBT is a lens to view these factors and their linkages to capital 
disbursement with its associated volatility.  As such, it is a descriptive theory to inform making 
sense of relationships between behavior and volatility in order to better attack the problem. 
Moreover, the model can also be used to predict volatility in certain contexts.  Major 
relationships forming CBT are provided below: 
1) Collaborative participants agreeing on a tranche disbursement’s disposition will account 
for observed capital volatility. This is without regard to external stakeholders’ interests or 
their EEI definition and measurement, especially when different from the collaborative. 
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However, linkages between capital volatility and organizational behavior vary in 
dimensions deal-by-deal/package-by-package.   
2) Capital volatility of a deal is affected by participant organizations’ internal accountability 
tactics and strategies, including competitive considerations; regardless to whether it is 
prior or pursuant to a request for disbursement by the collaborative.   
3) Stewardship of mission and resources in a financial sustainability manner is required for 
sustained financial sector effectiveness, efficiency, and responsiveness to the target 
population (impact).   
4) Where bureaucratic behavior and capital disbursement involves all three properties, 
linkages with volatility are clear and agreed upon.  Participants—MFIs, apex, and 
donors—have found balance between their respective organizational interests and the 
collaborative.  Power is balanced by participants making credible commitments.  
5) An organization’s collaborative commitment reflects the interest(s) of its most powerful 
stakeholder(s) at the time of capital disbursement; perhaps deal-by-deal/package-by-
package. 
6) An organization’s collaborative commitment is affected in capital disbursement 
considerations by the degree they have power to influence the collaborative definitions 
and measures of effectiveness, efficiency, and impact to align with their own. 
7) Capital volatility of a deal is affected by participant organizations’ internal definitions and 
measures of EEI combined with reflecting the interest(s) of its most powerful 
stakeholder(s).  This is without regard to alignment with collaborative definitions and 
measures. 
These statements of relationships, though not comprehensive, represent central 
hypotheses of CBT and were observed during the investigation.  For example, Hypothesis 1 
suggests that when the apex, donors, and an international MFI agree, as participants in a deal, 
there will be clarity on the action to be taken.  Consequently, behavior-volatility linkages will 
evident.  This clarity is not affected by the beliefs of other MFIs or the central bank. 
According to Hypothesis 2, MFIs with key stakeholders valuing social outcomes over 
financial performance may show leniency to people in default.  Moreover, MFIs with a mission of 
providing credit to marginalized people may accept more credit risk than deemed consistent 
with sustainable operations. The target population holds MFIs accountable by selecting to do 
business with MFIs that most align with their needs.  As such, competition is considered an 
accountability mechanism for MFI customer stakeholders. 
Competition as an accountability mechanism may be foreign to some public organization 
researchers; however, it is found in public organization and business literature.  Literature 
discusses public organizations where “accountability to the market” is expressly used to explain 
how citizens choose between government alternatives, describing the alternatives as competing 
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to be selected by citizens (Adler, 2003, 2006).  Government interjurisdictional competition is 
described as an external “mechanism for accountability” (e.g., IAD external environment) where 
citizens can exercise Hirschman’s choice of exit (Bardhan & Mookherjee, 2006). 
The accountability relationship between government and business is addressed in the 
literature.  One researcher examined the regulator-business relationship, arguing that 
accountability is turned upside down as governments compete for foreign direct investment 
(FDI) from transnational corporations (TNC).  Competition for TNC’s FDI makes the government 
accountable to TNCs through the market for their FDI (Koenig-Archibugi, 2004).   
Markets are a context external to MFI organizations functioning as capital delivery 
mechanisms for poor people (i.e., financial services sector).  Competition is viewed by many in 
economics as a market structure with properties (Perloff, 2007).  From this perspective 
competition is a mechanism.  It also answers the three key accountability questions:  
accountable for what, to whom, and how.  Competition has been useful to customer 
stakeholders for holding businesses accountable for responsive practices by choosing to exit 
and select another provider. 
MITAF explicitly included in its formation document (Programme Support Document) the 
goal of donors working together by investing in deals to support the government coordinating 
“activities in the micro-finance sector in order to avoid duplication and over-subscription” 
(UNCDF, 2004b, p. 6).  Competition was viewed as a device to aid this avoidance by MITAF 
controlling investment capital, which is evidenced in MITAF Narrative Reports.  It aligns with the 
work of Coase and Simon explaining that organizations are preferred over markets for much 
economic activity (Coase, 1937; H. Simon, 1996).  MITAF was a powerful actor in shaping the 
structure of MFI competition, including competition for donor investment capital. 
 Hypothesis 3 contains a controversial concept as an explanation of behavior-volatility 
linkages when viewing powerful actors in MITAF.  Stewardship is the antithesis of the node self-
interest that emerged in data fragmentation and re-aggregation.  Some scholars view 
stewardship as a normative construct and, therefore, problematic as an explicator and predictor.  
However, the relationship between stewardship and high performance organizations is found in 
organizational theory literature.  In a world of limited resources, effective, efficient, and 
responsive financial service provision to the poor necessitates that MFIs perform at high levels 
to operate sustainably.  MITAF data underscore that stewardship is related to sustainability and 
volatility levels.  The volatility proclivity of the EEI property, however, can vary by deal.  For 
example, donors/programs that value effective service delivery and responsiveness to targeted 
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populations over efficiency will possess proclivities toward disbursing to MFIs similarly inclined, 
notwithstanding weak OSS and FSS performance.  On the other hand, proclivities will be the 
opposite where organizations value OSS and FSS performance over social outcomes.         
Stewardship theory is central to the EEI property that is foundational to Hypothesis 3 
because it focuses on participant alignment of beliefs regarding mission and performance.  As 
the literature explains, stewardship theory is based on behavior motivated by goal alignment, 
rather than self-interest (Davis, Schoorman, & Donaldson, 1997).  Stewardship theory literature 
relates identification with organizational mission.  Sustainability in stewardship theory assumes 
collaboration with organizations embracing similar visions.  Credible commitments and trust are 
integral to stewardship theory.  Moreover, stewardship theory literature explains behavior seeks 
achievement at the highest level of collective commitment, thus satisfying most of the group.   
Stewardship theory has not been studied extensively beyond the seminal work of Davis 
and his colleagues (Davis et al., 1997; Van Slyke, 2005).  This accounts in part for its limited 
use in explaining organizational behavior and related controversy.  One frequently cited 
empirical study in the literature looked at questions related to New York government agency 
contracting with nonprofit organizations for service delivery and the applicability of agency 
theory and stewardship theory (Van Slyke, 2005).  The theories were found to be 
complementing, not opposing.  In addition, it was suggested that length of relationship was 
particularly important to government agencies embracing stewardship views while nonprofit 
executives normally approached the relationship from a stewardship posture.  
Stewardship concepts were operationalized in the Global Leadership and Organizational 
Behavior Effectiveness Research program (GLOBE), which added to the body of leadership 
knowledge by focusing on cross-cultural interactions (see Appendix J).  GLOBE utilized a theory 
driven approach to develop question items to assess leadership values and practices across 
nations (Hanges & Dickson, 2004).  Factor analysis was used to develop six factors that 
describe universal patterns of leadership traits and behaviors.  The six factors were based on 21 
factors, or subscales, describing specific leadership traits and behaviors.  Table 9 provides 
some of the terms respondents rated regarding their importance to outstanding leadership 
(GLOBE, 2006).  Concepts expressed in these terms are integral to stewardship theory and 
thought. 
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Table 9:  Stewardship concepts contained in GLOBE survey. 
Self-Sacrificial Foregoes self-interests and makes personal sacrifices in the 
interest of a goal or vision. 
Collaborative Works jointly with others. 
Group-Oriented Concerned with the welfare of the group. 
Loyalty Encourages group loyalty even if individual goals suffer. 
Consultative Consults with others before making plans or taking action. 
Effective Bargainer Is able to negotiate effectively, able to make transactions with 
others on favorable terms. 
 
Hypothesis 4 represents the ideal from MITAF’s perspective.  All three properties have 
equal weight, are in alignment relative to the collaboration’s perspective, and have balance 
between individual organizational imperatives and collaborative goals.  However, this does not 
necessarily mean constrained volatility.  For example, all participants may be in agreement on 
targets to disburse capital only to experience MFIs taking longer to achieve the target.  When a 
tranche is expected to be released within 14 days of deal consummation, or within one year of 
consummation, conditions agreed to by all participants may have changed.  Environmental 
conditions at consummation may have been radically different from the environment at the time 
a determination was to made regarding tranche release.    At this later point the alignment may 
no longer exist.  For example, environmental changes may have contributed to lower than 
expected MFI outreach growth and OSS.  The MFI may believe this necessitates a wavier and 
leniency to provide support during a difficult period, while the investor may contend 
accountability to stakeholders necessitates a more careful use of investment capital.  The state 
of properties with equal weight, alignment, and balance constrains volatility when beliefs and 
actual performance are aligned. 
The assertion of Hypothesis 5 concerns effects of powerful stakeholders including 
instances when they are indifferent.  Deals with powerful stakeholders perceived as indifferent 
often spawn a collaborative commitment by the organization that can have low costs and high 
value.  This value includes securing other benefits (e.g., progress on donor/apex disbursement 
quotas) and support of other stakeholders.  Organizational self-interest was at times a central 
driver with MITAF participants.  Moreover, external evaluation of the collaborative project can 
affect the amount of capital and number of deals approved, as well as the volatility of capital 
flow pursuant to those deals.  Cooperation was enhanced during the mid-term evaluation.  
External evaluation may be viewed as a single stakeholder, though many stakeholders use the 
work product.  It is important to note MITAF seemed to respond to the approaching evaluation 
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with behavior not directly addressing a specific performance measurement; MITAF entered 
deals and disbursed capital.  Underlying performance measures is the understanding “it’s about 
the money.”   
  Hypothesis 6 asserts that an organization’s collaborative commitment is affected by its 
ability to influence the group and may come as no surprise.  However, it is noteworthy that 
greater variances between MITAF and a donor results in a higher likelihood of de facto denial 
deals.  Disbursement conditions that are likely to take a long time for an MFI to satisfy are the 
chief characteristics of de facto denial type deals.  Rather than be on the record as vetoing an 
MFI capital investment proposal, an MFI that significantly deviates from the IC member’s EEI 
definition may be subject to certain MITAF disbursement policies that, in effect, relegates the 
deal to denial status.  That is, the MFI condition is so far from disbursement conditions that 
MITAF disbursement expectations will not be satisfied (e.g., first tranche within 14 days, annual 
disbursements).  As such, it will officially appear as if the disbursement was delayed to the MFI 
because it failed to satisfy disbursement conditions.  For resource dependent MFIs it is 
important to have a non-collaborative capital source (e.g., donor), such as an international 
organization partner/sponsor to which they are accountable.   
CBT theory is expressed in relations that link key concepts found in the investigation 
data.  There are numerous relationships accounted for in CBT, including the seven key 
hypotheses presented above.  These seven hypotheses are not comprehensive or sufficient in 
themselves to apply CBT.  However, they are helpful in understanding the nature of CBT 
concepts used to explain behavior-volatility linkages and develop approaches to constrain 
volatility.  Guidance in applying CBT to empirical and theoretical data is provided later in the 
chapter.  Foundational to grasping CBT and applying the model is the central organizing 
concept discovered in MITAF data:  bureaucracy.   
7.2.3 Bureaucracy in CBT:  Structure, collaboration, and authority 
CBT theory is comprised of principles expressed in statements of concept relationships (i.e., 
hypotheses) to make sense of bureaucratic actions and outcomes.  Numerous definitions of 
bureaucracy have developed over the years.  Many came to define it by its misuse and 
associated destructive behaviors.  The word has been used to label abuse of rules and 
innovation torpor and lethargy. Bureaucracy has come to be identified with inertia, 
ineffectiveness, inefficiency, and dehumanization.  Many years ago this was not the case.  Nor 
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was it necessarily reflected in this MITAF case study.  CBT theory defines bureaucracy as 
structures and processes employing collaboration to accountably serve the public effectively, 
efficiently, and responsively.  
7.2.3.1 Classical bureaucracy and CBT bureaucracy  
Bureaucracy in public organizations was a response to special interests’ power and favoritism, 
especially in late 19th century United States (Kettl, 2007).  Bureaucracy was understood as an 
administrative approach that emphasized clear lines of hierarchal authority and was 
impersonally exercised.  Rule-governed actions executed by competent experts were used to 
ensure consistency in performance and equitable treatment.  Bureaucracy involved defining the 
task, breaking it into each of its parts, and matching skills to what needed to be accomplished.  
This included staffing based on competency, and decision making based on the most efficient, 
most effective options.  Skilled management and staff were delegated responsibility and given 
parameters to employ their talent.  Responsibility and accountability were hierarchical with a 
clear line of authority.  A “single source of final authority” was deemed to be “elementary to good 
organization,” and residence of authority was required to “be in the clearest terms” (White, 1939, 
pp. 45, 46).  Bureaucratic hierarchical structures were deemed to be universally applicable to all 
organizational settings.  In fact, bureaucracy in its basic form is still the organizational skeleton 
preferred by organizations, public and private, all over the world (Barzelay, 1992; Hummel, 
2008; Picard & Buss, 2009; H. Simon, 1996).  This section places CBT bureaucracy in the 
comparative bureaucratic literature and establishes collaboration as the distinguishing 
bureaucratic attribute in the CBT theory.  Next, bureaucratic characteristics are briefly discussed 
in the context of different scholars and U.S. history.  
The traditional view of bureaucracy only partially fits the MITAF experience.   As a result, 
a more contemporary, complex theory of bureaucracy is used to view the activity in MITAF and 
understand capital volatility.  CBT theory is consistent with the open system perspective of 
environments shaping organizations (e.g., loosely-coupled systems); however, this investigation 
connects actions with not only process but structures (Scott & Davis, 2003).  Also, Bernard’s 
“executive responsibility”60 and cooperative systems concept is incorporated (Barnard, 1938).  It 
should be noted that MITAF’s distinctive project collaborative structure does not possess 
                                                
 
60 Bernard considers a distinguishing characteristic of executive duties the creation of moral commitments 
to the collaboratively developed goals, which includes constraining individual imperatives (Barnard, 
1938). 
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traditional hierarchal characteristics used to delegate authority in creating a “working system” 
(Barnard, 1938, pp. 231, 232). CBT bureaucracy is viewed as possessing three defining 
properties:  collaboration; accountability; and effective, efficient operations that result in positive 
outcomes for the poor (impact).   
7.2.3.2 CBT behavior in bureaucratic tradition   
CBT explains capital flow volatility and is a theory of bureaucratic behavior.  Linkages of capital 
volatility with behavior are central to the investigation because these linkages are 
underdeveloped in volatility literature.  Bureaucracy was used by diverse MITAF participants to 
describe behaviors and processes explaining disbursement volatility.  At the same time, MITAF 
clearly had strong collaborative attributes.  Bureaucracy in MITAF built upon the evolving work 
of an international perspective of bureaucratic tradition.  MITAF’s contemporary, complex theory 
of bureaucracy is drawn from an evolving tradition explaining bureaucratic behavior in public 
organizations.  CBT’s distinction from popular views of bureaucracy is primarily observed in the 
collaborative property, which is examined by comparative bureaucratic theorists and others. 
Comparative bureaucratic literature classifies bureaucracy utilizing committees that 
operate with equal participants as collegial bureaucratic elite systems (Armstrong, 1973; 
Crozier, 1964; Heady, 2001).  John Armstrong (1973) explains how colonial administrators 
utilized a collegial bureaucratic mechanism influenced by cultural factors, such as team work 
encouraged by Oxford College.  Armstrong portrays administrative officials collaborating to 
avoid bureaucratic constraining behavior.  He also draws on restraint by Treasury officials to 
illustrate allowing other committee members to take leadership, rather than employing financial 
leverage to control decision making.  Armstrong and other classical comparative analysis 
scholars underscore a varied understanding of functional bureaucracy, which includes 
collaborative behaviors, while cautioning those unable to imagine bureaucratic principles other 
than their own.  For example, Crozier (1964) refers to research by English social psychologist 
Stephen Richardson who explored task organization, human interaction patterns, and authority 
relationships.  Crozier contends that a superficial reading of Richardson’s article may result in 
overlooking important differences between French and American bureaucratic behavior.  He 
illustrates this by underscoring Americans cooperating with greater ease, comparatively 
minimizing the need for centralization.    
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Cooperation as a central property of bureaucracy in CBT theory is consistent with the 
work of Herbert Simon and Donald Kettl.  Simon (1997), and later Kettl (2007), contend that all 
organizations practically employ some level or type of bureaucracy.  Kettl connects 
bureaucracy, coordination, and hierarchy for contemporary public organizations.  He notes that 
“Administration is about coordination….Hierarchy and authority cannot and will not be 
replaced….Hierarchy and authority provide enduring strategies for both coordination and 
accountability” (p. 168).  He further explains that hierarchy defines responsibilities, and authority 
provides for accountability.  Hierarchy and authority are applied to achieve efficiency and 
responsiveness in skilled bureaucratic behavior.  However, Kettl explains hierarchy and 
authority are not fragmented in high performing bureaucracies.  Collaboration is an integral 
connector. 
    Simon studied bureaucratic behavior by exploring influences, which includes authority 
incorporating collaboration as a key function.  Authority is one of two modes of influence Simon 
examines. In addition to providing organizations formal structure, Simon explains authority 
serves to achieve coordination.  He suggests that authority used to make decisions when 
agreement cannot be reached is overemphasized.  For Simon, collaborative behavior is 
distinguished by agreement, not efficiency, effectiveness, or responsiveness.  Behavior 
pursuant to believing the authority serves higher performance, and the performance is valued.  
It does not portray authority as disparaging.  Furthermore, Simon argues that, with support from 
psychological evidence, creative and fulfilling behavior is most likely in a setting with the 
appropriate level of structure.  Collaboration is a property of bureaucracy and a key authority 
function, where authority and structure (e.g., hierarchy) are operationally understood to include 
informal relations. 
Simon and others contends that the formal does not experience high performance 
without the informal (Barnard, 1938; Blau, 1963; H. A. Simon, 1997).  These aspects are not two 
organizations, but communication and interpersonal relations within the same organization.  He 
sees the formal encouraging development of the informal to serve high organizational 
performance, such as fostering an environment of cooperation.  Communications and 
interpersonal relations not accounted for by formal hierarchy and authority (but occurring within 
the organization) are not lost in the operational understanding of bureaucratic structure and 
behavior. 
Behavior outside formal relations has been ignored by narrower views of bureaucracy; 
however, it has long been considered by many administrative theorists (Barnard, 1938; Blau, 
1963; H. A. Simon, 1997).  According to Peter Blau, Weber’s bureaucracy of structure, rules, 
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and efficiency did not reflect his unquestioned understanding that behavior did not always 
conform to the formal.  Blau describes Weber’s bureaucracy as devoid of important operational 
aspects.  Weber did not rigorously explore this phenomenon, according to Blau, and therefore 
did not give attention to the resultant organizational learning.  Blau contends nonconformity is 
not revelatory or particularly interesting.  More importantly, he draws on Barnard to argue 
informal behavior serves organizational learning and intelligence.  Both formal and informal 
communication and interpersonal relations are integral to bureaucratic performance. 
   When MITAF performance was observed to examine capital volatility, formal and 
informal bureaucratic behavior were found to represent scales and incorporated into CBT 
properties.  Formal relationships and behavior are expressed in terms of hierarchy and authority 
in various official documents.  Informal relationships and behavior are captured in the data 
collected by this investigation.  Foundational to bureaucratic behavior and structure expressed 
by interview subjects is the collaborative communication, relations, and design of MITAF.  
7.3 MITAF :  A CASE OF ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR LINKED TO CAPITAL FLOW 
The MITAF case portrays how organizational actions/interactions pursuant to capital investment 
deals related to capital volatility.  Capital investment deals were part of a multi-faceted strategy 
to improve access to financial services for the poor and were in a context shaped by certain 
environmental factors.  Capital disbursements pursuant to deals experienced volatility ranging 
from substantially according to plan and expectations to substantial variance.  The case helps 
make sense of complexity and interconnectedness because, at times, they seemed inconsistent 
with producing capital flows that improved access to financial services.  Case data is viewed 
through the CBT lens to connect defining properties to the data.   
Data supports the claim that government regulation shaped the context where 
organization action/interaction was linked to capital flow from donors to MFIs.  This included 
government activity that created, empowered, and constrained MFI behavior by institution and 
the entire sector.  Specifically, regulatory activity involved monitoring both MFI risk and 
management.  This activity also included access to information about MFIs used to define and 
promote socially accepted behavior by MFIs.   
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Understanding how MFI regulation shaped the context where behavior was linked to 
capital flow also required making sense of its post-conflict and fragile state properties.  In Sierra 
Leone over a decade of civil war depleted and demolished much of the resident intellectual 
capital and bureaucratic infrastructure (Momo et al., 2011).  “Infrastructure has been destroyed, 
institutions have disintegrated, people have fled” (English & Stryker, 2006, p. iv).  Intellectual 
capital and infrastructure is integral to monitoring and reporting on (i.e., regulating) a growing, 
changing, diverse, and expansive MFI sector.  As such, the post-conflict property is closely 
related to the fragile state property.  Limited human capital, scarce financial and material 
resources, and competing national and international priorities can make a fragile-state 
regulatory force one key resignation, or a couple of extended illnesses away, from substantive 
curtailment (Duval & Bendu, 2009; Miamidian & Khalaf, 2009).  The threat of renewed conflict is 
another factor that helps shape the context where action/interaction is linked to capital flow. 
Of civil wars that reignite, a substantial number do so within 10 years of achieving 
peace.  Armed conflict constrains government regulatory effectiveness.  Sierra Leone has the 
unenviable distinction of hosting the largest UN peacekeeping force in history (Momo et al., 
2011).  Collapsing back into violence has significant ramifications for not only regulatory 
effectiveness, but well beyond the 71,740 square kilometers of this tropic nation.  The 
government and donors believed the path to productive engagement, prosperity, and long-term 
peace and stability was accessible, to a large extent, by making financial resources available to 
the population-at-large (Momo et al., 2011).   For many, their life was in the informal economy 
and financial services met them there.   
Understanding the informal economy and its role in shaping the context where 
organizational action/interaction was linked to capital flow is also extremely important.  The 
informal economy is all economic activity not subject to government regulation or taxation.  
Making sense of how the informal economy forms the action/interaction context requires 
comprehending its survival and criminality properties.  People and organizations are motivated 
to survive.  This survival is both literal and ontological.  Ever present are opportunities and 
pressures to engage in illicit activities.  Sierra Leone has a substantial informal economy.  Both 
licit and illicit forces work continually to capture and exploit the informal economy. 
The linkage between organizational action/interaction and capital flow occurs in a 
context formed and shaped by rules.  Rules were conceived, negotiated and agreed upon by 
stakeholders possessing various amounts of power.  Their respective amount of power was a 
174 
 
function of numerous decisions and actions over many decades.  It was also a function of then 
present constraints, urgencies, and resources.  Rules shaped the context by determining what 
was required, forbidden and permitted, as well as entering and exiting the context.  Power 
vested in stakeholders was employed in the use of rules.  Ostrom contends that, “rules are the 
tools…that fallible humans can use to try to change situations to achieve better outcomes” 
(Ostrom, 2005, p. 132).  History’s lessons are stored in modified rules as an imperfect heuristic 
in the hands of fallible people. 
The MITAF project was a context shaped by rules, espoused and working (theories-in-
use) rules, where organizational actions/interactions were linked to capital flow.  One group of 
MITAF participants were MFIs.  Participating MFIs were seen as possessing the best potential 
to lead and serve as a model for the sector.   They were selected by the MITAF Investment 
Committee (IC), as recommended by the apex through application of rules (criteria) for 
selection.  MFIs were broadly defined and have various structures, histories, and organizational 
missions.   
Another set of participants was the IC itself, which was comprised of four donors that 
pledged at least the specific minimum capital amount to the project.  Similar to MFI, donors 
represented various structures, histories, and organizational missions.  These four donors were 
among the leading investors in Sub-Saharan Africa microfinance sectors, measured in terms of 
number of nations and amount of capital. 
The final participant is the apex, or technical service provider (TSP).  The apex 
organization was the functional apparatus of MITAF.  It was charged with achieving broad 
outcomes that at times conflicted. The MITAF collaboration involved different types of 
organizations, based in different nations, from different perspectives, committed to a common 
mission with separate individual missions that, at times, were in conflict with the collaborative 
commitment.     
7.3.1 Properties and dimensions of bureaucracy 
Bureaucracy serves as helpful monocles in making sense of the MITAF collaboration’s 
complexities and interconnectedness.  Bureaucracy, however, has special attributes in MITAF.  
As noted above, this is not our father’s bureaucracy.  Woodrow Wilson, Frank Goodnow, Max 
Weber, Leonard White and others from 1887 through mid-twentieth century provided a 
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bureaucracy best understood by the administrative mechanism being replaced.  Similarly, 
bureaucracy in MITAF took on attributes for this project shaped by particular environmental 
factors (IAD framework exogenous variables).  The uniqueness was primarily found in the broad 
reaching effects of collaboration.  Collaborative attributes at times were the basis for, and 
conflicted with, espoused goals in commercial-based investment decisions where actors had 
political agendas.  Deals pursuant to those investment decisions were observed with a focus on 
organizational behavior and capital disbursement activity.  Fragmentation and re-aggregation of 
text data was combined with capital disbursement data to determine property combinations and 
predominance.  Moreover, observed linkages were viewed as data points for dimensions within 
each property. The logical connection between CBT properties is discussed in the following 
sections.  The attributes of the properties are connected to data, thereby providing the 
underlying case evidence. 
7.3.1.1 Bureaucracy of Collaboration  
The overarching goal of poverty alleviation required MITAF stakeholders to cooperate.  
Specifically, members of the Investment Committee, the apex staff, and MFIs needed to commit 
to the MITAF mission of providing “sustainable access to financial services for poor and low-
income people” (UNCDF, 2004b, p. 6).  At the same time, each organization’s mission was the 
primary compass guiding its work (Kearns, 2000; Picard & Buss, 2009).  MITAF’s effectiveness 
was directly related to its ability to coordinate the complexity of various interests while working 
collaboratively (Barnard, 1938; Gazley, 2010; Kearns, 2000; Kettl, 2007).  Central to this 
coordination was balance of power.  The collaborative property of CBT is the theory’s 
distinguishing aspect that presents an alternative way of viewing bureaucratic authority 
relationships.   
Compromise was important to balance power within MITAF.  Within the IC, compromise 
was important to developing disbursement conditions, notwithstanding policy set forth in various 
documents.  Compromise was important during interactions between IC and the apex, and apex 
maintenance of a “harmonious relationship” with the government and donors; this qualifier was 
not explicitly contained in the Programme Support Document, but an implicit measure within  
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MITAF,  the government, donors, and other stakeholders (UNCDF, 2004b).   Compromise was 
important during interactions between MFI and the apex, as well as between MFIs and donors 
(e.g., loan performance based agreement conditions negotiations).  Often compromise called 
upon one, or all parties, to grant concessions and to be confrontational.   
Efficient, expeditious development of the Sierra Leone microfinance sector, and effective 
investment of public capital, were explicit outcome goals strongly related to donor coordination.  
Donor coordination was deemed necessary to “guarantee” these outcomes (UNCDF, 2004b, p. 
6).  Technically and officially, MITAF was governed by UNDP rules and procedures.  Practically, 
the IC not only worked to coordinate donor investment in Sierra Leone and evaluate investment 
proposals, but functioned as a governance mechanism.  For example, the IC would regularly 
have the TSP give account of activities and provide direction under the broad authority of donor 
coordination.  Yet the awareness that many actions may not have been official, and the practical 
reality that there was not an UNDP authority giving management direction to the project, 
represented a task-performance challenge to effective, efficient, impacting execution.  The 
dimensions of coordination ranged from broad donor activities in the sector to specific MITAF 
program direction, as in coordinating activities in the microfinance sector on the ground in Sierra 
Leone. 
MITAF collaborative partners working to coordinate activities explicitly included 
“Government, Donors, Private Sector (Investors, Commercial Banks, Rating Agencies), MFIs” 
(UNCDF, 2004b, p. 12).   The collaborators in MITAF agreed, by virtue of deciding to partner, to 
perform in line with, and optimally coordinate to advance, the government’s microfinance policy 
(UNCDF, 2004b).  Despite this, mutual agreement is subject to numerous interpretations 
(Barnard, 1938; Ostrom, 2005).  For example, MFIs “largely free from government and political 
interference” may be understood differently by various partners (UNCDF, 2004b, p. 22).  This 
reference to partners agreeing to perform in line with the government microfinance policy 
illustrates the centrality of power in defining performance.  Consider, for instance, how 
government advocacy for domestic MFIs in IC disbursement deliberations was deemed by 
some participants as unwanted political interference and by others as an important 
representative voice,   
Respondent: Yeah. It’s, yeah, it’s true that the advisory committee, under MITAF 1, had 
a veto right which, in my view, and also in the view of [two other IC members], after 
discussions, is, is not consistent of the idea what an advisory committee should 
do…Because the advisory committee is a political forum and we, we do sector, what we 
call sector dialogue within advisory committee forum and talk about the overall 
development of the microfinance sector and relate issues, but there are people from the  
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government and from the Bank of Sierra Leone sitting in the advisory committee in 
MITAF 1, which should not know any details about the submitted investments by 
individual MFIs (Interview 9). 
Below is a perspective of government involvement in MFI submitted investment opportunities, 
which seems to imply there are dimensions where involvement is not interference, 
Investigator: When you run into that type of dynamic at the board meeting [strong 
influence over the direction of a meeting by a committee member], you try to, what’s 
your response to that? How do you, how do you guide the meeting when that kind of 
activity is going on?.... 
 
Respondent 2 :  I think there is also now central bank on the other side.  
 
Respondent:  Yes, central bank. 
 
Respondent 2:  Central bank tries to harmonize that because they try to balance when 
they see there is a lot of swaying this way they will try to put it in the middle, that’s what 
I’ve seen at least. And you find that in most cases they are also pro-local institutions so 
that’s where the balance comes in (Interview 3; Interview 4). 
 
The donor below also refers to the central bank61 as making a positive contribution to the 
meeting, 
…the criterias they have to meet before they can access funding… for some of the local 
MFIs, you know they might need some capacity building in some area and so I see it is 
very relevant because the Bank of Sierra Leone then comes up with these issues that 
look, I mean this is an international MFI. They have the capacity to meet these criterias, 
but we still have our national MFIs who will need to build their capacity (Interview 11). 
More than the specific performance definition, who defines and measure it is a central 
determinant of success.  In MITAF controlling power ranged from gridlock in the early years to 
focusing on benefits from each partner’s strengths and employing resources (including staff 
selection) appropriate for MITAF in the final couple of years.  One donor described IC learning 
as reflecting expressions of distinctiveness and variableness (dimensions),  
[J]oint cooperation of six years and continuous meetings every six months in Sierra 
Leone, physical meetings, I think we learned to understand each other and to come to a 
consensus and to a joint vision of microfinance much better…. And of course, in the 
past, these different approaches or accentuations kind of clashed because we were not 
always of the same opinion, but I would say, that it is for the project and for the  
  
                                                
 
61 Originally a central bank representative chaired the Investment Committee.  In 2008 the project 
document was amended to change the role to chairing a newly created Advisory Committee, with no 
direct participation during Investment Committee deliberations. 
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development of the microfinance sector in Sierra Leone that these different types of 
microfinance development approaches are complimentary to each other and are also 
enriching to each other and are conducive for the overall development in the 
microfinance sector (Interview 9). 
Capital flow was affected by collaborative behavior.  This investigation discovered 
numerous examples.  Empirically MFIs not sharing information about borrowers (e.g., credit 
bureau) resulted in higher defaults and write-offs, which tended to cause disbursements to be 
later than expected in MFI business plans.  This MFI behavior was related to competitive 
pressures, which were also visible in competition for staff.  Such pressures illustrate both the 
limits of collaboration when providing services in a market context and dilatory effects of 
competition (Mollenkamp, 2011; H. Simon, 1996).  In turn, disbursement conditions are not 
satisfied and capital is not disbursed.  Within organization collaboration was illustrated in the 
reference to the donor with other programs in the nation that assisted with monitoring 
developments in client MFIs, which also had potential ramifications for capital disbursements.  
Donors experienced preference constraints by agreeing to use common performance indicators, 
reporting, and performance based agreements (PBA), which simplified processes for MFIs that 
had multiple donors using different formats.  Moreover, collaborative behavior, both within and 
between organizations, affected capital flow.   
Interactions were often permitted but not required of participants.  MITAF worked with 
MFIs to identify specific areas for targeted assistance and resulted in improved financial 
performance and outreach.  MFIs were often not required to participate in MITAF trainings, and 
participation reflected a spirit of collaboration. This enabled MFIs to satisfy disbursement 
conditions and reduce the waiting time for capital investment.   Also, the apex negotiated 
disbursement condition waivers with donors that reduced volatility for MFIs that demonstrated 
improved performance, but had not achieved industry standards.  Similarly, donors negotiated 
directly with MFIs for disbursement conditions more lenient than MITAF policy.  The result was 
disbursed capital with less volatility.  Policies and PBA provisions required first tranches to be 
disbursed within 14 days of PBA consummation and implicitly called for disbursement conditions 
compatible with the nascent MFI sector in Sierra Leone.  In essence, Bureaucracy of 
collaboration is a property that provides insight into how collaboration is linked with capital 
volatility. 
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7.3.1.2 Bureaucracy of Accountability  
The central determinant of success in Bureaucracy of Collaboration is also at the heart of key 
questions involving accountability:  Accountable for what?  Accountable to whom?  Accountable 
how? (Slim, 2002).  Answers to these questions, all related to power positions, determined what 
accountability meant in MITAF.  Dimensions of accountability in almost any setting can range 
from laissez-faire to micro-managing (Derksen & Verhallen, 2008).  MITAF was no different.  
However, making sense of accountability involves considering how various factors and 
dimensions applied to participants.  MITAF partners’ power relative to one another varied 
according to the measurement and mechanism assessing accountability.  Accountability to 
commitments is central to creating the interdependence needed in collaborations.  Making 
sense of accountability is aided by using three factors:  effectiveness, reliability, and legitimacy.  
In Bell’s (2010) article discussing accountability networks, literature on accountability 
mechanisms for nongovernmental organizations is used to develop a comprehensive construct 
helpful in viewing accountability in MITAF.  As pointed out in this construct, core competencies 
and information enhances an organization’s credibility and directly relate to effective service 
deployment (Bell, 2010; Brown & Moore, 2001).  Reliability can be viewed in governance terms, 
such as board composition, financial stewardship, leadership, policies and procedures, and 
others (Jordan, 2005; Kearns, 1996).  Legitimacy factors include “transparency, mission-
focused activities, connection to the community” (Bell 2010, p. 43).  Legitimacy, reliability, and 
effective service deployment provide a robust explanation of accountability when added to 
dimensions of measurement.   
Kearns (1996) explains that dimensions of accountability are explicit and implicit.  For 
instance, explicit standards are found in MFI disbursement conditions.  Implicit standards are 
found in MFIs expecting donors to be moved to faster action as they better understand the 
constraints of providing financial services to a particular population.  Participants in MITAF had 
broad constituencies that occasionally encountered conflicting goals (Dunn, 2010).  As a result, 
goal clarification efforts (e.g., negotiated accountability) reflect the implicit and ill-defined shifting 
characteristics of certain measurements (Kearns 1996; Slim, 2002).  These dimensions of 
accountability and the three factors of accountability combine to provide a comprehensive 
construct:  “serving in accordance with the negotiated explicit and implicit standards for 
effectiveness, reliability, and legitimacy in order to benefit clients, volunteers, employees, 
contributors/donors, and the public” (Bell 2010, 43). 
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Bell’s accountability construct serves as an organizing mechanism in the Bureaucracy of 
Accountability.  For example, in 2006 the mid-term evaluation was an intervening condition 
related to the expeditious consummation and disbursement of many capital investment deals.  
On the other hand, the final evaluation in 2009 did not result in equal effectiveness.   All three 
factors in the construct, according to explicit dimensions of measurement, were going to find 
MITAF broadly coming short at the mid-term evaluation.  The evaluation’s focus, however, gave 
room for the implicit measure of demonstrated learning as a response to cited short-comings:  
“The mid-term evaluation will be forward looking offering lessons learned and recommendations 
to improve programme performance or national policy during the remaining project period” 
(UNCDF, 2004b, p. 10).  The expeditious capital investment activity during the mid-term 
evaluation year and immediately following demonstrates that learning was taking place and 
evidenced in action before the report was released (Thomson, 2010).  The 2009 final 
evaluation, on the other hand, was focused on the changes needed to remedy the continued 
difficulties of MITAF 1.  Owning the discovered on-going difficulties served as evidence in 
support of the proposed new structure.  The dimensions in the final evaluation had an implied 
greater weight on the proposed response (MITAF 2) than on the summative assessment of the 
project that ended (Easterly, 2006). 
Bureaucracy of Accountability and various dimensions were also evident within 
organizations, as opposed to between MITAF participants.  MITAF’s struggle to track and 
account for capital disbursements was fraught with bureaucratic complexity between the TSP’s 
main office in Mexico and a difficult tracking mechanism in Sierra Leone.  UNDP’s 
decentralized, locally responsive bureaucracy illustrated one dimension of accountability, while 
the UNCDF centralized multi-level review and approval process demonstrated another.  In 
addition, MITAF and each donor demonstrated a distinctive ability to consummate deals and 
disburse capital during the year an accountability mechanism was administered (mid-term 
evaluation).  Within-donor organization dimensions are reflected in the following donor’s 
response, 
Person:  Up to which extent you can make decisions that binds [donor] and that’s 
a problem we had. You know you can, you can decide. You can say ok, let’s say 
for example, the [a different donor] is kind of, is, has a rank of director in [the 
different donor]. [Person] can make decisions right away, which is approved by 
the [the different donor] management.  Which is not the case for [donor]…say oh, 
ok, I really would fund this and this because we think that this relevant and it 
makes sense to fund this. Ok? But then, they go back…will say oh, no, no, no, 
we don’t want to fund this…. 
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Investigator: And that sense of uncertainty impacts things.  
 
Person: Impacts, not only impacts things, but impacts also the behavior. If you 
are sitting across from someone from [donors] who fully represents the 
institutions, and you’re not, it doesn’t feel like you can represent the institution, 
you feel, you hesitating. You see? (Interview 6). 
 
Donor representative behavior was also affected by their organization’s accountability 
mechanisms that were perceived to constrain and provide authority.  Given that IC meetings 
discussed new investment opportunities and tranche disbursement decisions, these perceptions 
impacted capital volatility (e.g., hesitating).    
Within organization dimensions also existed in MFIs.  Reporting outreach and financial 
performance data was a type of explicit, effective resource deployment accountability.  MFI 
tactical decisions were observed to be directly tied to outreach and financial performance 
requirements for capital disbursements.  Similarly, MFIs answering credibility and representation 
questions for people in their community when expected capital was not available could be 
considered a type of implicit legitimacy accountability.  As depicted in Figure 9 earlier, 
overlapping accountability with collaboration and effectiveness, as well as viewing behavior as 
acts of accountability alone within the organization, helps make sense of the behavior and 
capital flow in MITAF. 
7.3.1.3 Effectiveness, efficiency, and impact (EEI)   
EEI focuses on results and achievement through good stewardship.  Stewardship is a concept 
central to public organizations, such as governments and NGOs.  It involves judiciously 
employing resources to serve the public interests (Block, 1996; Davis et al., 1997; Meagher et 
al., 2006; Zietlow, Hankin, & Seidner, 2007).  The oft cited work of Peter Block (1996) places 
EEI squarely in the discussion of stewardship, 
Stewardship can be most simply defined as giving order to the dispersion of power (p. 
18)….the spiritual meaning of stewardship:  to honor what has been given to us, to use 
power with a sense of grace, and to pursue purposes that transcend short-term self-
interest (p. 22)….Part of the meaning of stewardship is to hold in trust the well-being of 
some larger entity—our organization, our community, the earth itself.  To hold something 
of value in trust calls for placing service ahead of control…. (p. 41) 
Actions often were directed by effectiveness, efficiency, and impact (or responsiveness), 
expressed as goals and performance measurements.  MITAF focused heavily on explicit 
performance indicators designed into the project and participants were highly responsive to 
these measures, though not always with expected and desired behaviors. Evaluation 
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practitioners acknowledge that some important aspects of program performance are not defined 
a priori (Blakewell, 2007).  Tactics and strategies were developed to guide assigning 
responsibilities with the aim of achieving results.  Consequently, the important question is who 
defines EEI more than what the measures are (Block, 1996; Easterly, 2006).  The answer 
reveals relative power positions.  EEI dimensions have some normative features, ranging from 
impersonal operational assessments to expressions framed by missions, and characterize the 
dual-bottom line tension between commercial performance and social mission. 
Actions within organizations, including tactics and strategies, are an important aspect of 
the EEI property.  Chapters five and six provided examples of actions various participants 
directly related to capital volatility.  These examples were drawn from PBA consummation, MFI 
operations, and donor disbursement processes.  Additional examples of unintended and 
undesired behavior to effectuate EEI are in the data.  According to MFIs, their tactics and 
strategies (behavior) were in response to the incentives of performance indicators incorporated 
in deals as conditions for capital disbursement.  For instance, the MFI below had an improved 
financial self sustainability (FSS) during a quarter in 2010, but an extremely high caseload per 
credit officer, according to official documents,  
FSS [financial self sustainability] improved to 93.03% from 84.71% last quarter and OSS 
[operational self sustainability] is 106.15%, increasing from 103.27% last quarter. The 
increase in FSS is a result of fewer adjustments for TA [technical assistance] as [the 
MFI] received no TA from MITAF this quarter. The high PaR30 is attributed to the high 
case load per loan officer…(MITAF Narrative Report-1st Quarter 2010, p. 7).   
Although the apex attributes the improvement to fewer TA adjustments, the managing director 
of this MFI discussed using the strategy of increasing caseloads to satisfy capital disbursement 
conditions.  There were numerous examples of improved EEI due to MFI operational changes 
implemented through MITAF provided technical assistance.  The MFI below, which received on-
site technical assistance in 2008 and 2009, referred to the resulting procedures, 
Because MITAF, they have provided a lot of facilities for us…We don’t know what 
operational manner or financial manner but they recommended a RTA [resident 
technical assistant] to us who worked with us for almost a year. He put up all this 
assembly (Interview 5 others).   
The resulting organizational intelligence (enhanced performance) withstands tendencies toward 
increased capital volatility. 
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The definition and measure of EEI expresses and reflects power within CBT.  In MITAF, 
and the broader Sierra Leone microfinance sector, the EEI property illustrates the weakness of 
the commercial-political dichotomy contained in the Programme Support Document.  Power 
illuminates aspects of the property’s dimensions when commercial based key performance 
indicators focused on market share and financial performance are juxtaposed to social 
indicators focused on impact to Sierra Leoneans’ quality of life (Kettl, 2007).  Rules that defined 
what was required to be classified as effective, efficient, or impacting were legitimized based on 
stakeholder’s perceptions regarding the relevance of distinctions and importance of 
measurements.  The tensions found in demands for universal treatment while working in an 
environment requiring innovation and contextual adaptation involved judgments by those in 
power (Stone, 2002).   
Judgments resulted in variations in the use of key performance indicators as conditions 
for capital disbursements and were presented in the prior chapter.  Capital investment decisions 
and disbursements in 2006 and 2008 were analyzed utilizing performance criteria espoused and 
included in PBAs compared to actual performance.  The different situational contexts of those 
deals (i.e., mid-term evaluation and PBA consummation) illustrated the power of external 
(transparent evaluation) and internal (a donor participant) forces affecting the linkages between 
behavior and capital flow.  Use of key performance indicators were recognized as expressing 
EEI dimensions as self-interest (self over organization) shrouded as stewardship (organization 
over self) because of MITAF’s structure, 
So institutional, institutional development was, was kind of hindered by, or at the 
expense of…fulfilling the MITAF criteria…(Interview 9). 
I must say that these type of indicators [institutional disbursement conditions] were not 
very often proposed by the TSP. These were the type of things that we came up later 
with a, with making really the contract (Interview 7). 
So let’s say the project document is drafted in 2003, by 2006, the total sector has 
changed, everything has changed. So the TSP sticks with what was asked from him, 
within the document, he would miss a lot of what’s going on. That’s true. That’s true. And 
it happens….But, that’s why they have this midterm review. Ok? So the midterm reviews 
should really, really help fine tune some of the, the, the outcomes. And then, and then, 
so that we can say to the TSP, Ok, now, here are the real outcomes you have to look at. 
But it’s not sufficient, I think….They [donors] will ask him [TSP] and say, ok send us an 
annual report. And the annual report will say ok, we’ve done this, this. For outcome 1, 
this is what we have done. For outcome 2, this is what we have done. But for all the rest 
that are not specifically in the document, the project document, or even in the contract, it 
could be missed….But at the same time, the question is, do you think that as a TSP, 
as…a donor contractor, you could ask the consultant to come up with something that is 
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not in the terms of reference, or …come up with different structuring of the TORs, in 
terms of referencing? That’s, you know. That’s difficult actually (Interview 6). 
This conflict of interest was exacerbated by the fact that the TSP’s contract was 
performance-based and its compensation was contingent upon achieving project targets; 
an inherent tension was created between encouraging PLIs [partner lending institutions-
MFIs] to expand and helping them to build capacity. Further, ambitious project goals 
dictated that the TSP also identify and ensure capacity-building for numerous other local 
recipient institutions at meso and macro levels as well as administer the project overall. 
Fulfilling these multiple roles exceeds the capacity of one consulting firm and contributed 
to limited results at the meso and macro levels (Duval & Bendu, 2009, pp. 9, 10). 
Data reflects a strong awareness and belief that MFI institutional development was inadequate, 
thus threatening MFI sector sustainability, regardless of aggregate measures of outreach and 
financial performance suggesting success.  Thus, the power to define EEI is a substantial 
consideration in researching behavior-volatility connections. 
Linkages between behavior and capital flow volatility can positively impact social 
performance by utilizing bureaucracy, not for replacing social performance as the driver, but as 
a mechanism guided by the same mission (Hummel, 2008).  Mission is about values.  It is an 
expression of values as a statement involving dedicated time, talent, and treasure focused on a 
pursuit or end (Jurik & Cowgill, 2005).  Impact, or a responsive orientation, in human services 
initiatives is distrusting of effectiveness and efficiency due to the danger in focusing on 
achievement without meaning (Thomas, 2008).  Profit without social purpose captures impact to 
masquerade as altruistic when, in fact, success is defined as sustainably operating as 
measured by commercially framed indicators, such as market share in the façade of outreach.  
This aspect of the property reflects dimensions embedded in sustainability-social performance 
ontological tensions.    
The EEI dimensional epicenter focuses on sustainability.  Sustainability, at the core, is 
about reliability and stability.  It has been decided the people of Sierra Leone need reliable 
access to financial services.  Commercial banking institutions are accessible to relatively few.  
“Moneylenders” extract an exorbitant price (Kooi and Tucker 2003, p. 19, 23).  Microfinance 
institutions have proven to be reliable and accessible to many people in developing nations 
throughout the world; however, this requires a certain level of capital and consistently operating 
with revenues exceeding expenses (i.e., profit).  Although the magnitude of capital and profit is 
hotly debated, it is generally agreed by stakeholders from all persuasions throughout the world  
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that both are required for microfinance to provide people reliable, stable access to financial 
services.  MITAF aimed to develop financially sustainable MFIs.  However, it struggled in 
developing strategies to enhance institutional capacity while incorporating trends toward 
industry standards rather than strategies focused exclusively on MFIs reaching industry 
standard targets. 
7.3.2 Viewing MITAF deals through CBT 
CBT theory provides a perspective of behavior-volatility relationships to make sense of 
observations and predicting behavior and volatility in certain contexts.  Aggregation of deals in 
2006 and 2008 are used in this section to apply the theory.  In addition, unique outlier deals are 
used to demonstrate CBT’s limits.  There are three basic questions involved when applying the 
model to capital investment deals: 
• What is the prevailing relative weight of CBT properties? 
• What is the prevailing alignment of the properties relative to: 
o Commitment to collaboration compared to individual organization 
imperatives? 
o Alignment with individual organization imperatives (i.e., degree of 
responsiveness to organization stakeholders and targets of performance)? 
• What are the proclivities toward capital flow in the deal? 
o Relevance and nature of stakeholders’ interest.  
o Deal particulars (e.g., grant or loan; purpose of the investment-operating 
capital, technical assistance, loan capital; conditions for disbursement-
industry standards, condition relative to MFI status). 
o Conditions related to a tranche’s disbursement (e.g., pending external 
program evaluation, any target imperatives of funding source). 
o Individual organization characteristics (e.g., level of MFI dependence on 
MITAF, donor preference for type of MFI, length of relationships). 
o Considering these key factors, utilize a scale with “perform then payment” at 
one end and “payment then perform” at the other.    
The next section demonstrates model use, reflecting analysis presented in the previous chapter. 
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7.3.2.1 2006 deals:  Collaboration, Accountability, EEI 
As mentioned earlier, MFIs not approved for capital investments in 2006 were relegated to 
having fewer deals during MITAF.  MFIs not receiving deals in 2006 had the lowest average 
number of deals of any group not receiving commitments for a year.  Closer examination 
revealed 2006 deals were disbursed quickly:  43.5% disbursed within twelve months, compared 
to 34% for 2009 deals. Volatility was primarily related to self-interested behavior, or the 
stewardship antithesis.  This disbursement observation is associated with accountability. The 
most outstanding difference between 2006 and other years was the MITAF mid-term evaluation, 
which is an accountability mechanism.  The capital investment machine worked to demonstrate 
and create an empirical record that MITAF, as of 2006, was an improved, learning organization.  
Behavior in 2006 proved to be the touchstone illuminating linkages with capital volatility.  CBT 
properties aligned to reflect a primary emphasis on collaboration and accountability, with less 
emphasis on EEI.   
Figure 10:  2006 deals—Collaboration, Accountability, EEI. 
 
CBT properties in practice are separate and distinct, but also overlap. Like two variables 
with interaction effects in measuring dependent variable variance, combined contribution of 
properties is not merely derived by addition.  The overlap reflects the complexity and duality 
observed in interactions involving behavior and capital flow.  The alignment of collaboration and 
accountability is reflected in their overlap in Figure 10.  The respective weight is viewed three 
dimensionally with accountability in the forefront, followed by collaboration, then EEI.  EEI is 
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slightly aligned with accountability-collaboration combination, and slightly with accountability 
without collaboration.  The alignment is reflected by the hexagons relative placement whereas 
the dimension of each property is reflected by placement on the axes.   
The x and y axes are used to reflect the dimension of the property on a range.   
Placement on the y-axis (vertical) reflects location on the collaboration properties scale.  High 
scales represent dimensions of activity relatively more aligned with MITAF, lower dimensions 
represent those relatively less aligned with MITAF.  Placement on x-axis (horizontal) reflects 
location on the scale for accountability and EEI.  These two properties can be observed 
independently of the MITAF collaborative (i.e., individual organizational activity).  The left of the 
scale represents dimensions of activity relatively more aligned with individual imperatives, while 
dimensions on the right represent relatively less responsiveness to individual organizational 
imperatives (e.g., considered not responsive to the organization’s stakeholders).  For all three 
properties the center represents ideal alignment where MITAF and individual participant 
imperatives are the same.   
As described earlier, 2006 deals did not give substantial consideration to MFI 
performance considerations (e.g., MITAF espoused EEI).  However, there was remarkable 
collaboration in consummating deals and disbursing capital.  This was determined to primarily 
be driven by the MITAF mid-term evaluation as an intervening condition.  This explains 
observations of constrained volatility.  Moreover, disbursement deliberations on deals in similar 
conditions (e.g., impending external evaluation, constrained disbursements to-date) with CBT 
properties configured similar to Figure 10 will likely find a bureaucratic mechanism that 
constrains volatility.   This can be stated with greater certainty provided the proclivity of the 
given property, like the relative number of positive and negative charged atom particles, is 
toward disbursement. 
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7.3.2.2 2008 UNDP/YES deals:  EEI, Accountability, Collaboration 
Youth Employment Secretariat (YES), a UNDP program, provided capital used to invest in 50% 
of 2008 MFIs receiving IC approval.  YES capital was invested by UNDP as a MITAF IC 
member.  As explained earlier, deals involving YES capital were distinctive in part because 
there was no evidence of:  
• Delay in PBA consummation,  
• Dispute on disbursement conditions,  
• Post-PBA consummation disbursement delay, or  
• Premature disbursement criticism.   
 
Capital volatility was constrained, and loan portfolio quality improved into 2010.  Figure 11 
presents the model assessing behavior-volatility linkages in 2008 YES deals.  
  
Figure 11:  2008 UNDP/YES deals—EEI, Accountability, Collaboration. 
  
 
Bureaucracy of 
Accountability 
Bureaucracy of  
Effectiveness, 
Efficiency, and 
Impact 
Bureaucracy of 
 
 Collaboration 
189 
 
YES deals reflected an emphasis on individual organizational imperatives, but not to the 
exclusion of collaborative commitment.  The alignment of EEI and accountability is reflected in 
their overlap in Figure 11.  Collaboration also overlaps with EEI-accountability combination, and 
to some degree with EEI without accountability.  There are, however, substantial areas of 
nonalignment.  Viewed three-dimensionally, EEI and accountability are on the same level 
followed by collaboration at a deeper level.  The relatively decreased emphasis on collaborative 
commitment is reflected in the property’s relative level and relative small amount of hexagon 
overlap.   
YES deals were distinct in the EEI property of CBT due to an apparent emphasis on 
program targets different from MITAF and actions taken to be accountable to YES program 
aims.  The YES-MITAF memorandums of Agreement and Understanding were not obtained for 
this investigation.  Nevertheless, evidence of their execution and observed capital flow and 
organizational behavior support the conclusion that each organization agreed to collaborate and 
accept some level of cost (e.g., MITAF accepted industry standards subordinate to YES social 
goals for disbursement decisions, YES accepting MITAF IC process for selection of MFIs 
receiving investment).  Development agencies and the Sierra Leone government considered 
incessant and ubiquitous unemployment among youth a serious threat to stability (UN-Sierra 
Leone, 2008).  Weakness in youth empowerment and employment was considered the greatest 
peril to peace of several concerns identified.  Official documents underscored the importance of 
urgency, “realizing immediate and quick impacts that will help bring visible and tangible peace 
dividends to the population” (UN-Sierra Leone, 2008, p. 2).  The urgency imperative was 
addressed by several initiatives, including the Youth Employment Scheme (a.k.a., Youth 
Employment Secretariat, Youth Enterprise Development, and Empowerment Scheme).  EEI for 
YES shared MITAF’s espoused urgency imperative; however, it also focused on a population 
segment (i.e., youth) and did not give considerable weight to the capital delivery mechanism’s 
capacity to be self-sustainable.   
YES was a three year project created to immediately provide support to existing and 
new businesses owned by young people.  It provided start-up capital, training, and other 
services to empower youth operating in both the formal and informal sectors.  But, as discussed 
before, a central challenge in poverty alleviation efforts was an effective capital delivery 
mechanism.  One such mechanism in Sierra Leone was microfinance institutions.  However, 
microfinance sector was capacity-challenged and also required an appropriate capital delivery 
mechanism.  YES looked to MITAF as an effective capital delivery mechanism for MFIs.  United 
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Nations-Sierra Leone utilized its UNDP membership on the MITAF IC in a strategy to effectively 
and urgently disburse capital to unemployed young people interested in developing businesses.  
It seems MITAF, in turn, accommodated the YES initiative’s definitions and measures of EEI 
while using MITAF’s EEI definition and measures as subordinate criteria in making deals.  More 
importantly to this investigation, it seems MITAF’s EEI was also subordinate in capital 
disbursement decisions.  This subordination is reflected in the model by the collaborative 
property at a lower depth level, overlapping less with the other two properties, lower position on 
the y-axis, and rightward positioning on the x-axis.     
7.3.2.3 Outlier deals 
The collaboration property is the only property where MITAF is represented.  Capital 
disbursements not exhibiting this property reflect bureaucratic dimensions of organizational 
participation in the deal.  That is, MITAF espoused rules had no effect.  Participating 
organizations may share some of the same rules and reflect behavior that would have been 
observed if MITAF was involved.  Such outlier behavior can be modeled with CBT theory and is 
reflected in Figure 12.  Activity outside the collaborative by collaborative-participating 
organizations is not reflected in the collaborative official records.  That said, to the degree 
behavior was outside of MITAF, it had associated costs and benefits.  CBT theory 
acknowledges behavior outside the collaborative (Hypotheses 2, 3, 7); however, such 
behavior’s capital value affects are not postulated.   
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Figure 12:  Outliers—Accountability, EEI, Collaboration 
There were deals consummated outside of MITAF that were attributed to it.  This is 
reflected in Figure 12 by the collaboration hexagon placed low, and to the far right.  Each IC 
member engaged in this activity, though it was rare.  As mentioned earlier, there were capital 
investments made without prior IC approval by an IC member.  Subsequently, the deals were 
added to the MITAF portfolio of commitments and data in official records.  Data is insufficient to 
determine organization disbursement activity with a high level of confidence.  For example, it is 
not clear what role the apex had in determining the MFI’s satisfaction of disbursement 
conditions and request for disbursement of tranche(s).  Official records seem to reflect one deal 
consummation taking no more than 60 days.  Also, records seem to reflect it was fully disbursed 
no later than five months after consummation.  Data at consummation reported the MFI’s PaR 
at more than double industry standards; therefore, it did not conform to MITAF’s financial 
performance standards.  PaR decreased approximately 20% during the following two quarters.  
Also, outreach went down during the quarter of consummation, but increased slightly the 
following quarter.  Data available suggests this outside deal disbursed with low volatility to an 
MFI that did not perform at MITAF’s EEI standards.  The accountability and EEI hexagon 
overlap reflects perfect property alignment, but lack of collaboration overlap and placement low 
and far right indicates the deal was outside of MITAF.  
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Once capital flow leaves the collaboration certain dynamics come into play.  Some 
dynamics are outside the scope of focused analysis in this investigation.  For example, capital 
flow viewed through CBT as substantially outside the collaboration may experience low 
volatility.  However, CBT theory realizes there are devaluing effects of being outside the 
collaboration.  Though devaluing effects other than volatility are outside this investigation, the 
MITAF collaboration attribute is associated with constraining transaction costs.  Numerous 
transaction costs are increased outside the collaboration, such as learning and obtaining capital 
by MFIs (Coase, 1937; H. Simon, 1996; Tucker, 2011).  The value-preserving effects of low 
volatility of a deal outside of MITAF may be offset by transaction costs related to capital flow 
activity outside the collaboration. 
The three examples, described above, illustrate how to apply the CBT model.  It can be 
applied to aggregate deals, such as 2006 and 2007.  The model can also be applied to 
individual deals, such as the outlier deals.  Applying the model allows linkages to be viewed in a 
manner to examine effects and assists developing responses to certain behavior-volatility 
linkage configurations.  In addition, the model can be used to configure what-if scenarios to aid 
program design.   
7.4 SUMMARY 
This chapter set forth a theory for understanding the linkage between organizational behavior 
and capital flow volatility.  The theory, Capitalflow Bureaucratic Triad, explains how 
organizational behavior within a contemporarily designed collaborative bureaucracy is linked 
with capital disbursement timing, aids predicting behavior and volatility in certain contexts.  The 
characteristics, or properties, of bureaucracy were described:  collaboration; accountability; and 
effectiveness, efficiency, and impact (responsiveness).  Collaboration was portrayed as a 
structure of authority, defining the participant subassembly of IAD:   learning capacity, power, 
and credible commitments.  That is, official relationship-defining documents (e.g., Program 
Support Document, MITAF terms of donor participant agreement, MITAF Manual, performance 
based agreement) set forth mutual commitments, as well as required, permitted, and forbidden 
actions.  The collaboration was also the space for participant discretion within the collaborative 
(e.g., MFI discretion in employing a deal’s capital).   
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In the chapter accountability was described as involving effectiveness, reliability, and 
legitimacy measured by implicit and explicit standards.  Accountability in MITAF ranged from 
within the collaborative to totally outside the collaborative.  When it was within in some measure, 
volatility was constrained to varying degrees.  In deals when collaborative accountability was 
given no weight, volatility was also constrained to varying degrees; however, transaction costs 
associated with non-collaborative behavior had capital devaluing effects.  Similarly, deals where 
EEI was defined and measured within the collaborative experienced volatility to varying 
degrees.  Also, deals that gave less weight to the collaborative experienced volatility to varying 
degrees. However, when the collaboration was given no weight or activity occurred outside the 
collaborative, there were capital devaluing effects.   
CBT theory, including associated properties, was explained by seven hypotheses 
representing major relationships.  Comprehensively, CBT was demonstrated to be grounded in 
data by applying the model to phenomena observed in MITAF.  The property hexagons of the 
model were applied to observed behavior detailed in the prior chapter.  Capital flow 
experiencing varying degrees of volatility involving MFIs with varying conditions (e.g., outreach, 
financial performance, governance) were associated to the different hexagon patterns.  
Linkages between organizational behavior and capital volatility are explained by the CBT theory, 
which informed development of several policy recommendations.    
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8.0  POLICY IMPLICATIONS:  RECOMMENDATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
What does MITAF teach that will inform organizational behavior and capital flow within 
collaborative arrangements?  The biggest challenge in the collaborative effort, within and 
between organizational group types, was demonstrated clarity of a common perspective and the 
ability to rapidly locate the effort in a place of agreement such that outcome values were not 
diminished by capital volatility.  Evolving perspectives on the properties and dimensions of key 
MITAF outcomes and assessment methods were particularly important.  Where and how to 
move in adjusting various perspectives was central to initiating organizational actions and 
disbursing capital investments such that all were equally uncomfortable, but all agreed there 
was progress (Barnard, 1938).   
The chapter begins by providing recommendations about how to affect organizational 
actions and capital disbursements.  This is followed by a research agenda outline.  First, 
attention is given to four strategic take-aways developed from examining MITAF.  One strategy 
is directly addressing exogenous variables, or environmental factors, to minimize delays in 
capital disbursements.  Encouraging gains in MFI organizational intelligence can be quickly 
stifled or completely reversed when environmental factors constrain MITAF type projects.  
Another strategy requires realizing that changes in human behavior and life style status are 
long-term propositions.  This strategy calls for employing the combined skill sets of the team to 
expeditiously assess the situational context, detect and assess contextual changes, and 
maintain a calculated action-orientation.  The multicultural team each organization brings to 
function within the collaboration will account for the variance experienced in behavior and 
capital volatility, within a context.   
Accounting for variances in behavior-volatility linkages necessitates collection of quality 
and relevant data.  An important strategy is to provide sufficient funding and marshal sufficient 
resources to collect data and employ the rigorous processes required to inform learning and 
make thoughtful, nuanced, strategic decisions as the program progresses.  Data are processed 
and organized to develop key definitions used as information employed by actors in decision 
making and actions. Finally, a synergistic strategy involves accounting for the project’s 
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commitments; tracking money is only part of accounting.  Entering collaboration makes 
transactions consummated one-on-one between donors and MFIs subject to additional 
commitments that must be accounted for.  The four strategic recommendations affecting public 
organization actions and capital disbursements are based on the premise that public policy 
administration is the actual expression of policy and it speaks to espoused theories’ relevance in 
attacking societal problems.  These recommendations are explicated with backing from 
literature and the investigation’s data. 
Second, the chapter outlines a research agenda extending work in this study.  MITAF 
Sierra Leone was one of eleven capital delivery mechanisms introduced as UNCDF 
collaborations in Africa.  Analyzing these projects could provide additional insights regarding 
behavior-volatility linkages, and will add to the sparse data available in order to better 
understand these phenomena.  Exploring accountability as effectiveness, reliability, and 
legitimacy to better understand MITAF participants’ views and constructs for ranking importance 
of various strategies can improve efforts to bridge communication and performance gaps.  
Moreover, examining MITAF participants beliefs about how their views have changed regarding 
defining and measuring effectiveness, efficiency, and responsiveness can help explain and 
assess organizational learning related to constrained capital volatility.  The agenda presented 
aims to tackle the complex organizational behavior associated with development in Sub-
Saharan Africa and post-conflict areas. 
8.1 ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS AND CHANGE 
One unanticipated finding during this investigation is how various development programs in 
Sierra Leone underestimate depletion and devastation caused by colonialism and the war.  The 
human potential in Sierra Leone is remarkable; however, the existing aggregate human talent is 
desperately low.  In addition, the structure and resources needed to engage human capital is 
very often absent or remarkably inadequate.  One government agency concept paper prepared 
in early 2011 (not directly related to this research) requested assistance from civil society 
organizations by explaining that government staff was inadequate and unmotivated.  
Encouraging gains in MFI organizational intelligence can be stifled or completely reversed in 
short order without proper attention to environmental factors shaping MITAF type projects. 
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The IAD framework used to organize the presentation of this investigation suggests that 
outcomes from interactions can, over time, change exogenous (environmental) variables 
(Ostrom 2005).  The framework did not suggest the impact is as direct as environmental factors 
on the arena where organizations interact; rather only as interactions continue to produce 
results the factors shaping the interaction may change.  The concern here is that outcomes are 
excessively relied on to change environmental factors (e.g., MFI regulation and informal 
economy) that shape the arena of interactions, such as MITAF.  Exogenous variables, or 
environmental factors, must be directly addressed to minimize delays in capital disbursements.  
Project outcomes, often reflected as investment deal disbursement conditions, can be severely 
constrained when market incentives and punishments operate unchecked in an imperfect 
market environment, and when market-regulating institutions are weak.  This seems to be 
especially the case in a post-conflict fragile state setting.  It can take considerable time to 
observe substantial shaping of environmental factors by outcomes from organizational 
interactions; direct action is needed to shape environmental factors.  
Meso and macro institutions are environmental level factors that are vital to maintain and 
improve micro level outcomes.  MITAF had the right idea.  Meso level institutions, such as 
industry associations, credit exchange agencies, and support services like independent audit 
firms are important to developing a sustainable pro-poor financial sector in Sierra Leone.  
Unfortunately, MITAF was not able to completely achieve the galactically huge project mandate, 
which included meso level development.  An important item for future exploration is how these 
environmental factors affect MFIs that have experienced a period of sustained growth and 
financial performance.  Do MFIs continue the positive trend without development of meso level 
institutions?  Does stagnation set in?  Do MFIs experience decline?  How is capital volatility 
affected?  These are important questions regarding meso and macro institutions relationships 
with MFIs growth and sustainability. 
Apex organizations are also a vital meso level institution.  Meso level institutions that 
provide capital are especially germane. The Rules on capital flow that shaped MITAF are best 
understood in terms of organizational theories than market theories.  Literature reviewed 
suggested that Sierra Leone’s underdeveloped markets and pro-poor financial sectors did not 
provide the capital the country urgently needed.  Simon (1996) explains that economist use 
externalities and uncertainty to explain the benefits of organizations over markets for a lot of 
economic activity.  The more important reason, according to Simon, is actors provide additional 
effort to benefit the collaborative because they benefit more from collaborative learning than by 
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incurring the cost of learning independently.  Both capital investors and MFIs benefit in critical 
ways from meso level capital-providing institutions, thus minimizing factors that increase capital 
volatility.    
Monitoring external factors closely is important to developing a pro-poor financial sector 
in a context like Sierra Leone.  The metaphor of the frog in the water pot with the heat 
continually, gradually rising is apropos to maintaining focus on environmental factors.  If external 
factors are not given careful, consistent attention the same factors that constrained the sector’s 
development will inhibit its growth or worse (Duval & Bendu, 2009). 
8.2 LEADERSHIP AND TEAM SKILL-SETS 
An important strategic take-away from this investigation involves people.  Each organization, 
group of organizations, and the project as a whole should invest considerable attention toward 
the people selected to be involved with its activities (primarily and secondary),62 especially at 
the outset.  This recommendation applies both to MITAF and individual participant 
organizations.  The evidence showed team compilation made a difference in capital volatility.  
People must work to diligently understand the perspective of other players and find an initial 
place of agreement where action can, and does, take place; “Great vision without great people 
is irrelevant” (Collins, 2001, p. 42).  System knowledge and expertise enable administrative 
tasks to be completed without delay and prevent bottlenecks due to carelessness and 
inattention to detail.  The ability to ascertain and appreciate, within and between, organization 
differences aids in minimizing behaviors that contribute to capital disbursement delays. The 
multicultural team each organization brings to function within the collaboration will account for 
the variance experienced in behavior and capital volatility, within a particular context. 
  
                                                
 
62 Organizations have people directly involved in the collaboration, such as donor representatives 
attending Investment Committee meetings, TSP staff managing day-to-day operations, and MFI staff in 
direct communication with MITAF/TSP.  There are also people involved indirectly, such as processing 
requests for disbursements at the donor, MFI staff preparing MITAF reports, and MITAF staff performing 
certain financial tasks at the home-office. 
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The effect of leadership and team composition on behavior and capital was visible from 
the mid-term evaluation, responses in interviews, and records of disbursement activity.  The 
mid-term evaluation suggested capital investment decisions did not reflect sufficient risk-taking 
in smaller MFIs.  The evaluation and this investigation’s interviews reflected the need for MFI 
capacity building, including training, procedures, policies, tools, and systems.  Quick, targeted, 
measured capital investments were needed for training, operating capital, and on-site technical 
assistance (that also could serve as monitoring function).  The record reflects meaningful 
capacity enhancement in MFIs early on; however, they were deemed to still have substantial 
weaknesses (Duval & Bendu, 2006).  Initial MFI trainings could have served creation of 
increased awareness and general knowledge diffusion more than behavioral modification.   
Trainings are also opportunities to gain insight into perspectives by all parties.  Regional 
and on-site trainings could have assisted in encouraging participation.  In MITAF, apex on-the-
ground team members varied in attributes to assess and monitor the environment with the intent 
of disbursing capital to MFIs in a targeted manner utilizing appropriate disbursement techniques 
(e.g., pre/post utilization documentation, direct/indirect to MFI/supplier). Collaborating 
organizations selecting team members able to quickly assess the environment, continually 
monitor it, and with a freedom and propensity for action is vital to behaviors that constrain and 
minimize capital volatility, especially in the crucial first 18-24 months.  In post-conflict fragile 
state collaborations, it is not selecting a team before organizational structure, but selecting a 
team with freedom and a propensity to act that facilitates organizational learning and 
intelligence (Collins, 2001, 2005; March, 1999; Picard & Buss, 2009). 
People able to assess and respond effectively to the performance orientation of their 
team and collaborative partners are vital, especially during the beginning of a project (Kearns, 
2000).  These people, regardless to title or rank, are leaders (Barnard, 1938).  These leaders, 
including formal leaders (e.g., authority positions) can potentially facilitate mutually agreed 
progress that creates momentum for performance rapidity, such as MITAF mandated. One party 
involved in MFI assessment provided support for this point by discussing leadership and 
management as roles, 
Person: No, frankly speaking, from the management cohort, leadership and 
management are different, they are two different. You can be a manager and not a 
leader. You can be a leader but not a manager but we aren’t going to treat it the same. 
But we are normally, in many cases we have, like in the community bank we have 
identified already the leader in the bank. 
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Investigator: And a leader in that bank would, what would a leader look like as an 
example? 
 
Person: The leader is the guy who inspires everyone, the guy who motivates people, he 
might not be the manager himself… 
 
Person: Believing 
 
Investigator: Believing? 
 
Person: People believing, you’re a team player. 
 
Investigator: Ok 
 
Person: If I could give you an example, most of the community bank you discover that 
the person who is really up and running some of them are the accountants, not the 
manager himself. Maybe it’s an accountant, maybe it’s operations manager, even at 
[MFI] for example.  The guy who I thought was the leader there was the operations 
manager, apparently had just left. Yesterday, four other people just left. But if the CEO, 
the chief executive officer who is the manager, but people don’t believe in him (Interview 
3, 29:45). 
Similar observations were also found in the Global Leadership and Organizational 
Behavior Effectiveness Research program (GLOBE), which investigated performance 
orientation in organizations and societies.  GLOBE was created to add to the body of knowledge 
pertaining to cross-cultural interactions (see Appendix J). The study found that performance 
orientation was the most valued of seven scales by societies around the world.  This scale 
includes encouraging and rewarding “innovation, challenging goals, and improvement” (Javidan, 
2004, p. 248).  A performance-oriented society is desired across societies; however, the desire 
does not always positively correlate with perceived practice.   
An example of differences between desire and perceived practice can be found between 
Sub-Saharan African nations and Germanic Europe region nations.63  Sub-Saharan African 
nations scored higher than Germany and the Netherlands on the importance they place on 
performance orientation; however, they scored generally lower on the assessment of perceived 
                                                
 
63 See Appendix J. The Germanic Europe cluster of nations was based on research conducted and 
published by Simcha Ronen and Obed Shenkar,  (1985), “Clustering Countries on Attitudinal Dimensions:  
A review and synthesis,” Academy of Management Review, 10(3), 435-454. The Sub-Saharan Africa 
group, as used by GLOBE, was not established by prior empirical research.  Characteristics of the group 
include values of “reciprocity, suppression of self-interest, the virtue of symbiosis, and human 
interdependence” (Gupta & Hanges, 2004, pp. 187, 188). 
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practice.64  Interestingly, the study found finance industry respondents on performance 
orientation to be most correlated with overall society, both in terms of perceptions of what is 
valued and practiced, than those in other industry groups sampled.  A person from a high 
performance oriented society, as reflected in perceived values and practice, may interact in a 
collaborative with people from another nation with a greater variance between perceived value 
and practice than those in their own nation.  Such an experience may cause the person 
confusion and frustration as the talk-and-the-walk of people from nations with a higher variance 
does not seem in alignment.  For some people, observing misalignment between talk and action 
results in certain value judgments that are prone to divide more than unify (Kearns, 2000).  For 
example, such an observation could be interpreted as intentionally misleading. A global 
orientation, such as understanding the perspective of others, can go a long way to minimize 
behaviors that promote capital volatility, such as division between collaborative actors.  
An example from MITAF can illustrate a challenge of perceptions and perspectives.  An 
interview excerpt presented earlier expressed a perspective regarding a divide in north-south 
development paradigms that were perceived to affect behaviors in MITAF in ways that were 
linked to capital volatility.  An interview with another respondent also provided an enlightening 
response regarding the suggestion of a north-side divide affecting capital flow, 
Investigator: For example, I visited with an MFI, and they said to me that the TSP at one 
point did not understand how business operated in Sierra Leone. I paraphrased there. 
They said the Chief of Party had a northern mindset. But that there was a change to 
someone who understood southern paradigms… 
Person:…I would not agree to this statement...the question is really what does this MFI 
member, or do the people that think, in the same direction, what do they think the south 
paradigm and the Sierra Leonean business paradigm is about? I mean microfinance is a 
pretty clear exercise, a pretty clear business, and although there are of course significant 
differences in local and national contexts, I would say that microfinance from 
Bangladesh and from India and or from America does not differ very much from 
microfinance in Sierra Leone. Of course Sierra Leone has its particular challenges and 
some national requirements or whatever, but the core business of microfinance still 
remains the same. So I really wonder what these people that think that we are dealing 
here or we are having a north-south discrepancy will be meaning as they say it. I mean 
of course we have a zero-tolerance – that means we do not accept any 
extra...bribes…(Interview 9). 
                                                
 
64 Also, Tropical Wet and Dry climates, like Sierra Leone, had a variance of over 60% between society 
values and society practices for performance orientation; however, Marine West Coast climates, such as 
Germany and the Netherlands, had a variance almost half as much (Javidan 2004, pp. 260, 261).  
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Differences in experience and perception are important factors when team members and 
leadership can make an immediate and project-long difference (Harvey et al., 2002).  There is 
an extensive body of knowledge on north-south perspectives on development in collaborative 
arrangements (Ashman, 2001; Derksen & Verhallen, 2008).  The MFI spoke of the north-south 
divide in reference to access to resources, or capital disbursement.  The other respondent 
seemed puzzled by the idea and queried about what the MFI thought the Sierra Leonean 
business paradigm consisted of in the context of microfinance.  In addition to reduced tension 
between the government and the TSP, the most empirically clear difference from the chief of 
party change in the excerpt is the timing of disbursements. 
The team and leadership, with various backgrounds and points of view, are vital to 
developing mutually agreed to goals and for achieving them.  The combined skill sets of the 
team should expeditiously assess the situational context, detect and assess contextual 
changes, and maintain a calculated action-orientation while realizing changes in human 
behavior and life style status are long-term propositions.  Observations from a recent study in 
Sierra Leone underscored this point, 
Development is obviously perceived as a vital factor in preventing and combating violent 
instability.  But it is also extremely important to keep in mind that in post-conflict 
situations, goals such as development, sustainable growth, social stability and political 
accountability may take some time to be implemented, and the professionalism, 
commitment and quality of the work of NGOs’ staff becomes a key element in the path to 
rebuilding the nation and guaranteeing its future stability (Momo et al., 2011, p. 1). 
Attributes of staff and their freedom to act affects the power aspect in the Bureaucracy of 
Collaboration property where performance  (mutually agreed to goals) is defined (Kearns, 
2000).  
In addition to freedom, action requires leadership.  Skills sets are key elements in an 
international collaboration involving market mechanisms and financial institutions/rules with 
social and cultural ramifications, such as MITAF (Picard & Buss, 2009).  In addition, 
complementing skills sets are important.  Remember the donor that shared how the IC gained 
organizational intelligence by capturing the learning from teams interacting,   
[J]oint cooperation of six years and continuous meetings every six months in Sierra 
Leone, physical meetings, I think we learned to understand each other and to come to a 
consensus and to a joint vision of microfinance much better…. I would say, that it is for 
the project and for the development of the microfinance sector in Sierra Leone that these 
different types of microfinance development approaches are complimentary to each 
other and are also enriching to each other (Interview 9). 
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Freedom to employ approaches, including skill sets, that distinguish each participating 
organization allowed for the benefits of complimentary synergy to be realized by MITAF 
(Barnard, 1938). Freedom to act speaks to the centrality of organizations having an orientation 
and environment that thrives on cultural and generational diversity (Springer, 2011). The 
leadership and staff in the collaboration understanding each other, reaching agreement on 
goals, and operationalizing a joint vision can help minimize capital volatility. 
8.3 DEFINITION CHANGES AND DATA 
As important as the team composition decisions are, so are the actions and decisions involving 
key definitions and data.  From inception, MITAF placed a high priority on data (Duval & Bendu, 
2006; UNCDF, 2004b). Key definitions are important information developed from data, whereas 
data are building blocks, a substance of information (Blair, 2001; Hendrick, 1994).  
Organizational learning and intelligence are based on actions and decisions informed by key 
definitions and data.  In other words, data are processed and organized to develop key 
definitions.  In turn, key definitions are used as information employed by actors in decision 
making and actions.  Examples of producers and reservoirs of huge amounts of data include: 
• Environmental factors  
• MITAF actors  
• Capital flow  
• Actor interactions  
• Credit history and life style indicators of borrowers  
Data are processed into information servicing actions and decisions shaped by, and shaping, 
key definitions.  
As understandings improve and new levels of agreement are reached (information), 
definitions change.  Definitions of acceptable performance standards change.  Definitions of 
what constitutes a waiver changes.  A focus on trends, while developing the sector to operate in 
accordance with industry standards, can result in definition changes.  It is important to provide 
sufficient funding and marshal sufficient resources to collect data and employ the rigorous 
processes required to inform learning and make thoughtful, nuanced, strategic decisions as the 
program progresses.  This is money beyond capital investments to service delivery 
organizations (MFIs).  Developing microfinance sectors in contexts like Sierra Leone requires 
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aggressively attacking information asymmetries, including data acquisition-dissemination and 
organizational learning translated to organizational intelligence, thus connecting data and 
action.  
Two points forcefully made during this investigation connected data and action: the 
importance of trends reflecting performance direction, and assessing progress toward the 
overarching goal of reducing poverty.  Comments from two participants drive these points home, 
What I’m interested in, in any commitment, are the trends. Are the trends positive or not? 
And this is an important statement because, I can give you an example which is not 
even Sierra Leone they had that. We had that discussion even during the last investment 
committee...So, are we going to relax a little bit the portfolio at risk that we expected 
MFIs  to have because of some contextual factors that could impact negatively? Yes, we 
can. We can discuss that because usually we are talking about 5, total is 5% but in some 
contexts, up to 10% (Interview 5). 
From my point of view, the biggest question mark and the greatest interest is certainly in 
the IMPACT of donor contributions to the microfinance client. Do all these capital flows 
really help poor people?...With targeted interviews and field research, one could find out 
the different impacts of diverse types of microfinance interventions, e.g. comparing 
BRAC with other types of MFIs and deposit-taking/ non-deposit taking institutions. 
Besides the practical relevance, impact of MF capital flows in SSA [Sub-Saharan Africa] 
is of great interest in science (Donor email, September 2010). 
These comments reflect dynamics of a learning organization in a challenging context.  
Although a key goal was MFIs operating according to industry standards, MITAF underscored 
the importance of organizational intelligence reflected by MFI positive performance trends in a 
nascent sector like Sierra Leone.  MITAF also highlights the importance of performance 
reflected in deals containing terms and conditions that align with data-supported, unique 
attributes of MFIs and the target population.  IC interviews and, at times, MITAF actions 
demonstrated more consideration of MFI uniqueness rather than inflexible homogenization to 
implement industry standards.  Organizational intelligence (sustained improvement in 
performance) resulted from learning and employs a systemic view informed by data beyond the 
specific MFI performance indicators and MITAF outcome measures (e.g., implementing industry 
standards in MFI operations).  Included is understanding the importance of trends developed by 
sufficient, relevant data, beyond what to why (Collins, 2009; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Jurik & 
Cowgill, 2005).      
Dynamics harnessed to inform actions can result in an empirical record of learning and 
March’s (1999) organizational intelligence.  This learning and intelligence is important to future 
development efforts, including work to reduce capital volatility.  The subtleties and 
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undercurrents associated with creating an atmosphere of collaboration, hope, and expected 
success (i.e., confidence) are exploited by praising and rewarding achievement.  This is done 
while also understanding and responding to non-improving trends and questionable impact.  A 
response from a donor (provided earlier) discussed positive re-enforcement for achievement, 
and assistance for those performing below targets.  While an initiative may have sound 
mechanisms for formal legitimacy, confidence of participants and intended beneficiaries is also 
required for public organizations to effectively perform (The World Bank, 2000).  Confidence and 
successful performance are important considerations in an accountability ethos supported by 
credible information from quality, relevant data. 
One MFI shared a very telling thought that speaks to subtleties and undercurrents 
resident in an environment of hope and expected success that affects capital disbursement, 
You know microfinance is very new program in this country. We are used to sending a 
proposal, but a proposal is quite different from a business plan. So, sometimes we have 
to take us time actually to put a business plan. We have to finish a projection. That is 
very much important. We have to set our target. We are to go from here before the end 
of 2010s from where will you be. So you have to talk of all of those things. If they are not 
in place, no way [no capital disbursement]. So these are some of our challenges. But 
with that, [emphasis added] they [MITAF] have been conducting a series of trainings 
actually.  Yeah (Interview 5 Others). 
Challenges and obstacles accompanied with that believed to be sufficient to overcome create 
an expectation of success and greater confidence when confronted in the future with the 
unknown and unfamiliar (Momo et al., 2011).  The learner believing and buying into the lessons 
and practices taught is important to increased knowledge and awareness (e.g., key definitions).  
These aspects of the learner are also important to changes in behavior (actions and decisions) 
that improve performance and reduce capital volatility, especially after behavior is directly 
connected to specific capital investments (BBC, 2011; Thomson, 2010).   
The following excerpts from interviews and the MITAF final evaluation underscore this 
recommendation,   
But believe me, when we went through it [adding a branch office], and I said this was 
what (MITAF) deprived us of, the ability to learn, to know. You know.  When people are 
given the opportunity to learn, to know, to test, the learning is stronger. Hmm? (Interview 
1). 
I like Sierra Leone. But we spend a lot of money on training and in many cases, many 
people who we trained, very many, 10% of the people we have trained, they have come 
back and applied what they learned. We need a lot of training of trainers but…out of 
maybe 20 people only 2 people that I can identify and say I can even use them…The 
rest, it’s a country problem. There’s no label; now the standard are gone. I can’t blame 
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them for that. So that’s what we need….on one hand we try to bring in new discipline 
into the sector to enforce best practice, we call them performance based agreements 
and they work to enforce best practice in the sector. But if you look on the other side, 
you enforcing, we are getting, forcing the horse [MFIs] to drink water (Interview 3).  
The TSP is to be particularly commended for identifying many regional consultants to 
act as RTAs [resident technical assistance] for the MFIs. However, the technical 
assistance provided by both ESGC [the TSP] staff and the RTAs identified by the TSP 
and financed by the project seem to have had little lasting impact on many of the MFIs. 
Although the assistance generally was appreciated by the PLIs [partner lending 
institutions, MFIs], few of the institutions seem to be applying the systems and policies 
developed by the RTAs. In the estimation of the evaluation team based on discussions 
with the PLIs in question, this is partly due to…the fact that ESGC staff and the RTAs 
tended to develop manuals and plans for the institutions rather than guide them in 
developing these materials for themselves (Duval & Bendu, 2009, p. 29). 
 
Quality, relevant data is vital to developing credible information used to increases 
performance—organizational intelligence.  MFIs selected for leadership development in the 
sector and presented as models need to be substantive partners in shaping a systemic 
leadership model.  However, a leadership model shaped by MFI superficial conformance to 
certain output measures without strong, deep controls can experience failure (Collins, 2009), 
exemplified by ProCredit discussed earlier.  This view of data and leadership development 
(changing, adapting) is central to organizational learning in CBT. Quality data is important to 
develop credible information used in learning that is shaped and embraced by MFIs.  In 
practice, MITAF redefined performance (to some degree) as new and better data emerged.  
8.4 RECORD KEEPING AND ACTION:  IT’S ABOUT THE MONEY, AND MORE! 
MITAF struggled with maintaining records of capital investment activity.  The challenge was 
exacerbated by donors remitting directly to MFIs without notice and before disbursement 
requests were submitted by the TSP.  Delays in consummating a performance based 
agreement similarly impact disbursement record keeping.  The structure of MITAF itself, though 
expedient and helpful in the beginning, contributed in some measure to struggles.  The diversity 
and complexity of activity made record keeping a significant challenge for the TSP’s approach to 
the task.  Nevertheless, it was empirically demonstrated that challenges were manageable 
when there was sufficient motivation for the parties involved.  It is important to account for the 
project’s commitments; tracking money is only part of accounting. 
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Stewardship requires accounting for MITAF commitments.  UNDP in Action:  Delivering 
on Our Commitment to Development, references their 2007 strategic plan and underscores the 
importance of this strategic recommendation: “The plan stressed the importance of delivering 
programming in an effective and accountable manner with measurable and transformative 
results” (p. 2).  The stewardship mandate associated with delivering on commitments is akin to 
promises that are integral to economic systems (chapter one, Microfinance is Banking). When 
capital flows directly from a donor to the MFI it is less a financial accounting issue because it 
employs resources to effectively satisfy the MITAF commitment.  A deal between a donor and 
an MFI was not just that; it was also an MITAF commitment.  The investment package was 
presented to the IC,65 which first acts on the investment opportunity.  It was then an individual 
donor got involved to varying degrees through completion of the performance based agreement 
and disbursement of all the capital, in accordance with the MITAF commitment. Collaboration 
begets one-on-one transactions between donors and MFIs that are subject to additional 
commitments that must be accounted for. 
MFI understanding of capital investment commitments, and how they perceive donor 
and apex behavior relative to those commitments, should be expected to inform MFI actions.  
Although capital market development is environmentally important and centrally necessary for 
developing an inclusive financial sector in developing countries (Imboden et al., 2006), it is not 
best employed as the primary mechanism in post-conflict fragile states.  Governments and 
donor communities would be wise to not rush quickly to the normative framework visible in 
today’s huge, tech savvy capital markets.  Initiatives like MITAF function as financial 
intermediaries66 and should not employ less people-centric, more big-technology centric 
mechanisms that assume behavioral reputations matter less (Davidoff, 2011; Van Slyke, 2005).  
Not only is reputation an “important enforcement mechanism” (Davidoff, 2011), but is used in 
asymmetrical power relationships by less powerful actors, such as MFIs in many capital 
investment deals, to protect against exploitation (Cook et al., 2005).  MFI reporting and capital 
disbursement behavior is an important record keeping-capital volatility connection.    
                                                
 
65 In a very few instances it appears donors invested directly in MFIs without IC approval and MITAF was 
credited with the investment. 
66 See chapter three’s discussion of apex organizations. 
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For the MFI, the deal included both MITAF and at least one donor from the start.  
Resource dependent MFIs may agree to the deal even if they believe it is unlikely they will 
satisfy the conditions committed to.  What do they have to lose?  If they do not enter the deal 
they are without the capital investment.  If they enter the deal and default on their obligations 
they are without the capital investment.  If they enter the deal, there is a chance they will satisfy 
the conditions, or that a wavier may be granted.  For MFIs the commitments are often about a 
survival sense; the motivation is the desperate need to acquire capital that consumed 50-60% of 
the director’s time prior to MITAF (Tucker email, March 2011).  Accounting for MITAF 
commitments is about the money, but it is also about stewardship of promise keeping.  The 
motivation for MITAF, including specifically donors, to manage the challenges of accounting for 
capital disbursements is that MITAF made a promise.  A normative, intrinsically motivating, 
promise was provided in a communiqué after an IC meeting informing the MFI a decision was 
made to enter a capital investment deal.  With that notification delivery, time started and 
commitments were made.  In addition, MITAF did not have viable alternative means of 
accomplishing its mission (Thomson, 2010).  Making credible commitments was so important to 
MITAF’s mission that not transparently accounting for activity related to each promise carried 
potentially reduced the value of its capital.   
Cook and her colleagues (2005) contend that transactions involving bankers, absent 
power equality, often use “reputation systems” as a source of information to assess actors’ 
reliability and trustworthiness.  Reputation not only has properties that encourage reliable 
behavior to preserve future business opportunities (Davidoff, 2011), but it is an important 
assessment tool for the less powerful to avoid being exploited (Cook et al., 2005).  Research 
involving relationships with power asymmetry has found that if the more powerful party makes a 
commitment sufficient enough to convince the less powerful party that their desire for trust is 
genuine, then balance of power can be adjusted (Cook et al., 2005).  In essence, power 
relations can reflect interdependence where more trust can be realized with associated benefits.   
The interdependence of this collaborative necessitated that donor and apex actions were 
consistent with rhetoric involving rapidity in the MITAF commitment, or mission.  The 
contextualized importance of timeframes in Sierra Leone capital investment commitments has 
been made clear.  The UNCDF Results-Oriented Annual Report 2007 characterized MITAF as a 
“high risk niche,” a reflection of the donor’s “risk-taking nature” (p. 2).  It is important that there is 
consistency between committing capital investment to rapidly develop the sector and the 
conditions employed for disbursement.  The goal is MFIs performing in accordance with industry 
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best practice.  However, providing capital to a sector considered nascent and high risk, while 
imposing disbursement standards of best practice during the first 36-48 months, is not always 
consistent with a commitment to rapidly develop the sector.  Entering a deal with disbursement 
conditions substantially inconsistent with the performance trend is inherently problematic.   
A recent microfinance study in Sierra Leone addresses timing and best practices. It 
suggested the following strategies for MFIs:  “Do not abandon best practices.  In post-conflict 
environments, sustainability may take longer to reach, and the repayments especially in the 
earliest phase of the programme may be lower than usual” (Momo et al., 2011, p. 8).  The goal 
to perform in accordance to MFI industry standards is advanced by mission accountability 
tracking of capital invested and disbursed, including when and to whom.  A donor’s response 
provided earlier underscored that MITAF capital investments are venture capital.  Though not a 
license for careless due diligence, it is not unexpected to write-off over 20% of the deals.  
Advancing the mission in Sierra Leone placed a strong demand on donor’s risk-taking 
predisposition. 
In summary, the four strategic recommendations are: 
1. Monitor external factors to ensure the environment is conducive for sustainable 
growth of the financial sector.  This is important to minimize capital volatility and 
ensure organization learning is retained as intelligence reflected in enhanced 
performance. Ensuring conduciveness requires direct action that impacts the 
environment and employs meso level organizations.    
2. Effective leadership and competent staff should be given early attention.  
Thoughtfully consider the people selected to be involved throughout the project (in 
project location and elsewhere), especially at the outset.  A multicultural team 
embodies the organizational attributes and intelligence needed to account for 
variance in behavior within a context involving organizations from various nations, 
and in capital volatility.  The organization with an orientation and environment that 
thrives off cultural and generational diversity achieves high level performance.  
People that can assess and respond effectively to the performance orientation of 
their team and collaborative partners are vital, especially during the beginning of the 
project. The combined skill sets should expeditiously assess the situational context, 
detect and assess contextual changes, and maintain a calculated action-orientation 
while realizing changes in human behavior and life style status are long-term 
propositions. 
3. Provide sufficient funding and marshal sufficient resources to collect data 
required to inform learning and make thoughtful, nuanced, strategic decisions as the 
program progresses. Definitions change as organizational intelligence grows and 
new agreements are reached among collaborators.   Organizational intelligence, 
sustained improvement in performance resulting from learning, employs a systemic 
view informed by data beyond the specific MFI performance indicators and MITAF 
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outcome measures, including understanding the importance of trends.  Aggressively 
attacking information asymmetries and making changes that a dynamic context 
requires is central to creating and maintaining a sense of hope among participants.  
Quality, relevant data are vital to developing credible information used in learning 
that increases performance—organizational intelligence.  The learning organization 
believing and buying into the lessons and practices taught is important to increased 
knowledge and awareness, as well as changes in behavior that improve 
performance.   
4. The project’s commitments must be timely and accurately accounted for.  
Stewardship requires accounting for MITAF commitments.   Credible commitments 
have value, similar to loan notes discussed in chapter one.  Entering collaboration 
makes one-on-one commitments between donors and MFIs subject to additional 
commitments that must be accounted for.  Accounting for MITAF commitments is 
about the money, but it is also about stewardship of promise keeping.  It is important 
that there is consistency between committing capital investments to rapidly develop 
the sector and the conditions employed for disbursement.  Tracking money is only 
part of accounting.  It also includes accounting for commitment stewardship, such as 
stipulated timeframes to process performance based agreements. 
8.5 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
Linkages between behavior and capital volatility is important for both industrialized nations and 
the developing world.  Minimizing outcome-devaluing linkages is vital for effective performance 
and organizational intelligence.  This is critical for developing nations where the devaluing 
impact of volatility is multiples of industrialized nations.  Moreover, volatility in resource 
dependent relationships requires those in power to be highly sensitive to the importance of 
credible commitments.  Underdevelopment and destabilization often hang in the balance of 
making sense of the connection between behavior and capital flow. 
There is much to learn beyond the insights from this investigation.  The UNCDF 
collaborative sector projects, MITAF being the first, can yield valuable data on linkages between 
behavior and volatility.  A similar investigation exploring these other collaborative projects can 
test the CBT lens and may yield additional insights on the linkages.  In addition, the data would 
allow for a comparative analysis yielding rich findings beyond the scope of this investigation.  
Further investigating legitimacy, reliability, and effectiveness in MITAF can excavate important 
variances that can inform sense making of behavior and volatility linkages.  For example, 
obtaining data from stakeholders that MITAF participants identify as key can provide valuable 
insights into evaluative construct differences.  In addition, deeply exploring these relationships 
to identify and assess “accountability fatigue” can provide insights to undesirable effects (2010, 
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p. 6).  Additional research analyzing tensions between volatility, effectiveness, efficiency, and 
impact can provide interesting, rich insights on perceptions and beliefs regarding trade-offs.  
Furthermore, constructs used by different participants in measuring EEI, including relative 
weights, can help identify and bridge gaps that exacerbate capital volatility.  Measuring impact 
of microfinance has been a difficult challenge that arguably begins with understanding different 
perspectives and measures of impact (Derksen & Verhallen, 2008).   This future research 
agenda suggests that there is complexity associated in combining aid with organizational 
behavior in collaboratives and in Sub-Saharan Africa.       
There are no simple answers or formulas to change behaviors contributing to capital 
volatility or vice versa. Organizational learning is found in cognizance of environmental factors, 
organizational and contextual histories, relative importance of individual and collaborative 
imperatives, and developments on the ground.  Monitoring environmental factors and taking 
direct action are important.  Leadership and team are important, as are valuing and committing 
data to eliminate crippling information asymmetries.  Intrinsic motivation to embrace 
commitment stewardship is another important property that is linked with capital volatility. 
The complexity and interconnectedness found in seeking to understand linkages 
between behaviors and capital volatility can easily overwhelm the seeker.  Intransience, 
stubbornness, bullying, and dishonesty are examples of the easily available unpalatable 
explanations that lead to simple prescriptions.  On the other hand, viewing complexity and 
interconnectedness through the Capitalflow Bureaucratic Triad lens can subside the 
overwhelming waves.  Collaboration; accountability; and effectiveness, efficiency, and impact 
combine to make sense of dedicated organizations that work to make substantive differences 
and remain relevant in an increasing perilous, dynamic, and challenging world. 
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APPENDIX A 
ARCHIVAL DOCUMENT DATA SOURCES 
Annex A Client Growth Figures (MFI Growth)-4th Quarter 2009 
Annex Donor Breakdown-December 2009; March 2010 
Annex Individual Portfolio Reports-December 2009; March 2010 (for each MITAF MFI) 
Annex MFI Write Off Summaries-December 2009; March 2010 
Annex P Training Participants Chart-December 09 
Annex U TSP and Training Financial Report- July to December 2009 
Cordaid MITAF Participation Agreement 
Emails-direct personal correspondence 
Field Notes 
Good Practice Guidelines For Funders of Microfinance; Microfinance Consensus 
 Guidelines (October 2006, 2nd edition) 
Investment Committee Policies and Procedures Manual-MITAF July 2006 
Investment Committee Preparation Procedures 
Loan Approval Form 
MFI Grant Approval Letter 
Microfinance Insider; April 2010, Issue 1 
Minutes of the MITAF Investment Committee Meeting of Friday, November 6, 2009 
MITAF Final Evaluation 2009 
MITAF Mid-term Evaluation 2006 
MITAF Narrative Report-1st Quarter 2009* 
MITAF Narrative Report-1st Quarter 2010* 
MITAF Narrative Report-2008 Final* 
MITAF Narrative Report-2nd Quarter 2009* 
MITAF Narrative Report-3rd Quarter 2009* 
MITAF Narrative Report-4th Quarter 2009* 
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Performance Based Agreement-Final 2009 
Planet Rating Girafe Assessment of MFIs (three individual MFI assessments 
 performed in July and September 2009) 
Post-Conflict Action & Microfinance in Sierra Leone (Report published 
 by Spanda Foundation, The Hague, The Netherlands) 
Programme Support Document (UNDP Development of a Sustainable 
 Pro-Poor Financial Sector in Sierra Leone 2004-2009) 
Proposed Grant to the Republic of Sierra Leone for the Rural Finance and 
Community Improvement Programme (International Fund for Agricultural 
Development, Presidents Report: Executive Board-April 17-18, 2007) 
Restructuring MITAF-October 2009 
Sierra Leone:  Fourth Review Under the Three-Year Arrangement Under the  
Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (IMF Country Report: No. 09/215 July 
2009) 
Sierra Leone:  Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix 2009  
(IMF Country Report: No. 090/12) 
Updated Funding Criteria for MFIs-June 2007 (Annex to Investment  
Committee Policy Manual) 
 
 
 
 
* coded for data fragmentation and theory development 
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APPENDIX B 
INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD DOCUMENTS 
Subject Recruitment Script 
 
Hello.  My name is David Bell.  I am a doctoral student with the University of Pittsburgh in the 
United States and am researching the MITAF project.  Specifically, I am seeking to learn about 
the relationship between the behavior of organizations such as a microfinance institution—apex 
organization—donor-funder and the characteristics of the flow of capital from donors to 
microfinance institutions.  I would like to visit with you for about 30-45 minutes and view any 
materials you believe would be valuable to my learning.  The questions involve three categories:  
describing the process; challenges to the operation of the process; design features that should 
be changed, added, or deleted. Is there a day and time I can come by and visit with you? 
 
Pre-Interview Statement: 
 
Hello.  My name is David Bell.  I am a Doctoral student at the University of Pittsburgh, 
and I am conducting research on the relationship between organizational behavior, such as a 
microfinance institution and the characteristics of capital flow from donors to microfinance 
institutions.  I would like to ask you questions about the process of disbursing funds from the 
time an investment is approved until all the money is disbursed and available to the 
microfinance institution, including the organizational behaviors that affected disbursement 
decision-making.  With your permission, I would like to record this interview to better assist me 
in my data coding and analysis.  I would also like to stress that I will observe the standard 
practices of professional conduct throughout this research process.  As such, your identity will 
remain strictly confidential and will not be included in the interview transcripts or the final report. 
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PROJECT INFORMATION 
 
The purpose of this research is to understand the linkages between the behavior of 
participants in the Mircrofinance Investment and Technical Assistance Facility (MITAF) Project 
and the characteristics of the capital flow from Investors to Partner microfinance institutions.  
For that reason I will be studying various documents and interviewing the staff of participant 
organizations in MITAF.  The questions involve three categories:  describing the capital flow 
process; challenges to the operation of the process; design features of the process that should 
be changed, added, or deleted. The initial interview will last approximately forty-five (45) 
minutes.  Follow-up interviews may or may not occur and involve varying lengths, normally less 
than forty-five (45) minutes.  If you are willing to participate the interview will be about the 
process of disbursing funds approved for investment to a MFI, as well as your beliefs about the 
operation and design of the process.  There are no foreseeable risks associated with this 
project, nor are there any direct benefits to you.  The information and data collected will be 
treated with the utmost confidentiality. Reports generated from this study will in no way identify 
individual responses, or reveal information about the participant’s organizational connections.  
Though vital to this research, your participation is voluntary, and you may withdraw from this 
project at any time.  This study is being conducted by David Bell, who can be reached at 
01.412.418.8117 or DBell1@aol.com, if you have any questions. 
EMAIL REQUESTING VALIDATION MEETING 
 
Greetings  
I hope all is well with you and you are preparing for a great week of independence 
celebration! 
I’ve had a fantastic 2 months here in Sierra Leone.  My research on MITAF 1 is about 
finished.  There is one more piece it would be great to complete.  I would like to meet briefly with 
you to get your reaction to a two page document I’ve prepared.  The amount of time need be no 
more than our first time together, probably less. 
May I come see you on  
Thanks for considering my request and helping with my learning. 
David A. Bell 
PhD Candidate 
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF PUBLIC AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 
University of Pittsburgh 
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PRE-INTERVIEW STATEMENT FOR CAPITALFLOW BUREAUCRATIC TRIAD VALIDATION 
INTERVIEW 
(Not previewed by IRB) 
 
On this sheet of paper [document handed to interviewee] is a brief summary of MITAF, 
its participants, and operations relative to disbursing capital.  After describing MITAF a tool for 
viewing the behavior of organization and the connection with the timing of capital flow is offered.  
It is the goal of this tool to account for and explain, as much as possible, the different types of 
organizational behavior and capital flow timing, or volatility.  This includes the connections 
between organizational behavior and capital flow timing, without regard to which is the cause.   
I am going to read through this description and would appreciate your making note of 
any thoughts.  Afterward, I would appreciate your taking as much time as you like to review it, 
ask any questions and make any comments about your belief on how completely it accounts for 
the different types of behavior and linkages with capital volatility. 
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APPENDIX C 
STORYLINE MEMO 
The Microfinance Investment and Technical Assistance Facility (MITAF) was a context 
where organizational actions/interactions were linked to capital flow.  Microfinance institutions 
(MFIs) are one group of participants in MITAF.  Participating MFIs were seen as possessing the 
best potential to lead and serve as a model for the sector.   They were selected by the MITAF 
Investment Committee (IC, as recommend by the apex through applying the rules (criteria) for 
selection.  The MFIs have various structures, histories, and organizational missions.   
Another set of participants is the Investment Committee (IC) comprised of four donors 
pledging a specific minimum amount of capital to the project.  Similarly, these represent various 
structures, histories, and organizational missions.  These four donors are among the leading 
investors in Sub-Saharan Africa microfinance sectors, measured in terms of number of nations 
and amount of capital. 
The final participant is the technical service provider (TSP), or the apex.  The apex 
organization is the functional apparatus of MITAF.  It is charged with achieving broad outcomes 
that at times conflict. The MITAF collaboration involved different types of organizations, based in 
different nations, from different perspectives, committed to a common mission with separate 
individual missions that, at times, were in conflict with the collaborative commitment.     
From the time the IC approves an MFI investment package numerous, diverse, and 
complex organizational actions/interactions occur that are linked to capital flow.  Beginning with 
written notice of approval provided to the MFI by the apex, through and until the last tranche of 
capital is disbursed, there are complex interactions between organizational behavior and capital 
flow.  Some behaviors assist timely flow of capital, some delay the flow of capital.  The 
difference in time is volatility.  The linkages between organizational behavior and capital 
volatility are explained by three interconnecting properties of bureaucracy. 
217 
 
Many definitions of bureaucracy have developed over the years.  It has come to be 
associated with inertia, ineffectiveness, inefficiency, and dehumanization.  Many years ago this 
was not the case.  Bureaucracy was a response to special interests’ power and favoritism.  
Bureaucracy was understood as an administrative approach emphasizing clear lines of authority 
impersonally exercised.  Rule-governed actions executed by competent experts were used to 
ensure consistency in performance and equitable treatment.  Bureaucracy involved defining the 
task, breaking it into each of its parts, and matching skills to what needed to be accomplished. 
This included staffing based on competency, and decision making based on the most efficient, 
most effective options.  In fact, bureaucracy in its basic form is still the organizational skeleton 
preferred by organizations, public and private, all over the world.  
The traditional view of bureaucracy only partially fits the MITAF experience.   As a result 
a more contemporary, complex view of bureaucracy is used to view the activity in MITAF and 
understand capital volatility.  The view of bureaucracy has the properties of: collaboration; 
accountability; and effective, efficient operations that result in positive outcomes for the poor. 
 
 
Bureaucracy of Collaboration:  Provides for and challenges group commitment and 
individual restraint.  Donors work together to invest capital in opportunities.  It requires flexibility 
to accommodate a wide variation in goals.  Effective coordination of the complexity is important.  
Getting work done when no one is in charge is a challenge.  The art of compromise through 
balance of power is important.  MFIs work together to develop capacity and control losses.  The 
TSP works with donors, MFIs, Bank of Sierra Leone, and other resource providers, including 
consultants.  Donors work together to make investment decisions in accordance to the 
collaborative commitment while remaining true to their respective organizational missions. 
Bureaucracy of 
Accountability 
Bureaucracy of 
Collaboration 
Bureaucracy of 
Effectiveness, 
Efficiency, and 
Impact 
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Bureaucracy of Accountability:  The attributes serving and resisting managerial 
oversight, governance, transparency, and various stakeholders at the expense of narrow 
interests.  Often involves both top-down pressure and bottom-up pressure for various 
stakeholders.  For example, disbursements to MFIs are tied to satisfying conditions, which have 
pressure from MITAF to improve financial performance while communities are pressuring for 
increased access to financial resources.  As goals vary so too do the results.  In the process 
accountability becomes less clear. 
Bureaucracy of Effectiveness, Efficiency, and Impact:  Those features designed to 
produce quality outcomes and doing so at the least cost, challenged by those forces pursing 
greater equality and broader, deeper access to financial services.  Pursuing effectiveness, 
efficiency, and responsiveness is difficult when no one is in charge.  Whoever sets the goals 
determines the measurement of performance. 
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APPENDIX D 
NODE SUMMARY REPORT 
Begins on following page 
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Example of axial coding process utilizing NVivo 8 
 
During the axial coding process Query serves to constantly compare code-to-code to view interactions in the capital flow process.  In the 
portion of text viewed below Query extracted all text located in both Collaboration and Donor Tools nodes.  Then View option was selected 
to display stripes for all other nodes where the extracted text was coded.  For the specific text below it is particularly noteworthy that the 
MITAF Legal Identity property node, Information Asymmetry (IA), was also coded.  In axial coding IA was connected with Collaboration.  
This supported Collaboration emerging as an axial code.  Coding at other nodes supports its contribution to conceptually dense theory.  
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Definitions: Sources: Number of different files (e.g., interview, archival document) accessed for this node. 
References:  Number of different text sections created during fragmentation and attributed to this node. 
Words:  Number of words in references. 
Paragraphs:  Number of paragraphs as delineated by line spacing. 
Tree Nodes\Bureaucracy of Collaboration Tree Node 
Description Property:  The characteristic, attribute of Bureaucracy; it defines and gives meaning to 
Bureaucracy (S and C p. 101, 117).  The bureaucracy associated with cooperative efforts 
of separate legal entities, including organizational processes and culture 
3/25/2011 10:25 AM 
8/10/2011 10:15 AM 
Created On 
Modified On 
By 
By 
DAB 
DAB 
Users 
Cases 
 1 
 3 
Duration   Rows Sources References Paragraphs Type Words Region 
 81  15 Document  5,908  151 
 81  15  151  0 Total  5908 
Tree Nodes\Bureaucracy Tree Node 
Description Condition: It is the stage where events arise.  The why events occur.  Looking at process shows how 
(S and C p. 127).  From interviews, the steps and days of communicating and verifying the 
satisfaction of a conditionality 
3/25/2011 10:25 AM 
8/9/2011 5:34 PM 
Created On 
Modified On 
By 
By 
DAB 
DAB 
Users 
Cases 
 1 
 2 
Duration   Rows Sources References Paragraphs Type Words Region 
 17  5 Document  1,814  41 
 17  5  41  0 Total  1814 
Tree Nodes\Bureaucratic Accountability Tree Node 
Description Property:  The characteristic, attribute of Bureaucracy; it defines and gives meaning to Bureaucracy 
(S and C p. 101, 117), Bureaucratic processes that involve monitoring and inspection 
3/25/2011 10:25 AM 
8/10/2011 10:21 AM 
Created On 
Modified On 
By 
By 
DAB 
DAB 
Users 
Cases 
 1 
 3 
Duration   Rows Sources 
15 
15 
References 
81 
81 
Paragraphs 
156 
156 
Type 
Document 
Total 
Words 
6,234 
6,234 
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Region 
 81  15 Document  6,234  156 
 81  15  156  0 Total  6234 
Node Summary Report Page 1 of 11 
Tree Nodes\Capital Disbursement Tree Node 
Description Outcome/consequence:  capital disbursed pursuant to a PBA 
4/1/2011 6:53 AM 
8/10/2011 10:10 AM 
Created On 
Modified On 
By 
By 
DAB 
DAB 
Users 
Cases 
 1 
 2 
Duration   Rows Sources References Paragraphs Type Words Region 
 27  9 Document  1,439  57 
 27  9  57  0 Total  1439 
Tree Nodes\Competition Tree Node 
Description A context/action situation-Among commercial banks and among MFI, and among financial 
intermediaries 
3/25/2011 10:25 AM 
8/10/2011 10:12 AM 
Created On 
Modified On 
By 
By 
DAB 
DAB 
Users 
Cases 
 1 
 1 
Duration   Rows Sources References Paragraphs Type Words Region 
 48  12 Document  3,189  51 
 48  12  51  0 Total  3189 
Tree Nodes\De facto Rejection Tree Node 
Description Property: From funder interview, there appears to be linkage to the time it takes to fulfill a condition 
and the speed with which a disbursement request is processed, disbursement priorities change, it’s 
like a new request.  Conditionalities means never having to say "no" to a funding proposal, 
3/25/2011 10:25 AM 
8/10/2011 10:22 AM 
Created On 
Modified On 
By 
By 
DAB 
DAB 
Users 
Cases 
 1 
 1 
Duration   Rows Sources References Paragraphs Type Words Region 
 14  7 Document  1,284  30 
 14  7  30  0 Total  1284 
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Tree Nodes\Disbursement Variance Tree Node 
Description Consequences/Outcome:  capital not flowing according to the espoused process and/or as expected 
by parties to the dealer 
3/25/2011 10:25 AM 
8/10/2011 10:16 AM 
Created On 
Modified On 
By 
By 
DAB 
DAB 
Users 
Cases 
 1 
 3 
Duration   Rows Sources References Paragraphs Type Words Region 
 92  17 Document  5,748  138 
 92  17  138  0 Total  5748 
Tree Nodes\Donor Tools Tree Node 
Description The Instruments available to the donor 
3/25/2011 10:27 AM 
8/10/2011 10:12 AM 
Created On 
Modified On 
By 
By 
DAB 
DAB 
Users 
Cases 
 1 
 3 
Duration   Rows Sources References Paragraphs Type Words Region 
 38  11 Document  3,454  57 
 38  11  57  0 Total  3454 
Tree Nodes\Dual mission Tree Node 
Description Outcome/Consequence: Blending of social outreach mission and financial sustainability 
3/25/2011 10:26 AM 
8/10/2011 10:09 AM 
Created On 
Modified On 
By 
By 
DAB 
DAB 
Users 
Cases 
 1 
 2 
Duration   Rows Sources References Paragraphs Type Words Region 
 23  11 Document  1,957  36 
 23  11  36  0 Total  1957 
Node Summary Report Page 3 of 11 
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Tree Nodes\Efficient-Effective Bureaucracy Tree Node 
Description Property:  The characteristic, attribute of Bureaucracy; it defines and gives meaning to Bureaucracy 
(S and C p. 101, 117), Bureaucratic processes that increase impact and reduce cost and time. 
3/28/2011 7:46 AM 
8/10/2011 10:15 AM 
Created On 
Modified On 
By 
By 
DAB 
DAB 
Users 
Cases 
 1 
 1 
Duration   Rows Sources References Paragraphs Type Words Region 
 59  10 Document  3,936  114 
 59  10  114  0 Total  3936 
Tree Nodes\Financial Performance Tree Node 
Description Property:  The characteristic, attribute of Dual Mission; it defines and gives meaning to Dual Mission 
(S and C p. 101, 117),   Includes Operational Self Sustainability, Financial Self Sustainability 
3/28/2011 7:27 AM 
8/10/2011 9:25 AM 
Created On 
Modified On 
By 
By 
DAB 
DAB 
Users 
Cases 
 1 
 1 
Duration   Rows Sources References Paragraphs Type Words Region 
 112  11 Document  6,369  119 
 112  11  119  0 Total  6369 
Tree Nodes\Funding Conditionalities Tree Node 
Description Property:  The characteristic, attribute of Disbursement Variance; it defines and gives meaning to 
Disbursement Variance (S and C p. 101, 117).creates variance in how established, results in 
variance due to lack of satisfying.  The establishing of a condition is an action and work in response 
to a condition is an action 
3/25/2011 10:25 AM 
8/10/2011 10:21 AM 
Created On 
Modified On 
By 
By 
DAB 
DAB 
Users 
Cases 
 1 
 3 
Duration   Rows Sources References Paragraphs Type Words Region 
 82  16 Document  7,241  145 
 82  16  145  0 Total  7241 
Node Summary Report Page 4 of 11 
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Tree Nodes\Funds Availability Tree Node 
Description Condition:  intervening, unanticipated...did deal, but took so long priorities change 
3/25/2011 10:55 PM 
8/10/2011 8:20 AM 
Created On 
Modified On 
By 
By 
DAB 
DAB 
Users 
Cases 
 1 
 0 
Duration   Rows Sources References Paragraphs Type Words Region 
 8  5 Document  615  21 
 8  5  21  0 Total  615 
Tree Nodes\Government-Donor Interaction Tree Node 
8/27/2010 1:02 PM 
8/10/2011 9:44 AM 
Created On 
Modified On 
By 
By 
DAB 
DAB 
Users 
Cases 
 1 
 0 
Duration   Rows Sources References Paragraphs Type Words Region 
 14  5 Document  1,411  29 
 14  5  29  0 Total  1411 
Tree Nodes\Government-MITAF Interaction Tree Node 
8/27/2010 2:08 PM 
8/10/2011 9:49 AM 
Created On 
Modified On 
By 
By 
DAB 
DAB 
Users 
Cases 
 1 
 0 
Duration   Rows Sources References Paragraphs Type Words Region 
 21  8 Document  1,628  41 
 21  8  41  0 Total  1628 
Tree Nodes\Information Asymmetry Tree Node 
Description Imbalance information needed for action and decisions 
3/25/2011 10:26 AM 
8/10/2011 9:29 AM 
Created On 
Modified On 
By 
By 
DAB 
DAB 
Users 
Cases 
 1 
 3 
Duration   Rows Sources References Paragraphs Type Words Region 
 59  12 Document  4,307  101 
 59  12  101  0 Total  4307 
Node Summary Report Page 5 of 11 
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Tree Nodes\Institutional Conditions-Context Tree Node 
Description Interviews and Narrative, 09-4Q, factors such as capacity and governance 
3/25/2011 10:25 AM 
8/10/2011 10:06 AM 
Created On 
Modified On 
By 
By 
DAB 
DAB 
Users 
Cases 
 1 
 1 
Duration   Rows Sources References Paragraphs Type Words Region 
 58  13 Document  3,859  95 
 58  13  95  0 Total  3859 
Tree Nodes\Investment Committee-TSP Interaction Tree Node 
8/27/2010 2:11 PM 
8/10/2011 10:15 AM 
Created On 
Modified On 
By 
By 
DAB 
DAB 
Users 
Cases 
 1 
 1 
Duration   Rows Sources References Paragraphs Type Words Region 
 49  13 Document  4,470  103 
 49  13  103  0 Total  4470 
Tree Nodes\MFI business Tree Node 
Description Action/interaction: Things they do or say, strategic or routine, make loans, collect payments, new 
products; non-donor, non-MITAF actions 
4/1/2011 6:28 AM 
8/10/2011 9:48 AM 
Created On 
Modified On 
By 
By 
DAB 
DAB 
Users 
Cases 
 1 
 4 
Duration   Rows Sources References Paragraphs Type Words Region 
 51  10 Document  3,372  70 
 51  10  70  0 Total  3372 
Node Summary Report Page 6 of 11 
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Tree Nodes\MFI Performance Delay Tree Node 
Description Action/Interaction:  MFIs operate in a certain way, due to capacity limitations, market constraints, 
philosophy, that causes delay in satisfying conditions 
3/25/2011 11:04 PM 
8/10/2011 10:22 AM 
Created On 
Modified On 
By 
By 
DAB 
DAB 
Users 
Cases 
 1 
 2 
Duration   Rows Sources References Paragraphs Type Words Region 
 30  13 Document  1,780  40 
 30  13  40  0 Total  1780 
Tree Nodes\MFI-Donor Interaction Tree Node 
8/27/2010 1:45 PM 
8/10/2011 9:43 AM 
Created On 
Modified On 
By 
By 
DAB 
DAB 
Users 
Cases 
 1 
 2 
Duration   Rows Sources References Paragraphs Type Words Region 
 39  13 Document  3,628  92 
 39  13  92  0 Total  3628 
Tree Nodes\MFI-Government Interaction Tree Node 
9/20/2010 3:43 PM 
8/10/2011 9:48 AM 
Created On 
Modified On 
By 
By 
DAB 
DAB 
Users 
Cases 
 1 
 0 
Duration   Rows Sources References Paragraphs Type Words Region 
 12  7 Document  770  21 
 12  7  21  0 Total  770 
Tree Nodes\MFI-MITAF interaction Tree Node 
9/20/2010 3:17 PM 
8/10/2011 10:21 AM 
Created On 
Modified On 
By 
By 
DAB 
DAB 
Users 
Cases 
 1 
 2 
Duration   Rows Sources References Paragraphs Type Words Region 
 41  12 Document  3,974  82 
 41  12  82  0 Total  3974 
Node Summary Report Page 7 of 11 
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Tree Nodes\MITAF Legal Identity Tree Node 
3/28/2011 10:17 AM 
8/10/2011 10:12 AM 
Created On 
Modified On 
By 
By 
DAB 
DAB 
Users 
Cases 
 1 
 0 
Duration   Rows Sources References Paragraphs Type Words Region 
 14  6 Document  1,378  42 
 14  6  42  0 Total  1378 
Tree Nodes\Organization Interaction Tree Node 
Description Action/Interaction:  Things they do or say, strategic or routine. 
3/25/2011 11:21 PM 
8/9/2011 6:42 PM 
Created On 
Modified On 
By 
By 
DAB 
DAB 
Users 
Cases 
 1 
 0 
Duration   Rows Sources References Paragraphs Type Words Region 
 8  4 Document  516  10 
 8  4  10  0 Total  516 
Tree Nodes\PBA delay Tree Node 
Description Action:  actions the delay the PBA's completion beyond its expected time 
4/1/2011 6:51 AM 
8/10/2011 10:17 AM 
Created On 
Modified On 
By 
By 
DAB 
DAB 
Users 
Cases 
 1 
 1 
Duration   Rows Sources References Paragraphs Type Words Region 
 21  8 Document  1,132  39 
 21  8  39  0 Total  1132 
Tree Nodes\Performance Based Agreement Tree Node 
Description Context:  It is what creates the deal, it is the action situation 
3/25/2011 10:27 PM 
8/10/2011 10:22 AM 
Created On 
Modified On 
By 
By 
DAB 
DAB 
Users 
Cases 
 1 
 1 
Duration   Rows Sources References Paragraphs Type Words Region 
 42  9 Document  3,756  108 
 42  9  108  0 Total  3756 
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Tree Nodes\Post-conflict nation Tree Node 
Description The property of the environment, here it also incorporates the fragile state property.  Grouped here 
is also macroeconomic phenomena 
3/28/2011 10:10 AM 
8/10/2011 8:34 AM 
Created On 
Modified On 
By 
By 
DAB 
DAB 
Users 
Cases 
 1 
 2 
Duration   Rows Sources References Paragraphs Type Words Region 
 37  11 Document  2,730  62 
 37  11  62  0 Total  2730 
Tree Nodes\Power G-D Tree Node 
Description Interviews and field notes.  The dominance of one funder in IC meetings, North-South issue of TSP, 
Org autonomy 
3/25/2011 10:27 AM 
3/29/2011 9:18 AM 
Created On 
Modified On 
By 
By 
DAB 
DAB 
Users 
Cases 
 1 
 1 
Duration   Rows Sources References Paragraphs Type Words Region 
 3  2 Document  322  2 
 3  2  2  0 Total  322 
Tree Nodes\Power M-A Tree Node 
Description Relationship interactions between MFIs and apex 
3/25/2011 10:27 AM 
4/27/2011 5:53 AM 
Created On 
Modified On 
By 
By 
DAB 
DAB 
Users 
Cases 
 1 
 3 
Duration   Rows Sources References Paragraphs Type Words Region 
 10  3 Document  1,368  21 
 10  3  21  0 Total  1368 
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Tree Nodes\Power Tree Node 
Description CATEGORY: Interviews and field notes.  The dominance of one funder in IC meetings, North-South 
issue of TSP, Org autonomy, "partner" 
3/25/2011 10:27 AM 
8/10/2011 9:56 AM 
Created On 
Modified On 
By 
By 
DAB 
DAB 
Users 
Cases 
 1 
 0 
Duration   Rows Sources References Paragraphs Type Words Region 
 25  8 Document  2,541  56 
 25  8  56  0 Total  2541 
Tree Nodes\Relationship-INGO-Type Tree Node 
Description Action/interaction:  How donors and/or apex (TSP) viewed or prefer or not prefer a particular MFI or 
type of MFI 
3/25/2011 1:27 PM 
8/10/2011 9:45 AM 
Created On 
Modified On 
By 
By 
DAB 
DAB 
Users 
Cases 
 1 
 1 
Duration   Rows Sources References Paragraphs Type Words Region 
 5  4 Document  879  20 
 5  4  20  0 Total  879 
Tree Nodes\Resource Dependency Tree Node 
Description Because don't have the resources there is not the wherewithal Dependent on handouts to do what 
believes needs to be done 
3/25/2011 10:27 AM 
8/10/2011 10:10 AM 
Created On 
Modified On 
By 
By 
DAB 
DAB 
Users 
Cases 
 1 
 3 
Duration   Rows Sources References Paragraphs Type Words Region 
 48  14 Document  3,536  80 
 48  14  80  0 Total  3536 
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Tree Nodes\Self-Interest Tree Node 
3/31/2011 6:14 AM 
8/10/2011 8:16 AM 
Created On 
Modified On 
By 
By 
DAB 
DAB 
Users 
Cases 
 1 
 1 
Duration   Rows Sources References Paragraphs Type Words Region 
 30  11 Document  2,254  60 
 30  11  60  0 Total  2254 
Tree Nodes\Social Performance Tree Node 
Description Property: The characteristic, attribute of Dual Mission; it defines and gives meaning to Dual Mission 
(S and C p. 101, 117),  Includes outreach, number of loans, average loan 
3/28/2011 7:25 AM 
8/10/2011 10:12 AM 
Created On 
Modified On 
By 
By 
DAB 
DAB 
Users 
Cases 
 1 
 2 
Duration   Rows Sources References Paragraphs Type Words Region 
 90  12 Document  5,858  105 
 90  12  105  0 Total  5858 
Tree Nodes\Voice Tree Node 
Description PROPERTY of Category:  The ability to influence the discussion, opportunities and ways of learning 
(eg branch opening) Interviews and field notes.  Cornwall article on participation. 
3/25/2011 10:27 AM 
8/10/2011 10:08 AM 
Created On 
Modified On 
By 
By 
DAB 
DAB 
Users 
Cases 
 1 
 1 
Duration   Rows Sources References Paragraphs Type Words Region 
 20  7 Document  2,505  31 
 20  7  31  0 Total  2505 
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APPENDIX E 
CRITERIA FOR SELECTIVE CODING 
Strauss and Corbin 1998, p. 147 
1. It must be central; that is, all other major categories can be related to it 
2. It must appear frequently in the data.  This means that within all or almost all cases, there 
are indicators pointing to that concept. 
3. The explanation that evolves by relating the categories is logical and consistent.  There is no 
forcing of data 
4. The name or phrase used to describe the central category should be sufficiently abstract 
that it can be used to do research in other substantive areas, leading to the development of 
a more general theory. 
5. As the concept is refined analytically through integration with other concepts, the theory 
grows in depth and explanatory power. 
6. The concept is able to explain variation as well as the main point made by the data; that is, 
when conditions vary, the explanation still holds, although the way in which a phenomenon 
is expressed might look somewhat different.  One also should be able to explain 
contradictory or alternative cases in terms of that central idea. (Strauss 1987, p. 36) 
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APPENDIX F 
PROGRAMME SUPPORT DOCUMENT 

SIL/03/C01
Government of the Republic of Sierra Leone
United Nations Capital Development Fund
Development of a Sustainable Pro-Poor Financial Sector
in Sierra Leone
(2004 -2009)
Executive Summary
At present the microfinance sector in Sierra Leone is at a nascent stage.  It is estimated that the 
demand for credit for productive purposes ranges between 90,000 and 160,000 customers with 
a combined loan volume ranging from US$ 24.8 to 43.5 million. Although many operators have 
adopted a business like approach and are committed to reach profitability and scale, the present 
supply reaches less than 13,000 customers with a combined loan portfolio of less than US$ 
1,000,000. Experience shows that this gap can only be overcome by building robust and 
professional institutions or bank units that are specialized in providing sustainable financial 
services to the lower segments of the market.   Considerable funding would be needed for 
building capacity and financing an expansion of the customer base. Measures should be taken 
to ensure optimal coordination among stakeholders in order to effectively advance the vision 
and strategy presented in the Government’s microfinance policy.  If government and donors 
combine their efforts, it is feasible that within a period of 5 to 7 years, Sierra Leone could move 
from the start-up to the consolidation phase of building an inclusive financial sector with 
microfinance as an integrated part of the financial system.
 PART I.
A. Situation Analysis1
A.1 Country Context
1. The  population  of  Sierra  Leone  is  estimated  to  be  5.6  million  inhabitants,  with  an 
estimated 935,800 households.  Estimates are that the informal sector accounts for at least two-
thirds of the total labor force, and 70% of the urban labor force.  Of the total population around 
65 percent lives in rural areas.  Ten years of war resulted in a decline in social indicators putting 
Sierra Leone at the bottom of UNDP’s Human Development Index. More than 80 percent of the 
population has an income below the poverty line of $1 per day. 
2. There is, however, renewed hope that enduring peace has returned.  Disarmament was 
completed in January 2002, civil authority has been gradually restored throughout the country, 
Presidential and Parliamentary elections were peacefully held in May 2002, and over 300,000 
internally displaced persons and refugees have returned to their places of origin.   
3. The improved security situation provided through the support of UNAMSIL has facilitated 
the resumption of economic activities.  Real GDP is estimated to have risen by 6.4 percent in 
2001 and by 6.3 percent in 2002.  The rate of inflation has fallen sharply from 37 percent in 
December 1999 to –3.1 percent in 2002.  The exchange rate is relatively stable, and interest 
rates have also declined in line with the fall in inflation.2  
A.2 Microfinance Sector Development in Sierra Leone
Supply of Microfinance
4. The landscape of microfinance operations in Sierra Leone is comparable to other post 
conflict situations.  Present capacity is basic, outreach is still  very limited, while none of the 
operations are yet sustainable.  A shift has been made recently from a relief towards a business 
like orientation with a focus on sustainability.  This shift  was accelerated by the microfinance 
policy recently approved by the Government (see chapter II.B).
5. Of the six commercial  banks in Sierra Leone,  a few expressed interest in lending to 
microfinance institutions provided sufficient security is offered. The Sierra Leone Commercial 
Bank is the only commercial bank that is planning to engage in microfinance by establishing a 
microfinance unit in June 2003.
6.     The two development banks, the National Development Bank (NDB) and the National 
Cooperative Development Bank (NCDB) are engaged in microfinance. NDB had 1,600 active 
borrowers in April 2003 but plans to shift to wholesaling to MFIs after its restructuring process. 
NCDB had 600 active borrowers in April 2003 and plans to transform into a corporate financial 
institution. The Bank of Sierra Leone (BoSL) has established as pilots two community banks 
that provide microfinance, and plans two additional pilots. 
1 See “Microfinance Sector Development in Sierra Leone, An Assessment”, May 2003,  www.uncdf.org/sum for a 
more detailed analysis of country context, supply and demand for microfinance, legal environment, prior assistance, 
government policy, opportunities and constraints, and stages of sector development. 
2 Government of Sierra Leone, National Micro-Finance Policy, November 9, 2002, p.4.
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7. The  Social  Action  and  Poverty  Alleviation  Programme  (SAPA)  is  the  microfinance 
window of National Commission for Social Action (NaCSA), which is a Government programme 
supported by the AfDB and the World Bank. SAPA’s NGO program  provides loans to 50 NGOs 
for the purpose of on-lending to individuals or groups. SAPA has developed strict guidelines that 
include the terms under which the loans can be on-lent. From its inception the NGO program 
lent Le 710 million until April 2003 to microfinance NGOs. 
8. The combined active clients base of Microfinance NGOs and programs is around 15,000 
borrowers with a total loan portfolio outstanding of around US$ 1,000,000.  There are around 50 
to 60 microfinance NGOs, projects and programs in Sierra Leone. Most of these microfinance 
operations are small and institutionally weak with an outreach of less than 200 clients. The MFIs 
at present with the highest outreach include World Hope, ARC, ARD, and PRIMED. They have 
a client base between 400 and 4,000 clients. These institutions and programs would all require 
considerable capacity building and capital support to become sustainable MFIs.  
9. Sierra Leone has two indigenous financial mechanisms that provide access to credit. 
Osusu  or  rotating  savings  and  credit  associations  (ROSCAs),  are  common  throughout  the 
country.   Group members enforce credit  discipline  and may claim any part  of  a  defaulter’s 
assets.  Given the low-income of most members, the amounts mobilized are not sufficient to 
generate  significant  funds.  Moneylenders  are  also  found  throughout  the  country,  with  the 
common terms of borrowing being a 2 for 1 system.  Borrowers often come for emergencies, 
and indebtedness can rapidly build.  Repayment is also strongly enforced.  
Demand for Microfinance
10. Sierra Leone has a thriving informal sector. Many households earn their livelihood by 
running a micro or  small  business.  Most  of  these household  have no or  limited  access  to 
microfinance.    If  one assumes that  12 percent  of  the total  households  could  be an active 
borrower  of  a loan between Le 100,000 (US$ 40) and Le 10 million  (US$ 4,000),  the total 
potential active client base would be 91,000 households with a total active loan portfolio of Le 
62 billion (US$ 24.8 million).  In case 20 percent of the total households would be an active 
borrower  of  a loan between Le 100,000 (US$ 40) and Le 10 million  (US$ 4,000),  the total 
potential active client base would be 160,000 households with a total active loan portfolio of Le 
109.2 billion. (US$ 43.7 million).  Given the present supply and the estimates above, the unmet 
demand comprises 76,000 to 145,000 customers and a financing gap of US$ 20 to 40 million.
Legal Environment
11. Financial sector reforms were a key component of economic reforms between 1992-97, 
including the liberalization of interest rates and elimination of directed credits and credit ceilings. 
The Bank of  Sierra  Leone Act  and the Banking Acts  were  revised in  2000,  and the  Other 
Financial Institutions Act was introduced in 2001.3  
Prior and Ongoing Assistance to the Microfinance Sector
12. Donor funded support to microfinance has been limited to date.  The World Bank and 
African Development Bank (AfDB) supported the microfinance policy process.  AfDB has also, 
through its support to the National Commission for Social Action (NaCSA), supported the SAPA 
programme and, is currently discussing continued support.  The World Bank has made available 
potentially  up  to  $6.5  million  of  additional  support  to  the  sector.   Various  NGO-MFIs  have 
received limited support  from few donors.  There has been no  significant  donor support  to 
microfinance as most donor funding has focused on recovery and resettlement.  
3  Government of Sierra Leone, National Microfinance Policy, November 9, 2002, p.5.
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A.3 Opportunities and Constraints for Development of Microfinance Sector
Opportunities
13. The potential demand is high: the indicative demand estimates  illustrate that there is a 
large gap between the demand and supply of credit for micro and small business activities. 
Entrepreneurial activities are wide spread and microfinance has been an inherent part of the 
Sierra Leone local culture through widespread ROSCA’s and traditional money lenders.
14. Poverty  alleviation,  private  sector  development,  microfinance  and  employment 
generation are high priorities for  the Government.  The Government has recently adopted a 
national  policy  on microfinance.  This  policy  provides  a framework  that  is  conducive  for  the 
development of the microfinance sector and its integration into the commercial financial sector. 
15. The legal and regulatory framework is conducive for a microfinance industry to emerge 
and expand. The Bank of Sierra Leone is supportive of developing an inclusive commercial 
financial  system.   In  a  short  period  around  sixty  players  have  emerged  in  the  field  of 
microfinance.    Although operators are still  small  in size and require additional investments, 
many expressed a strong commitment to manage their  organization as a business with the 
longer term objective to become independent of subsidies.
Constraints
16. At  present,  none  of  the microfinance  operators  are  commercially  viable.  Virtually  all 
operators use product methodologies developed in other countries that are not yet fully adapted 
to the market realities of Sierra Leone. International experience shows that the emergence of 
market  leaders that  demonstrate significant  scale and commercial  viability  is  essential  for  a 
rapid expansion of the microfinance sector. These leaders function as role models for peers by 
having demonstrated that customers at the lower end of the market are bankable. At present 
such leaders have not yet emerged in Sierra Leone.
17. A  major  constraint  is  the  lack  of  funding  needed  by  microfinance  operators  to 
professionalize and expand their operations. Only SAPA and a few other donors provide limited 
funding. Most of these donors have not yet adapted their policies in line with the national policy. 
Most major donors have concentrated their programs on relief, rehabilitation and reintegration. 
Microfinance operators need financing for  expansion,  infrastructure and capacity  building  in 
order to be able to reach sustainability.   “Capacity building of institutions and individuals in the 
sector is by far the most pressing and needed intervention given the developmental stage of the 
sector”4.
18. Numerous actors note that the market was distorted due to grant and subsidized credit 
programs from government and donors. The shift from grants to loans has caused confusion for 
some clients. There is a need to reshift people’s perception from charity to self-reliance.   The 
banking  infrastructure  was  also  destroyed,  causing  the  need  to  reconstruct  safe  deposit 
services.
19. Despite  the  limited  number  of  donors,  the  lack  of  coordination  is  perceived  as  a 
constraint.  Some  donors  do  not  adhere  to  internationally  accepted  best  practices  in 
microfinance by setting interest rate ceilings, providing highly subsidized interest rates and by 
exclusively  targeting  customers with  predefined common characteristics.   The government’s 
microfinance policy is built on the experience that unsustainable microfinance programs distort 
the market and undermine  the emergence of a sustainable microfinance industry. At present 
4 National Policy of the Government of Sierra Leone, page 20
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there is no professional and permanent focal unit for microfinance in the Bank of Sierra Leone to 
ensure inclusive financial sector development, standards and transparency. 
20. As the microfinance sector matures, it is important that regulations are formulated that 
stipulate the prudential and licensing requirements. These regulations would take into account 
the  unique  characteristics  of  microfinance  and  would  allow  further  integration  of  the 
microfinance sector into the commercial and regulated financial sector. 
A.4 Host Country Government Policy and Strategy on Microfinance
21. The Government’s National Recovery Strategy (2002-03) includes microfinance as one 
of the four key areas of intervention for restoration of the economy, given that the ‘country’s 
large informal economy has the potential to absorb huge numbers of the working population.’5 
The  Interim  Poverty  Reduction  Strategy  Paper  (June  2001)  stresses  the  importance  of 
promoting microenterprises, and the extension of microfinance and banking services within the 
context of developing the private sector to stimulate recovery and growth.6  
22. A Government Task Force7 developed a National Microfinance Policy recently approved 
by  Cabinet.   The policy  states  that  the  past  lack  of  guidelines  has  lead  to  a  tendency  of 
‘undermining  good  initiatives  in  the  sector’,  and  acknowledges  that  ‘the  Government  will 
therefore disengage from any direct involvement in the provision of micro-credit’8.   It  is thus 
necessary to clearly define the country’s vision for the sector, and how it could ‘be integrated 
within the mainstream national economy.’  The stated vision behind the policy is:  “To develop 
and integrate  micro-finance into  the  broader  financial  system and facilitate  the provision  of 
viable and sustainable micro-finance services to low income Sierra Leoneans in a transparent 
and accountable manner for meaningful productive activities and thereby contribute to economic 
growth and reduce poverty.”9
23. The  policy  describes  the  following  key  principles’:  1)  Disciplined  management;  2) 
Transparency, with donors, government, clients and public having the right to know status; 3) 
Reporting and accountability,  with regular operational,  financial  and audit  reports; 4) Pricing, 
with MFIs free to set prices reflecting the prevailing market conditions and their internal costs; 5) 
Delinquency control, capability for timely and full loan repayment; 6) Appropriate techniques and 
products, a variety of collateral substitutes and repayment incentives can be used; 7) Gender 
consideration, enabling the participation of women; 8) Governance, sound structures suitable to 
the institutional type, and largely free from government and political interference.
24. The strategies to realize these objectives include: 1) Market oriented financial and credit 
policy  conducive  for  broadening  and deepening of  micro-financial  services for  effective and 
efficient functioning of the financial market; 2) Establishment of a legal framework that promotes 
increased intermediation; 3) Developing national capacity for sound policy review, programme 
design, implementation, management, supervision and monitoring; 4) Coordinating activities in 
the micro-finance sector in order to avoid duplication and over-subscription and enhance fair 
distribution of micro-finance resources available in country.10
5 National Recovery Strategy, Sierra Leone, 2002-2003, p.57.
6 Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, June 2001, p.36.
7  Comprised of members from the Ministry of Development and Economic Planning; Bank of Sierra Leone; Ministry 
of Finance; SAPA; Sierra Leone Commercial Bank; and Association for Rural Development.
8   Government of Sierra Leone, National Microfinance Policy, November 9, 2002, p.10.  Note, the Ministry of 
Finance Budget submitted to Parliament end November 2002 excluded a previous budget line for Government 
micro-credit.
9 Ibid.
10  Government of Sierra Leone, National Microfinance Policy, November 9, 2002,  p.4.
5
A.5 Conclusion
25. At present the microfinance sector in Sierra Leone is at a nascent stage.  It is estimated 
that the demand for credit for productive purposes ranges between 90,000 and 160,000 
customers with a combined loan volume ranging from US$ 24.8 to 43.5 million. Although many 
operators have adopted a business like approach and are committed to reach profitability and 
scale, the present supply reaches less than 13,000 customers with a combined loan portfolio of 
less than US$ 1,000,000. Experience shows that this gap can only be overcome by building 
robust and professional institutions or bank units that are specialized in providing sustainable 
financial services to the lower segments of the market.   Considerable funding would be needed 
for building capacity and financing an expansion of the customer base. Measures should be 
taken to ensure optimal coordination among stakeholders in order to effectively advance the 
vision and strategy presented in the Government’s microfinance policy.  If government and 
donors combine their efforts, it is feasible that within a period of 5 to 7 years, Sierra Leone could 
move from the start-up to the consolidation phase of building an inclusive financial sector with 
microfinance as an integrated part of the financial system.
B. Strategy
B.1 Programme Strategy
26. World leaders have pledged to achieve the Millennium Development  Goals  (MDGs), 
including the overarching goal of cutting absolute poverty by half by 2015.  UNDP coordinates 
global and national efforts to reach these Goals.    
27.   Providing  sustainable  access  to  financial  services  to  poor  and  low-income  people  is 
considered  an  effective  tool  for  poverty  reduction.  Comprehensive  impact  studies  have 
demonstrated  that:  (i)  microfinance  helps  poor  households  meet  basic  needs  and  protect 
against  risks;  (ii)  the use of financial  services by low-income households is associated with 
improvements  in  household  economic  welfare  and  enterprise  stability  or  growth;  (iii)  by 
supporting  women’s  economic  participation,  microfinance  helps  to  empower  women,  thus 
promoting  gender-equity  and  improving  household  well-being;  (iv)  for  almost  all  significant 
impacts, the magnitude of impact is positively related to the length of time that clients have been 
in the program.11  
28. The overarching  goal  of  the  programme is  to  contribute  to  the  achievement  of  the 
Millennium Development Goals, in specific the goal of cutting absolute poverty by half by 2015, 
by increasing sustainable access to financial services for poor and low-income people in Sierra 
Leone. The programme will contribute to this goal by developing a competitive and sustainable 
inclusive  financial  sector  that  provides  access  to financial  services  to poor  and low-income 
people in general and micro and small businesses in particular. 
29. Experience in other countries demonstrates that major constraints need to be addressed 
for the microfinance sector to advance rapidly from the start-up phase into the expansion phase. 
The principal constraint is the absence of professional microfinance institutions that drive the 
development of the microfinance sector. Experience elsewhere has shown that such leaders 
function as role models for peers and the public in general by demonstrating that people and 
enterprises at  the lower  end of  the market  are bankable.  Providing considerable support  to 
professionalize potential market leaders in Sierra Leone is therefore crucial for the microfinance 
sector  to  develop  rapidly.  In  addition,  it  is  considered  important  that  investors  in  the 
microfinance  sector  coordinate  their  efforts  in  order  to  guarantee  a  smooth  and  rapid 
development of the microfinance sector and effective use of public funds. 
11 Clients in Context, The Impacts of Microfinance in Three Countries,   Assessing the Impact of Microenterprise 
Services (AIMS), USAID, January 2002 (www.mip.org).
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30. Secondly, it is essential that an enabling environment is shaped to optimally develop the 
growing  sustainability  and outreach of  the  young  microfinance industry.  For  this  purpose a 
microfinance unit will be established in the Bank of Sierra Leone that will act as a focal point to 
guide the development of an inclusive financial sector. Furthermore, a series of measures will 
be taken to increase general awareness of sound microfinance principles.
31. The Project  will  address  these  issues  by  concentrating  on  four  mutually  reinforcing 
programme outputs  to  support  the  development  of  a  competitive  and  sustainable  inclusive 
financial  sector.  The  first  two  outputs  are  related  to  the  development  of  the  microfinance 
industry  itself  while  outputs  three  and  four  are  related  to  the  development  of  an  enabling 
environment (see Figure 1. Objectives and Outputs)
32. Output 1: Potential leaders of the microfinance industry have reached sustainability and 
have considerably increased their outreach within a competitive environment. The Project will 
support  institutions  that  have the  potential  to  become future market  leaders which  includes 
commercial banks that plan to downscale their operations.  Potential candidates will be selected 
based on an institutional assessment, a realistic business plan and capacity building proposal. 
Proposals need to be approved by the Project Investment Committee. Approved proposals will 
result in a performance-based agreement between  donors and the institution. The size, nature 
and timing of support will be defined in the Agreement. 
33. Output  2:  Strategic  partnerships  are  built  with  other  donors,  equity  investors  and 
commercial  banks  in  joint  support  of  a  sustainable  pro-poor  financial  sector.  A  Project 
Investment Committee will be established to approve capacity building proposals of MFIs and to 
facilitate  donor  investment  in  MFIs  that  are  potential  market  leaders.   The  Project  will  be 
designed to function as an effective and conducive  mechanism for  donors to  channel  their 
investments to MFIs (see part III  for details on management arrangements). The project will 
engage in active mobilization of additional donor funding to further strengthen the microfinance 
sector
34. Output 3: A professional microfinance unit has been established in the Bank of Sierra 
Leone  (BoSL)  to  ensure  an  optimal  enabling  environment  for  the  development  of  the 
microfinance industry and its eventual integration into the financial system. The microfinance 
unit in the Bank of Sierra Leone will function as a permanent focal point for the development of 
a  pro-poor  financial  sector.  The  project  will  support  the  BoSL  in  the  establishment  and 
strengthening of this unit in, among others, the following areas: capacity building of the unit’s 
staff through training and exposure visits to other Central Banks, the establishment of a sector 
data  base,  industry  standards,  transparency  criteria  and  bench  marks,  sector  studies  on 
(potential)  constraints and opportunities,  advice to policy  makers and regulators, information 
dissemination,  development  of  national  capacity  in  support  services  to the  sector  (auditing, 
accounting, legal, IT) and the shaping of regulatory environment conducive for integrating the 
microfinance sector into the financial system.
35. Output  4:  Sound  microfinance  principles  have  been  disseminated  and  are  widely 
accepted and adopted. The Project will  take initiatives to create general awareness of “best 
practices”  in  microfinance  through  training  via  the  UNCDF  microfinance  distance  learning 
training  program,  fellowships  to  renowned  training  institutions,  and  exposure  visits  to  top-
performing  MFIs  in  other  countries.  With  respect  to  this  output,  the  project  will  explore 
opportunities to work closely with  the  Consultative Group to Assist  the Poor (CGAP). CGAP 
promotes adherence to sound microfinance principles and stresses the importance of aiming at 
sustainability and outreach. 
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Figure 1. Objectives and Outputs 
Part II.
A. Results and Resources Framework (See Annex I)
Part III.
A. Management Arrangements: Roles and Responsibilities of Project Parties
36. The Bank of Sierra Leone will be the Government counter part of the project. To support 
the enabling  environment,  the Bank of  Sierra Leone will  establish  a microfinance unit  as a 
permanent  focal  point  for  the  development  of  the  microfinance  sector  (see  Annex  II  for 
details).The Bank of Sierra Leone will make capable staff, premises and budget available for the 
microfinance  unit.  The Bank  of  Sierra  Leone  will  establish  and  lead  a  microfinance  sector 
development working group with representatives of institutions  that are supported by the project 
to  periodically  review  the  policy,  regulatory  and  supervisory  framework  for  microfinance, 
constraints and opportunities that influence the sector and to identify changes needed for the 
sector to develop as an integrated part of the financial system.
37. UNCDF/SUM  will  serve  as  executing  agent  for  its  own  funds,  and  will  act  as  the 
implementing agency for some budget lines of UNDP funds.  Other donors wishing to make use 
of these arrangements would be able to do so, under cost-sharing arrangements.
POVERTY
REDUCTION
COMPETITIVE AND SUSTAINABLE 
PRO-POOR FINANCIAL SECTOR
MICROFINANCE
INDUSTRY
Strategic partnership 
investors
Capacity building 
potential leaders
Microfinance unit 
in BoSL
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38. The  Project  will  establish  an  Investment  Committee  in  line  with  the  Government’s 
Microfinance  Policy  to  coordinate  activities  in  the  micro-finance  sector  in  order  to  avoid 
duplication  and  over-subscription.   Donors  and  private  investors  supporting  microfinance 
institutions will be encouraged to join the Investment Committee, chaired by the Bank of Sierra 
Leone (BoSL) (see Annex 3 for detailed TOR). A Technical Service Provider (TSP) will provide 
tailored, on the ground, technical assistance to selected MFIs and the BoSL.  In order to recruit 
the  best  possible  technical  expertise,  UNCDF/SUM  will  carry  out  international  competitive 
bidding  for  the  Technical  Service  Provider  (see  Annex  4  for  TOR).   Both  individuals  and 
institutions will be encouraged to apply.  If an institution is selected as having the best proposal, 
they will be contracted under a performance-based contract totalling $2 million over the five (5) 
years, and the operational budget lines (BLs: 11, 17:02, 17:03, 20, 32, 45, 52, 53) of the UNDP 
and UNCDF projects will be revised accordingly, compiled into budget line 20 Subcontracts.  If 
an individual is viewed as having the best qualifications to serve as Team Leader, s/he will be 
contracted with the responsibility to hire the other team members, and manage the $2 million 
technical assistance budget.  In either case, the Technical Service Provider will submit annual 
work plans and progress reports to the Investment Committee who will supervise their work.
39. The  investment  committee  will  receive  business  plans  and  funding  proposals  from 
commercial  banks,  MFIs,  and  other  institutions  interested  in  providing  sustainable  financial 
services  to  low-income clients.   Criteria  for  consideration  of  proposals  from MFIs  are  also 
contained in Annex III.    Technical  officers from the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of 
Development  and  Economic  Planning  (MODEP)  shall  sit  as  observers  to  the  Investment 
Committee.    
40. The administration of this Project shall be governed by UNDP rules and procedures as 
defined in the Programming Manual within the policy context defined by the Executive Board. 
This project conforms to the provisions of the Standard Basic Assistance Agreement (SBAA) 
between the Government of the Republic of Sierra Leone and the United Nations Development 
Programme signed by both parties on 27 December  1977.   The host-country implementing 
agencies  shall,  for  the purpose of  the SBAA refer  to  the  Government  co-operating  agency 
described in the Agreement.  
41. The total initial programme cost is U.S.$8.83 million, of which U.S.$ 2,500,000 is to be 
provided by UNDP under the current Country Programme.   UNCDF’s contribution is for $3.0 
million.   Five  percent  of  UNDP and UNCDF’s  funds  constitutes  administrative  costs  of  the 
UNDP or UNCDF, according to budget lines implemented. 
B. Monitoring, Evaluation and Reporting
42. The  Investment  Committee  will  provide  reporting  on  an  annual  basis  to  the 
Government’s Microfinance Coordinating Committee12 (previously the Microfinance Task Force) 
on: 1) Investments made; 2) Results achieved by MFIs based on standard performance and 
financial indicators; 3) Constraints and opportunities for further developing the sector; 4) Policy 
changes needed to remove the constraints or seize opportunities.  Reports will be posted on 
UNCDF/SUM’s website with links to other programme partners upon request.
43. The  Microfinance  Coordinating  Committee,  the  Investment  Committee  and  MFIs 
supported under the programme will meet at least once a year to review progress achieved; and 
actively  discuss  constraints  and  opportunities  to  support  the  development  of  an  inclusive, 
sustainable  financial  sector.13  Recommendations  emerging  from  these  discussions  will  be 
12 See Annex 5 for draft TOR.
13 These Annual Meetings shall serve the purpose of Tri-Partite Reviews for UNDP, and be co-hosted by MODEP, 
and UNDP.
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referred to the respective bodies with the mandate to review and implement, where possible. 
Subsequent annual reviews will examine progress achieved in removing constraints and seizing 
opportunities. 
44. The  programme is  subject  to  independent,  external  mid-term  and  final  evaluations, 
managed by the UNCDF Evaluation Unit, to assess its overall performance, the outputs and 
outcomes produced against its initial targets, the impact it has brought or would likely to bring 
about with a focus on their sustainability, its relevance to the national context, and management 
efficiency.   The  mid-term  evaluation  will  be  forward  looking  offering  lessons  learned  and 
recommendations to improve programme performance or national policy during the remaining 
project period. 
 
MODEP14 Chair-
Microfinance
Coordinating
Committee
BoSL
             Microfinance
            Unit         Reporting
  Chair
       
Technical BoSL Chair-
    Assistance Investment
             Committee
Proposals  Reporting 
TSP
      Technical Service
Provider
       Funding
Technical    Reporting
Assistance
 
  MFIs       MFIs     MFIs MFIs           MFIs       MFIs    MFIs
14  See Annex 6 for draft TOR for MODEP’s microfinance unit. 
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PROJECT RESULTS AND RESOURCES FRAMEWORK* Annex 1a
Intended Outcome as stated in the Country Results Framework: Contribute to the achievement of the Millennium 
Development Goals, including the overarching goal of cutting absolute poverty in half by 2015, by increasing sustainable access 
to financial services for the poor from Sierra Leonean microfinance institutions.  
Outcome indicator as stated in the Country Programme Results and Resources Framework, including baseline and 
target: Enhanced private sector participation through a combined active client base of the microfinance industry of 80,000 micro 
and small businesses in year 5 (baseline 13,000 active clients in year 0).
Applicable Strategic Area of Support (from SRF 2.5) and TTF Service Line (if applicable): Development of a sustainable 
inclusive financial sector
Partnership Strategy: Government,  Donors, Private Sector, MFIs
Project title and number: SIL/03/C01
Intended Outputs Output Targets for (years) Indicative Activities Inputs
1. Potential leaders of the 
microfinance industry have 
reached sustainability and have 
considerably increased their 
outreach to develop a 
competitive, sustainable pro-poor 
financial sector.
1. Increase from baseline in 
number of active clients of 
selected MFIs by:
 - 10,000 active clients by end of 
year one (12 months).
- 40,000 active clients by end of 
year three (36 months).
- 80,000 active clients by end of 
year five (60 months).
2. At least three MFIs have 
become fully self-financing by 
year 5
3. At least three MFIs have 
adopted international standards 
in governance, systems and 
policies by year 5.
4. At least three MFIs have a 
large branch network that covers 
a major part of Sierra Leone by 
year 5.
- Identify and select potential 
future leaders of the microfinance 
sector
- Provide support in developing 
capacity building proposals and 
performance based agreements
- Provide capacity building and 
capital support to selected MFIs 
- Provide/arrange tailor made 
training and expert advice to 
selected MFIs in all areas 
relevant for them to reach 
sustainability like: governance, 
business planning, profit center 
approach, financial management, 
human resource management, 
MIS and MIS software, product 
methodologies, transformation 
etc.
- Organize exposure programs to 
top performing MFIs in other 
countries.
- Technical assistance as per 
annual workplans, grants and 
loans as per MFI agreements and 
project budget.
-  Fellowships and Other Training 
as per project budget
PROJECT RESULTS AND RESOURCES FRAMEWORK* Annex 1b
Intended Outcome as stated in the Country Results Framework: Contribute to the achievement of the Millennium 
Development Goals, including the overarching goal of cutting absolute poverty in half by 2015, by increasing sustainable access 
to financial services for the poor from Sierra Leonean microfinance institutions.  
Outcome indicator as stated in the Country Programme Results and Resources Framework, including baseline and 
target: Enhanced private sector participation through a combined active client base of the microfinance industry of 80,000 micro 
and small businesses in year 5 (baseline 13,000 active clients in year 0).
Applicable Strategic Area of Support (from SRF 2.5) and TTF Service Line (if applicable): Development of a sustainable 
inclusive financial sector
Partnership Strategy: Government,  Donors, Private Sector (Investors, Commercial Banks, Rating Agencies), MFIs
Project title and number: SIL/03/C01
Intended Outputs Output Targets for (years) Indicative Activities Inputs
2. Strategic partnerships are built 
with other donors and private 
sector in joint support of a 
sustainable pro-poor financial 
sector.
. 
- Strategic partnerships that 
enable MFIs access to capital 
(grants, loans [hard and soft] and 
commercial equity) are 
established initially in year 1, then 
expanded.
- Coordination amongst 
donors/investors from year 1 as 
donors/investors utilize 
investment committee framework.
- Resources mobilized for MFIs 
as cost-sharing,  parallel 
financing, or savings mobilization 
(an additional US$ 10 million 
cumulative by year 5)
- Establish Investment 
Committee.
- Develop standardized 
performance agreements, and 
MFI reporting.
- Build partnerships with other 
donors
- Mobilization of resources for 
Project and/or MFIs directly
- Technical assistance as per 
annual workplans and project 
budget.
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PROJECT RESULTS AND RESOURCES FRAMEWORK* Annex 1c
Intended Outcome as stated in the Country Results Framework: Contribute to the achievement of the Millennium 
Development Goals, including the overarching goal of cutting absolute poverty in half by 2015, by increasing sustainable access 
to financial services for the poor from Sierra Leonean microfinance institutions.  
Outcome indicator as stated in the Country Programme Results and Resources Framework, including baseline and 
target: Enhanced private sector participation through a combined active client base of the microfinance industry of 80,000 micro 
and small businesses in year 5 (baseline 13,000 active clients in year 0).
Applicable Strategic Area of Support (from SRF 2.5) and TTF Service Line (if applicable): Development of a sustainable 
inclusive financial sector
Partnership Strategy: Government,  Donors, Private Sector, MFIs
Project title and number: SIL/03/C01
Intended Outputs Output Targets for (years) Indicative Activities Inputs
3. A professional microfinance unit 
in the Bank of Sierra Leone is 
operational and capable of 
ensuring an optimal enabling 
environment for the development 
of the microfinance industry and 
its eventual integration into the 
financial system
- A Microfinance Unit  in BoSL 
established as a professional focal point 
for the development of the microfinance 
industry. - Industry standards developed 
with MFIs including efficient and 
transparent information exchange
- A microfinance sector data base 
developed
- The support infrastructure for the 
sector has improved (audit, credit 
reference bureau)
A conducive regulatory and supervisory 
framework for microfinance has been 
established. This framework stimulates 
integration of the microfinance sector 
into the financial system
- Develop a BoSL microfinance unit 
TOR and staffing 
- Establish a microfinance unit
- Provide/arrange training to unit’s staff 
(f.i.UNCDF Microfinance Distance 
Learning Course, Boulder Microfinance 
Course)
- Organize exposure visits to other 
Central Banks Staff to participate in, 
and exposure programs.
- Support development of industry 
standards through BoSL working group, 
efficient and transparent information 
exchange through Investment 
Committee
- Establish and maintain a microfinance 
sector data base
- Support to BoSL for credit reference. 
-To assist BoSL to review regulatory 
framework. Draft guidelines discussed 
with a Microfinance Working Group lead 
by BoSL. Conduct a seminar on draft 
with relevant stakeholders 
- Technical assistance as per 
annual workplans and project 
budget.
- Fellowships and Other Training 
as per project budget.
- Seminars as per project budget. 
Training to take place in Sierra 
Leone as much as possible.
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PROJECT RESULTS AND RESOURCES FRAMEWORK* Annex 1d
Intended Outcome as stated in the Country Results Framework: Contribute to the achievement of the Millennium 
Development Goals, including the overarching goal of cutting absolute poverty in half by 2015, by increasing sustainable access 
to financial services for the poor and low-income people from Sierra Leonean microfinance institutions.  
Outcome indicator as stated in the Country Programme Results and Resources Framework, including baseline and 
target: Enhanced private sector participation through a combined active client base of the microfinance industry of 80,000 micro 
and small businesses in year 5 (baseline 13,000 active clients in year 0)
Applicable Strategic Area of Support (from SRF 2.5) and TTF Service Line (if applicable): Development of a sustainable 
inclusive financial sector
Partnership Strategy: Government,  Donors, Private Sector, MFIs
Project title and number: SIL/03/C01
Intended Outputs15 Output Targets for (years) Indicative Activities Inputs
4. Sound microfinance principles 
have been disseminated and are 
widely accepted and adopted.
- MODEP NGO-MFI conducive 
registration and monitoring  process 
established
- Government, donors, consultants 
and practitioners have access to and 
utilize best practices in microfinance.
- To assist MODEP to review 
registration and monitoring 
framework for NGO-MFIs.
- Stakeholders  to participate in 
Distance Learning, Boulder 
Microfinance Course, and exposure 
programs.
- UNDP staff to enroll in Distance 
Learning, Boulder, SUM/CGAP and 
participate in exposure programs.
- Dissemination of UNCDF/SUM 
-------Distance Learning guide to 
Government and MFIs.  Negotiate 
----MOU for locally tutored DL 
course. 
Conduct a training programs for 
auditors.  
- Technical assistance as per project 
budget.
- Fellowships and exposure as per 
project budget.
- Other Training as per project 
budget.  Training to take place in 
Sierra Leone as much as possible.
15 The “Intended Outputs” are based on UNDP’s global guidance for the Strategic Results Framework for Microfinance within the Poverty Practice Area.
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Total Budget                   (Initial)                              
Technical assistance: US$ 2,000,000 22.7%
Training fellowship: US$    500,000 5.6%
Miscellaneous: US$    500,000 5.6%
Grant16 funding: US$ 3,000,000 34.1%
Loan  17   funding:                US$ 2,800,000          31.8%  
Total: US$ 8,800,000 100%
16 Use of grants will be in conformity with microfinance best practices as defined in “Micro and Small Enterprise Finance:  Guiding Principles for Selecting and Supporting 
Intermediaries”, Committee of Donor Agencies for Small Enterprise Development, and Donor’s Working Group on Financial Sector Development, October 1995 (page 4) that 
have been adopted by UNDP as policy (see Programming Manual, 6.4.6 Reference Center). Regarding Grants, the Guiding Principles state:  “Appropriate Uses of Grants:  1) 
Institutional development; 2) Capitalization; 3) Operating Losses; and 4) Fixed Assets.”  See the Guiding Principles for details.   The Investment Committee will review and 
adjust its use of grants and loans, as necessary, to any updates that may become available during the course of the Programme.
17 Use of loans will be in conformity with microfinance best practices as defined in “Micro and Small Enterprise Finance:  Guiding Principles for Selecting and Supporting 
Intermediaries”, Committee of Donor Agencies for Small Enterprise Development, and Donor’s Working Group on Financial Sector Development, October 1995 (page 4) that 
have been adopted by UNDP as policy (see Programming Manual, 6.4.6 Reference Center).    Regarding Loans, the Guiding Principles state:  “Appropriate Uses of Loans: 
Donors support through loans is appropriate for lending-based institutions that meet performance standards.  However, loan capital from local and commercial sources should 
be sought as early as possible, even at start-up.   Care should be taken to avoid burdening young institutions with foreign exchange risk in loans denominated in foreign 
currency, unless adequate precautions are taken.  Donors are also advised to be careful not to undermine savings mobilization efforts of savings-based institutions, such as 
savings and credit associations, by making loans available to them below the cost of mobilizing funds locally.”
15
Budget  UNDP Contribution      
Imple-
menting 
Agency
BL Description 2004 2005 2006 2007TOTAL
UNCDF 11SUM Backstopping 25,000 25,000 20,000 20,000 90,000
UNCDF 15
Evaluation 0 0 40,000 0 40,000
UNCDF 16Mission Costs 24,000 24,000 18,000 18,000 84,000
        
UNDP 17National Consultant1 18,000 19,000 20,000 21,000          78,000 
UNCDF 20Subcontracts         72,000         37,000         37,000         37,000         183,000 
        
UNDP 31Fellowships        100,000         75,000         75,000         63,198         313,198 
UNDP 32Other Training 110,000 100,000 75,000 75,000 360,000
UNDP 45Equipment 90,000 0 8,952 0 98,952
UNCDF 52Reporting 8,000 4,000 4,000 4,000 20,000
UNDP 53Sundries 14,000 13,000 13,000 12,000 52,000
UNCDF 93Implementation Fee 6,450 4,500 5,950 3,950 20,850
UNDP 71Micro-Capital Grants        270,000        290,000        310,000        290,000      1,160,000 
  GRAND TOTAL $737,450 $591,500 $626,902 $544,148 $2,500,000 
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Budget  
UNCDF 
Contribution        
  Description 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009TOTAL
UNCDF 11
SUM 
Backstopping
20,000 20,000 20,000 20,000 20,000        7,095 107,095
UNCDF 11Consultant 120,000 153,000 155,000 157,000 160,000       70,000 815,000
UNCDF 11Consultant 70,000 122,000 125,000 54,048  371,048
UNCDF 15
Evaluation             40,000 40,000
UNCDF 16Mission Costs 18,000 18,000 18,000 18,000 18,000       12,000 102,000
UNCDF 17National 
Consultant1
0 0 0 0 22,000 0       22,000 
UNCDF 17National 
Consultant2
0 0 0 0 22,000             -          22,000 
UNCDF 17National 
Consultant3
0 0 0 0 22,000             -          22,000 
UNCDF 20Subcontracts         5,000         5,000         5,000         5,000         5,000         5,000        30,000 
UNCDF 31Fellowships              -                -                -                -                -                -                  -   
UNCDF 32Training 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
UNCDF 45Equipment 5,000 0 0 0 0 0 5,000
UNCDF 52Reporting 5,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 15,000
UNCDF 53Sundries 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 6,000
UNCDF 71Capital      300,000      300,000      300,000      300,000      100,000 0  1,300,000 
UNCDF 93. 
02
Programme 
Support Costs
27,200 31,050 31,300 27,852 18,600 6,855 142,857
  TOTAL $571,200 $652,050 $657,300 $584,900 $390,600    143,950 $3,000,000 
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United Nations 
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Programme Financing
UNCDF: US$3,000,000 
(Including AOS) 
Parallel  Financing: 
∈uro3,000,000 KfW
UNDP 2,500,000
Development Programme
Programme of the Government of the Republic of Sierra Leone
Programme Support Document
UNCDF PROJECT NUMBER: SIL/03/C01
PROJECT TITLE:  Development of a Sustainable Pro-Poor Financial Sector in Sierra 
Leone
Source Of Fund (SOF): TRAC, Government, and others
ESTIMATED START DATE: April 2004
ESTIMATED END DATE:  April 2009
STATEGIC AREAS OF SUPPORT:  Development of 
An Inclusive Sustainable  Financial Sector
MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENT:   UNCDF Execution
UNITED NATIONS IMPLEMENTING AGENCY:   UNCDF/SUM for some UNDP budget lines
Approved on behalf of:
Government: _________________________________ ________________
    Konah C. Koroma                Date
        Development Secretary
BoSL: ___________________________________    ________________
Dr. James Rogers                Date
                    Governor
UNDP ___________________________________    ________________
  Alan Doss        Date
Resident Representative
UNCDF: ___________________________________    ________________
  Normand Lauzon        Date
Executive Secretary
Annex 2
Draft Terms of Reference Microfinance Unit Bank of Sierra Leone
The microfinance unit in the National Bank of Sierra Leone will function as a permanent focal 
point and as coordinator of the development the microfinance sector and its integration into the 
financial system.   The microfinance unit will:
- Support and build consensus on the development of an inclusive financial system;
- Establish a centralized databank on microfinance activities;
- Set standards to ensure transparency;
- Address constraints that hamper the development of an inclusive financial system;
- Draft and monitor policies and regulation in collaboration with major microfinance operators;
- Supervise and monitor regulated microfinance operators;
The Project will support the strengthening this unit in, among others, the following areas: 
--staff capacity building, 
--the establishment of a sector data base, 
--sector studies (constraints and opportunities), 
--advise policy makers and regulators, 
--information dissemination (including translation),
--development of industry standards, transparency criteria, bench marks. 
The project  will  also,  indirectly  support  this  unit  by  developing  national  capacity  in  support 
services to the sector (auditing, accounting, legal, IT). 
The Project will also provide support, in collaboration with the unit, dissemination of information 
on  best  practices,  joint  research  studies  with  local  institutions  (e.g  informal  sector,  small 
business sector etc.), support to microfinance networks, training and exchange visits for key 
stakeholders, workshops and seminars.  To the greatest extent possible, to ensure wide access, 
training will take place in Sierra Leone.
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Annex 3
Terms of Reference: Investment Committee
1. Background
In line with the Government’s Microfinance Policy to ‘Coordinate activities in the micro-finance 
sector  in  order  to  avoid  duplication  and  over-subscription’  donors  and  private  investors 
supporting microfinance institutions will be encouraged to join an Investment Committee.  
2. Composition
The  Bank of Sierra Leone (BoSL) will serve as (non-voting) Chair of the Investment Committee. 
Donor/Investors will  agree to abide by microfinance best practices18 in joining the committee. 
Minimum contribution for Donor/Investors to become a voting member of the committee will 
initially be set at U.S.$1,000,000.  Donors who wish to use the mechanism of the investment 
committee, but not take a voting seat on the committee may do so through the cost-sharing 
mechanisms, as may donors with contributions below $1,000,000.   The International Technical 
Service Provider   will  serve as the Secretariat  of  the Board.     Technical  officers from the 
Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Development and Economic Planning (MODEP) shall sit 
as observers to the Investment  Committee.   Their  role as observers shall  be limited to:  1) 
advising the committee if any potential investment is not in line with government policy, and 2) 
reporting  back  to  their  respective  ministries  on  progress  in  implementing  the  government’s 
policy.  The technical officers will have received training in microfinance. 
3. Rationale
In order to support the development of a competitive, sustainable inclusive financial sector, the 
Investment Committee will provide a framework where donors can:
• Receive business plans and funding proposals;
• Jointly review potential investments;
• Complement relative strengths and weaknesses (provision of only technical assistance, 
grants, loans or equity) in order to tailor investment packages to the institution.  
• Utilize standard reporting and performance based contracts with MFIs;
• Review individual investments within the context of the Government’s policy of building a 
pro-poor, sustainable financial sector;
• Jointly supervise the technical assistance provided to participating MFIs;
• Jointly carry out needed technical  reviews,  evaluations, audits,  field monitoring visits, 
etc. within a commonly (scheduled) agreed time period;
• Jointly  review  progress  in  building  the  enabling  environment  for  sustainable 
microfinance.
This  arrangement  will  also  minimize  transaction  costs  to  MFIs  seeking  funding,  and  the 
Technical Service Provider.  
4. Criteria for Applications from MFIs
18 Best-practices in microfinance are reflected in the “Donor Guidelines for Selecting Financial Intermediaries”, and 
CGAP Focus Notes, Technical Papers and other publications.
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Proposals may be made from start-ups, institutions currently operating in the country, or those 
outside, wishing to start-up operations.  
In  line  with  the Government’s  microfinance policy,  the criteria  for  selecting  investments will 
include the following:
• Disciplined management;
• Transparency,  with  donors,  government,  clients  and public  having  the  right  to  know 
status;
• Reporting and accountability, with regular operational, financial and audit reports;
• Pricing, with MFIs free to set prices reflecting the prevailing market conditions and their 
internal costs;
• Delinquency control, capability for timely and full loan repayment; 
• Appropriate techniques and products, a variety of collateral substitutes and repayment 
incentives can be used;
• Gender consideration, enabling the participation of women; 
• Governance,  sound structures suitable to the institutional  type,  and largely  free from 
government and political interference.
In  order  to  complement  the  assistance  provided  by  SAPA  to  young,  emerging  MFIs,  the 
minimum criteria for consideration by the committee will initially19 include:
• 500 active clients;
• In existence for at least one year;
• Microfinance as the sole focus of its services;
• Financial self-sufficiency as a stated goal within 5-7 years
• Plans for a major but realistic expansion of the client base
In addition to the criteria noted above, those institutions making proposals from outside to enter 
the Sierra Leonean market will provide background on their track record in other countries.  This 
information  will  include  standard  outreach  and  performance,  and  financial  reporting 
disaggregated  by  institution  per  country;  and  also  includes  the  total  funding  received  per 
institution to achieve those results (see Annex 3b).   This information will assist the investment 
committee to make investment decisions on a cost-effective basis, and assess proposed targets 
in light of past achievements.
5. Technical Support for Preparing Business Plans, Proposal Review, and Funding 
Requirement Projections
The Investment Committee will  be responsible for approving the Technical Service Providers 
(TSP)  long-term  and  annual  workplans,  progress  reports,  and  payments  under  the  TSPs 
performance based contract.  UNCDF/SUM will contract the TSP.  The TSP’s responsibilities 
will include (see Annex 4  for full TOR):
• Assist indigenous institutions in preparing business plans;
• Carry out Institutional Appraisals, 
• Provide technical review of funding proposals to Investment Committee;
• Secretariat to the Investment Committee.
• Annually,  prepare  multi-year  projections  estimating  country  demand  and  supply  for 
microfinance services;  including funding needs (loans, grants, TA, equity) of MFIs to 
close this gap.  Prepare analysis of options for Investment Committee consideration to 
catalyze  development  of  the  sector  and  close  the  gap  in  a  reasonable  timeframe. 
19 The Investment Committee will not review applications for start-ups until after its first meeting.
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Based on funding needs, develop strategies to mobilize additional  resources; or limit 
further funding placed under Investment Committee management.
6. Process for Reviewing Investment Proposals
The Investment Committee will meet at least twice a year in Sierra Leone.  Participation shall be 
mandatory for  at  least  one meeting per  year,  while  participation  in  other  meetings  may be 
facilitated  via  telephone/TV-conferences.  Funding  proposals  will  be  circulated  six  weeks  in 
advance of meetings.  The Secretariat (TSP) will prepare and circulate technical analysis of all 
proposals to all Investment Committee members at least four weeks in advance of meetings. 
The Secretariat  (TSP)  will  consult  in  advance with  donors/investors  on potential  interest  in 
funding a proposal. For simplification, the goal will be that not more than three (3) signatories 
per contract with an MFI for a proposal under consideration.  Funds placed by donors under 
UNCDF/SUM management shall be considered as one signatory.
Decisions will be made on a commercial basis, and not be subject to political or disbursement 
pressures.  A funding decision will be taken by consensus. Donor/investors will discuss and vote 
on any  proposal,  with  each voting  member  of  the  Investment  Committee  having  one vote. 
Proposals not approved but receiving one or more ‘yes’ votes, can be revised and resubmitted. 
Proposals that are deemed to be a violation of the Government’s microfinance policy will be so 
advised by the Government chair, and requested not to proceed without amendment.   These 
overall  arrangements  are  intended  to  strengthen  the  implementation  of  the  Government’s 
Microfinance  Policy  by  ensuring  donor  coordination,  and  that  weak  investments  do  not 
undermine the sector.  
7. Harmonization of Performance Based Agreements and Reporting:
Donor/Investors participating in the Investment Committee agree to utilize harmonized: 
1) Performance based agreements, with key indicators (Outreach: number of active clients; 
Portfolio  quality:  PAR  @30  days;  Profitability/Sustainability:  Adjusted  Return  on  Assets 
AROA) for minimum performance standards; and 
2) Reporting  requirements,  using  standard  terms  and  definitions  as  developed  by  the 
Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP).
8. Execution/Implementation Arrangements:
UNCDF/SUM will serve as executing agent for its own funds, and implementing agent for some 
UNDP budget lines.  Other donors are encouraged to cost-share through UNCDF/SUM in order 
to 1) minimize disbursement pressure; 2) harmonize reporting; 3) reduce administrative costs; 
and 4) expedite payments and implementation.   
The project will establish a forex, interest-bearing main account with sub-accounts for each MFI 
or programme component.  The Technical Service Provider and CEO of each MFI supported 
will serve as co-signatories of the respective sub-accounts.  Donor/Investors  will ensure that 
either: 1] investments approved by the Investment Committee can be paid within two (2) weeks 
of approval; or 2] that a certain percentage of committed funds (i.e. concretely committed via 
contracts for specific projects) is kept in the main account.  It will be replenished upon proof that 
the previous tranche has been adequately used.  Donor funds will be expended on a pro-rata 
basis (calculated according to the percentage of funds accepted under management) based on 
the payments approved at each meeting.  Arrangements will be made for external auditing of 
the use of  funds on a yearly  basis  by an independent  auditing  firm who  will  report  to  the 
Investment Committee.
Donors will have the right to cease support to an MFI, programme component or the programme 
if deemed necessary (non-fulfilment of performance criteria, misappropriation of funds).  The 
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decision should be discussed in the Investment Committee, or between the relevant donors in 
the case of  support to a specific MFI.   
If needed, the Investment Committee will review these Terms of Reference to adjust them to 
changing realities and to ensure smooth implementation arrangements.
9. Linkages to Government Policy Review:
The Bank of Sierra Leone will establish a working group on Microfinance Policy and Regulatory 
Framework  that  will  include  a  representative  of  MFIs  that  have  received  funding  via  the 
Investment Committee.  The working group will be lead by the microfinance unit of the BoSL. 
The working group will periodically review the policy, regulatory and supervisory framework for 
microfinance and identify changes needed for the sector to develop as an integrated part of the 
financial system.  The working group will liaise with the Ministry of Development and Economic 
Planning (MODEP) to ensure complementarity with  the NGO registration process for  NGO-
MFIs.   
The Investment  Committee  will  provide  reporting  on  an  annual  basis  to  the  Government’s 
Microfinance Coordinating Committee (previously Microfinance Task Force on: 1) Investments 
made; 2) Results achieved by MFIs based on standard performance and financial indicators; 3) 
Constraints and opportunities for further developing the sector; 4) Policy changes needed to 
remove  the  constraints  or  seize  opportunities.   These  reports  will  be  posted  on  the 
UNCDF/SUM website  with  links to programme partners,  based on request.   UNCDF/SUM’s 
webpage will list donor/investor contributions by value of funds pledged/disbursed (in U.S.$). 
The Microfinance  Coordinating  Committee,  the  Investment  Committee,  and  MFIs  supported 
under the programme will meet at least once a year to review progress achieved; and actively 
discuss constraints and opportunities to support  the development  of a pro-poor,  sustainable 
financial  sector.   Recommendations emerging from these discussions will  be referred to the 
respective  government  bodies  with  the  mandate  to  review and implement,  where  possible. 
Subsequent annual reviews will examine progress achieved in removing constraints and seizing 
opportunities.   The timing of  these meetings  will  be  organized  to  coincide  with  Investment 
Committee meetings when Donor/Investor representatives may be present in the country.
As the sector  matures,  the Investment Committee will  review the need for  continued grant, 
donor subsidy to the sector, and make decisions regarding whether additional funds should be 
placed under its management accordingly.  The Ministry of Development and Planning will be 
advised of this recommendation for its consideration and communication to donors active in or 
considering funding microfinance in Sierra Leone.  Once the sector is fully established on a 
commercial  basis,  the  Government  may wish  to  advise  donors  of  pressing  needs  in  other 
sectors  (health,  education)  that  require  grant  funding  in  order  to  achieve  the  Millennium 
Development Goals. 
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Annex 3:
Information to be included in funding proposals: (continued)
Institution (name and locally registered institutional form):
Mission Statement:
Brief history:
Governance:  Executive Director/CEO, Board or Directors, Names and background:
Organigram:
Ownership Structure:  Current (Percent shares by stakeholder), and if change anticipated, dates 
and process for change
Systems and Manuals:
Audited Income Statements and balance sheets:
Start Date:
Current and Proposed Areas of Operation:
Products and Terms:
Current and Proposed Annual targets over period of requested support:
--Number of active clients:
--PAR @ 30 days:
--Value of Loans Outstanding: 
--Average Loan Size:
--Adjusted return on assets (AROA):
Funding Requested (Grants and Soft-loans):
Proposed Budget allocation (by category and year):
Other Funding Available:
Grants (amount and source):
Commercial Loans (amount and source):
Equity (amount and source):
Annex 3 B:
Information  for  International  MFIs  submitting  funding  proposals  to  include  in  their 
submission:
For all currently active programmes:
Country:
Institution (name and locally registered institutional form):
Start Date:
Number of active clients:
PAR @ 30 days:
Value of Loans Outstanding: 
Average Loan Size:
Adjusted return on assets (AROA):
Grants received (amount and source):
Soft-loans (amount and source):
Commercial Loans (amount and source):
Equity (amount and source):
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Terms of Reference Annex 4
International Technical Service Provider (TSP)
Development of a Sustainable Pro-Poor Financial Sector in Sierra Leone
Background:
At present the microfinance sector in Sierra Leone is at a nascent stage.  It is estimated that the 
demand for credit for productive purposes ranges between 90,000 and 160,000 customers with 
a combined loan volume ranging from US$ 24.8 to 43.5 million. Although many operators have 
adopted a business like approach and are committed to reach profitability and scale, the present 
supply reaches less than 13,000 customers with a combined loan portfolio of less than US$ 
1,000,000. Experience shows that this gap can only be overcome by building robust and 
professional institutions or bank units that are specialized in providing sustainable financial 
services to the lower segments of the market.   Considerable funding would be needed for 
building capacity and financing an expansion of the customer base. Measures should be taken 
to ensure optimal coordination among stakeholders in order to effectively advance the vision 
and strategy presented in the Government’s microfinance policy.  If government and donors 
combine their efforts, it is feasible that within a period of 5 to 7 years, Sierra Leone could move 
from the start-up to the consolidation phase of building an inclusive financial sector with 
microfinance as an integrated part of the financial system.   KfW, UNCDF/SUM and UNDP plan 
to launch an initial U.S.$8.8 million,  programme to support the development of the sector.  Two 
(U.S.$2M) million of this amount would be available to cover costs related to providing technical 
assistance.
Detailed Terms of Reference: 
Expected Results:
Technical Service Providers (TSPs) will have overall responsibility for managing the programme 
of assistance to ensure that the results specified in Programme document are produced. 
These results include: 
• Potential leaders of the microfinance industry have reached sustainability and have 
considerably increased their outreach within a competitive environment.   From a baseline of 
13,000 active clients, increase to 93,000 active clients by end of 2008.
• Strategic partnerships are built with other donors, equity investors and commercial banks in 
joint support of a sustainable inclusive financial sector.
• A professional microfinance unit has been established in the Bank of Sierra Leone (BoSL) to 
ensure an optimal enabling environment for the development of the microfinance industry 
and its eventual integration into the financial system.
• Sound microfinance principles have been disseminated and are widely accepted and 
adopted.
TSPs will accomplish these results through a range of the following activities:
Work Planning and Managing Technical Assistance Team:
1. Develop a  five year and detailed annual workplans for Investment Committee approval. 
The workplan should cover all areas noted below, and clearly define the responsibilities 
of international, national staff and all proposed sub-contracting arrangements;
2. Identify and  select international and national staff, and draft necessary terms of 
reference. The national staff will be an integral partner in the provision of technical 
services;
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MFI identification, appraisal, business plan preparation, and investment proposals: 
3. Identify potential microfinance institutions (MFIs) for investment, based on capacities 
and potential to providing microfinance services in an efficient and financially viable 
manner;
4. Assist MFIs to develop solid business plans that could serve as the basis for programme 
investment, and identify an appropriate blend of grants, loans, equity and technical 
assistance for MFIs to meet performance targets;
5. In the period prior to the first Investment Committee meeting, propose to UNCDF/SUM 
micro-capital  grants ($10,000 to $150,000) for MFIs that the TSP would propose for 
investment, and who need interim funding prior to Investment Committee review and 
approval.
Serve as Secretariat to the Investment Committee:
6. Serve as secretariat to Investment Committee, ensuring all required documentation is 
available to facilitate decision-making, including performance-based agreements with 
MFIs.
7. Liaise with Investment Committee members to determine interest in funding specific 
proposals;
8. Propose subsequent tranches from the Investment Committee for participating 
organizations that meet performance goals;
9. Annually, prepare multi-year projections estimating country demand and supply for 
microfinance services;  including funding needs (loans, grants, technical assistance, 
equity) of MFIs to close this gap.  Prepare analysis of options for  Investment Committee 
consideration to catalyze development of the sector and close the gap in a reasonable 
timeframe.   Based on funding needs, develop strategies to mobilize additional 
resources; or limit further funding placed under Investment Committee management.
Tailored Technical Assistance to MFIs Selected for Investment:
10. Develop and provide, in consultation with each participating organization, a tailored 
training programme, and technical assistance plan; 
11. Ensure MFIs have a MIS that can produce on-time information needed for MFI 
management, as well as meet programme reporting requirements. TSPs are required to 
verify participating MFIs quarterly reports to the Investment Committee.
12. Advise on the strengthening of the board of directors of MFIs, and options for 
institutional form/legal structure; 
13. Organize exchange and exposure visits between participating MFIs  and lead MFIs in 
other countries.
Technical Advice to Bank of Sierra Leone (BoSL):
14. Assess needs and identify in consultation with BoSL staff a knowledge building agenda, 
including  exposure visits to other Central Banks with potential model frameworks for 
regulation and supervision of microfinance. 
15. Serve as a technical advisor to the Bank of Sierra Leone (Central Bank) in developing 
the supervisory and regulatory framework for microfinance.
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16. Carry out studies of potential constraints that could hinder the development of an 
inclusive financial sector, with microfinance as an integral part of the financial system. 
Ensure policy actions required are clearly identified for Government of Sierra Leone 
review and action, as needed.   Monitor implementation of follow-up actions.
17. Support development of supportive infrastructure (audit, credit reference bureau).
Liaison, Dissemination of Best Practices, Reporting and Resource Mobilization:
18. Assist the Ministry of Development and Economic Planning (MODEP) in establishing a 
registration and reporting process for non-regulated NGO-MFIs.
19. Liaise with all donors/investors active in Sierra Leone.
20. Organize general trainings to disseminate information on best-practice microfinance, in 
collaboration with CGAP where possible.
21. Study potential linkages between financial sector institutions.
22. Liaise with SAPA and other actors in microfinance;
23. Prepare Annual Reporting on results achieved for the Government’s Microfinance 
Coordinating Committee and liaise with the Committee on relevant issues.
Programme Administration:
24. Establish a local dollar, interest bearing account with sub-accounts for each MFI 
approved for investment.  Serve as co-signatory to each sub-account.  Advise 
investment committee when replenishment of account is required to meet planned and 
approved expenditures.
25. Facilitate tendering for procurement of goods or services of significant value.
26. Facilitate annual external audit of programme resources by TSP and MFIs, and annual 
audit of MFIs (balance sheets, income statements).
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Annex 5
Draft Terms of Reference Microfinance Coordinating Committee (MCC)
• To guide and oversee further development of the policy and its implementation;
• To ensure that stakeholder’s carryout their roles and responsibilities as outlined in the 
policy;
• To provide technical advice to Government on microfinance;
• To undertake research on microfinance related issues, especially on constraints to the 
sector’s development, in close collaboration with the University of Sierra Leone and 
other agencies or research institutions;
• Annually review progress reports of the Programme for Development of a Sustainable 
Pro-Poor Financial Sector, together with members of programme’s Investment 
Committee, and participating MFIs;
• Identify constraints and seize opportunities to support the development of an inclusive, 
sustainable financial sector.  Recommendations will be referred to the respective bodies 
with the mandate to review and implement;
• Promote transparency of all donor programmes and microfinance institutions. The 
microfinance unit’s of both the Bank of Sierra Leone and MODEP will report to the 
NMCC based on the information received from microfinance providers on a yearly basis. 
The Committee will publicize its findings on a regular basis;
• To perform any other task that may be assigned to the Committee.
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Annex 6
Draft TOR Microfinance Unit within the Ministry of Development and Planning (MODEP):
• To register, monitor and annually review for renewal all NGO MFI’s operating in Sierra 
Leone;
• To ensure  that  all  NGO MFIs operate  in  accordance with  the  National  Microfinance 
Policy;
• To sensitise stakeholders and the nations on the National Microfinance Policy;
• To guide potential MFIs on the operations of the microfinance industry;
• To  mobilize  resources  and  encourage  potential  donors  or  investors  to  join  the 
Government  chaired Investment  Committee of  the Programme for  Development  of  a 
Sustainable Pro-Poor Financial Sector in Sierra Leone;
• To inform the Government on the performance of the microfinance industry;
• To advise the Government on any aspects of the policy that require modification as the 
industry develops;
• To monitor geographical distribution of NGO MFIs, and in collaboration with the Bank of 
Sierra Leone (BoSL), annually map the distribution of financial services in the country;
• To provide NGO MFIs information on application  procedures for  the  Programme for 
Development of a Sustainable Pro-Poor Financial Sector in Sierra Leone;
• To serve as Secretariat to the Microfinance Coordinating Committee (see Annex 5);
• To facilitate the development of capacity required for the further enhancement of the 
industry in both the public and private sector.
30
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APPENDIX G 
INVESTMENT COMMITTEE NOTIFICATION DOCUMENTS (TEMPLATES) 
 
Dear    : 
We are pleased to inform you that the MITAF Investment Committee decided to approve 
your funding request for the amount of     . The term of the grant will be   
and the following conditions apply: 
a. 
b. 
c. 
d. 
 
Please submit a letter of acceptance or rejection to the MITAF office at 9A Wilberforce 
Loop, Freetown or through email to <cfeinberg@esglobal.com>. We thank you for application 
and commitment to poverty reduction in Sierra Leone. 
 
Sincerely, 
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[Name] 
MITAF Chief of Party 
LOAN APPROVAL FORM 
 
I. MFI:        
  Approved 
Conditions: 
i. 
 
ii. 
 
iii. 
 
iv. 
 
v. 
 
vi. 
 
Amount:      Duration:     
 
  Rejected 
 
Reasons: 
 
i. 
 
ii. 
 
iii. 
 
 
Approved By: 
 
 
UNDP:             
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          Date  
 
 
 
UNCDF:             
          Date  
 
 
 
KfW:              
          Date 
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APPENDIX H 
CORDAID MITAF TERMS OF AGREEMENT AND SAMPLE LOAN CONDITIONS 
 
Documents begin on the following page.  

I 
I 
I 
L 
Total Amount Recommended for Approval: 
$200,000 grant to be disbursed in two tranches 
Before the first $100,000 tranche of the grant is released, must complete the following: 
Provide detailed budget of fixed asset purchases and operating costs to be covered by grant. 
Determine specific locations for branch expansion using valid market research data. 
Begin the process of recruiting an Operations Manager, Finance Manager and MIS Manager. 
Before the second $100,000 tranche of the grant is releasedI-1~ust complete the following: 
• Maintain PAR30 at 5% or less. 
Maintain an average loan loss rate at 3% or less. 
Score no higher than 40 points from the MIT AF due diligence exercise. 
• Reach adjusted client growth figures 
Recruit an Operations Manager, Finance Manager, and MIS Manager 
• Report to the MIX Market 
The loan of $350,000 loan to be disbursed in two tranches and loan terms to be negotiated with the donor providing the 
loan funds. 
Before the first $175,000 tranche of the loan is released,- must meet the following conditions: 
Maintain PaR30 at 5% or less. 
Maintain an average loan loss rate at 3% or less 
Provide external audit report for financial year 2008. 
Shareholders must pay at least 50% of their shares. 
Before the second $175,000 tranche of the loan is released, .. must meet the following conditions: 
Maintain PaR30 at 5% or less. 
Maintain an average loan loss rate at 3% or less. 
Increase OSS to 100% or higher. 
Increase FSS to I 00% or higher. 
Reach adjusted client growth figures. 
Be up-to-date with payments of interest installments on the first tranche of the loan. 
• Have recruited an Operations Manager to oversee credit operations. 
• Report to the MIX Market _____________________ _ _____ _j 
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APPENDIX I 
DESCRIPTIVE AND INFERENTIAL STATISTICS 
This investigation aimed to observe numerous capital investment deals in order to 
capture high variety in linkages between organizational behavior and capital volatility.    Capital 
investment deals were viewed in numerous contexts, such as performance based agreements.  
Another view combined the MFI context with the year context to observe a variety in linkages 
between organizational behavior and capital volatility.  The four MFIs with the highest capital 
investment monetary amounts received commitments representing approximately 50% of all 
capital amounts (grants and loans) invested by MITAF, totaling approximately $4.7 million.  
These four MFI institutions represent 25% of institutions that received capital commitments from 
MITAF, and 28% of the capital investment deals.  In contrast, the four MFIs interviewed 
received commitments representing 31.8% of all capital amounts invested by MITAF, but 42.7% 
of all capital investment deals.  This investigation’s focus on observing more deals to capture 
more variety was better served by the interview sample than it would have been by focusing on 
MFIs receiving commitments for the most capital.  Several statistical procedures were 
performed that shape an MFI context linked with a context distinguished by years.  When 
looking at the three years containing most capital investment deals, MFIs that received capital 
commitments in 2006 and 2008 significantly differed in their percentage of all MITAF capital 
investment deals. 
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The statistical analysis focuses on capital investment deals in the context of MFIs, as 
opposed to donor-investors.  The perceptions and beliefs of MFI leaders were captured through 
interviews with organization representatives; however, observing deal activity by year aids 
ascertaining the significance of empirical events.  As such, it is helpful to understand the 
characteristics of capital investment deals in a context of MFIs most experienced with deals.   
Capital investment deals were decided at Investment Committee (IC) meetings, which 
were also intended to be used for disbursement decisions.  The IC typically met twice a year.  
Detailed information was not consistently available for IC meetings, but substantial data was 
available by year.  Below are descriptive statistics and exploratory analysis to provide greater 
insight to the significance of MFIs to understanding capital investment deals. 
 
Table of Capital Investment Types-By Year* 
Percent of All MITAF MFIs 
N=16 (100%) 
INVESTMENT TYPE Pre-
2004 
2004 2005 2006 2008 2009 
Grants and Loans 0 6.3%** 0% 12.5% 37.5% 50% 
Grants and No Loans 31.3% 18.8% 50% 43.8% 25% 0 
Loans, no Grants 0 0 0 0 0 0 
No Loans, No Grants 68.8% 75% 50% 43.8% 37.5% 50% 
*2007 there were no 
capital investment deals 
** Equals one MFI 
      
      
 
The table above provides descriptive statistics on approved deals, by type of capital 
deal, by year.  Given loan eligibility standards for financial performance were higher than for 
grants, MFI loan activity later in MITAF follows reason (2006, 2008, 2009); however, it was 
interesting investment packages did not include loans without grants.  This is further support for 
the cross-connectedness of deals (e.g., grant capital for capacity building, loan capital for 
customer loan funding).  A key objective in MFI capacity building was to develop MFI sector 
leading institutions as models.  MIFs showing the most promise would be expected to receive 
the most deals.  The table below provides descriptive statistics on approved deals (grants and 
loans), by year, and MFI s selected and not selected for interviews.  The years selected for the 
two-way analyses of variance had the highest number of capital investment deals of all the 
years in the MITAF project.  Viewing those capital investments through the MFIs that received 
the capital investment commitments in each year provides insight on their collective experience, 
as reflected in the average percent of all MITAF deals.  
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TABLE OF DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF APPROVED DEALS 
Selected Years and Interviewed/Not-Interviewed Groups 
 
DESCRIPTIVES 2006 2008 2009 Not-
Interviewed 
Interviewed 
No. of MFIs with Approved 
Deals 
9 10 8 12 4 
MFI Average Number of MITAF 
deals* 
6 6 6 4 8 
# Standard Deviation* 3 3 3 2 2 
MFI Average Percent of all 
MITAF deals 
8.18% 7.76% 7.23% 4.81% 10.53% 
% Standard Deviation 3.77 3.85 4.40 3.04 2.65 
*Rounded up to whole deal at .5      
 
The average percent and number for each year is more than the average and number for MFIs 
not selected for interviews. However, the MFI interview sample had more total capital 
investment deals, on average, than MFIs grouped for each of the years. 
A two-way analysis of variance was conducted to investigate percent of total number 
deals differences in capital investments by year (“Yes,” MFI received a capital investment 
commitment; “No,” MFI did not receive a commitment).  The years selected were the three 
highest in number of capital investment deals.  ANOVA results are presented in the table below 
(Years With Most Deals:  Yes/No).  As shown in the table, the interaction between factors was 
not significant.  The results showed a significant main effect for 2006 capital investment deals, 
(F (1, 8) =9.876, p = .014, partial η2=.552), and 2008 capital investment deals (F (1, 8) =11.878, 
p = .009, partial η2=.598).  The effect size indicates that a large proportion of percent variance is 
accounted for by 2006 and 2008 when looking at the three years with the most capital 
investment deals.  Capital investment deals for 2009 did not show a significant mean effect, (F 
(1, 8) =2.04, p = .119, partial η2=.203), nor did any of the interaction effects (see table below).  
When viewing the three years with most capital investment deals in the context of MFIs, 
receiving capital in 2006 and 2008 significantly account for a substantial amount of variance in 
MFIs percent of total number deals. 
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TWO-WAY ANOVA SUMMARY TABLE—YEARS WITH MOST DEALS: YES/NO 
Source Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean 
Square 
F Sig (p) 
α=.05 
Eta 
Squared 
Corrected Model 184.646 7 26.378 5.795 .012 .835 
Intercept 377.700 1 377.700 82.984 .000 .912 
YN2006 44.950 1 44.950 9.876 .014 .552 
YN2008 54.060 1 54.060 11.878 .009 .598 
YN2009 9.287 1 9.287 2.040 .191 .203 
YN2006*YN2008 9.287 1 9.287 2.040 .191 .203 
YN2006*YN2009 6.057 1 6.057 1.331 .282 .143 
YN2008*YN2009 18.467 1 18.467 4.057 .079 .337 
YN2006*YN2008* 
YN2009 
5.757 1 5.757 .985 .293 .137 
 
Another two-way analysis of variance was conducted to investigate percent of total 
number deals differences in types of capital investments by year (loans, grants, both, none).  
The years selected had the most deals.  A correlation matrix was used to assess collinearity, 
which indicated no significant correlations (p > .370).  ANOVA results are presented in the table 
below.  Except for 2008, all main effects and interaction effects were not significant.  The 2008 
main effects (F (2, 4) =7.0, p = .049, partial η2=.778) represent the amount of variance in the 
percent of deals accounted for by types of deals.  The Scheffe post hoc test was conducted to 
determine which types of deals were significantly different.  Results revealed that the deal type 
grants and loans (M=10.30%, µ1/2=9.2%) significantly differed in percent of deals from all other 
types (p<.005).  In addition, it is interesting to note MFIs with grants and no loans (M=3.95%) 
were not significantly different in percentage of deals from those with no loans, no grants 
(M=3.70%), given that the number of MFIs are the same (p=.985). When viewing deals in the 
MFI context, investment type by year did not significantly account for variances, but for 2008. 
  TWO-WAY ANOVA SUMMARY TABLE—TYPES OF DEALS: SELECTED YEARS 
Source Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean 
Square 
F Sig (p) 
α=.05 
Eta Squared 
Corrected Model 206.166 11 18.742 5.034 .066 .933 
Intercept 456.036 1 453.056 121.688 .000 .968 
Yr2006 29.023 2 14.511 3.898 .115 .661 
Yr2008 52.122 2 26.061 7.000 .049 .778 
Yr2009 7.577 1 7.577 2.035 .227 .337 
Yr2006*Yr2008 11.663 3 3.888 1.044 .464 .439 
Yr2006*Yr2009 3.018 1 3.018 .811 .419 .169 
Yr2008*Yr2009 4.829 2 2.414 .649 .570 .245 
Yr2006*Yr2008*Yr2009 .000 0     
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APPENDIX J 
BACKGROUND ON THE GLOBE STUDY 
(text represented mostly verbatim, page numbers from book unless specifically noted otherwise) 
 
Culture, Leadership, and Organizations:  The GLOBE study of 62 societies.  Editors, 
Robert House, Paul Hanges, Mansour Javidan, Peter Dorfman, Vipin Gupta.  Thousand 
Oaks:  Sage Publications: 2004. 
 
Global Leadership and Organizational Effectiveness (GLOBE) Research Program is 
multi-method, multiphase and is designed to conceptualize, operationalize, test, and validate a 
cross-level integrated theory of the relationship among culture and societal, organizational, and 
leadership effectiveness (p. 29). GLOBE measures both cultural practices and values at the 
organizational level of analysis (p. 29).  In GLOBE Leadership is the ability of an individual to 
influence, motivate, and enable others to contribute toward the effectiveness and success of the 
organizations of which they are members (p. 15). Each society studied was found to have a 
unique profile with respect to the culturally endorsed implicit theory of leadership (p. 17).  
GLOBE’s empirically derived construct of leadership Performance Orientation directly relates to 
ambition and challenge.  It reflects the leader’s excellence orientation and constant pursuit of 
improvement….On a 7-point scale, the average is around 6.00, which is very high, reflecting the 
participant’s belief that performance orientation is a highly effective characteristic for leaders (p. 
267).  The finance industry and overall country means score were both 6.02. (p. 268).  
GLOBE was designed to explore the relationship among organizational and societal 
culture, and the content of culturally endorsed implicit leadership theory (CLT) belief systems (p. 
11, 122).  Researchers first specified the general nature of the constructs that they wanted to 
measure before writing any items or developing and GLOBE scales.  They proposed that 
organizational culture, societal culture, and culturally endorsed implicit leadership theory 
are…convergent-emergent constructs.  Convergent because the responses from people within 
organizations are believed to center about a single value usually represented by scale means.  
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Emergent because the properties of these constructs are actually manifested at the aggregate 
level of analysis, that is the organization (p.124). The GLOBE scales were designed to be 
psychometrically sound at the organizational and societal levels of analysis. This means that the 
scales were designed to explain “between-organization” differences or “between-society” 
differences. The scales were not designed to explain “between-individual” differences. The 
reliability of the scales is a joint function of inter-rater agreement and inter-item consistency 
(GLOBE Guidelines, 2006, p. 3). 
There are six global leader behaviors of culturally endorsed implicit theories of 
leadership (p. 11, 14).  Implied leadership theory suggests that these belief systems allow 
individuals to efficiently distinguish leaders from others.  By knowing the content of an 
individual’s leadership belief system, it is believed that one could predict whether that individual 
would perceive another individual as an effective or ineffective leader (p. 670). A major part of 
the GLOBE research program is designed to capture the CLTs of each society studied.  They 
found that…if aggregated to the societal level of analysis,…responses to the leadership 
questionnaire…reflect the culturally endorsed implicit theory of leadership of the societies 
studied (PP. 16, 17).     
The researchers identified 21 primary leader attributes or behaviors that are universally 
viewed as contributors to leadership effectiveness.  Also, they identified 8 primary leader 
attributes or behaviors that are universally viewed as impediments to leader effectiveness.  
Furthermore, 35 specific leader attributes or behaviors are considered to be contributors in 
some cultures…and…impediments in other cultures.  Finally, they identified six global leader 
behaviors (p. 14): 
 Charismatic/Value-Based  
 Team-Oriented 
 Participative 
 Humane-Oriented 
 Autonomous 
 Self-Protective 
In each society, data were collected from at least one of the following industries:  Food 
processing, finance, and telecommunications (p. 248, 249).  The correlation between the overall 
societal practices score for each society and the scores for the participating industries were  
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shown (p. 249).  Performance Orientation perceived practices correlation between the overall 
score and Finance Industry (.97, n=54 nations, p<.01 2-tailed) was the highest of all industry-
overall correlations (Table 12.7, p. 149). 
A more recent genre of leadership theory is the neo-charismatic school of thought, which 
postulates that effective leaders not only combined task-oriented and employees-oriented 
behaviors, but they also show specific skills and mind-set relating to, among other things, 
setting ambitious goals and communicating high expectations of their subordinates.  They 
achieve ambitious goals by building their subordinates’ self-confidence and by intellectually 
challenging them.  GLOBE’s empirically derived construct of leadership Performance 
Orientation directly relates to this notion of ambition and challenge.  It reflects the leader’s 
excellence orientation and constant pursuit of improvement…focuses on the extent to which the 
attribute of excellence orientation is seen to lead effectiveness. ..On a 7-point scale, the 
average is around 6.00, which is very high, reflecting the participant’s belief that performance 
orientation is a highly effective characteristic for leaders (p. 267).   
 
GLOBE Guidelines (2006).  Guidelines for the use of GLOBE Culture and Leadership Scales.  
August 1, 2006. 
http://www.bsos.umd.edu/psyc/hanges/index_files/GLOBE_Culture_and_Leadership_Scales_G
uidelines.pdf.  Accessed December 29, 2009. 
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